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ABSTRACT 
 
Combined Heat and Power and District Heating technology systems (CHP-DH) is a 
network-based infrastructure known to offer a more efficient and more sustainable 
option for meeting society’s energy needs with reduced emission production in the 
face of increasing population and energy demand compared to other forms of 
conventional thermal plants. Specifically, this brings to the fore the potential 
importance of these systems, their rate of penetration and what factors are militating 
against their diffusion. 
The United Kingdom (UK) currently exhibits a low penetration of CHP and particularly 
CHP-DH systems in terms of contribution to both electricity and heat generation profile 
with the adoption of these systems failing to meet their potential over decades. This is 
despite Government commitments to meeting environmental targets for emission 
reduction and 2020 energy targets from renewable energy by introducing several 
governance mechanisms. This failure suggests that these mechanisms have not fully 
captured the potential of CHP-DH systems to achieve these targets. Secondly, it is 
also not clear that the UK has adequately considered heat energy as a critical aspect 
of the energy vector to meet its energy target, based upon the limited governance 
infrastructures to facilitate the efficient generation and distribution of heat.  
This thesis focuses on investigating the inducing and blocking mechanisms that 
influence the diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK using both a technological 
innovation system approach and governance theoretical concepts with a view to 
proposing alternative governance pathways to influence the CHP-DH penetration. 
Qualitative and quantitative methodologies are adopted here. A wide selection of 
stakeholders is consulted to identify barriers and assess potential solutions with a view 
to examining possible strategies for both communities and society at large to harness 
the potential of CHP-DH in meeting energy, environmental and social targets.  
The results suggest several governance options that seek to influence the diffusion of 
CHP-DH systems in the UK. Summarily, it highlights the roles that hierarchies of 
governance (State and Local Authorities) can play in influencing the diffusion of the 
technology, with the state to evolve a joined-up policy portfolio to stimulate investment 
and growth of CHP-DH systems and the LAs as prime movers of the CHP-DH TIS 
taking up “doers and enablers” roles in the penetration of the technology. Thereby 
contributing to the energy policy debate by persuading the hierarchies of governance 
to see CHP-DH systems through the lenses of a network-based infrastructure and 
consider alternative governance mechanisms that may ultimately enhance the 
selection environment of CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Energy systems are continuously the focus of improving efficiency, security and 
reducing carbon emissions. Growth in energy demand is expected to continue, as with 
a recently estimated 30% global increase by 2040 (IEA, 2016). The contribution of 
energy generation to environmental impacts most notably includes the effects of 
emissions on global warming. Heat production contributes to over half of the world’s 
final energy consumption with about three quarters of this consumption met with fossil 
fuels, accounting for one third of the world’s CO2 emissions (IEA, 2014c). While, 
electricity generation accounts for almost 40% of global primary energy and also 
contributes about 40% of global energy related CO2 emission (IEA, 2014d). The 
combined figure for heat and power accounts for almost three quarters of global 
energy related CO2 emission. This underpins the necessity of an efficient integration 
of heat and power generation technology in abating global warming and presents a 
long-term opportunity of curtailing the environmental consequences of rise in energy 
demand.  
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) technology (also known as cogeneration) produces 
electricity and heat simultaneously, allowing the heat to be captured to be used for 
either space heating/cooling, water heating or process heating. Furthermore, CHP 
systems can be fuelled by an array of sources including renewable energy sources 
and low carbon sources to generate both electricity and heat with the opportunity of 
generated heat to be distributed though district heating (DH) networks. DH networks 
are also able to receive heat from various heat sources including CHPs and other 
renewable energy sources of heat (RES-H) technologies. A recent report by IEA 
(2014a) suggest that 79% of the total DH in OECD countries in 2012 is produced from 
CHPs indicating the interdependence of CHPs and DH technologies. Therefore, the 
interconnection or integration of CHP and DH technologies to achieve a mutual goal 
of generation and distribution of energy vectors is further referred to in this research 
work as a CHP-DH system. This suggests that CHP-DH systems are network-based 
infrastructures that produce and distribute public goods/service which have their 
peculiarities. Such as incremental transition, path dependency, asset specificity, 
requires huge investment cost, and precipitates sunk cost that ultimately would have 
political, economic, social and environmental implications on the fabric of the society. 
Several studies have shown that the use of an integrated energy system like CHP-DH 
to simultaneously generate electricity and heat can contribute to higher efficiency and 
emission reduction of energy production compared to generating electricity and heat 
separately (Torchio et al., 2009, Genon et al., 2009, Connolly et al., 2014, Rezaie and 
Rosen, 2012, Haghifam and Manbachi, 2011). Other benefits of CHP-DH system may 
include economics by reducing energy bills (Shahnaz, 2013), or socially by 
contributing to mitigating fuel poverty (Hawkey et al., 2013). However, in spite of these 
benefits only about 9% of the worlds electricity demand is met from CHP with only 
about 12% of Europe’s total heat demand is provided by DH (IEA, 2014a). Considering 
that the EU accounts for one fifth of the worlds energy use with 80% of its GHG 
emission emanating from energy use (EU, 2011c). It is suggested that there is a 
considerable potential for the deployment of CHP-DH systems in the EU in abating 
emissions and improving energy efficiency.  
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Consequently, the EU has adopted a strategy for a competitive, sustainable and 
secure energy system by 2020. This entails a target for 20% GHG emission reduction 
by 2020 compared to 1990 base levels, increase of energy consumption from 
renewable energy sources by 20% and a 20% increase in energy efficiency through 
various action plans (Fabrizio, 2013). This strategy also considers the deployment of 
CHP-DH systems as part of the key solutions to improve its energy efficiency and 
sustainable energy goals going forward (EU, 2011c). 
Subject to the EU 2020 mandate and subsequent European legislation agreed by 
member states, the UK is currently legally obligated to achieve a target of 15% of its 
energy from RE by 2020 through three broad scenarios. These includes 30% of 
electricity demand, 12% of heat demand and 10% of transport demand from 
renewable energy sources through several energy efficient technologies. Such as 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) and District Heating (DH) Technologies (DECC, 
2009). UK Government data suggests that CHP-DH systems have the potential to half 
emissions from heating and cooling relative to other technologies with a greater 
potential to reduce further emissions using RES-H on the network (DECC, 2013a). 
Consequently the UK Government has predicted that DH schemes fuelled by CHPs 
will play a key role in its heat decarbonisation route to 2050 given that about 72% of 
existing DH schemes are fuelled by CHPs (DECC, 2013a). This may have informed 
the Government’s suggestion that between 14% and 43% of the UK’s heat demand 
can be provided by efficient heat networks in order to meet the 2050 carbon objectives 
cost efficiently (DECC, 2016a). Suggesting the potential role of CHP-DH systems 
might play as part of the solution portfolio to meeting UK’s energy goal of energy 
security, affordability and sustainability (BIS/DECC, 2009, DECC, 2013a, DECC, 
2014, Kelly and Pollitt, 2010, Ricardo-AEA, 2013, Ricardo-E&E, 2015, Ricardo-AEA, 
2014, Toke and Fragaki, 2008, Pöyry, 2009). 
However, despite the numerous benefits, technological maturity and potential role 
CHP-DH systems can play in meeting the UK energy target, available information 
indicates that CHP contribution to electricity generation has never moved above 8% 
(in 1953) with lows of 3% in both 1983 and 1988 (DECC, 2013b). The latest figures 
indicate 5.9% of UK electricity came from CHP in 2015 (DBEIS, 2016a). The 
Government also estimates that DH delivers about 2% of the UK’s total heat 
consumption (DECC, 2013a). 
The first time an attempt was made to evaluate the national potential of DH systems 
in the UK was in the 1970s (Russell, 2010) through the Marshall report. The report 
summarised that without strong government initiatives DH systems would not develop 
to a significant level (Marshall, 1977). A more recent study, led by Pöyry (2009) for the 
Government, also suggest that without significant changes to the prevailing energy 
institutional infrastructures, the potential of DH networks to substantially contribute to 
national heat demand would not occur. The 2009 study is likely to remain relevant 
today since not much has changed in terms of market and regulatory conditions 
impacting positively on the CHP-DH industry. The low penetration of CHP-DH systems 
in the UK and the conclusions of the Pöyry work suggest that Government intervention 
is required to influence the rate and direction of CHP-DH diffusion, and the pathways 
of Government’s intervention to facilitate the diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK 
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are the focus of this research. The overall research objective is to examine the reasons 
for the low penetration of CHP-DH systems through three broad based questions and, 
building on the conclusions drawn for this point, to develop recommendations for 
alternative governance routes to improve its penetration. 
The aims are: firstly, to investigate the dominant governance structures that permeate 
the UK CHP-DH landscape and the underlying characteristics such as economic and 
management models, with a view to improve the impacts of these models on the 
technology diffusion and also unveiling the dominant risks that militates against the 
development of the system from CHP-DH actor’s perspective. Secondly, building on 
the understanding of the prevailing characteristics and risk profile with the underlying 
barriers that feed these risks. The research seeks to pose alternative governance 
pathways to reduce or eliminate these barriers. Alternative roles of local authorities 
(LAs) as governance hierarchies in the UK were also explored to address these 
barriers given the potential roles they can play to promote social, economic and 
environmental wellbeing of their community and being CHP-DH champions globally 
(UNEP, 2015). Thirdly the research shall explore the impact of the current governance 
instruments that exist in the UK electricity and heat sectors in influencing the diffusion 
of CHP-DH systems with a view to propose more impactful instruments.  
Therefore, the underlying driver of this research is to contribute to the UK energy policy 
debate by firstly, exploring TIS and governance theoretical concepts as the analytical 
tools to empirically offer alternative governance routes that may influence the diffusion 
of CHP-DH systems in the UK to stimulate the nursing market. Secondly, to 
contribution to the debate of policy makers to recognise CHP-DH systems through the 
lenses of a network-based infrastructure that would require governance intervention if 
energy and environmental targets are to be met at a reasonable cost. 
1.2 Research Structure 
 
This research is in seven major parts, as depicted in Figure 1. This shows that the 
research begins with a discussion on the technological and theoretical concepts that 
form the knowledge tool set used for the research investigation and as such will be the 
focus throughout this research. The output of the technological and theoretical 
discussion will lay the foundation upon which subsequent narration and analysis will 
be based upon in the following chapters. 
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Figure 1: Schematic of research structure 
Chapter 2 introduces CHP-DH technology by discussing the connection between CHP 
and DH systems to unveil the interdependence of both systems and principles of 
operation. This chapter seeks to capture the performance of CHP-DH systems in the 
UK and the various significant barriers that have impacted the diffusion of the 
technology in the UK. Chapter 3 presents the concept of infrastructure and its 
connection to socio-technical system theories, before narrowing it to the two 
theoretical concepts that the research is based upon.  Firstly, Innovation Systems (IS) 
theory, which seeks to link innovation to economic growth using an evolutionary 
approach (Nelson et al, 1982). It suggests that with the entrance of a new product or 
a new process for an existing product, economic growth can occur (Edquist, 1999) 
such as new innovative or new ways to govern CHP-DH systems for economic 
development.  
IS theory delineates systems into several areas depending on the focus of interest and 
the focus of this research is based upon CHP-DH technology penetration within the 
UK, which the IS theory considers as Technological Innovation Systems (TIS). 
Therefore the TIS concept was adopted and it is bound around the dynamic network 
of agents interacting in a specific economic/industrial area under a particular 
institutional infrastructure to influence the generation, diffusion, and utilization of a 
technology (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991). TIS captures both vertical and 
horizontal agents that may influence the penetration of the technology (Breschi and 
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Malerba, 2005 pg:131) and its selection environment. The second theoretical concept 
adopted is the governance concept by considering the framework of governance 
around CHP-DH systems in the UK. The governance concept can be largely defined 
as the interaction and coordination amongst multifarious actors to achieve a collective 
goal. Governance emerges through four key iterations including: processes, structures 
mechanisms and strategies (Risse, 2012 pg: 700, Börzel and Risse, 2010, Levi-Faur, 
2012 pg: 8). Governance was preferred over policy because the concept of 
governance stresses the importance of coordination to achieve sustainable 
innovations which requires social initiatives that are usually outside the remit of 
conventional policy instruments which often emphasises on top-down approach 
(Hillman et al., 2011). Therefore, the research analysis draws upon TIS and 
governance concepts with a view to integrating these two theoretical concepts to 
provide answers to the research questions and offer possible pathways to influence 
the diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK.  
In the concept of system of innovation, systems are not optimal partly because each 
system is unique and continuously changing; therefore to ascertain if systems of 
innovation are performing well or not, it is imperative to focus on comparing the 
differences between systems rather than adaptation (Edquist, 2005 pg:20). 
Furthermore technological systems are locked into national systems, such that levels 
of technological penetration are bound to vary between countries as a reflection of 
demand structures, institutions and incentives (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991). 
Consequently, chapter 4 focuses on the underlying governance mechanisms that 
define the Netherlands and Norway CHP-DH systems as some of the best practice 
governance approaches to CHP-DH systems in Europe with similar market conditions 
with the UK. Such as huge gas reserve and market competition. This is with a view to 
benchmarking the benefits of the various governance interventions adopted in these 
countries. 
The fifth chapter discusses the various governance mechanisms from both the EU and 
UK that permeate the UK electricity and heat sectors, and which may influence future 
diffusion of CHP-DH systems. This chapter also discusses the context of the prevailing 
engagement of Local Authorities (LA) in the governance of CHP-DH systems in the 
UK and the governance structures adopted. Chapter 6 captures the research 
methodological framework and strategies adopted which involves both quantitative 
and qualitative approaches. This chapter also outlines the research questions in detail. 
While chapter seven is the output of the statistical studies derived from the quantitative 
method through questionnaires.  
The discussion on the research questions was embarked upon in chapters 8, 9 and 
10, while chapter 11 is the concluding chapter which captures mapping of the TIS 
function with its strength and weaknesses as derived from the research and proposed 
possible contributions to the TIS theoretical concept and recommendations. 
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2.0 Overview of Combined Heat and Power (CHP) and District 
Heating (DH) 
2.1 Principles of CHP-DH 
2.1.1 Combined Heat and Power (CHP) 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP – sometimes known as cogeneration) technology is 
the simultaneous production electricity and heat, with the possibility of the heat being 
used for either space heating/cooling, water heating or process heating. CHPs are 
known to achieve higher efficiencies to as high as 90% compared to conventional 
plants which generate power and heat separately at a much lower efficiency of 
between 30%-37% with combined cycle gas plants having efficiencies of about 50%-
60% (IET, 2008, Haghifam and Manbachi, 2011). In part because the heat wasted 
from conventional plants may reach as high as 40% or above, but CHPs utilises the 
wasted heat from the generation process for other purposes. Suggesting that it has 
the potential to exhibit economic and environmental benefits (Shahnaz, 2013) and 
therefore may be relevant as part of the government energy portfolio to meet its energy 
targets. 
Figure 2 depicts a schematic diagram of the level of fuel efficiency that obtains when 
generating electricity and heat separately and when generating both forms of energy 
simultaneously. 
 
Figure 2: Schematic diagram of separate and simultaneous generation of Electricity 
and Heat    
Source: DECC (2015n) 
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CHP technology is a combination of three major components which work together to 
create electrical and thermal energy simultaneously. The components are the prime 
mover, a generator and a heat exchanger/recovery system. If a cooling effect is 
required then a fourth component, absorption chillers, might also be required and the 
addition of this component allows for trigeneration. 
Figure 3 below describes in a schematic structure of the overall principle of a 
cogeneration system, while Figure 4 depicts that of trigeneration system. 
             
Figure 3: Principle of co-generation 
Source:  (COGEN Europe, 2013)  
Prime movers are devices that convert energy released from fuel into mechanical 
energy such as shaft power to rotate an electrical generator (steam turbines, gas 
turbines) or through electrochemical process to convert energy to electricity (Fuel cell 
– Solid Oxide). Generators are devices that convert mechanical energy to electrical 
energy while the heat recovery systems converts’ heat/thermal energy to mechanical 
energy or work through a thermodynamic process. Heat recovery systems are 
generally in two classes: topping-cycle or bottoming-cycle systems, depending on the 
flow of the energy being used. 
If the primary purpose of the energy in the fuel is to generate electricity, this process 
is known as the topping-cycle system. In this system, the waste heat is captured 
then used for heating or cooling applications, such as, district heating, industrial 
processes or district cooling (Noordermeer, 2000). Typical examples of topping-cycle 
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systems are steam turbines, gas turbines, reciprocating engines, micro turbines and 
fuel cells for industrial applications. However, on the contrary, if the primary purpose 
of the fuel energy is to provide process heat first, this is known as a bottoming-cycle 
system, which is often used for industrial purposes such as metal smelting and glass. 
In this process the wasted heat is captured and used to drive turbines to produce to 
electricity. It is noteworthy, that it is also possible that both systems can be integrated 
to have a system that produces electricity by two separate generators, such as a gas 
turbine topping cycle and the other part, a steam turbine bottom-cycle system. This 
process is commonly referred to as combined cycle CHP. 
2.1.1.1  Prime movers 
Prime movers are broadly characterized into four groups namely: Steam engine, Gas 
engine, Reciprocating engine and Fuel cell. They differ in many ways, such as fuel 
type, capacity range, start – up time, electrical efficiency and many more, but the 
process of generating electricity and capturing of heat for further application is more 
defining. Further description of the various prime movers that are applicable to CHP 
systems is under-taken below:  
2.1.1.1.1 Steam Turbines 
These are turbines (rotating machinery) that don’t burn fuel directly or convert fuel 
directly to electrical energy but require high pressure steam produced in a boiler or a 
heat recovery steam generator, which is commonly referred to as the Rankine cycle 
(CRES and ZREU, 1999). They are about the most versatile and oldest of all the 
technologies used to drive a generator or machinery. They are a mature technology 
used in various applications. Such as CHP, DH and Cooling, combined cycle power 
plants and mechanical drives (Darrow et al., 2015). Its strength is the ability to operate 
at high steam pressures and maximises efficient steam utilization (Onsitesycom, 
1999). They can be deployed in topping-cycle, bottoming-cycle and combined cycle 
systems. Steam turbines for CHP applications are divided into (2) two major 
categories: Non-condensing (also referred to as back pressure) steam turbines and 
extraction steam turbines. (Darrow et al., 2015). Both systems work effectively in a 
CHP application, depending on the quality of heat required, quantity of power and heat 
required, and economic considerations. They also offer flexibility to various demand 
criteria such as low grade hot water, low-pressure steam or medium-pressure steam, 
but particularly deployed where the heat required is more than the power required and 
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are not designed to burn fuel directly but rely on boilers or steam generating equipment 
like Heat Recovery Steam Generator (HRSG) to deliver the required amount of high 
pressure steam (Carbon Trust, 2010). Therefore, steam turbines in CHP applications 
typically have low electrical efficiency between 5 to 40+%, but with an overall CHP 
efficiency that is close to 80% (Darrow et al., 2017). 
Non-condensing (back pressure) steam turbines discharge the entire flow of steam at 
one or more locations that is appropriate for downstream process equipment. Such as 
process applications or feed in for lower pressure steam turbine. While, when the 
casing has one or more openings for extraction of some of the steam to be used for 
feedwater heating or process heating in CHPs at an intermediate pressure, it is known 
as extraction steam turbine (Darrow et al., 2015).  
Steam turbines have the attribute of meeting more than one heat site requirement 
(Darrow et al., 2017) and the application of steam turbines in CHP are durable, highly 
reliable and are better suited for medium and large-scale industrial CHP application 
with a range from a few MWe to over 100MWe (Carbon Trust, 2010, Darrow et al., 
2017). They also have the ability to use a variety of fuel options. Such as coal, nuclear, 
biomass, various solid waste and by products, such as wood chips, tire-derived fuel, 
refuse- derived fuel, municipal solid waste, residual oil or refinery gas (Oland, 2004, 
Onsitesycom, 1999). 
However, steam engines have a slow start up, low power to heat ratio and requires a 
boiler or HRSG to start operation (Darrow et al., 2017). 
2.1.1.1.2 Gas Turbine 
Gas turbines also known as combustion turbines are used as prime movers for 
generation of electricity and heat in both topping-cycle and combined-cycle systems. 
The turbine produces electricity, whilst the useful heat from the turbine exhaust flow is 
being captured through a heat recovery system. The common components in a gas 
turbine CHP are air compressor, combustion chamber, heat recovery system, turbine 
and generator. Gas turbine commonly operates with Brayton cycle principle, which is 
when there is an intake of atmospheric air as the working fluid from the environment 
by the compressor only once and forced into the combustion chamber where it ignites 
the fuel for combustion occur (CRES and ZREU, 1999). The energy released from the 
fuel during the high temperature combustion process drives the turbine. This system 
can effectively use the rejected waste heat or thermal energy from gas turbines by 
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recovering the continuous stream of high-temperature exhaust gases and reuse it for 
process applications to achieve a higher system efficiency of over 70% (Darrow et al., 
2017). These recovered heat/gases are used to produce steam or increase the 
temperature of the boiler feed water, or directly heating other process applications 
(Oland, 2004).  The common fuels for gas turbine are natural gas, synthetic gas, landfill 
gas, and fuel oils (Darrow et al., 2017). 
Two basic types of gas turbines are being applied in CHP; aero-derivative gas turbines 
adapted from air craft engines and the industrial or frame gas turbines. The application 
of both systems in CHP are mainly because of the advantages of the ability to switch 
fuel, low maintenance cost, low initial cost, high availability, high quality heat and high 
efficiency in large sizes. Therefore, recent developments of gas turbines are targeted 
at CHP applications with a view to generate electricity and heat simultaneously from 
a low emission natural gas fuel at a higher efficiency (CRES and ZREU, 1999). 
Aero-derivative type of gas turbine are typically more expensive than the frame type 
but are lighter, thermally more efficient, capable of faster start up and rapid response 
to changing load with ranges up to 40MW. While the frame types are of higher ranges, 
of more than 200MW, heavier and better suited for continuous base load operation 
with longer inspection and maintenance interval (Oland, 2004). 
Gas turbines usually have higher electrical efficiency than steam turbines because 
they operate at higher temperatures and are often designed to operate on cleaner 
gaseous fuel such as natural gas fuel with usually a stored liquid fuel as a backup 
(Carbon Trust, 2010). One of the major devices that help to improve the efficiency in 
a gas turbine is the integration of a heat exchanger into the process, though It also 
has design challenges as ambient temperature rises and poor efficiency at low 
loadings (Darrow et al., 2017). They are also expensive, and their cost can normally 
be justified when a relatively low-cost fuel is being used and the gas turbine has high 
operating full load hours/year. 
The prices of gas turbine CHP applications vary a great deal because of sites, sizes 
and economy of scale with ability to be scaled up compared to steam turbines. Gas 
turbines have emissions such as NOx, CO, SOx, and volatile organic compounds, but 
abatement methodologies have been provided to reduce these emissions such as the 
use of Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) or catalytic combustion for NOx or carbon 
control and scrubbers for reduction of sulphur. While electrostatics precipitators and 
bag houses are deployed in reducing particulate matter (Darrow et al., 2017). 
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In summary gas turbines offer operational flexibility as they can satisfy both base load 
and follow load demands. While the heat recovered from the exhaust gas can be used 
to generate steam or hot water for DH, cooling or drying applications as demand 
requires. They also offer the capability of using the shaft power delivered by the turbine 
to drive a mechanical chiller compressor pump or other types of rotating machinery. 
Gas turbines are commonly operated in two cycle configurations. Namely: single cycle 
gas turbines or combined cycle gas turbines. 
The single cycle gas turbines are when the compressor and turbine are on the same 
shaft, often known as single shaft machines and they are commonly used on lower 
capacity applications, such as less than 25MW (CRES and ZREU, 1999). Whilst the 
combined cycle gas turbine is a combination of the steam and traditional gas turbine 
systems. In the combined cycle system, the exhaust heat from the gas turbine is 
recovered by passing it through a heat recovery steam generator (HRSG) making it a 
fuel to the steam turbine in a bid to improve the overall efficiency. The combination of 
the electrical production of the gas turbines through high input temperature and the 
low output temperature from steam cycle for heat usage, makes it an ideal description 
of CHP device. The latter (combined cycle) have more flexibility and reliability because 
of its ability to generate electrical energy and high temperature heat from more than 
one source, but its drawback is a higher cost than the simple cycle. Furthermore, 
simple cycle is much simpler to operate, smaller carbon footprint and lower start-up 
cost. Combine cycle gas turbine is a mature technology that has built in abatement 
facility for NOx, sulphur and particulate matter emissions with applications often from 
25MW and above (CRES and ZREU, 1999). CHP applications gain from the 
opportunities of a wide range of heat to power ratio provided by the integration of gas 
turbine with the supplementary firing from steam cycles in a combined cycle system. 
Gas turbines are deployed in scales depending on power requirement. A common 
nomenclature that is a departure in size from the conventional gas turbine is the micro 
turbine. The underlying difference is often the capacity range, size, lower emissions 
and fewer moving parts in the micro turbines compared to conventional gas turbine 
plants. The common fuels used in a micro turbine are natural gas, sour gas and liquid 
fuels (Darrow et al., 2017). The micro turbines are of smaller capacities, compact and 
are usually packaged with a microprocessor and a turbine, often from 30kWe and over 
300kWe (Oland, 2004). The micro turbines can be deployed in office blocks, factories, 
or in a distributed generation application due to its flexibility in connection methods. 
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However, micro turbines have a higher unit capital cost, relatively lower electrical 
efficiency and they are limited to low temperature applications (Darrow et al., 2017). 
2.1.1.1.3 Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines 
Reciprocating engines (or Piston engines) are generally driven by pistons inside 
cylinders through the conversion of pressure to a rotating motion. There may be more 
than one piston inside a cylinder with which a variety of fuel, such as gas, diesel can 
be introduced under pressure and the fuel mixture (air + fuel) is ignited by a spark 
ignition or heat compression to cause a combustion (thereby attracting the name 
internal combustion engine). However, when the heat energy required to drive the 
piston is being applied from outside the piston chamber, it is regarded as external 
combustion. Reciprocating engines are commonly deployed in locomotives, ships and 
CHPs (Breeze, 2005 pg:75). 
Reciprocating internal combustion engines are of two common types namely the Spark 
Ignition (SI) and the Compression Ignition (CI). The SI type uses timed high-intensity 
spark plugs to ignite a compressed air + fuel mixture introduced to the cylinder (Oland, 
2004). These types are generally fed with gaseous fuel or vaporised liquid fuels such 
as gasoline, propane, manufactured gas, landfill gas or natural gas which makes the 
most popular types of reciprocating engines. 
The CI (diesel engines) type uses the heat of compression of the fuel and air which 
are injected at high pressure into the cylinder to achieve ignition. CI can also be 
designed to operate in a dual fuel mode using the diesel as the compression ignition 
pilot fuel. The CI was common on power generation applications due to its high 
efficiency, but as a result of its higher environmental effect resulting from high 
pollution, such as nitrogen oxide, sulphur compounds from fuel used, it has limited 
application on CHP (Breeze, 2005 pg:75). Whilst, SI uses cleaner fuel such as gas 
which makes it a more favourite choice for CHP application, though all reciprocating 
engines emit NOx, CO and unburned hydrocarbons. However, modern reciprocating 
engines have abatement method integrated to reduce these emissions. Such as in SI, 
a Three Way Catalytic (TWC) conversion is often integrated to reduce the NOx, carbon 
and hydrocarbons, while in CI engine the wet or dry scrubbers are used to reduce 
sulphur and an electrostatic precipitator or a bag house is used to reduce the 
particulate emissions (Oland, 2004). Ongoing technological improvements have seen 
the growth of reciprocating engines, largely due to improved fuel efficiency and 
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emission abatements with the CI (diesel engines) the most globally installed annually, 
while SI (natural gas engines) is most popular with CHP applications (Breeze, 2018 
pg 9-10).  
In using reciprocating engine for CHP applications, common fuel used are natural gas, 
biogas, LG, sour gas, industrial waste gas, manufactured gas (Darrow et al., 2017).  
Reciprocating engines are increasingly becoming popular in the application of CHP 
because they are readily mobile, high availability (95%), suitable for distributed 
generation with ability to feed base load and peaking load, fast start-up capability, 
ability to provide power in an emergency if the battery for black-start is available with 
minimal auxiliary requirement. It is also economically competitive due to its cost per 
kilowatt for ranges of capacities (Onsitesycom, 1999). The thermal output from 
reciprocating engines is usually hot water instead of steam (Carbon Trust, 2010) 
making it ideal for water heating, space heating, and low temperature process, which 
can also be suited for driving absorption chillers that provide cold water, air 
conditioning and desiccant dehumidification. The range of CHP capacities from 
reciprocal engines are between 5kW to 10MW (Darrow et al., 2017).  
Another type of reciprocating engine (but not internal combustion engine) worthy of 
mention is the Stirling engines - external combustion engines. They are a kind of 
reciprocating engines that uses the movement of pistons in a cylinder to create motion 
but in this case, it is caused by externally induced temperature difference and not 
pressure.  This is an external combustion engine that operates in heat led mode. (i.e. 
they will run when there is demand for heat from the hot water storage tank). These 
engines typically have low electrical efficiency between 7% and 15% LHV (Hawkes 
and Leach, 2008a) but high overall efficiency compared to condensing boiler. 
 
2.1.1.1.3 Fuel Cell Engines  
Fuel cell engines converts chemical energy to electrical and thermal energy through 
an electrochemical process without the combustion of fuel directly or any moving parts. 
This technology uses the reaction between hydrogen and oxygen to produce 
electricity, heat and water through an electrochemical process and the hydrogen used 
in the oxidation process could be derived from hydrogen rich fuels such as fossil fuels 
or renewable energy sources (CRES and ZREU, 1999) . This in effect is the reverse 
of electrolysis – which uses electricity to separate hydro and oxygen. This technology 
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is similar to a battery system that produces Direct Current (DC) through a chemical 
reaction that normally happens when you have a cathode, an anode and electrolyte. 
However, the difference is that fuel cell is a power generator while battery is a power 
storage system. The electrochemical process begins by extracting hydrogen from 
hydrocarbons through a process known as reforming, then the hydrogen is separated 
into electrons and ions. While the electrons flow through the electrolyte to the anode 
(negative electrode) to produce electrical energy, the ions react with oxygen at the 
cathode to form water (H2O) and heat.  
There are four potential sources of useful heat for fuel cell. These are: exhaust gas 
including water condensation, stack cooling, anode off-gas combustion, and reformer 
heat (Oland, 2004). The heat generated during this chemical process is removed by 
either liquid or gaseous coolant by passing it through cooling channels in the stack, 
while the DC generated is converted to alternating current (AC) by an inverter.  
Fuel cells have a relatively high electrical efficiency of over 60% HHV of the fuel and 
around 55-80%% on overall CHP efficiency, with a commercial power generation 
range of 5kW – 2MW (Darrow et al., 2017). According to Lucia (2014), there are 
presently eight different types of fuel cells available as shown below and they are 
defined by the type of electrolyte that is being used.  These include: 
 MCFC (Molten Carbonate Fuel Cell) – Electrolyte is a molten carbonate salt 
suspended in a porous ceramic matrix. 
 PAFC (Phosphoric Acid Fuel Cell) – Electrolyte is an anode and a cathode 
made of a finely dispersed platinum. 
 SOFC (Solid Oxide Fuel Cell) - Electrolyte is a solid ceramic  
 PEMFC (Proton Exchange Membrane or Polymer electrolyte membrane fuel 
cell) - Electrolyte is a water-based, acidic polymer membrane and platinum-
catalysed electrodes.  
 Catalyst on silicon carbide and carbon structure in a phosphoric acid electrolyte.   
 HT-PEMFC (High Temperature PEMFC) is a PEMFC obtained by changing 
the electrolyte from a water-based to a mineral acid- based system.  
 DMFC (Direct Methanol Fuel Cell) – Electrolyte is a polymer membrane  
 AFC (Alkaline Fuel Cell) - An alkaline electrolyte. 
However, only the first four (MCFC, PAFC, SOFC, PEMFC) are commercially 
available for CHP applications by 2014 (Darrow et al., 2017). Such as in Japan, many 
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homes are currently receiving power and heat from CHP fuel cells (Sharaf and Orhan, 
2014).  While the UK first fuel cell scheme was launched in 2003 operated by Woking 
council to provide power for its park lightening, pool and the leisure centre (Carbon 
Trust, 2010). The fuel cell technology is characterized by several benefits, these 
includes: ability to be cascaded, efficiency is independent on its capacity, low emission 
due to no combustion, high reliability due to no moving parts, quiet operation, ability 
to follow load due to cell in array and produce varying thermal energy levels depending 
on the electrolyte and the operating temperatures e.g. MCFC and SOFC are capable 
of producing high pressure steam for CHP applications (Mekhilef et al., 2012). 
However, fuel cells require long time duration to start up compared to other prime 
movers, therefore they are useful for feeding baseload but not ideal for peak load or 
standby service (Oland, 2004).They also currently have high initial cost outlay, a 
limited service history, limited operational capacity, low power density per volume, 
short life spans of fuel cells due to demand and gas impurities (Mekhilef et al., 2012). 
Others are immature hydrogen infrastructures, hydrogen safety concerns, delicate 
heat and water management (Sharaf and Orhan, 2014), and the least commercially 
mature among all the prime movers in the CHP spectrum. 
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COMPARISON OF CHP PRIME MOVER TECHNOLOGIES 
Technology Reciprocal Engine Steam Turbine Gas Turbine Micro Turbine Fuel Cell 
Electric Efficiency (HHV) 27 - 41% 5 - 40+% 24 - 36% 22 - 28% 30 - 63% 
Overall CHP Efficiency 
(HHV) 
77 - 80% Near 80% 66 - 71% 63 - 70% 55 - 80% 
Effective electric efficiency  75 -80% 75 -77% 50 -62% 49 - 57% 55 - 80% 
Typical Capacity (MWe) 
.005 - 10 
0.5 - several 
hundred  
0.5 - 300 0.03 - 1.0 .002 - 2.8 
Typical Power to Heat Ratio 0.5 1.2 0.07 - 0.1 0.6 - 1.1 0.5 - 0.7 1.0 - 2.0 
Part Load ok ok poor ok good 
CHP Installed cost ($/kWe) 
1,500 - 2,900 670 - 1000 
1,200 - 3,300 ( 5 
-40MW) 
2,500 - 4,300 
5,000 - 
6,000 
Non-fuel O&M Cost 
($/kWhe) 
0.009 - 0.025 0.006 - 0.01 0.009 - 0.013 0.009 - .013 
0.032 - 
0.038 
Availability 96 - 98% 72 - 99% 93 - 96% 98 - 99% >95% 
Start - Up Time 10 Sec 1Hr - 1dy 10min - 1hr 60Sec  3hrs - 2days 
Fuels 
Natural gas, biogas, LG, 
sour gas, industrial 
waste gas, 
manufactured gas  
All 
Natural gas, 
synthetic gas, 
landfill gas, and 
fuel oil 
Natural gas, sour 
gas, liquid gas 
Hydrogen, 
natural gas, 
propane, 
methanol 
Uses for thermal output 
Space heating, hot 
water, cooling, LP steam 
Process steam, 
district heating, hot 
water, chilled water 
Heat, hot water, 
LP - HP steam 
Hot water, chiller, 
heating 
Hot water, 
LP - HP 
steam 
Power Density (Kw/m2) 35 -50 >100 20 - 500 5.0 -70 5.0 - 20 
Table 1: Comparisons of CHP Prime movers                   
 Source: (Darrow et al., 2017)  
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CHP systems can be further enhanced with the addition of an absorption chiller to 
produce cooling for buildings in a trigeneration system and a thermal storage to 
improve its overall efficiency. Figure 4 below depicts the schematic of a trigeneration 
system 
 
Figure 4: Principle of a trigeneration 
Typically, CHPs can be operated in various modes via a despatch or operational 
strategy. These are typically heat-led mode, electricity-led mode, or least cost/prime 
operating mode. 
 Heat-led mode: In heat- led modes the CHP would attempt to primarily meet 
the heat demand of the site, providing the thermal base load of the site directly 
from the CHP with an integrated boiler to provide the balance peak load as in 
the Aberdeen DH (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010). In this mode, dumping of heat is 
always avoided as the location’s heat demand determines the heat to power 
ratio of the CHP plant which often runs on full load except for normal 
maintenance shutdown (EEA, 2008)  
 Electricity-led mode: Here the CHP aims to meet the electrical peak demand 
as closely as the economics allow, bearing in mind the cost of import and export 
of electricity at different times of the day. So its main aim would be to reduce 
the net cost of electricity consumption; while it may consider dumping un-
utilised heat or storing it with heat accumulators within the system to be used 
later, as for instance in the Woking and Barkantine DH schemes (Kelly and 
Pollitt, 2010). This system may also use an integrated boiler when it is not 
economical to produce electricity or when heat demand exceeds CHP capacity 
(Hawkes and Leach, 2007). 
 Least cost/prime operational strategy. This option is primarily on best 
economic generation of both sources (heat and electricity) at any point for an 
unlimited time. In this mode there is no priority of any output but the minimal net 
cost of providing both the electricity and heat demand bearing the prevailing 
technical constraints and electricity import or export would depend on 
operational cost. In contrast to the two mentioned above, this strategy will 
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benefit from increased revenues from selling larger quantities of electricity 
during the summer and meet heat demand during the winter, for instance in 
Southampton DH scheme (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010). Thermal storage may not be 
required here unless the excess heat requires storage and be discharged on a 
cost benefit basis (Hawkes and Leach, 2007). 
2.1.2 District Heating (DH) 
District Heating (DH) delivers heat at various points of consumption or generation 
through pipes using steam or hot water as the transmission medium; it’s sometimes 
referred to as heat network (HN). DH mainly consists of pipes and heat interface units 
with additional consideration for thermal energy storage (TES) for operation and 
economic objectives. The early pipes were mainly made of concrete, but most recent 
pipes are pre-insulated pipes made of polymers to improve efficiency and ease of 
deployment. 
Most UK DH networks deliver heat between 90 -1200C and with an exit temperature 
at 40 – 700C (DECC, 2013a). The Government estimates that around two thousand 
heat networks are operational in the UK, supplying only two percent of domestic, public 
and commercial heat demand through 210,000 homes and 170,000 commercial and 
public buildings (DECC, 2013a). The largest CHP-DH system in the UK is the Olympic 
energy park centre with about 16km of community energy networks (Cofely, 2016, 
Roelich et al., 2013). 
District heating supplies heat via a local distribution system in which consumers are 
often locked to a single supplier. This is generally different from the markets for natural 
gas and electricity, which are supported by national transmission grids connecting all 
producers and consumers. The absence of physical linkage between distribution areas 
makes the district heating markets look like natural monopolies, each characterised 
by a group of heating consumers captured most often by a single producer which 
brings to fore the concern of efficiency in heat distribution. 
2.1.3 CHP and District Heating Relationship (CHP-DH) 
CHP-DH system is the inter-connected system of production of electricity and heat 
and distribution of heat from CHPs through DH networks, whilst using the electricity 
generated for consumption or sales. CHP-DH systems have stronger inter-linkages 
between production and distribution compared to other energy systems like gas or 
electricity. In part because the return temperature of the water in the DH network 
affects the economic performance of the CHP plants such that the lower the return 
temperature, the more improved overall economic performance of the CHP plant due 
to higher electricity production (Söderholm and Wårell, 2011). Similarly the separation 
of production and distribution activities makes it significantly more difficult to operate 
a cost-effective district heating system (Söderholm and Wårell, 2011). 
The integrated nature of CHP-DH systems leverages on the economy of scale of 
linking production and distribution of two critical energy vectors (electricity and heat) 
to capture economic, environmental and social objectives. Furthermore, CHPs can be 
fuelled by various sources while DHN can also receive heat from various heat sources 
including CHPs and renewable energy sources of- Heat (RES-H).  
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CHP-DH systems offer several benefits; such as their efficiency which means they are 
relatively low in emissions for both electrical and heat generation, suggesting it’s a 
useful option for heat decarbonisation. For instance in a recent study, the Government 
suggests that CHP-DH systems have the potential to half emissions from heating and 
cooling relative to other technologies with a greater potential to reduce further 
emissions using RES-H on the network (DECC, 2013a)..  
2.2 Trends in CHP-DH Development in the UK 
The earliest large CHP-DH scheme in the UK can be traced to a city centre power 
station supplying steam to nearby office blocks and factories by Manchester 
Corporation in 1911 (Russell, 1993, Kelly and Pollitt, 2010) and later the Boots 
company CHP-DH site beside the River Trent in 1919 (Jarvis, 1986). However various 
literature recognised that the CHP-DH system in London by Pimlico is considered as 
one of the first successful large schemes to showcase the technology on the back of 
supplying heat to housing estates (Martin and Thornley, 2013, Roelich et al., 2013, 
Diamant and McGarry, 1968 pg 172, Jarvis, 1986). In part, because hitherto there was 
the deep cultural place of open heating by coal as opposed to centralised heating 
resulting in lack of interest by municipal electricity utilities in CHP-DH systems (Rüdig, 
1986). Which led to the unpopularity of DH networks in cities but more in the industrial 
sector where there was demand of steam or heat plus power (Sievers et al., 2005). 
Available data from government archives on the development pattern of CHP-DH 
systems from the 50s to 2014 as shown in Figure 5, reveals that CHP contribution to 
electricity supply in the UK has never risen to 10% with 1953 as the year with highest 
contribution of about 8%. While 1983 and 1988 are seen as the years with the lowest 
contribution with about 3% of net electricity supply. 
This seemingly poor historical performance compared to some western countries such 
as the Netherlands can be traced to amongst other reasons. Such as, the unsure 
position of government on the technical and economic viability of the technology 
(Russell, 1993) and cheap cost of town gas from coal for heating. This was reinforced 
by the failure of a few earlier CHP-DH systems due to pipe corrosion like the Gorton 
scheme in Manchester and poor costing as with the Duddeston scheme in Birmingham 
(Diamant and McGarry, 1968 pg 171-172).  
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Figure 5: CHP technology growth profile 
Sources: Graph created from government data (DECC, 2014e, DECC, 2013b, 
DECC, 2013k, DECC, 2010d, DECC, 2007, DECC, 2005, DECC, 2006, DECC, 
2015c) 
Based on Government data the heat to power ratio of CHPs in the UK shows a 
downward trend, indicating a decline in the heat output relative to electricity. This was 
largely due to the gradual displacement of coal steam turbines by gas turbines and 
reciprocal engines as shown in Figure 6. Furthermore, the refocusing of the UK 
economy from industrial to service economy may have also contributed due to high 
industrial heat demands that gave way to lower heat demand from the industrial sector.  
 
Figure 6: CHP technology profile in 1977 and 2008 
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Source: DECC (2013b)  
The debate on the development CHP-DH systems in the UK received national 
prominence in the 70s when the national potential of DH systems was assessed in 
terms of public cost and benefits through the Marshall report (Russell, 2010, Kelly and 
Pollitt, 2010), influenced by the oil shock of the early 70s (Babus'Haq and Probert, 
1996). 
The Marshall report aimed to investigate the techno-economic role of DH systems in 
the UK energy mix and identify the barriers to its penetration and make necessary 
recommendations. The report suggests that the strength of DH systems was its energy 
saving ability and fuel flexibility. However they cautioned that competition from natural 
gas, the structural challenges within the electricity supply industry, high cost of DH 
systems and government’s energy policy preference for free market forces were 
inimical to its growth (Marshall, 1977). Therefore, the report recommended that without 
strong government initiatives CHP-DH systems will not develop to a significant level 
in the UK, key of which is a road map to unravel the potential of CHP-DH systems and 
the formation of a new organisation known as the “National Heat Board” (NHB) to 
regulate the heat industry. However, the NHB recommendation was ignored by the 
Department of Energy (DOE) partly because the government felt that it should be 
private sector driven if the economics was right. Subsequently DOE hired a consultant, 
Atkins & partners, to conduct a prefeasibility of CHP-DH systems to investigate the 
socio-economic and environmental implications of its deployment. (Atkins, 1982, 
Russell, 1993, Babus'Haq and Probert, 1996). 
The mandate of the Atkins contract from DOE was to identify the locations with 
significant heat density and socio-economic benefits to make business case in 
collaboration with the local authorities (Atkins, 1982). Suggesting that the participation 
from both the local authorities was desirable. After the assessment by both DOE and 
Atkins, nine local areas were favoured for DH systems (Belfast, Glasgow, Liverpool, 
London, Sheffield, Tyneside, Edinburgh, Leicester and Manchester) but Belfast, 
Edinburgh and Leicester were selected to benefit from the DOE £750,000 grant under 
the Lead City Scheme (Babus'Haq and Probert, 1996), while Sheffield, London and 
Newcastle decided to pursue CHP-DH through the private sector. The Belfast scheme 
was later abandoned due to a payback period of twenty years (Taki et al., 1993).  
The Atkin’s report was followed by the Electricity Act of 1983, which many consider as 
the first CHP-DH friendly UK legislative milestone (Budden, 1988, Babus'Haq and 
Probert, 1996). Prior to this act, individuals or companies other than the electricity area 
boards were not allowed to sell electricity to the area boards or local authority, because 
it was considered not their main business. This was a significant barrier to the growth 
of CHP-DH systems because CHP owners were locked to their own demand; the 1983 
Electricity Act repealed such rules and allowed private generators to buy or sell 
electricity from/to the local electricity board and also allowed prospective CHP 
developers to use the national transmission and distribution network for export of its 
power (Pearson and Watson, 2012). 
Another governance instrument of note was the Electricity Act of 1989 which ushered 
in the privatization of the electricity sector from 1990. This bill was thought to have 
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brought some consolation to the CHP-DH industry as it now allowed local authorities 
to embark on the sale of electricity as long as it was produced simultaneously with 
heat thereby encouraging the development of CHP-DH systems (HM Government, 
1989). However there were other actions that pulled CHP-DH systems in the opposite 
direction such as the failure of government to establish a market for heat and the 
changes to the tax system which meant that natural gas used in power stations was 
taxed at higher rates than natural gas used for heating in homes, therefore 
disadvantaging CHP-DH systems (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010, Pearson and Watson, 
2012). Additionally, power companies couldn’t internalise the waste heat from their 
plants due to the dominant electric heating (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010), lack of heating 
governance structures and the uncertainty of the price of natural gas on CHP-DH 
investment did not help as well (IET, 2008). All these may have culminated in the dash 
for gas by power stations not translating into growth of CHP-DH systems. 
Another significant milestone was the report by the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution, “Energy - The Changing Climate”, which advocated a long 
term decarbonisation target of 60% reduction in UK emissions by 2050 relative to 1990 
as part of an overall energy policy. Importantly, It also advocated a robust regulatory 
policy to encourage the use of CHP-DH systems and its role in emission reduction 
instead of technologies that generate power alone. (RCEP, 2000). The Royal 
Commission’s report was influenced by a growing concern as to the impact of energy 
on the environment and the global position on environmental pollution by the United 
Nations through the Kyoto Protocol; this could be argued as a turning point in the UK’s 
energy policy to incorporate environmental concerns. As part of government’s 
response, it set a target via the Climate Change programme to double the (electrical) 
capacity of CHP by 2010 (DETR, 2000), but capacity improved without reaching its 
target as the capacity of CHP in 2000 was 4.7GW (DECC, 2005) and by 2011 the 
capacity was 6.1GW (DECC, 2012c) as the prevailing conditions earlier highlighted 
were still very much around. CHP contributed about 5.9% to UK electricity generation 
in 2015 with average of electrical and heat efficiency of twenty-four percent and forty-
eight percent respectively (DBEIS, 2016a). 
The climate change programme heralded several schemes such as the 2001 
Community Energy Programme (CEP) through a grant of £50m to encourage the 
development of DH networks (DECC, 2003, DEFRA, 2004). Subsequently, the energy 
review of 2006 and energy white paper of 2007 all acknowledged the contribution of 
CHP-DH systems to the energy and environment debate (IET, 2008). 
In 2008, the Climate Change Act can be argued as the governance instrument that 
sought to set the scene for the linkage between the environment and energy demand 
in energy policy debate by setting a target of 80% emission below 1990 level by 2050. 
This culminated in several other policy documents amongst which is the future heating 
strategy in 2012 that seeks decarbonisation of heat generation and the Energy Act of 
2013 that introduced the Electric Market Reform (EMR), which sought to provide 
secure, cheap and low carbon electricity. It also led to the formation of heat network 
delivery unit by DECC to facilitate the developments of DH systems. 
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2.3 Challenges of CHP-DH penetration in the UK 
In spite of the technological maturity of CHP-DH technology, UK market penetration 
remains low, providing only an estimated 2% of heat consumption in the UK via DH 
network (DECC, 2013a). Many CHP plants are being mothballed such that in 2014 
alone 42 schemes were removed from the register and CHPs contributing only 6% to 
the electricity consumption (DECC, 2015g). This suggests that CHP-DH systems may 
be experiencing challenges in the UK that may require attention. Hence the discussion 
of some inherent challenges being experienced by CHP-DH systems in the UK 
2.3.1 Electricity Market  
A key determinant for the development of CHP-DH systems is the ability to sell both 
electricity and heat outputs but given the uncertainty in the heat market due to heat 
largely being treated as a waste/by-product, the sale of electricity becomes crucial in 
the development of CHP-DH systems. 
The electricity market has been driven by competition through economic regulation, 
Ofgem admits that the market is still fraught with lack of competition, rising profits and 
distrust of the dominant energy suppliers without satisfying customer expectation 
(Ofgem, 2014). The 1990 privatisation led to the fall of electricity export prices and 
generators to negotiate their price with their local RECs. This resulted in small 
generators like CHPs entering the market under poor contract terms because many 
lacked the requisite skills to negotiate and resources to hire one. The result was that 
by 1991 small generators that were hitherto receiving 75% of the commercial sales 
tariff was now receiving 60% and new entrants only about 25% (Sievers et al., 2005). 
In 2000, New Electricity Trading Arrangement (NETA) covering England and Wales 
only were formed from the pool regime and later in 2005 the transmission networks in 
Scotland were integrated to form the British Electricity Trading and Transmission 
Arrangement (BETTA) (Tovey, 2005) but with essentially the same rules. The 
NETA/BETTA regime operated a more competitive, complex arrangement, and 
offered greater choices to market participants; however CHP generators and 
distributed generators in general were paid against a measure of wholesale power 
prices with a discount to the supplier’s cost and imbalance risk. Shortly after the take-
off of the NETA regime CHP generators received 17% lower price than earlier received 
in the pool prices as wholesale electricity prices dropped between 20 – 25% for the 
first three months, subsequently 60% of output from CHP plants was lost within the 
first year (Ofgem, 2001). This was reinforced by increased gas prices which raised 
their cost and the complex requirements of being part of the newly introduced the 
balancing and settlement code (BSC) (Cornwall and Littlechild, 2008).  
The System Operators of the grid – NGET – used the “balancing mechanism” under 
the BSC to buy or sell power to maintain the energy integrity of the grid. BSC sets the 
rules for balancing mechanism and its framework is managed by Elexon. Elexon also 
manages the settlement process by resolving any issues arising between generators’ 
actual output and suppliers’ actual demand and clearing debts or credits of market 
participants. In a study by Cornwall and Littlechild (2008) suggested that most CHPs, 
who are considered small generators because of their predominantly lower than 
50MW capacity, were found to have difficulty in accessing the market partly due to 
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lack of patronage from major suppliers and the burden of imbalanced risk. Suppliers 
passed this risk to the CHP developers resulting in high market transaction costs and 
many opted for short term off-take agreements. CHP generators had to also persuade 
suppliers to take up power by signing contracts that shared their embedded benefits 
such as Levy Exemption Certificates (LECs) when they export power (DTI, 2005). It 
can be concluded that from its inception the NETA/BETTA arrangement was not 
designed to encourage distributed generation but rather to emphasise competition and 
reinforce lock-ins of the large generators leaving many CHP generators at a relatively 
disadvantaged position on market entrance (Smith and Watson, 2002; Woodman and 
Baker, 2008; Wood and Dow, 2011). 
Another issue within the electricity market framework that militated against CHP-DH 
development was the licensing regime. Under the UK Electricity Order 2001, electricity 
generators under 5MW threshold were exempted from generation, distribution and 
supply licences, stipulating that generators of electricity can only supply not more than 
2.5MW to domestic customers and 5MW to business customers without having a 
supply licence. This was known as the class order exemption 2001 (DTI, 2005, Ofgem, 
2008a). This effectively limits how much a CHP-DH operator can self-supply electricity 
through a distributed network operator without a supply license. However, if the 
electricity supply is through a private network, no restriction applies. Secondly, if the 
CHP-DH operator procures the services of a supplier it usually cost a discount of about 
10-20% of the wholesale electricity market price, which typically constitutes the cost 
of trading, balancing cost, administrative cost, long term risk and profit margin 
(Handley, 2013). This was exemplified by the collapse of a Leicester citywide district-
heating scheme when it failed to secure a supply contract for the sale of its electricity 
(Kelly and Pollitt, 2010). This restriction of electricity supply of 5MW indicates the 
adverse consequence of electricity licensing regime on CHP-DH operators. 
However, in 2009, licence lite (LL) licence was introduced to encourage small 
distributed generators like CHP generators to supply their customers directly but with 
a caveat that they would still require the services of a standard licence owner. 
Currently there are three main routes to be licensed to supply electricity, which are 
Licence Lite (LL) license, Standard Supplier License and white label providers. LL 
licence “junior electricity supply licence” allows a small scale electricity supplier to 
supply through a third party who has a standard supplier license and a BSC registrant 
so that it can transfer the compliance obligation on codes. Such as BSC to the 
standard supplier if the generator is going through the public network. It protects the 
LL licensee from embarking on the technical and financial implications of a standard 
supplier, such as high start-up cost, operational complexities and higher market risk 
associated with a standard licensee (IPPR, 2014). The white label routes introduced 
in 2013 are for organisations that want to supply electricity or gas using their brand 
names to retail electricity to customers. This also has to have a third party agreement 
with a full supply licence for compliance of the industry codes and standards (Ofgem, 
2015a). While the third one is the full electricity standard supply licence with condition 
to comply with all codes and standards as required by the licence conditions. 
Nonetheless, electricity generators such as CHPs without a standard licence will have 
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to sell their electricity at a discount due to imbalance risk introduced by the 
NETA/BETA regime. 
2.3.2  Heat Market 
In spite of the advantages of CHP-DH systems in energy efficiency and social 
objectives such as reduction of fuel poverty (Hills, 2012), the heat market in the UK is 
neither a top-down model nor market based competition. It differs considerably from 
the market for electricity largely due to the fact the large majority of heat produced is 
consumed locally (on site) or wasted, the volume of heat supplied to third parties is 
negligible. Secondly, there is no heat grid as in the electricity industry to facilitate 
widespread heat transaction and thirdly, the UK is still without national heat 
governance infrastructures. 
2.3.3  Policy and Regulatory risk 
Markets are created by policies and regulatory mechanisms, the stability of these 
mechanisms in the long term determines how investors react to the market (Foxon et 
al., 2005). One risk that investors find difficult to manage or judge is policy/regulatory 
uncertainty. At best, they will find an alternative route by investing in lobbying or be 
patient till the regulatory tide calms down (Grubb and Newbery, 2008 pg. 297). 
Therefore uncertainty over future regulation within the energy sector has the effect of 
limiting long-term investment and encourages conservative short-term, quick profit 
decision-making (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010) or investors will adopt a wait-and-see position 
since they will not invest speculatively (Webb, 2014). Policy/regulatory uncertainty can 
also emerge from political uncertainty arising from change of political guards at the 
governance hierarchies. For instance, the CHP industry lost a major financial stream 
when in 2010 the treasury under the new coalition government initiated a reform of the 
climate change levy regime. This was with a view to remove the previously enjoyed 
levy exemption certificate (LECs) on electricity exported from CHPs with effectiveness 
from the 1st of April, 2013, but still retained the LECs for only site consumption 
electricity (HMRC, 2010). 
2.3.4  Public Perception  
Early problematic experiences of the performance of CHP-DH systems in the UK may 
have affected public support (Sievers et al., 2005) precipitated by the failures of some 
early schemes due to pipe corrosion after installation and poor design leading to cost 
overruns. For instance the early DH system at Gorton and Blackley in Manchester in 
1919 was abandoned due to pipeline corrosion. (Diamant and McGarry, 1968 pg. 171-
172). A study by Larsson (2006) on the perception of CHP-DH systems in UK, 
suggested that in addition to the earlier mentioned design and management issues, 
there are contracting problems when the companies providing the DH services are not 
able to give the appropriate guarantees to the customers. The poor hindsight that 
these early systems may have left and the perception that CHP-DH systems is not 
considered an integral part of the energy system in UK but rather an appendage, may 
all have fuelled the negative perception it has. (Russell, 1993).  
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2.3.5  Investment/Finance 
CHP-DH infrastructure is characterised by high initial capital and low marginal return 
that makes the investment fully recoverable after many years, which makes it less 
attractive to investors (Balcombe et al., 2013, Kelly and Pollitt, 2010, Aronsson and 
Hellmer, 2009). CHP-DH systems produce two energy vectors with different 
characteristics in terms of infrastructure, regulatory institutions and determinants. 
Secondly the losses in electricity is largely determined by the volume of power and 
demand, while heat loss is largely determined by the ambient temperature and pipe 
insulation (Orchards, 2013). 
The intersection of these variables with the recovering of a huge sunk cost on 
infrastructure makes financing a challenge. Furthermore, the regulatory signals of the 
UK energy system feed the investment risk of CHP-DH systems. For instance, the 
perspective with which energy assets are regulated in the UK are based on return on 
capital invested with little or no consideration to political economy, which dis-
incentivises the development of CHP-DH systems in spite of its socio-economic gains 
(Webb, 2014). Simply put, the recovered heat from a CHP-DH system which displaces 
additional carbon emission in the energy supply chain at a cheaper cost is only 
considered as a by-product suggesting heat supply as an additional risk. Therefore, 
these additional institutional and economic risk attracts additional cost to the capital, 
which impacts on the viability of the schemes.  
The methodology for financing of CHP-DH systems is typically derived using a life-
cycle costing method, which analyses the cost based on justified benefit from the 
system over the economic life of the system known as discounted cash flow (DCF). 
This is consistent with a recent EU Energy Efficiency Directive Article 14, which 
mandates all CHP-DH (thermal or electricity generation) installation above 20MW 
threshold to show evidence of a cost benefit analysis statement since 2014, except for 
CHPs with less than 1,500 hours of operation per year (DECC, 2015v). This method 
of DCF is used to determine the viability of the scheme by discounting the cash flow 
of the project by a factor over the period to determine the present value. The rate of 
return used to determine the output of DCF analysis is known as the discount rate. 
The discount rate selected will determine the level of financial return to the investor as 
the higher the discount rate the higher the financial return due to reduced cost over 
time, but the UK recommends a discount rate of 3.5% for social analysis with estimates 
for heat network to be between commercial rates of 10% to 20% (Hawkey and Webb, 
2016 pg:122). Suggesting that for CHP-DH systems to be attractive to the market, it’s 
likely to have a rate of return above 10%, which many Heat Network Delivery Unit 
(HNDU) facilitated schemes seem not to have (King, 2016). The Heat Network 
Delivery Unit – HNDU (England and Wales) is an initiative since 2013 to support CHP-
DH schemes through provision of grants for feasibility studies in England and Wales 
with focus on LAs schemes.  
There are two main ways CHP-DH systems are financed in the UK, on-balance-sheet 
financing or off-balance-sheet financing. This suggests either debt with equity finance 
or through equipment supplier and operating leasing. The choice as to financial route 
is usually dependent on how much the parties are risk averse and the desired return 
on investment.  
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2.3.6  Transmission and Distribution Infrastructure 
The early grid networks in the UK were constructed to lock in centralised and large 
generation, leveraging economies of scale and many of them presently nearing the 
end of its design life (Hammond and Waldron, 2008). Ofgem (2009a) estimated 
expenditure of £53.4bn will be needed between 2009 and 2025 to reinforce the 
electricity grid amidst the changing generation profile to accommodate more 
distributed generation, as this is critical to the overall energy strategy. The grid has 
been slow in meeting its obligation as there is increased demand for connection of 
distributed generation, partly due to the required high investment for grid reinforcement 
and long lead time in completing transmission and distribution reinforcement projects. 
As a result, the grid is experiencing bottlenecks and difficulty in granting access to 
distributed generation, for instance there is restricted power flow of about 2.2GWe 
from Scotland to England (Hammond and Pearson, 2013). The increased difficulty for 
the connection of distributed energy, including CHP, naturally constituted a major 
barrier to grid access as long queues of application would wait for wider system 
reinforcements to be completed before connection (Wood and Dow, 2011).  
However, Ofgem and the DNOs had introduced several schemes to reduce the impact 
of this challenge, such as the Transmission Access Review (TAR) in 2008 that 
introduced “connect and manage” approach to accelerate new connections and 
allowing the generator to choose any point of connection but on the long term, 
generators will have to provide financial commitment to guarantee long term access. 
Others are the Low Carbon Network Fund (LCNF) in 2010, which made available 
about £500m from 2010 to 2015 with the aim of challenging distribution companies to 
come up with innovative ideas in the form of pilot projects to improve network 
challenges (Ofgem, 2010a). This was subsequently succeeded by the Network 
Innovation Competition (NIC) scheme to run from April 2013 – March, 2021. NIC is an 
annual competition amongst network companies to compete to access an annual 
maximum amount of £27m for delivery of innovative projects that would impact on grid 
management and operation (Ofgem, 2013i). Lastly, the incentive regulation of the RIIO 
(Revenue = Incentive + Innovation + Outputs) to stimulate innovation in network 
connections through price control, which seeks DNOs to capture sustainability and 
best customer service in their business plans from April 2015 to March, 2023. (Ofgem, 
2013i). However, from the available information, it’s still not clear how it has impacted 
on better CHP grid access. 
Nonetheless, grid connection issues for distributed generators (DG) are far from over. 
Primarily because in the UK there is no regulation that grants distributed generation 
and CHPs in particular priority access to the grid as obtainable in Germany and 
Denmark and the non-socialisation of reinforcement cost as practised in Denmark 
(Simonds and Hall, 2013). Rather it is on a first come, first served basis with 
guaranteed network access only after a connection agreement has been signed. 
Some DGs are still struggling to connect their plants to the grid as a result of high 
connection cost quotations which largely depends on location and non-standardisation 
of connection process amongst the DNOs. In addition to these challenges are the high 
variance amongst DNOs in terms of timelines and consistency as there is no fixed 
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timescale for connection and opacity of connection information from the DNOs 
(Simonds and Hall, 2013). 
2.3.7  Spark Spread 
Around two thirds (67%) of CHPs in 2014 were gas fuelled (DECC, 2015g), suggesting 
that price volatility of natural gas would greatly impact on the viability of CHP-DH 
development from a spark spread perspective. Spark spread is the gap or difference 
between the wholesale gas price used for electricity production and the cost of 
electricity sold to domestic consumers as shown in Figure 7. Spark spread usually acts 
as an investment pointer to let the CHP-DH developers know if they can recover the 
investment over time through the sale of electricity or the financial viability (Bonilla, 
2006). The graph in Figure 7 indicates how the gap between these indices are getting 
further apart as the years forward and the resultant would mean lower financial hurdles 
for CHP-DH developers. As the rate of increase in electricity price out paces the rate 
of increase in the gas price, then the financial viability of CHP-DH systems improves, 
because of this, others have argued that a more accurate measure for the competitive 
viability of CHP-DH systems is the difference in price between gas sold for domestic 
use and gas sold for the generation of electricity, or what some may define as the 
domestic-wholesale gas price spread (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010). Nonetheless, spark 
spread continues to be critical to the investment decision process of CHP-DH 
development, even more so in places where the spark spread is not consistent like the 
US, where they are varying spark spread depending on the region (CODE, 2010).  
 
 
 
 Source: (DECC, 2014d) 
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Figure 7: Average prices of fuel for non-domestic customers in the UK 
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A study by Streckienė et al. (2009) suggested that the electricity and natural gas price 
impact most on the NPV of CHPs, therefore spark spread is a vital risk indices for 
CHP-DH developers .  
2.3.8  Planning Systems 
A further constraint on CHP-DH penetration in the UK is planning. Planning is a 
governance mechanism used by the state or LAs to control processes (Teisman and 
Edelenbos, 2004 Pg. 176). This control and steering is achieved through the 
production of rules of engagement with non-hierarchical actors seeking to engage in 
infrastructural development. These rules are often rigid and obligatory which also 
exhibits the extent of the rights of actors and options to exit, else actors may be denied 
interaction with the locality (Brousseau and Raynaud, 2006). It is therefore always in 
the purview of hierarchical governance, either by the state or municipal/LA to evolve 
planning rules for engagement with non-hierarchical actors. In the UK it is also a route 
to compensate those whom the development has affected through communal 
compensation.  
Planning in the UK as it relates to CHP-DH scheme is divided into two major sections, 
firstly planning for construction of a DH network and secondly planning rights for the 
CHP plants to be built and discharge its electricity. The development of DH networks 
falls under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 rather than the permitted 
development rights as electricity, gas and water networks which don’t require planning 
permission (GLA, 2014a). However, in spite of DH heating networks not being part of 
the permitted development rights, there are other ways that DH networks can get 
approval to be developed as indicated under the national planning policy framework. 
The routes could be permission under a wider development, adoption of a local 
development order, electricity undertaker permitted development rights, LA permitted 
development right and De Minimis treatment of heat networks (GLA, 2014a). 
To discharge its electricity, CHPs would require application for larger capacity CHP 
plants (>50MW) in England and Wales to be approved by the planning inspectorate 
and while lower capacity will be approved locally. Similarly, plant sizes (>50MW) in 
Scotland will be approved by the Scottish Government and lower capacity plants will 
be approved locally. This suggest that the entrance of large capacity CHP (>50MW) 
would still go through the more bureaucratic state approval structures even as the 
smaller plants still experience a common hurdle of long decisions on planning locally 
(Wood and Dow, 2011). Therefore the impact of the planning approvals is significant 
on CHP developers, since it feeds into the grid connection offer as a prerequisite which 
is usually time bound ranging between one and six months at the distribution levels 
(Simonds and Hall, 2013). While at the transmission level the grid connection offer 
expires after 90 days (Klessmann et al., 2008), indicating the importance of timely 
planning approvals. 
The dominant instrument of engagement with CHP-DH developers by LAs is through 
Section 106 (S106) agreements which stipulates the rights and exit options. S106 
agreement was designed to ensure that developers contribute to the cost of the 
development of local infrastructures but the agreement can only be reached if the 
condition of local planning policies such as implementing CHP-DH systems in 
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designated areas is adhered to. However, S106 agreements has been criticised for 
the undue delays it brings to projects due to how long it takes for LAs to firm up these 
agreements, in part due to the negotiating skills of all parties (Bottini et al., 2013). 
Therefore planning permission and procedures are vital to the success of any CHP-
DH system. For instance the Thameswey Energy (an ESCO wholly owned by Woking 
Borough Council) identified difficulties gaining permission to lay pipes as a significant 
barrier to their DH project in Melton Keynes (Hawkey, 2009). 
The first notable example of where planning policy was used to incentivise the 
adoption of renewable technologies and by extension, CHP-DH systems in the UK 
was the introduction of an innovative planning system by the London Borough of 
Merton in 2006. It demands that all new non-residential developments above 1000m2 
should incorporate the allowance of providing at least 10% of its energy requirements 
from a renewable energy source (TCPA, 2006). This is what is now commonly known 
as the “Merton rule” which many LAs, for instance Blackpool (CLASP, 2011), have 
adapted in signposting developers to CHP-DH systems.  
2.3.9  Asymmetric Information 
Information is a vital instrument in driving government policies and it’s often used in 
deciding the fate of policies (Peters, 2012b pg. 117), since actors would use 
information to determine market entrance.  A study by Jaffe and Stavins (1994) to 
generate an s-shaped diffusion curve with an 'epidemic model", using the spread of 
information regarding the existence and profitability of the innovation. They suggested 
that one obvious source of potential market failure affecting adoption decisions is lack 
of information about available technologies. This is further reinforced by Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld (2001) which stated that markets can fail because of asymmetric information 
and high information transaction cost. Since information is vital to investment and 
government is a critical information node because of its capacity to pool and keep data 
to direct policy and citizen behaviour, therefore role of Government cannot be 
relegated in this arena (Peters, 2012b pg. 117) in making sure information is available 
to all market participants and other actors. 
Currently, a complete database of CHP-DH systems in the UK is scarce as only limited 
information is held by DBEIS (Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy) 
(formerly DECC) and ADE (Association for Decentralised Energy). There is also no 
registry of CHP-DH data in UK, which can attract an additional transaction cost to 
obtain. The information landscape may soon get clearer as it’s begin to benefit from 
the Heat Network (Metering and Billing) Regulations which came into effect in 
December 2014. The Act which was the Government’s response to the EU Energy 
Efficiency Directive mandates all DH systems to be registered by April 2015. However, 
the law only permits registration of systems after commencement of operation as 
indicated in Section 3 paragraph 2b of the Act. (UK Legislation, 2014). This means 
that collation of data of systems under development will still be a challenge, because 
businesses wishing to plan future schemes will still face a transaction cost to get 
information of on-going systems. 
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2.3.10  Retrofitting of CHP-DH system in developed areas  
The UK built environment contributes about 46% to UK emission (Davies, 2010), 
largely due to the poor energy performance of existing building stock. For instance, a 
not too recent report estimates that for homes built before 1996, the average net space 
heat demand for the building stock in 2050 is 9,000kWhr/year, while homes built after 
1996 will be 2,000kWhr/year (Boardman et al., 2005). Considering that about 80% of 
the homes that will exist in 2050 have already been built (CR, 2017), the contributions 
from existing buildings to the ambition of 80% reduction of UK’s emission by 2050 
compared to 1990 may be significant. Therefore, the EU, through the energy 
performance directive had directed member states to undertake major renovations in 
buildings and consider other alternative low carbon energy sources, in a bid to improve 
the energy performance of existing stock (EU, 2010a). Furthermore, member states 
are to determine new minimum energy performance levels for new buildings so that 
all new buildings will be nearly zero energy level by 2020.  However, while new 
buildings will have energy efficient measures integrated at design stages, existing 
buildings will have measures that can be adopted which includes refurbishing of 
windows, doors, roofs, walls and floors, and the adoption of alternative low carbon 
sources of energy to the existing buildings, such as CHP-DH systems. 
As iterated in the earlier sections, the benefits of the deployment of CHP-DH are 
numerous, such as lowering of energy bills, reducing carbon footprint and so on. 
However, the conditions that are prevalent in deploying CHP-DH systems in a new 
build are totally different from deploying it in an existing built environment. For 
instance, most new builds that deployed CHP-DH systems, did it as an integrated part 
of the infrastructure provided which often considered the thermal behaviour of the 
buildings and heat appliances required at the design stage. Therefore, in developing 
the CHP-DH system in a new build sufficient space would have been acquired for the 
CHP units and right-of-way for the DH pipes. However, the same cannot be said for 
deploying CHP-DH systems in an existing built environment because of the several 
factors that will impact on the deployment. One of such is a reduced ratio between DH 
network heat loss and heat consumption by the existing buildings for the optimal 
technical and economic operation of the system by having a reduced supply and return 
temperature (Brand and Svendsen, 2013). Therefore, to meet the desired temperature 
for the optimal operation of a CHP-DH system, several measures are sometimes taken 
such as renovation of the building stocks or internal heating appliances (Brand and 
Svendsen, 2013, Østergaard and Svendsen, 2016). Both measures are expensive 
with the renovation of internal heating appliances a faster and cheaper route and thus 
a challenge to the adoption of CHP-DH system on existing systems. 
There are other notable barriers that deploying a CHP-DH system on an existing built 
environment often experience, such as laying of DH pipes in the streets and roads. 
Laying of pipes on hard digs are more expensive than soft digs such as grass verges 
or undeveloped areas and laying of pipes on congested streets with existing utilities 
even attracts additional cost (Arup, 2011b). Other inhibitions to the deployment of DH 
pipes includes physical constraints such as highways, cemeteries, waterways and 
railways. Laying of DH pipes across these structures may be expensive or not even 
permitted. Furthermore, meeting the right noise and air pollution for the locality during 
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the construction can also be a concern. Another consideration in retrofitting a CHP-
DH system in an existing environment is acquiring enough space of land at the right 
location for the energy centre that would house the CHPs to feed the DH networks. 
This also constitute a challenge due to the extent of development.    
Therefore, the enormous considerations in retrofitting a CHP-DH system in an existing 
built environment attracts significant additional cost that impacts on the technical and 
economic performance of the system. This constitutes a significant barrier to its 
deployment, though there a few recent examples of retrofitted CHP-DH systems in an 
existing built environment in the UK. Such as the Aberdeen heat and Power in 
Scotland (Ian, 2013) and the Bunhill Heat and Power CHP-DH project undertaken by 
the Islington Council in London (Islington, 2013).  
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3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter shall seek to explore the conceptual framework for investigating CHP-DH 
systems in the UK as an infrastructure using innovation systems with a view to improve 
its diffusion through governance process with emphasis on the role of the hierarchies 
of governance (state and Local Authority). 
This chapter shall traverse three theoretical concepts that has potential to 
conceptualize CHP-DH system as an infrastructure and advance reasons for the 
selection of Technological Innovation Systems as the preferred option for the analysis. 
The three are Large Technical Systems (LTS), Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) and 
Technological Innovation Systems (TIS). Furthermore, the concept of Governance 
shall also be discussed and how it can complement the TIS concept with a view to 
compensate for its weaknesses and create opportunities to reduce the effect of the 
blocking mechanisms to the diffusion of CH-DH system in the UK. 
A broad and generalised discussion of the TIS theoretical frameworks shall be 
undertaken to gain a better understanding of how the various activities of the 
hierarchies of Government and other actors impact on CHP-DH systems in the UK 
and to set the scene for an empirical assessment of the roles these actors can play 
further in the growth of the system. This chapter also sets the scene that leads into 
further in-dept discussion on how the overall research objective/questions are 
discussed. 
 
3.1 Infrastructure Overview 
 
Infrastructure is a widely used term to represent various meanings, such as collective 
inputs, artefacts, public utilities, institutional setups and so on, therefore it has a broad 
representation but with no universally accepted definition. However, some authors 
have considered it from various perspective such as, Star (1999) saw it as an output 
of inseparable relationship between actions, tools and the built environment, but Smith 
(2005b) considers it as collective resources for production that would require 
investment decision. While Guy and Marvin (2016) examines it as a physical construct 
of a constant flow of technological innovation in a production arena to meet demand 
sustainably. The common consensus though is that infrastructure possesses several 
inherent characteristics such as technical, economic, social and political that would 
determine its functionality. These characteristics are also in a seamless web with the 
organisational and institutional structures that supports the infrastructure. Therefore, 
there must be a balance of action on these factors for an optimal performance of the 
infrastructure resulting from complex interaction of characteristics. Hence, analysing 
infrastructure from a system perspective (Markard, 2011).  
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Finger et al. (2005) argues that infrastructures exhibit key features, which includes: (a) 
they are physically network based, that contribute to economic importance by being a 
conduit for goods and services. (b) Because they precipitate positive and negative 
external effects, increasing returns and networks effects, which often adopted 
traditional market failure approach cannot address, thus, often constituting a challenge 
to institutional governance. (c) It provides a service that meets social objectives and 
has a significant economic and political impact. These features suggest that 
infrastructures would require huge investment and precipitate sunk cost, asset 
specificity – investment in assets that cannot be efficiently relocated and exhibits social 
dependencies, which would all constitute barriers for structural change. Therefore, 
infrastructures are impossible for sudden transition, but rather they have tendencies 
for incremental change (Frantzeskaki and Loorbach, 2008). They also have path 
dependencies – changes along established paths (Bolton and Foxon, 2015) and the 
change could be caused by endogenous or exogenous factors. Endogenous factors 
may include environmental effect or persistent underfunding/underinvestment, while 
the exogenous factors could be state policy priorities, macroeconomic changes or 
reduced funding from/to the local authorities (Markard, 2011, Markard and Truffer, 
2006). Infrastructural changes which can lead to penetrative or transformative capacity 
take place through three broad routes (Jonsson, 2005, Frantzeskaki and Loorbach, 
2008): Firstly, system improvement – enhancement aimed at efficiency achieved 
through new/hybrid designs often from a top-down intervention. Secondly, system 
synergies – enhancement of production through coordination of different systems and 
scheduling i.e varying with the rate of usage of the infrastructure. Thirdly, social 
innovation – satisfying the needs of users through new processes or new social forms 
and its often a bottom-up intervention. 
Infrastructures have been broadly divided into three categories by Jonsson (2005) and 
Frantzeskaki and Loorbach (2008) namely: Distributive systems – Linking users from 
a central node, for instance, television, radio, water and electricity, Accumulative 
systems – process flow in opposite direction, i.e from users to a central mode such as 
sewer and waste disposal. The other is Communicative systems – multidirectional 
flow, for instance, telecom, transportation systems and mail systems. Drawing upon 
the taxonomy above, CHP-DH system can be considered a distributive system as it’s 
an infrastructure-based system consisting of nodes (CHP plants) and linkages that 
connect these nodes (DH networks) to supply electricity and heat energy (Loorbach 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, these infrastructures function under organisational and 
institutional structures. Such as laws, market structures, regulatory and legislative 
frameworks, governance structures and role of public authorities. Therefore, the 
integration of these elements with the hardware component (infrastructure) function 
together to deliver the electricity and heat to the public. Suggesting that infrastructures 
would require governance to function to achieve its purpose.  
However, firstly, governance of infrastructure often emphasises on the asset specificity 
of the technology, rather than being part of a system (Finger et al., 2005). The 
consideration for governance of infrastructure as part of the system is borne out of the 
socio-political significance it may hold as a public goods/service provider. This means 
that infrastructure provides good/services that should be affordable, reliable and 
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accessible to all within the geographical coverage. Thus, suggesting the necessity of 
a partial or direct involvement of the hierarchies of governance (state and LAs) in the 
operation or management with a view to determine the desired social or economic 
objectives. This also suggest the reason why infrastructures are often strongly 
regulated, which impacts on the transformation (Markard, 2011), though (Finger et al., 
2005) has argued for three different types of coordination mechanism. They include: 
centralized coordination – top down approach, decentralized coordination – distributed 
decision making from various actors and lastly, peer-to-peer coordination – self 
coordination through self-selected actors or bilateral contracts. Secondly, under 
market failure conditions private investment is often scarce for infrastructures, 
because of the presence of free riders that may benefit from the infrastructure without 
payment or unaccounted market benefits and the constant demand for expansion due 
to increase in demand (Finger et al., 2005). Thirdly, the usual framework of analysis 
of infrastructures is often either considered as technological or institutional problem. 
Therefore, to properly conceptualise an infrastructure such as CHP-DH system with a 
view to fully capture the various characteristics to be able to analyse its performance 
or diffusion, the various components - technological (hardware) and institutional 
(software) factors, must be considered together as a system. (Markard, 2011, 
Künneke et al., 2010). 
The interaction of the varying components (hardware and software) to achieve the 
desired goal of an infrastructure has been commonly conceptualised to mean 
sociotechnical systems but the study of how the penetrative and transformative 
capacity develops has been explained from broadly three holistic approaches of 
science and technology literatures. Namely as Large Technical System (LTS) 
(Jonsson, 2005, Loorbach et al., 2010, Joerges, 1988, Hughes, 1993, Hughes, 1987, 
Mayntz and Hughes, 1988, Van der Vleuten, 2004, Giikalp, 1992), socio-technical 
transitions – Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) (Bulkeley et al., 2014, Bolton and Foxon, 
2015, Geels and Schot, 2007, Elzen et al., 2004b, Geels et al., 2004, Geels, 2002), 
and Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) (Bergek et al., 2010, Smith, 2005b, 
Bergek et al., 2015, Markard et al., 2015, Hekkert and Negro, 2009). Consequently, a 
broad discussion on these three theories shall be undertaken below, with a further 
comparison to determine the analytical framework to take forward. 
3.2 Large Technical Systems (LTS) 
 
The concept of Large Technical Systems (LTS) has been developed to capture the 
features and dynamics of infrastructures as a socio-technological system that evolves 
over a long time arising from a seamless web of various components and also seeks 
to specifically separates its analytical framework from other social systems. For 
instance, the LTS framework shares similar insight with the Social Construction of 
Technological Systems (SCOT) which places more emphasis on history and 
sociology, while LTS places more emphasis on system analysis and on material 
infrastructures – sometimes referred to as infra-systems (Ewertsson and Ingelstam, 
2004 pg:293-294). A leading influence on the LTS framework was Thomas Hughes, a 
historian of technology, who attempted to see the electricity sector from the lens of 
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LTS because he considers technological systems as complex systems that are 
constructed and shaped socially. In part because, LTS is developed by human 
construct and made up of systematic interaction of not only the technology but the 
non-physical artefacts. Such as regulations, investment bank, environment, business 
cultures, organisations, political actors and so on (Hughes, 1987). The LTS concept 
models the technological system to evolve through a life cycle of invention, 
development, innovation, transfer, growth, competition and consolidation, though not 
in any order.  
Hughes (1987) conception of the causal analysis of the structural tension within a 
technological system that may inhibit or induce growth or expansion is seen from three 
perspectives, namely: Load factor, Reverse salient and Momentum. Load factor seeks 
to explain system growth from a techno-economic perspective, for instance the rate of 
return on investment. Reverse salient are critical problems that emerge within the 
system, often unexpectedly as the system expands, such as technical 
/institutional/organisational anomalies, which requires intervention for system growth. 
When the problem cannot be resolved or addressed its considered a radical problem 
that may require a new or competing system. While, momentum is the concept 
associated with systems that have grown and consolidated over time (critical mass), 
acquired velocity (rate of growth) and direction of growth, but appears to be 
autonomous – out of control. He opines that mature systems appear to be 
institutionalized “inertia to motion”. In part because of the path dependencies of actors 
or system culture, but in practice the direction of the acquired momentum could be 
redirected by external forces, such as political or environmental. Therefore, load 
factors and reverse salient are considered as mainly internal dynamics, while 
momentum reflects external effects (Joerges, 1988)  
Another critical concept of LTS is the system builder, who is the dominant actor rather 
than the designers (Joerges, 1988). These system builders could be entrepreneurial 
professionals, politicians or regulators that play the core role of increasing the size of 
LTS due to their ability to coordinate all actors and bring them to the same page with 
a view to foster unity of purpose within the system and address system problems by 
providing the link between system performance and system goals (Hughes, 1987). 
The LTS concept has been applied by various authors on different types of 
infrastructures. Such as Davies (1996) for Telecommunication sector and Markard and 
Truffer (2006) who examined the effect of liberalization in the electricity supply system 
and suggested that liberalization as an external stimulus triggered a radical innovation 
process in the electricity sector. They also went ahead to mention four selection 
environment that can trigger a radical innovation in LTS namely: external and internal 
developments, reverse salients and government policies. However, (Markard, 2011) 
argues that LTS framework is not sufficiently equipped to explain the likely disruptive 
effects and how the sector would respond to external pressures. Such as selective 
pressures resulting from oil crisis that would impact on input prices or technological 
discontinuity - adopting new technologies to change market position. Such as in the 
application of gas turbine in the electricity generation which was first applied in the 
aircraft industry. Furthermore, Magnusson (2012) also attempted to analysis the 
current and future trends of the Swedish DH sector using the LTS framework, but 
50 | P a g e  
 
cautioned that LTS lacks the capacity to fully distinguish the system growth potentials 
of different grid based systems. He argues that LTS may suffice for electricity and gas 
networks as they can grow over distance due to low energy losses but that is not the 
case for DH networks, which exhibits high heat losses of 5-10% and to even as high 
as 30% in lower density systems. In part because, losses in electricity is largely 
determined by the volume of power and demand, while heat loss is largely determined 
by the ambient temperature and pipe insulation, which has a significant impact on 
expansion decision due to the cost and efficiency (Orchards, 2013, Persson and 
Werner, 2011). Therefore Magnusson (2012) opines that the conceptual narrative from 
LTS of systems interconnectivity resulting into national or international systems like 
the Nordic grid, which hinges on system geographical growth to new areas to meet 
demand and gain from economies of scale may seem impossible on DH systems.  
Further challenges of the application of LTS have been enumerated by Ewertsson and 
Ingelstam (2004). These include: a) The strong focus of LTS on heroic actors such as 
system builders at the detriment of less visible actors whose action may have 
influenced the development of the system. b) The desire of LTS to portray the 
development of a system as well-controlled in an orderly manner with little attention to 
the inherent chaos or uncertainty in system building. c) The fluidity of system 
boundaries in LTS, as it considers the system boundaries to be constantly changing 
and thus difficult in delineating system boundaries.  
3.3 Socio-technical Transition - MLP 
 
Lately, any innovation process of an infrastructure is bound to exhibit the following 
characteristics. Such as economic growth, technological change, societal benefit and 
environmentally sustainable. This has become another lens which policy makers look 
through to formulate policies, given the concern that diffusion of technologies may 
mean diffusion of side effects and what is the relationship of this growth to the 
environment and natural resources. Hence, Misa (1994) argues for a framework for 
integrating the social shaping of technology and the technological shaping of society, 
thus the evolution of concepts like the socio-technical transitions.  
Transition theory is an alternative framework for sociotechnical systems, which seeks 
to capture not just the technological changes but changes in other elements that make 
up the system. Such as regulations, demand, institutions, social networks and so on. 
The concept of transition was originally used to describe changes in phases, such as 
going from solid to liquid to gas, but has been further applied to describe shifts in 
qualitative state and recently applied in ecology, psychology, technological studies, 
economics (Loorbach et al., 2010).  
Therefore, transition theory combines research from technical, social and historical 
analysis to understand past and future technological changes of a sociotechnical 
system based on interaction at three different levels: Socio-technical regimes, 
technological niches and socio-technical landscape (Foxon et al., 2008a, Rotmans et 
al., 2001). They summarise the functionality of these levels as follows: Landscapes 
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(macro level) entail the physical infrastructure, non-physical elements, such as political 
culture, socio-cultural values, macro economy, institutions and natural environment. 
Socio-technical regimes (meso level) refers to the set of rules, shared assumptions 
and beliefs that govern interactions of the various elements imbedded within the socio-
technical system. While the technological niches (micro level) refers to the actors, local 
practice and technologies. Hence, transition framework seeks to explain technological 
changes and how to anticipate and manage future transition processes by 
investigating the dynamic interaction at these three levels (Greenacre et al., 2012). 
There are three common variants of the transition theory, which includes: Multi-Level 
Perspective (MLP), Transition Management and Socio-technical Scenarios, but the 
broader and more widely adopted approach is the MLP approach (Bolton and Foxon, 
2015, Smith et al., 2010). The early proponents of MLP are Dutch scholars who 
combined studies from institutional theory, sociology of technology and evolutionary 
economics to apply hierarchical levels of innovation through a multi-level perspective 
to explain the past and future dynamics of socio-technical change (Geels, 2004a 
pg:33, Rip and Kemp, 1998, Rotmans et al., 2001, Geels and Schot, 2007)  
The MLP emphasises on the interaction of three system levels. Namely, micro level 
niches, meso level socio-technical regimes and macro level landscapes. A broad 
discussion of these levels is undertaken below. 
Micro Level Niches: This is considered the source where radical innovations are 
generated and are often carried out by small networks of dedicated actors which are 
typically outside or fringe actors e.g environmental activist (Geels and Schot, 2007). 
At this level, the niches (e.g technological projects, emerging technologies), which are 
initially unstable and with low performance act as the change room of the socio-
technical system or incubation rooms for new technologies or social practice. Hence, 
they are protected spaces for experimentation against normal market selection 
pressures or enable emergence of radical innovations (Schot, 1998, Kemp et al., 
1998). Small networks of actors provide protection because they are willing to invest 
in the development of new technologies which would create spaces for crucial internal 
processes like learning processes – learning-by-doing, learning-by-using, and 
learning-by-interaction and building of social networks, (Verbong and Geels, 2007). 
Transition of technology and market share do not only happen at this level but other 
elements of the socio-technical systems evolve as well such as infrastructure, 
networks, and regulation (Greenacre et al., 2012). Resulting in niche accumulation 
that would enable diffusion to increase market share which will eventually compete 
and overthrow the incumbent (Geels and Schot, 2007). 
Meso Level Socio-Technical Regimes: These are the stable structures that govern 
the interaction of actors, institutions and other elements of the sociotechnical system 
with a view to provide stability and reinforce the existing system. The aligned activities 
due to interaction between the elements that span the production – consumption 
divide, such as scientist, engineers, policy makers, investment, normative, users, 
usually trigger incremental innovation to provide stability (Geels and Schot, 2007). 
Therefore, the regime level places more emphasis on optimization rather than 
transformation since incremental innovation is being generated at this level. The 
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stability in the regime precipitates path dependency and lock-in due to the interlinked 
trajectories of firms. However, firms may not share similar cognitive routines, such as 
technological search, problem definitions, belief systems, guiding principles, which 
may lead the trajectories of technological change to be misaligned and precipitate 
tension resulting in instability in the regime (Geels, 2004a pg:34, Greenacre et al., 
2012). Socio-technical regimes typically consist of three nested elements (Verbong 
and Geels, 2007): (a) network of actors and social groups, (b) rules that govern 
interaction - formal (regulations, standards, laws), normative (value and norms 
pattern), cognitive and (c) tangible elements - physical infrastructures.   
Macro Level Landscapes: These are the external environmental factors that usually 
represents the broader political coalitions, socio-cultural values, macro-economic and 
institutions that form deep structural trends of a society (Foxon, 2011). They are 
heterogenous factors that can influence the niches and socio technical regimes with 
the potential to cause shock and surprises to the system, such as wars, rising oil 
prices, environmental problems (Geels, 2004a pg:34). These factors exert slow 
changing effects on the sociotechnical system which could take decades and therefore 
more resistance to change. However, if changes occur in the system, it starts from the 
niche level and expands through regimes and possibly leading to landscape 
transformation (Greenacre et al., 2012).                             
The application of MLP is conducted through the interaction of the aligned activities at 
these three levels (macro, meso and micro) to provide a global map of the entire 
transition process of the infrastructure. Geels and Schot (2007) summarized how 
transitions are introduced through the interactions of the levels in MLP framework. (a) 
Internal momentum is built up by niche innovations through the processes of learning, 
improvement of price/performance and supports from networks. (b) a downward 
pressure is created on the regime by landscape, which destabilizes the regime to 
create opportunities for niche innovation to compete and displace the incumbent 
regime. Therefore, the beginning of transition is often when the regime begins to show 
serious problems that would trigger key innovations at the niche to allow for transition 
of the technology to take place and the end of the transition process is when the new 
regime has taken hold or socially embedded and this process usually takes decades 
(Genus and Coles, 2008).                      
The concept of MLP has in no doubt broaden the conceptualisation of transitions of 
infrastructures (and other artefacts) to new socio-technical systems drawing on 
contributions from various levels that constitute the framework of its existence and 
technological change. Such as cultural patterns, markets, economy, political, 
environment and social activist. However, it has not been without its criticisms. For 
instance MLP has been generally criticised for the inconsistent conceptual framing, 
the relative neglect of agency, the over emphasis on niches as drivers of system 
change, and less attention on plurality of niches (Genus and Coles, 2008, Berkhout et 
al., 2004, Smith et al., 2010) and more importantly the silence on cost and economic 
factors or business strategies on technological innovation (Foxon, 2011, Alkemade et 
al., 2011). For instance, in a study by Fouquet (2010) on 14 past energy transitions in 
the UK, which includes the heating, power and lighting sectors. He notes that the 
dominant drivers for energy transition in the UK were cheaper price and better service. 
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In particularly, the key driver for the heating sector for technological change was 
cheaper price while better service was the main driver in the power sector. Suggesting 
that economic factors could be critical for adoption and diffusion of technology, which 
has been given less emphasis in transition studies than social groups (Fouquet, 2010). 
Other scholars have also opined that lack of consensus on the functional distinction 
between the levels make the perspective extremely difficult to operationalize (Genus 
and Nor, 2007). However, Geels and Schot (2007) argues that both regimes and 
niches have similar kinds of structure depending on the scale and stability, since both 
(regimes and niches) have features of community interaction or organisations. 
Nonetheless, Bulkeley et al. (2014) notes that since the socio-technical regimes are 
considered to be operating at the national, while niches are considered to be at the 
local, where the management, negotiation and contestation will take place is vague, 
considering that the concept regards them to be in continuous interaction. 
Furthermore, they opine that since niches are considered to be in bounded and 
protected spaces within the regime, the MLP concept de-emphasises the extent of 
political tension that may ensue in practice due to conflicts and contestation. 
Suggesting that similarity does not mean the same. Geels et al. (2008) also agrees 
that MLP has not sufficiently captured the socio-political processes between 
governance hierarchies. A not too distant example is the introduction of an energy 
policy by London Borough of Merton in 2003 requiring all new non-residential 
developments above 1000m2 to make provision for at least 10% of its energy 
requirement from a renewable energy source, but the state initially considered it an 
affront to its role in pivoting energy policy (Keirstead and Schulz, 2010). 
Furthermore, on the operationalization of the levels in the MLP concept, Geels (2004a 
pg:35-36) notes that the structuration of activities of niches are localized, vague and 
loose, because of the weak coordination of the multitude of experimentation by niche 
actors, but with stronger coordination at the regime and strongest coordination at the 
landscape. However, with respect to CHP-DH systems, a recent report by UNEP 
(2015) suggests that Local Authorities are in the best position to be global champions 
to facilitate the diffusion of DH systems. In part because of their frontline role to 
promote social, economic and environmental wellbeing of their community. 
Additionally, DH systems are geographically localized centralized heating system with 
typically no national interconnectivity due to efficiency and heat losses. Therefore, the 
demand for strong coordination of multifarious actors locally is imperative for the 
diffusion of CHP-DH systems. This suggest that the operationalization of MLP on the 
diffusion of CHP-DH systems may be less practical. This is further collaborated by 
Winskel et al. (2012) when they argue that MLP has more emphasis on the nature of 
the technology development and technology systems in their socio-historical context 
rather than technical or economic imperatives. 
Finally, in a recent summary by Smith et al. (2010) of a workshop by network of 
researchers on the MLP concept. They concluded that the MLP concept is still vague 
on a number of issues. For instance, how would niche actors perform as political actors 
in such a way that they can shape the space so as to prosper through ways like, 
technical standards, finance, regulatory frameworks and engaging with agendas of 
public policy. This is in addition to other multiple challenges like impact of geography 
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(territorial or boundary jurisdictions) on transitions or governance of transitions. 
Concluding, it recommended that the MLP concept is still work in progress that 
requires further work to capture more cross disciplines that influences transitions of 
socio-technical systems. 
 3.4 Innovation Systems  
 
Economists like Lundvall (2007) and Saviotti (2005 pg:181) tend to agree that 
innovation theory can be traced back to Schumpeter’s “Theory of economic 
development” (Schumpeter, 1934) that established that the major drivers behind 
economic development are organisations or entrepreneurs who create competition by 
using new processes, raw material, industrial structures and markets to implement or 
deliver new products thereby creating the difference between what is popular and what 
is new. Edquist (1999) further clarifies that in as much as innovation may lead to the 
entrance of a new product to the market, it could as well be the introduction of a new 
process for an existing product. This definition could include new and innovative ways 
to govern CHP-DH systems for economic development.  
Innovation systems draw from the field of evolutionary theories in economics, which is 
characterised by two major strands that describes its concept. Firstly, that within an 
economic structure, elements change with time, suggesting that they are dynamic and 
are renewed randomly. Secondly the long-time growth of the economic system is 
crucially determined by technological change, institutional change and financial 
market (Dosi and Nelson, 1994). Therefore, innovation system is a concept that links 
innovation to economic growth using an evolutionary approach (Nelson and Sidney, 
1982), which seeks economic growth through creation of industrial structures, 
competition amongst firms, and products. This process is underpinned by the 
interaction of institutions through shared knowledge that is often bounded by 
regulations and laws (Carlsson, 2006, Metcalfe, 1997) and can be used as a practical 
tool to innovate policies (Lundvall, 2007).  
Innovation systems could stimulate economic growth and it typically captures three 
vital components that interact together to achieve innovation, these includes actors, 
networks and institutions (Bergek et al., 2008b, Hekkert et al., 2007b, Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004). 
Actors: These are organisations, firms, entrepreneurs, or agents that are 
technically, financially or politically relevant to the extent of influencing the 
development and diffusion of the technology (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). 
For instance, in the case of CHP-DH systems in the UK, they may include 
universities, hospitals or other site owners, developers of CHP-DH systems, 
DH pipe suppliers, or CHP suppliers. 
Networks: These are opportunities and routes created amongst the 
constellation of actors to transfer knowledge and experience to shape the 
process and diffusion trajectory of the technology. They are often built around 
markets but sometimes non-markets as well to share information with a view to 
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influence actors decisions and setting up of institutions to guide the process 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004) and they are also more informal than formal 
(Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991). An example of a network within the UK CHP-
DH system is the Association for Decentralised Energy (ADE), UK District 
Energy Association (UKDEA) or Creative Finance Network 
Institutions: These are the umpires or arbiters of the system who stipulate the 
rules and regulate the interactions between actors with a view to either 
influence the direction of the rate of diffusion through incentives or through 
demand structures (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Edquist, 1999). They also 
provide mitigations against conflicts, apply sanctions and gauge the system 
dynamics through feedbacks from both the actors and market, and can provide 
incentives to signpost actors and define selection environment (Carlsson and 
Stankiewicz, 1991, Carlsson et al., 2002). Therefore, they may take several 
forms depending on their role in the system in stimulating development or 
diffusion. These include political institutions, market institutions, economic 
institutions or trade institutions (Edquist and Johnson, 2005 pg:50), for example 
in the UK CHP-DH context, the UK energy regulator, the Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets (Ofgem). 
Innovation is not spontaneously generated by the components or generated in 
isolation but rather by the interaction of the components within the structure, 
suggesting that it possess the capacity to change over time depending on the relations 
between the components. Innovation systems are characterised by a number of vital 
features. Firstly, learning processes – learning is at the heart of innovation systems 
and can encompass various modes of learning, including: 
 learning by searching – learning through formal education and research and 
development (R&D) (Edquist, 2005 pg:16); 
 learning by doing – reduction of unit cost of production resulting from market 
growth (Winskel et al., 2012, Smith, 2000); 
 learning by using – Increase in experience in using by consumers/demand 
instigating increase in productivity and diffusion (McWilliams and Zilbermanfr, 
1996); and 
 learning by interaction – interaction between demand and supply actors to 
innovate production (Edquist, 2005 pg:16). Learning processes emphasis on 
knowledge transfer and development processes to foster innovation which is a 
key ingredient for the system to survive over time by reducing uncertainties and 
increasing diffusion.  
Secondly, Innovation systems are holistic and strongly interdependent with other 
components or agents within as they depend on the interactive and complex relations, 
allowing for inclusiveness of the litany of actors such as social, political, institutional or 
organisations actors (Edquist, 2005 pg:17).  
Thirdly, the agents are rational but are bounded by their limitation and capabilities to 
perceive future technological growth, which means the innovation system will be 
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characterised by uncertainty because of the unknown solutions to the techno-
economic problems (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991, Ehrnberg and Jacobsson, 2005 
pg:322) 
The components of innovation systems interact to deliver outcomes depending on the 
performance of the various elements within the system. The combination of the 
performance of these elements could determine if the system has stimulated 
innovation or not. This suggests that these elements could reveal that the system is 
not performing, and a system failure may have occurred which may warrant 
Government/policy intervention (Edquist, 1999, Smith, 2000). However, Governments 
often intervene on technological change with governance mechanisms and policies 
based on market failure by focusing on removal or reduction of market barriers 
(Metcalfe, 1995, Nilsson et al., 2007). For instance, in responding to the challenges of 
the heating industry in the UK, the government suggest that its primary concern is to 
eliminate the market barriers by developing the right framework to facilitate entrance 
to market by reducing transaction cost (DECC, 2013a).  
This market failure approach to address infrastructural challenges has been severally 
criticised for not sufficiently appropriating the externalities such as knowledge 
generation which are not reflected in market transactions but attracts a cost as the 
market is driven by competitive prices (Smith, 2000). This means that the market will 
not allocate the right volume of resources to stimulate the required innovation to steer 
technological change. In part because infrastructures are known to be large scale 
capital goods producer with multiusers that often requires public provision or 
intervention (Smith, 2005b, Finger et al., 2005). Suggesting that market alone cannot 
provide the resources required for development of infrastructure to create economic 
development due to its the public good attribute (Metcalfe, 1995). Thus, the essence 
of an innovation system failure framework that may warrant Government/policy 
intervention based on the socio-technical peculiarities of an infrastructure. Drawing 
upon Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) and (Foxon, 2007 pg:131-133) system failure 
framework, the four major characteristics of a system failure are: 
 Infrastructural Failure: These are the failures of the physical infrastructures 
that actors within the system require to function, such as communication (ICT, 
broadband) energy systems (energy networks and supply), road, transport and 
sciences (knowledge and possibility for knowledge transfer). These 
infrastructures are usually of a scale that requires substantial capital outlay and 
long operational periods that the private sector may not be attracted to invest 
in due to low returns so may require public intervention to meet actors demand. 
For instance, the grid bottlenecks which is restricting power flow of about 
2.2GWe from Scotland to England makes it difficult for CHPs to get connection 
offers on time (Hammond and Pearson, 2013).  
 Institutional Failure: These may be in the form of either formal institutional 
failure (regulatory frameworks and agencies from both the private and public) 
or informal institutional failures (political culture and social values that implicitly 
informs the behaviour of actors). These institutions shape the economic 
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behaviour and interaction of actors and therefore can block the stimulation of 
innovation and offer the rationale for policy intervention. 
 Network Failure: Network failure could result from either a weak or too strong 
interaction between actors in a network. A too strong interaction of actors in a 
network could result from path dependency due to asset specificity, high 
switching cost or market dominance leading to lock-in by incumbents. While 
weak interaction may arise from poor alignment between the technology and 
institutions. Therefore, the extent of dominance of either the incumbents or the 
technology may provide the impetus for policy intervention to allow for new 
entrants within the same technological system. 
 Transitional Failures: These failures are associated with existing firms, 
especially with small firm’s failure to adapt to technological changes and market 
demands due to limitation in terms of capabilities and competencies since their 
core focus is usually on the technology with which they are experienced and 
skilled in. Therefore, public intervention may help these firms to overcome such 
barriers. 
3.4.0 Types of Innovation systems 
Several commentators have proposed various versions of innovation systems to 
depict demarcations depending on the purpose of study. The common versions are 
national systems innovation, regional systems innovation, sectorial systems 
innovation and technological system innovation. Below are broad discussions on each 
type of innovation system outlining the perimeter for each mode. 
3.4.1 National Innovation System (NIS) 
National Innovation systems arose as a result of the concern of innovation system 
failure to address the lack of emphasis of the measure of leaning activities amongst 
the array of institutions in a national economy as a whole. This is as a result knowledge 
resulting from patents and number of R&D, considering that countries have varying 
technological change pattern. Therefore it may be pertinent to capture innovation 
systems at a national level with a view to access and compare innovations of the 
elements within the innovation process of an economy or country (Patel and Pavitt, 
1994, OECD, 1997). The key demarcation is capturing innovation between elements 
of innovation structure that share common geographical boundaries, culture, 
language, history and socio-political institutions (Breschi and Malerba, 2005 pg:130) 
Literature is rich in providing explicit definitions of NIS from various commentators 
such as Freeman (1995), Lundvall (1998), Metcalfe (1995), Patel and Pavitt (1994) 
and many more. However this research identifies with the definition by Patel and Pavitt 
(1994) which stresses the importance of a geographical boundary of a country in a 
NIS structure “the national institutions, their incentive structures and their 
competencies, that determine the rate and direction of technological learning (or the 
volume and composition of change-generating activities) in a country.” (Patel and 
Pavitt, 1994). 
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However, others have criticised the NIS for not being sufficiently capable of comparing 
countries systemically (Balzat and Hanusch, 2004) due to its greater focus on firms 
and technology, which Groenewegen and Steen (2006) has suggested that it may 
need to be more focused on socio-political institutions and their dynamism. Hekkert et 
al. (2007b) also suggested that mapping the dynamics of NIS may be difficult due to 
the complexity and size of actors, network relations and institutions. 
3.4.2 Regional Innovation System (RIS) 
Regional innovation systems can be likened to NIS except that in RIS innovation and 
diffusion results from interaction of actors in a local technological system. Another 
point of comparison is that the actors in both NIS and RIS share similar socio-cultural 
and political institutions but in RIS, it’s delineated in a technological cluster within a 
country or local geographical area. This concept is largely attributed to the work of 
Cooke and his colleagues in the late 1990s who argued that territories smaller than a 
state sharing similar socio-cultural, political institutions and economic cohesiveness, 
that differentiates them from the other regions could gain from geographical proximity 
to reduce transaction cost of innovation and limit uncertainties through local learning 
networks (Cooke et al., 1998).  
The distinctive feature of RIS is the formation of geographic clusters or industrial areas 
resulting from collective knowledge of firms that are in the same or related technology. 
This precipitates fast information flows, coordinated investment and knowledge spill 
over to increase the rate of diffusion of the technology which is underpinned by shared 
culture and values (Ehrnberg and Jacobsson, 2005) 
However, RIS may exhibit potential for strong networks (Ehrnberg and Jacobsson, 
2005) or too strong interaction of actors which may precipitate lock-in resulting from 
path dependency leading to the failure of the system to innovate (Foxon, 2007 pg:132, 
Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Maskell (1996) also argues that it’s difficult to reproduce 
the economic environment partly due to knowledge embeddedness. 
3.4.3 Sectorial Innovation System (SIS) 
 
The concept of sectoral innovation systems (SIS) was developed by Franco Breschi 
and his colleagues in the late 1990s (Lundvall, 2007) in an attempt to capture 
innovation between industries of the same technological regime. The concept of SIS 
distinguishes itself through more focus on vertical interaction and less on actors 
outside its cluster of industries (Carlsson et al., 2002). Therefore, there is little focus 
on interdependence of actors but rather industries with similar technological 
opportunities, capacity and knowledge trajectories seek to interact, irrespective of 
geographical location and compete amongst themselves or inter-regional competition. 
In order words geographical proximity often plays little role in fostering innovation 
amongst industries since knowledge is standardised and codified systematically for 
knowledge transmission and access to actors (Breschi and Malerba, 2005 pg:137). 
This characteristic of clustering of innovators at a much higher geographical scale than 
the regional concepts may have led to the suggestion that it is the bridge between RIS 
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and NIS (Cooke et al., 1998). SIS has been used in a variety of conditions (Malerba, 
2005, Malerba, 2002, Breschi and Malerba, 2005). 
3.4.4 Technological Innovation System (TIS) 
 
This concept was championed by Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991) in the early 1990s 
to focus on a particular techno-economic area or industry, as with CHP-DH technology 
in this research. They defined TIS as a dynamic network of agents interacting in a 
specific economic/ industrial area under a particular institutional infrastructure and 
involved in the generation, diffusion, and utilization of technology (Carlsson and 
Stankiewicz, 1991). Secondly TIS captures both vertical and horizontal agents that 
play a role in the development and diffusion of the technology (Breschi and Malerba, 
2005 pg:131). Suggesting the inclusive recognition of social-political actors in addition 
to the techno-economic actors in innovative activities and influencing the selection 
environment. Nonetheless the number of actors, networks and institutions in a TIS is 
usually smaller than in an NIS even if both have geographical and cultural proximity 
due to the greater complexity and interaction of NIS it has more agents in the 
innovation system component than TIS (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991, Hekkert et 
al., 2007b). Early applications of TIS had captured the systems dynamics of matured 
infrastructures and whole sector technological systems that impact on socio-economic 
growth, such as telecommunication industry, Pharmaceutical industry, electronics and 
computer technology (Carlsson, 1997).  
TIS captures two key determinants of the interaction between agents. Firstly, the 
economic competencies of the agents – the ability of the agents to take opportunities 
that the market provides, and this competency is cumulative. Secondly, the economic 
competencies are acquired through the knowledge network - learning processes, 
which permeates the industry in a view to impact on the adoption and diffusion of the 
technology. This indicates that market formation is a key driver of the TIS processes 
amongst the structural components bringing to fore the essence of technology push – 
market entrance of firms and demand pull – market formation by user/consumers 
within the institutional infrastructure which will shape the processes and couple the 
technology with the market (Hendry et al., 2008 pg:114). Therefore, activities or 
barriers that may hinder technologies from taking advantage of the opportunities that 
the market provides may be considered a market failure. 
Drawing on the market failures that can be deduced from an innovation system by 
Jaffe et al. (2005), the low rate of diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK can be 
attributed to a number of market failures/barriers as enumerated in chapter 2. These 
also includes: firstly, the unpriced value of carbon reduction in the process of energy 
generation compared to other conventional processes which CHP-DH offers as a 
public good drawing on the negative externalities of GHG on the climate. Secondly is 
the selection environment the energy system impacts on CHP-DH systems. Such as 
lack of heat grid(s), mature gas grid used for domestic heating, heat governance 
structures and barriers to electricity grid connection, all of which favour the incumbent 
technologies. Thirdly, the asymmetry of information in the UK CHP-DH industry - 
where there is not even a complete database of CHP-DH systems - seems to inevitably 
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lead to increases in transaction cost for new entrants. The removal of market barriers 
to perpetuate economic growth is a vital ingredient of innovation, including other non-
market failures that are inherent in the system such as network or institutional failures 
which the TIS seeks to provide a systemic view of entire process of innovation. 
Therefore, TIS seeks to capture the production – consumption wide elements that 
influence the transformation of a specific socio-technical system, which compliments 
the general challenge of policies deduced from IS approach, that focuses more on the 
optimization of institutional environment of the innovation process of firms (Weber and 
Rohracher, 2012). 
The structural components of TIS is usually characterised by dynamics that interact 
with internal and external factors to influence the adoption and diffusion of the 
technology (Bergek et al., 2008b pg:88-89). For instance, institutional change arising 
from the Treasury’s removal of the CCL tax exemption on exported electricity earlier 
enjoyed by CHP is an example of an internal structural factor that can influence the 
diffusion of CHP-DH systems. While the seemly regulatory capture of the highly 
organised ‘big six’ energy companies on the energy market, such as the formation of 
codes through Elexon, which the ‘big six’ seeks to perpetuate their market dominance 
is an external factor that may impact the selection environment for CHP-DH systems. 
This suggests that actors in the TIS not only compete in the market but also compete 
to influence the institutions to enhance their survival, locking in their technology to the 
detriment of new entries (Bergek et al., 2008b pg:82). However, Markard and Truffer 
(2008a) argues that in delineating the system boundary, TIS framework considers the 
interaction of components within the system as more intense than the interaction 
between the system and the environment. This was further elaborated by Geels et al. 
(2008) who notes that TIS approach draws little distinction between internal and 
external factors since it views the system as an integrated system, but stresses that 
the role of external factors such as emission reduction targets, are very strong on 
sustainable energy systems. Coordination of policy activities has also been mentioned 
as a shortcoming of the innovation systems, as coordination is mainly referred to as 
the coordination of R&D actors, with less attention to coordination of horizontal and 
vertical policy activities/levels (Weber and Rohracher, 2012). Suggesting that TIS has 
not fully captured socio-political processes, since diffusion of technology is not only 
driven by market and legitimacy but also by socio-political processes between 
hierarchies of governance (state/LA) (Geels et al., 2008, Kern, 2015). Therefore, TIS 
is known to have analytical difficulties in terms of governance of sustainable 
technologies, especially as it relates to the effect of the dynamic interaction of 
exogenous factors to the core of the system (Smith et al., 2010).  
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3.5 Rationale for choice of Theoretical socio-technical framework 
 
CHP-DH systems as a network-based infrastructure that provides electricity and heat 
to the society, places it as systems that are crucial to the socio-economic fabric of the 
society. Not least because energy is the bone of industrialisation and economic 
growth, which contributes to the social being of any society. For instance, watching 
football matches with family and friends via televisions or warming our homes uses 
both electricity and heat energy. The unique features of CHP-DH system also played 
a crucial role in the selection of analytical concept. Such as DH networks are not 
typically scalable to have national or intercontinental connectivity like the electricity 
network, but the CHP system has the capacity to be a distributed and flexible electricity 
generation source. Suggesting its integrated features and the ability to use array of 
renewable sources of energy and low carbon fossil fuel like natural gas compared to 
coal, may have contributed to its consideration as part of the energy systems to 
contribute to UK’s energy sustainability ambitions. Additionally, CHP-DH system is a 
matured technologically but not commercially matured in the UK due to its poor 
penetration. 
Three approaches had been discussed with a view to capture insights on their 
suitability for offering analytical framework to answer the research objectives of this 
work. Namely: Large Technical Systems (LTS), Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) and 
Technological Innovation Perspective (TIS). All three have the capability to investigate 
infrastructures as socio-technical systems and capture the linkages of the 
heterogenous (technical and non-technical) elements within the system to effect 
technological changes. However, Geels (2004a pg:31) notes that’s LTS framework 
focuses on technological changes on emergence of new technologies but little on 
diffusion. More importantly, Magnusson (2012) had cautioned that LTS lacks the 
capacity to analyse DH systems because of the difficulty to conceptualize it as a local 
or centralized system with little or no national and international connectivity due to the 
inherent heat losses in expanding heat networks. 
Generally, both MLP and TIS seek to promote innovation in infrastructures that 
promote technological change, economic growth and sustainability, but their key policy 
focus differs (Alkemade et al., 2011). MLP policy objectives is concern with solving 
societal problems at an aggregated level, such as, climate change, energy systems, 
water management, transport, while TIS is more focused on improving the 
performance or penetration of specific technology with a view to contribute to 
economic growth (Weber and Rohracher, 2012). Secondly, MLP often seeks to 
replace the incumbent regime through a regime shift (change of existing production 
and consumption system), often resulting from niche accumulation through radical 
innovation in the micro/niche level. While, TIS policy often focuses on competency 
enhancement of selected technologies and strengthening of existing regimes (e.g 
regulations, standards or institutions) that would make such regimes more sustainable 
through incremental innovation (Alkemade et al., 2011). 
Even though all concepts (LTS, MLP or TIS) have been used extensively on various 
infrastructures. They all have been considered insufficient or evolving by various 
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scholars. Such as LTS (Geels, 2004a pg:31), TIS (Markard et al., 2015, Kern, 2015) 
and MLP (Smith et al., 2010, Geels, 2011). Hence, they can be considered work in 
progress. Therefore, the analytical choice is not of conceptual stability but rather on 
best fit because the conceptual choice shall mainly depend on the overarching 
objective of the research. The conceptual choice shall possess a diagnostic and 
exploratory characteristic to investigate the dynamic pattern of the penetration of CHP-
DH systems in the UK with a view to have insights into the barriers and drivers to its 
diffusion and utilization. Suggesting that, diagnosing, incremental innovation and 
enhancement of competencies is at the centre of the analysis considering that CHP-
DH as a matured technology, generates electricity which already has a regulatory 
institution overseeing matured electricity and gas grids but no heat regulation in UK. 
Furthermore, a system failure framework is sought that would investigate the poor 
penetration of CHP-DH systems and low market share in the electricity and heat 
sectors in the UK despite it being initially deployed decades ago. The essence of 
system failure framework is to justify the intervention by the hierarchies of governance. 
Therefore, drawing on narrative on the key characteristics of this research mentioned 
above, the TIS approach is alluring because it meets the desire of the research and 
will be adopted as the analytical framework going forward. This approach is simply 
heuristics, since it does not claim to offer a perfect solution to the status of CH-DH in 
the UK considering its analytical challenges. However, the TIS shall be complimented 
by integrating it with governance concept and this would serve as an integrated 
approach to provide insights into the attributes to its current state and potentially 
present governance measures that can influence the penetration of CHP-DH in the 
UK. 
3.6 Conceptual Framework for Governance 
  
In conceptual terms, the debate about governance cuts across various spheres of 
study ranging from public administration, political science, economic development, 
international relations, sociology, organisational management and many more, hence 
its proliferated definitions (Jessop, 2001, Rhodes, 2007, Offe, 2009, Börzel and Risse, 
2010, Bevir, 2011, Rhodes, 2012, Levi-Faur, 2012, Peters, 2012). The absence of 
consensus on the definition of governance largely depends on the discipline or debate 
the narrator leans on (Stoker, 1998, Jessop, 1998). However, many institutions have 
attempted to adopt governance concept in their activities to address collective 
concerns. For instance, the EU’s governance white paper sees governance as a way 
to strengthen “openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence” 
amongst members of the union (EU, 2001). The world bank defines governance as 
“the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority 
to shape public policy and provide public goods and services” (WB, 2007). In 
navigating through various definitions of governance, the underlying recurrent has 
been that governance largely refers to the interaction and coordination amongst 
multifarious actors to achieve a collective goal. 
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This research draws upon the definition of governance by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) because of its emphasis on the 
impact of interaction and coordination of the activities multifarious actors on innovation 
to achieve economic growth. The OECD defines governance as a process to broaden 
the role of government in innovation policy to capture more independent actors with a 
view to achieving more socio-economic growth (OECD, 2005a). It suggests that 
governance of innovation policy entails improved interaction and coordination between 
government and non-governmental actors since non-technological changes are as 
potent as technological changes in innovation policy (OECD, 2005a).  
The concept of governance emerges from four key iterations: processes (modes of 
social coordination of interaction and steering functions), structures (formal and 
informal Institutions and actors), mechanisms (Instruments of compliance and control) 
and strategies (design and adaptation of institutions and mechanism) (Börzel and 
Risse, 2010, Risse, 2012 pg:700, Levi-Faur, 2012 pg:8). The modes of coordination 
may be hierarchical such as top down decision making, inter-organisational, inter-
personal network, inter-systematic steering, (Jessop, 1998), or non-hierarchical such 
as negotiation, persuasion, social learning (Risse, 2012), and value chain integration 
(Griffiths et al., 2007). 
The discussion of governance typically revolves around three broad perspectives 
(state, market and society), as proponents struggle to out debate their opponents on 
the most appropriate type of governance to adopt. Firstly, governance can be seen 
from the position of the market, where market forces drive economic growth (Best, 
2001, Streeck, 1991). Lindblom (2002 pg:4) argues that all societies use markets, so 
the coordination of activities can be done through transactions. This is sometimes 
known as market-led governance, where the role of the state in decision making is 
limited and the transactions are governed by a market superintendent (Waarden, 2012 
pg:358). The second perspective is state-led governance, where the state takes a 
steering role (gathering of information, making of ground rules and enforcement) and 
rowing role (service delivery, distribution and taxes) (Levi-Faur, 2012 pg:14, Osborne, 
1993) in governing the market and society. Proponents of state-led governance 
suggest policies will be more effective if they emanate from the state, especially in the 
present era of globalisation and global threats, largely due to the huge capacity of the 
state to make and enforce rules (Offe, 2009).  
Thirdly, others see the state as not capable of formulating public policies and as such 
they advocate “unravelling” (Hooghe and Marks, 2003), or “unbundling” (Pollitt and 
Talbot, 2004) of the state to allow for only rowing. Some refer to this as the “hollowing 
out” of the state, suggesting the devolution of state powers horizontally to non-
hierarchical actors, such as networks, non-governmental organisations or vertically to 
regions, local authorities and political institutions (Jessop, 1998, Stoker, 1998, 
Rhodes, 2007). However, this form of governance reinstates a great deal of authority 
on the state in as much as it recognises the importance of non-government actors. 
This form of governance is sometime referred to as “big governance” (Levi-Faur, 2012 
pg:13) but often referred to as “governance networks” (Jessop, 1998, Rhodes, 2012 
pg:33-35, Rhodes, 1997, Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004, SØRensen and Torfing, 
2009, Torfing, 2012 pg:99-106)  
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The concept of governance networks emerged because of the desire of scholars to 
understand the role of the state in governance, given the failure of state and market-
led governance systems by incorporating actors from the private sector to participate 
in governance (Rose, 1996 pg:43). The key variance between state-led governance 
(the hierarchical control of the state), market-led governance (competitive regulation 
of the market) and governance network (regulated self-regulation) (Torfing, 2012 
pg:105, Jessop, 2001) is the degree of relationship between actors and mode of 
compliance. State led governance is known to have a unicentric command and control 
relationship with actors, while market led governance has multicentric relationship that 
makes it difficult for competitive markets to evolve but governance networks has 
pluricentric relationship (Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004). This suggests that the 
relationship between actors in governance networks involves more independent 
interaction of actors which entails a lot more negotiation and compromise to produce 
public goods. Compliance in the state-led governance is through legal sanctions, while 
in market-led governance, its often through economic sanctions, but compliance is 
achieved through trust, political obligation and jointly developed rules and regulations 
in governance network, thereby creating a sense of ownership amongst actors 
(Nielsen and Pedersen, 1988, SØRensen and Torfing, 2009).  
Governance networks are also credited as having more potential for proactive 
governance to collective problems and mitigations as market and state-led 
governance are considered too rigid and reactive, largely due to the complexity and 
multi-layered fashion of society (SØRensen and Torfing, 2009). Furthermore, 
governance networks entrench governance through regulatory instruments (Levi-
Faur, 2012 pg:13), it also encourages the development of technological innovations 
via actors internal capabilities, resources (Griffiths and Zammuto, 2005) and legitimacy 
(Börzel and Risse, 2010).  
However, in spite of its attractive contributions to governance, governance networks 
may exhibit risk of governance failure as networks are not formed spontaneously and 
may lead to undesired outcomes such as uninformed or wrong decisions (Torfing, 
2012 pg:107). Furthermore, they may have potential to undermine political 
competition, since there is no equal representation of actors but rather representation 
from a given sector or area, thereby making political and policy processes more open 
to capture (SØRensen and Torfing, 2009). 
The implementation of governance activities requires action and compromise by both 
the state and the market, since both lack capacity to achieve systemic economic 
growth (Offe, 2009). The state will have to give up some of their steering powers, which 
is top-down authority, while the market will have to give up some economic decision 
powers to achieve the desired systemic economic growth (Jessop, 1998). However 
because of the need to make and ensure the implementations of socially binding 
decisions, such as energy efficiency targets by LAs, this function best resides with the 
state and LA through corporation and coordination with other multifarious actors (Offe, 
2009).  
Furthermore, no actor can regulate the economy and society singlehandedly, partly 
because all actors are limited in capacity and knowledge (Torfing, 2012 pg:100). 
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Therefore Government/policy intervention may fail for a variety of reasons such as 
firstly, Government activities are enclaved in human relations which can be 
unpredictable (Jessop, 1998). Secondly the complex bureaucratic procedures, 
information asymmetries, political short sightedness and demarcation between the 
policy makers and policy benefactors can all offer recipe for a failed Government/policy 
intervention (Metcalfe, 1995). Therefore, the application of governance networks 
through interaction with horizontal actors which possess large knowledge resources 
to compliment the decision-making process can be the antidote to failure of 
Government/policy. 
Furthermore, in order to also harness the financial and knowledge capacity of non-
hierarchical actors, and the vital role of governance network in social regulations 
(Torfing, 2012 pg:99), the governance network perspective seems the preferred 
governance option as it captures the plurality of actors within the TIS of CHP-DH 
system in the UK and will henceforth be referred to in this research as just governance. 
3.7 Theoretical Analytical Framework 
3.7.1 Functions of Innovation Systems 
Innovation systems has been characterized to be analysed using a system failure 
framework, which seeks to be an alternative to the market failure approach in 
addressing infrastructural failures adopted by government/policy makers by capturing 
the components of the system that impacts on the system behaviour. The system 
failure approach typical depicts the failure of a socio-technical system into four distinct 
categories namely: infrastructural failure, network failure, institutional failure and 
Transitional failure (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005 pg:131-133, Foxon, 2007). However, 
this approach has often been criticised for only capturing the structural element of the 
system (actors, networks and institutions) and not paying enough attention to the 
system dynamics that determine the performance of the system which can be offered 
by the functional perspective of TIS (Bergek et al., 2008b, Bergek et al., 2010, Hekkert 
et al., 2007b). The TIS functional analytical approach seeks to capture both the 
structural and functional processes and seeks to explain how the socio-technical 
system work and performs in relation to the structure rather than how the system  is 
composed (Markard and Truffer, 2008b). 
Innovation does not occur in isolation largely due to the fact that it emerges over time 
under the influence of several factors (Edquist, 2005 pg:1) and in a complex interaction 
between the agents in the components, suggesting that it emerges through dynamic 
processes. The dynamic processes involve several activities which determine the 
outcome of the system innovation. However the outcome of the innovation processes 
such as high diffusion of technology is not the only criteria that determines if the system 
is functioning well or not (Hekkert and Negro, 2009). Since system innovation is not 
just about product innovation but also about process innovation in understanding the 
system as whole. 
Therefore, the TIS tool to assess the dynamic activities of the internal structures of the 
system (actors, networks and institution) is described as the system functions, which 
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seeks to bridge the gap between performance of the system and the structure (Bergek 
et al., 2008b pg:83). This functionality can be categorised into seven different functions 
or “activities” which are capable of influencing the performance of the system either 
positively or negatively so as to allow for insight of the impact of the various 
contributors on performance (Hekkert et al., 2007b, Hekkert and Negro, 2009, Bergek 
et al., 2008b, Bergek et al., 2008a). This functionality pattern can be deployed for 
various types of innovations system irrespective of the system delineation whether it 
is NIS or TIS, since the strength of the functionality framework lies more with the role 
of institutions (macro level) than the actions of the firms (micro levels) (Hekkert et al., 
2007b). The seven amalgamated categories of functions as discussed by various 
authors (Hekkert et al., 2007b, Hekkert and Negro, 2009, Bergek et al., 2008b, Bergek 
et al., 2008a) are detailed below: 
Function F1; Entrepreneurial Activities: Technology (or rather technology 
companies) seeks to permeate the market via actors taking on risk in the midst 
of market uncertainties to ensure that the technology is diffused and utilised. 
These actors are often entrepreneurs undertaking entrepreneurial activities 
which will leverage knowledge, networks and market to explore new business 
opportunities. They may be new entrants that have seen new market 
opportunities or incumbents that change their business models with a view to 
capture new business opportunities (Hekkert et al., 2007b, Bergek et al., 
2008b). This may include established large utilities that have ventured into 
CHP-DH systems or renewable energy generation.  
Function F2; Knowledge Development and Diffusion: Knowledge is at the 
heart of innovation and the most critical way of acquiring knowledge is through 
learning activities (Lundvall, 2007). Therefore, the development of knowledge 
and how actors receive it plays a major role in how a system innovates. A 
common way to develop knowledge is through research and development 
(R&D), while it can also be diffused to ensure market growth through various 
other processes of learning such as “learning by doing” or “learning by using” 
(McWilliams and Zilbermanfr, 1996). These processes may instigate market 
growth from cost reduction through learning-by-doing or be the driver for market 
growth through learning-by-research (Winskel et al., 2012). Others have also 
argued that knowledge spill over also contributes to the technology diffusion 
since innovation in a technology industry can arise from innovative activities in 
another organization, industry or country (Clarke et al., 2006).  
Function F3; Influence on the Direction of Search: Function (1) noted that 
firms create market growth through innovation in the midst of market 
uncertainties, but the entrance of these firms is strongly influenced by different 
motivations and expectations, including political, regulatory, environmental, or 
economic (Shane et al., 2003). These motivations could be created through 
incentives or mechanisms or interaction sufficient to direct firms to the market, 
with the expectations of meeting actors’ specific vision and targets. The 
culmination of different components within the TIS, which seeks to capture the 
processes of development, diffusion and utilization of the technology that could 
influence the direction of growth of the technology (Bergek et al., 2008b). 
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Function F4; Market Formation: A new or emerging technology will often have 
to compete with an established technology for market share, therefore for the 
technology to grow into a bridging market from its nursing market (Andersson 
and Jacobsson, 2000), it may require a protected space to allow it to grow 
(Hekkert et al., 2007b). This will afford the new or emerging technology space 
to develop knowledge and expectations. This typically happens through two 
processes namely, by creating a niche market for it to acquire knowledge 
through learning processes or via favourable regulatory mechanisms such as 
incentives or policy goals that may influence the bridging market to emerge into 
a mass market (Bergek et al., 2008b).  
Function F5; Resource Mobilization: Resources are critical inputs to the 
activities of innovation system. They can be in the form of human capital 
(training in technological, legal, financial and economic, operational and 
management skills) or financial (e.g. grants, seed capital, access to finance, 
funding of R&D or pilot schemes) and assets (machineries, network 
infrastructures or buildings) (Bergek et al., 2008b) 
Function F6; Creation of Legitimacy: In order for a new or emerging 
technology to acquire market growth, it must do so within an established system 
or overthrow it, thereby fanning the embers of creative destruction leading to 
resistance from incumbents (Hekkert et al., 2007b). Challenging the 
incumbents heralds advocacy coalitions that grow in power and size to confront 
the resistance with a view to create legitimacy (Hekkert and Negro, 2009). The 
effectiveness of these advocacy coalitions depends heavily on resources such 
as money, knowledge, size and influence with a view to creating legitimacy for 
the new technological trajectory (Sabatier, 1988). Legitimisation is a deliberate 
action by various firms or organisations within the innovation system to 
overcome the “liability of newness” (Bergek et al., 2008b) as incumbents, media 
or other interested parties may seek to de-legitimise the technology by unit 
performance, growth potential or cost. (Negro et al., 2012). 
Function F7: Development of Positive Externalities: As individual firms grow 
within the functions in the TIS, such as legitimacy, market formation, 
entrepreneurial activities and knowledge development, they may not be fully 
able to appropriate the whole benefits of investment and growth. Other firms or 
actors may benefit from them in areas such as knowledge spill over, reduced 
uncertainty and further legitimisation which may result in the increase of new 
entrants and technology clusters can be considered as a positive externality 
(Bergek et al., 2008b) 
Adopting the functionality pattern approach of a TIS framework to assess the 
performance of CHP-DH systems within the UK may offer several benefits to this 
research due to its “diagnostic” (Kern, 2015) and “explanatory” (Markard et al., 2015) 
capacities. Firstly, it presents the tool to describe the status of CHP-DH system in the 
UK with a view to determining the mechanisms that are blocking or inducing innovative 
activities within the system, thereby offering the opportunity to map these functions to 
provide a picture of the system performance (Johnson, 2001). Secondly, it would make 
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more feasible the differences in institutional infrastructures when comparing different 
innovation systems and thirdly it offers the potential to provide clarity of governance 
mechanisms to achieve set targets (Hekkert et al., 2007b). 
In explaining the development of a TIS using the functional approach, there are two 
distinct phases that defines the technological transformation of a socio-technical 
system.  They are the formative and growth/market expansion phases (Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004). According to Bergek et al. (2008a) and Bergek et al. (2008b), the 
formative phase is determined by time dimension, often depicting early entry of actors 
and high uncertainties. While the growth phase is determined by when the market is 
formed and up to when its self-sustaining. This phase is also known as the market 
formation phase, which is further divided into three categories, namely: (a) nursing 
market – when market begins to evolve and with limited size, (b) bridging market – 
enlargement of actors and increased market size, (c) mass market – when market is 
fully evolved and self-sustaining. However, Winskel et al. (2012) argue that the framing 
of innovation systems in terms of functional patterns may not fully capture the influence 
of socio-technical factors or learning impacts from the various learning processes such 
as learning-by-doing from other industries.  
The formative phase of CHP-DH innovation system shall be discussed below, while 
what phase of growth it currently holds shall discussed in the concluding chapter 11.  
3.7.2 Formative Phase of CHP-DH innovation system in the UK (1910 – 1980) 
 
Bergek et al. (2008b pg:82) defined the formative phase of a TIS to typically be 
characterised by three features. These are the early entrance of firms and 
organisations, institutional alignment and formation of networks. This is occasioned by 
the high uncertainty experienced by the entry of entrepreneurial actors and investors 
and the role of policy makers regarding the technology, market and regulations. The 
formative phase of the CHP-DH system in the UK has been captured from the period 
of early schemes in the early twentieth century to 1980 when the first national 
assessment of CHP-DH potential was carried out. 
Entrepreneurial Activities- F1 
Early entrance of actors in to the CHP-DH innovation system can be traced to the 1911 
city centre power station at Manchester (Russell, 1993, Kelly and Pollitt, 2010) and 
later the Boots Company system by River Trent in 1919 (Jarvis, 1986) and a few other 
isolated systems such as the systems operated by the Bank of England (Rüdig, 1986). 
However, LAs have been central to the development of DH networks in the UK, due 
to their role as custodians of the social and economic fabric of their locality, but it 
wasn’t until in the late 50s that the first successful CHP-DH system in the UK was built 
on the back of residential housing estate in Pimlico by Westminster City (Martin and 
Thornley, 2013, Roelich et al., 2013, Diamant and McGarry, 1968 pg 172, Jarvis, 
1986).  
Electricity companies which were hitherto regional and municipally owned were 
nationalised in 1948 even though few municipal and private companies were endeared 
to CHP-DH systems before nationalisation (Russell, 2010). Nonetheless, private 
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industries who generate electricity and heat for local consumption were also involved 
in the CHP-DH industry. However, the state and LAs started a couple of CHP-DH 
systems but due to technical and economic difficulties, many systems were either 
discontinued or never left the feasibility stage (Russell, 1993). Key government 
departments involved were the Ministry of fuel and power – responsible for gas, coal, 
electricity and heating, Ministry of Town and Country Planning – responsible for new 
towns, Ministry of Housing – responsible for development of houses. Other are the 
gas council and 12 area gas boards that were formed after the nationalisation which 
were responsible for the regions (Arapostathis et al., 2013).  
However, it was not until the 1977 Marshal report resulting from the concerns of the 
global energy shock, which recommended amongst others a national heat board and 
a strong government intervention to open the CHP-DH space for growth.  
Market Formation – F4 
The UK has a long history with deep cultural place of open heating by coal as opposed 
to centralised heating resulting in lack of interest by municipal electricity utilities in 
CHP-DH systems (Rüdig, 1986), which often resulted in resistance of DH networks by 
both the gas and electricity industries (Russell, 1993). The heating culture has been 
dominated by production and supply of gas through three key phases of transformation 
due to economic and environmental pressures. These includes; coal carbonization – 
production of town gas from coal, oil gasification – using refineries of produce gas from 
oil and lastly from natural gas (Arapostathis et al., 2013). For instance, since 1812 
when London gas-light and coke company was established as the first UK gas 
company (Falkus, 1967), pipelines has been used to supply gas to buildings in the UK 
for over 200 years (Dodds and McDowall, 2013, KPMG, 2016) which provides fuel for 
residential heating. Due to the availability of cheap coal to produce town gas and 
extensive gas networks for heating houses, DH networks in cities has been unpopular 
in the UK, but more popular in the industrial sector where there was demand for steam 
or heat plus power (Sievers et al., 2005). Therefore, the availability of cheap town gas 
from coal through pipelines to houses for heating did not incentivised the deployment 
of DH networks for residential houses, thereby essentially locking out heating from 
CHP-DH systems and stifling the formation of market for CH-DH systems. 
Nonetheless, in a brief period in the sixties, coal and oil companies offered heat service 
packages due to competition in the domestic heat market (Russell, 2010). However, 
the dominance of gas through gas network in the provision of heating in the UK was 
further reinforced by the discovery of natural gas from the North Sea in the late 1950s 
(Arapostathis et al., 2013). The discovery of natural gas was followed with widespread 
upgrading of gas networks to high transmission gas networks known as the NTS 
(National Transmission System) between regions and low distribution gas network 
replacement programme known as the IMRP (Iron Main Replacement Programme) to 
replace all iron pipes that were within 30m of any building with polyethylene pipes 
(Dodds and McDowall, 2013). The upgrade of the gas infrastructures also includes the 
conversion of gas burners to be natural gas complaint from 1966 leading to the 
conversion of more than 40 million appliances by 1977 (HoP, 2017).  
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Furthermore, the operation of many CHP-DH systems by the LAs were truncated by 
the poor economic and technical characteristics of the system, leading many LAs to 
sought Government’s intervention to guarantee losses, but the LAs were not 
successful in securing such guarantees from the central government (Russell, 1993). 
This suggest that the failure of many early CHP-DH systems may have contributed to 
the stifling of the formation of DH market. However, electricity from CHP had little 
resistance compared to heat from DH as many CHPs were developed by electric 
utilities and industries to generate electricity before and after the nationalization of the 
electricity industry. This culminated in CHPs contributing about 8% of electricity to 
UK’s gross electricity production by 1953, which is still considered the highest 
contribution from CHP according to available records till  recent times (DECC, 2013b). 
Therefore, the complexities of combining the provision of the dual product of electricity 
and heat was disadvantageous to the formation of a CHP-DH market. In part because 
of lack of heating governance infrastructures, economic assessment of CHP-DH 
systems and minimal recognition of CHP-DH systems in mainstream energy provision. 
Resource Mobilization – F5 
While the few industries developed CHP-DH systems privately to cater for local 
demand, the lack of powers limited LAs to develop CHP-DH systems. They often had 
to sponsor local bills at the parliament and by 1955 some thirty councils had obtained 
powers to develop DH and generate electricity (Russell, 1993). However, part of the 
compromise with the state for the LAs to obtain such powers was the acceptance of 
strict separate accounting to forestall any form subsidy from the state and the refusal 
by the state to underwrite any CHP-DH scheme (Russell, 1993). Suggesting that as 
there was scarcity of successful CHP-DH systems, with some struggling economically 
and lack of support from the state, the LAs lacked sources to mobilize resources and 
therefore were rightly cautious to develop citywide CHP-DH systems. 
Creation of Legitimacy – F6 
The failure of several early schemes impacted on the legitimacy of CHP-DH systems 
in the UK. The reasons for the failure are attributed to several causes. Such as in 
Gorton and Blackley in Manchester built in 1919, the system was unsuccessful due to 
pipeline corrosion (Diamant and McGarry, 1968 pg:171). Flixton near Manchester also 
suffered pipeline corrosion, while the Duddeston and Nechells in Birmingham suffered 
from poor costing (Diamant and McGarry, 1968 pg:171-172). Similarly in Dundee, the 
CHP-DH system could not survive the day due to bad economic position of the system 
(Russell, 1993). These failures were further reinforced by poor management, 
ineffective maintenance and low quality labour force (Jarvis, 1986). Consequently, 
many CHP-DH systems attracted criticisms for decades and therefore LAs lacked 
successful systems to draw experience from, resulting in low social acceptance of 
CHP-DH system into the social fabric in UK. 
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3.7.3 Governance on TIS-Functional Pattern 
Infrastructures are socio-technical systems because of their complexities arising from 
the interaction of technical, economic, political and social actors to ensure their 
diffusion and utilization. The functional pattern of the TIS framework which is the 
adopted diagnostic and explanatory tool used in this research in analysing the 
performance of CHP-DH system as socio-technical system draws from the activities 
of the dynamic interaction of these actors. This suggests that the modes of governance 
of the interactions of these actors are vital for the technology to meet set targets and 
goals (Carlsson et al., 2002, Hillman et al., 2011). Additionally, from a socio-technical 
perspective, one of the key requirement for the performance of an infrastructure is the 
adoption of a coordination mechanism to forestall failure (Jonsson, 2005, Finger et al., 
2005). However, one of the criticisms of TIS is that they do not capture the influence 
of external factors that may impact on the development and diffusion of the technology 
such as social, financial or environmental sufficiently (Markard and Truffer, 2008b). 
Kern (2015) also argues that TIS should look beyond market entry and knowledge 
generation to capture the political agency of varying actors in activities such as 
coalition building, writing narrative, lobbying e.t.c and how they can shape the 
selection environment of technology adoption. Thus, he suggests that TIS does not 
underpin the strong impacts of socio-political processes on the performance of socio-
technical systems. In response to this criticism, TIS scholars opine that the 
functionality pattern of TIS captures both exogenous and endogenous factors that 
influences the dynamics of the system, but however, agree that more work is required 
in the analysis of the context (Markard et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, firms in a TIS usually find it difficult to drive technological discontinuity – 
adopting new technologies to change market position: due to uncertainties and risk, 
which translate to higher transaction cost and leads to barrier to new entrants, and 
therefore may require governance support to diffuse the technology to a self-
sustaining state (Bergek et al., 2008b). Effective governance however can enable 
coordination mechanisms (regulatory, market and public/private partnerships) to 
shape the functions of TIS (knowledge development and influence the direction of 
search, entrepreneurial experiment, market formation, legitimation and development 
of positive externalities) and the understanding of the inducing and blocking 
mechanisms by TIS actors (Hillman et al., 2011).  
Therefore, to further enhance the quality of coordination of the TIS framework, 
considering the complex horizontal and vertical coordination requirement for the 
embedded processes of both electricity and heat sectors and their actors that are 
crucial to the performance of CHP-DH systems in the UK. A complimentary layer of 
governance will be required to compensate for the weakness of inherent governance 
processes within the TIS (Brousseau and Raynaud, 2006, Cohendet and Uerena, 
2005 pg:238).  Hence, governance concept will be integrated with the TIS functional 
pattern to further capture and coordinate activities of actors that can influence the 
diffusion of CHP-DH system in the UK. Governance concept was adopted for this 
research, because of its reliance on social initiatives for sustainable development and 
diffusion of technology and contribution to social goals rather than conventional policy 
instruments which tends to be more top-down without much consideration to social 
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initiatives (Hillman et al., 2011). Governance concept also reinforces the role of the 
state concentrating on steering powers (e.g. making ground rules) while leaving rowing 
(e.g. services provision) to other segments of the system or actor such as LAs and 
governance concentrates on a particular area, particular sector or locality rather than 
global (Jessop, 2001).  
Therefore, policy intervention that seek to reduce the effect of the blocking 
mechanisms on the diffusion and utilization of CHP-DH in the UK shall be termed as 
governance mechanisms, which is a typical measure used to entrench governance. 
Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that governance mechanisms can 
influence the rate and direction of technological diffusion (Jaffe et al., 2005, Hillman et 
al., 2011, Nilsson et al., 2012). These mechanisms should be characterised by 
transparency, consistency and getting it right from the start, but also importantly to be 
predictable for the long term if the goal is to see new entrants or investors (Connor et 
al., 2015). These mechanisms should also exhibit seamless and strong interaction 
between the components of the structure to bring about the desired push through a 
systematic coordination and directionality (Geels, 2004a pg:8). However, there is no 
consensus on how these governance mechanisms should be measured with a view 
to determine its effectiveness (Torfing, 2012 pg:109), but many available indicators 
such as the quality of coordination, are based on subjectivity and surveys (Norris, 2011 
pg:188). Nevertheless, governance shall provide the bridge between the 
heterogenous actors and disciplines within the TIS, such as political, social groups, 
developers, operators, consultants, accountants, financiers, users, umpires, suppliers, 
regulators and so on (Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004).  
3.7.4 LAs role in the TIS 
Infrastructures exhibit stability and lock-in features, due to huge sunk cost, increasing 
returns and network externalities (Unruh, 2000, Unruh, 2002) and are known to be 
large scale capital goods producer with multiusers that often requires public 
intervention. Such as CHP-DH systems that produce electricity and heat. Suggesting 
that they are indices of socio-economic performance of the society which has high 
political relevance, that may partially or directly involve the hierarchies (State or LAs) 
of governance. Therefore, the array of actors that interact to determine the 
performance of an infrastructure span through the social, technological, economic and 
political spheres of the society. However, due to the complexity of interaction, 
governing the processes and elements that constitute the structure of the 
sociotechnical system is often a challenge (Finger et al., 2005). One of the key 
elements of TIS is the aggregation of actors through networks under similar 
institutional structures (Markard et al., 2015) to adopt and utilize a specific technology 
for economic growth. However, the concept of TIS mainly focuses on the meso-level 
of the system with little attention on the micro-level and therefore not able to capture 
all the activities at the micro level (Markard et al., 2015, Bergek et al., 2008b, Kukk et 
al., 2015). Furthermore, weak socio-political processes between the levels of 
government had been identified as one of the deficiencies of the TIS concept. 
Therefore, considering a recent report by UNEP (2015) which suggests that LAs are 
in the best position to be global champions to facilitate the diffusion of DH systems, a 
key feature of the governance layer is the role of the LAs in influencing the 
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performance of the TIS functions. In part because of their frontline role to promote 
social, economic and environmental wellbeing of their community and as part of the 
hierarchies of governance. 
Van De Ven (1996) argues that a system cannot innovate without a champion. In a 
similar vein, early work on TIS had suggested that for a system to reach stability and 
mass market, it requires an entrepreneur/actor who has the capacity to formulate 
visions that will capture the economic potentials of the system and create the required 
density of relationship amongst actors that would lead the system to mass market 
(Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1994). Such entrepreneurs are actor/actors with powerful 
attributes – such as political resources, to initiate and drive the diffusion of the TIS, are 
captured as “prime movers” (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000). Other literatures have 
identified this role of a dominant actor as “system builders” (Joerges, 1988, Hughes, 
1987) or “change agents” (Rogers, 2010 pg:37, Musiolik et al., 2012) and several work 
on system builders in TIS has also been embarked upon by scholars (Musiolik et al., 
2012, Kukk et al., 2015, Hellsmark and Jacobsson, 2009, Hellsmark, 2010). These 
prime movers are known to have the capacity to instigate innovation than the market  
(Boschma and Frenken, 2010 pg:488), and lead the transformation process of socio-
technical systems and drive interaction (van Mierlo et al., 2010, Rao and Kishore, 
2010). Empirical evidence from Devine-Wright et al. (2001) suggests that the prime 
movers can connect the bridges of innovation systems from the local networks to 
regional to national and to international networks. This is with a view to increase 
learning process. Therefore, Jacobsson and Johnson (2000) notes that prime movers 
are often located within the capital goods industry. 
Drawing on the narrative on the role and attributes of the prime movers including 
political strength, LAs as an actor within the TIS structure can draw on their political, 
structural and relational resources (Farla et al., 2012), such as social capital -trust, 
norms and networks (Pollitt, 2002), geographical proximity to CHP-DH actors 
(Boschma and Frenken, 2010 pp:123) and part of hierarchies of governance in the UK 
to influence the functions of TIS. Hence, LAs shall be assigned the role of the prime 
mover in the TIS considering their dominant attributes and strategic position.  
3.8 Conclusion 
According to Finger et al. (2005),  infrastructures exhibit key features, which includes: 
(a) networked based that contribute to goods and services, (b) increasing returns and 
network effects that requires governance. (c) Social goods producer. These features 
suggest that infrastructures would require huge investment and precipitate sunk cost, 
that would constitute barriers for structural change. Therefore, infrastructures are 
impossible for sudden transition, but rather they have tendencies for incremental 
change (Frantzeskaki and Loorbach, 2008) and path dependencies (Bolton and 
Foxon, 2015) which has political, economic, societal and environmental elements to 
its transformative capacity. Thus, suggesting the necessity of a partial or direct 
involvement of the hierarchies of governance (state and LAs) in the operation or 
management with a view to determine the desired the social or economic objectives. 
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The heterogenous elements that influence infrastructures, rightly qualifies them as 
socio-technical systems. Three common concepts that are used to study socio-
technical systems were discussed. These include: Large Technical Systems (LTS), 
Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) and Technological Innovation Perspective (TIS). All 
three have the capability to investigate infrastructures as socio-technical systems and 
capture the linkages of the heterogenous (technical and non-technical) elements 
within the system to effect technological changes. However, considering the purpose 
of the research to investigate CHP-DH in the UK with a view to address the system 
failure and the diagnostic and explanatory potentials of TIS, this research adopted the 
TIS concept to use as the analytical framework going forward. A broad and 
generalised discussion of the TIS theoretical frameworks was undertaken to gain a 
better understanding of how the various activities within the CHP-DH TIS impacts on 
the diffusion of CHP-DH in UK. In driving the innovation within the TIS, LAs were 
designated as the prime mover within the TIS structure due to their unique political, 
structural and relational resources (Farla et al., 2012), such as social capital -trust, 
norms and networks (Pollitt, 2002), and part of hierarchies of governance in the UK to 
influence the functions of TIS. Furthermore, the concept of Governance was discussed 
and how it can complement the TIS concept with a view to compensate for its 
weaknesses and create opportunities to reduce the effect of the blocking mechanisms 
to the diffusion of CH-DH system in the UK.    
Summarily, the integration of both TIS and governance concepts will offer the 
opportunities to advance governance measures to influence the transformation of 
CHP-DH in the UK. In operationalizing this framework, the functional pattern of the TIS 
shall be integrated with a governance layer to stimulate more bottom-up governance 
measures. 
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4.0 Overview of best practice of governance of CHP-DH systems 
in Europe 
Several countries have adopted CHP-DH systems to meet different challenges, from 
energy security, climate mitigation or socio-economic reasons. In Europe many 
countries have shown interest in the deployment of CHP-DH systems, but the research 
shall focus on two countries (Netherlands and Norway) with similar energy paradigm 
in terms of natural gas production and appetite for competition in the energy market 
through liberalisation. These countries become a ready choice to consider for further 
comparison with the UK, because they both possess similar energy resource in the 
form of natural gas that dictated the pattern of the political economy - interaction of 
political and markets forces, in the UK energy space. Furthermore, they both sought 
to follow the UK in energy liberalisation in a bid to entrench competition, through 
governance instruments. CHPs in Netherlands contributed about 35% to national 
electricity generated in 2013, while DH contributed about 4% to national heat demand. 
While in Norway, CHPs contribute about 0.28% to national electricity production in 
2015, with DH contributing about 3% to national heat consumption. 
The narrative below seeks to capture an overview of the various governance 
structures and market regimes in Netherland’s and Norway’s CHP-DH industry which 
may provide further insight on the pathway and diffusion of CHP-DH systems. 
4.1 Netherlands 
The Dutch energy system has been driven by gas since its discovery in 1959, leading 
to a wide spread development of gas infrastructures and exploration, though in 1969 
the first nuclear plant was built and a second one by 1973 which suggested that 
nuclear was also going to play a critical role in its energy policy (Pruiksma, 2013). 
However, the countries gas reserve which currently stands as the largest within the 
European Union and second largest gas producer after Norway in the European 
continent (Deloitte, 2015) indicates that role of gas may continue to be critical to the 
Dutch energy system. Since the 60s the abundance of gas may have instigated an 
energy policy that is focused on least cost energy to meet a guaranteed demand and 
security of supply with no long-term energy strategy in place before the global oil crisis 
of the early 70s (Pruiksma, 2013). Since oil prices are intricately linked to gas prices, 
the oil crisis resulted in high energy prices globally. The oil crisis and the emergence 
of environmental groups had caused the Dutch government to have a rethink on 
energy policy that considers gas reserves are infinite, but rather natural gas should be 
considered as a strategic fuel to be restricted to high grade applications (Raven and 
Verbong, 2007). 
In response to the 1973 oil crisis, the Dutch government introduced its first 
comprehensive energy report in 1974 which seeks to emphasis on measures to 
incentivise energy efficiency, reduction on energy consumption and further natural gas 
restrictions, then subsequently, the 1975 White paper on energy, which many 
considered as the turning point for the Dutch energy policy (Steen et al., 2008 p.183, 
Jong, 2004). It was a turning point because it was the first time CHP was mentioned 
in a government energy report but with little or no significant role (Jong, 2004). 
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However, despite the various measures seeking to promote energy efficiency, such 
as investment grants for home efficiency, it was not until 1978 that the government 
accepted that industrial gas turbine CHP could be considered as a vital energy saving 
option based on the advice from Dutch Energy Council (Blok, 1993).  
The first gas turbine was installed in 1968 at Dow Chemicals (Jong, 2004) with CHP 
contributing about 12% to electricity production in 1968 (Raven and Verbong, 2007). 
However, consequent upon the acceptance of CHP role by the government, the Dutch 
Energy council in 1978, proposed several key governance measures to stimulate the 
diffusion of CHP in the Netherlands. These include: the formation of an advisory body 
with members drawn from the government, utilities and industry to come up with 
modalities to stimulate the diffusion of CHP and to establish a body to function as an 
ombudsman to handle disputes (Blok, 1993). 
Subsequently in 1979, a commission on cogeneration for the industry was established 
on the advice of the Dutch Energy Council, with members drawn from Gasunie (Dutch 
gas company), industry, power producers, Ministry in the field of energy and the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (Hekkert et al., 2007). In its first report, the commission 
concluded that additional 2000MW of CHP could be installed by year 2000 to add to 
the 1100MW already installed by 1980 (Hekkert et al., 2007).  It also recommended 
that more natural gas should be provided to CHPs to facilitate the expansion of gas 
turbines, CHP to be included in the electricity grid planning and expansion, investment 
grants should be given to CHP developers to reduce payback time, utilities should pay 
the CHPs the fuel cost saved by their electricity supplied to the grid (Blok, 1993, Steen 
et al., 2008 p. 184). The investment grant scheme was assimilated into the Investment 
Act which provides about 12-13% of capital investment (Blok, 1993). Further 
recommendations were made in 1982 due to the disappointing level of penetration of 
CHPs. In part, because of the poor economic growth and the CHP growth trajectory 
was mainly anticipated from industries who were already struggling with high cost of 
oil and gas. The recommendations include: feasibility studies on CHP deployment by 
companies to benefit from subsidies – Government eventually subsidised about 50% 
of the cost of the studies (Blok, 1993), the removal of gas restriction for CHP 
development, free grid connections for industrial CHP plants and feed-in tariffs (FiT) 
for power supplied (Raven and Verbong, 2007). Also in 1982 the National Investment 
Bank was established, to militate against high interest rate and limited capital by 
offering finance at favourable rates without security or any risk assessment to projects 
like CHP (Blok, 1993, Hekkert et al., 2007).  
These governance instruments in early 80s were instrumental to the growth trajectory 
of CHPs in the Netherlands, though mainly from industrial plants – due to more 
experience in gas turbines than other sectors of the society. Key growth driver was the 
profitability of CHP plants due to the FiT scheme leading many new CHP plants to 
change operational strategy from meeting local electrical demand to heating demand 
since excess electricity can be sold profitably (Verbong and Geels, 2007). However, 
in terms of policy there was tension between the electricity from gas fired CHPs, coal 
gasification to militate against depleting gas reserve and nuclear plants. No sooner did 
it become clear to the government that coal gasification was more in the longer term 
with its antecedent environmental challenges and the loss of legitimacy by nuclear 
power due to the accidents at Three Mile Island (1979) and later at Tsjernobyl (1986) 
77 | P a g e  
 
resulting in CHPs taking frontline position in government energy policy (Jong, 2004). 
This further strengthens the interdependencies of natural gas and CHP in the 
Netherlands. Also, vital to the penetration of CHPs in the 80s was the partnership 
between utilities and industries to develop CHP systems, such as the partnership 
between AKZO and the EGD a regional utility in 1983. This form of joint venture 
became attractive to banks to offer financing (Hekkert et al., 2007). The result was the 
share of industrial CHP from decentralised power increased to 95% in 1988 from 
industries contributing 10.6% in 1968 to the total generated electricity, mainly through 
the installation of about 85 new industrial CHP units between 1968 and 1988 (Verbong 
and Geels, 2007).  
However, this growth phase of CHP systems in the Netherlands experienced a 
significant change in institutional arrangements in the late 80s. Prior to this time, there 
was no competition in the electricity market with the electricity supply divided into 
regional boundaries (Raven and Verbong, 2007). In 1989, the Electricity Act and Gas 
Act were introduced with a view to create competition in the energy sector. Key driver 
was the electricity act 1989, which mandated several governance arrangements. 
These include, the separation of ownership of the production of electricity from 
distribution, the distribution companies were now allowed to buy electricity from the 
cheapest sources or produce electricity themselves but to a maximum 25MW (Hekkert 
et al., 2007). Others include: Obligation on distribution companies to purchase power 
supplied to the grid from CHPs and pay a minimum tariff. Also, just about the same 
time with the Electricity Act, a market broker was established as part of the 
Cogeneration Incentive Programme, to play the role of an information hub for the CHP 
industry and link CHP industry actors (Steen et al., 2008 p. 185). 
As a result of the electricity act, four power production companies emerged that own 
the Dutch Electricity Generating Board, with the responsibility of planning, high voltage 
transportation and national pooling, while the distribution companies were now 
responsible for electricity and gas distribution (Blok and Farla, 1996). From the gas 
perspective, Gasunie (Dutch gas producer) and gas distributors (electricity distribution 
companies) agreed on a specially reduced tariff for CHPs in 1990 and they (CHPs 
assets) were exempted from ecotax if the electricity was consumed locally and 
produced with natural gas (Jong, 2004). Ecotax was a tax on energy introduced in 
1996 for energy consumers.   
However, in a bid to minimise the dependence on power producers by distribution 
companies, the distribution companies circumvented the process by forming joint 
venture with industries to develop CHP plants and sell excess power to the grid. 
Furthermore, due to the emergence of climate change awareness, the government 
and the electricity sector actors came to an agreement to reduce CO2 emission 
through an environmental action plan. The distribution companies identified this as 
also an opportunity to form joint venture agreements with industries to develop CHP 
projects with a view to meet their emission targets. 
Due to the impact of several governance mechanisms, including the Electricity Act, 
the contribution of CHP to total electricity production increased from 19% in 1988 to 
23% in 1993 (Blok and Farla, 1996). This also resulted to excess capacity from CHPs 
to the electricity grid leading to planning and monitoring crisis arising from frequency 
instability and voltage regulation which posed a daunting task to the electricity grid 
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operation (Hekkert et al., 2007, Verbong and Geels, 2007). However, the growth was 
not stifled, but in an attempt to stem its growth, an eight months moratorium was 
agreed in 1994 between the power producers and distribution companies to postpone 
all CHP development above 2MW (Hekkert et al., 2007). 
Another vital governance instrument that impacted on the electricity market and by 
extension the CHP systems was the liberalisation of the electricity market mandated 
by the Electricity Act of 1998 in accordance to the European Union directive. This 
electricity act ended the special treatment meted out to CHPs such as special 
transmission tariff for CHPs and the eradication of FiT for CHP as they were now to 
negotiate in the competitive market (Hekkert et al., 2007). However, the Dutch 
government obtained a relieve from the European Commission on noticing that CHPs 
struggled to cover their marginal cost by introducing some measures. Such as, 
introducing a feed-in subsidy for CHP electricity supplied to the grid and from 2003, 
CHPs were granted certificates based on plant efficiency or CO2 performance under 
the Netherlands emission trading system, which can be traded. This 1998 Act opened 
the doors for large European energy companies to purchase power assets from former 
national and distribution companies such as Noun and Essent, currently owned by 
Vattenfall and RWE respectively (Deloitte, 2015). The Dutch power production market 
is slightly dominated by four major players which control about 55% of installed 
capacity in 2013 – Noun/Vattenfall, Essent/RWE, E.ON, and Electrabel/GDF SUEZ. 
The transmission network is wholly owned by the government through TenneT, while 
the distribution network is operated by eight companies with four companies – Enexis, 
Delta, Liander and Stedin, managing about 90% of the network and the supply/retail 
arm is 100% liberalised with consumers allowed to choose their supplier (Deloitte, 
2015). It is noteworthy that Enexis and Liander are owned by providential and local 
authorities. Also, consequent upon the new electricity act of 1998, the Dutch Electricity 
Generating Board was dismantled. The key regulator for the energy sector is Authority 
for Consumers and Markets (ACM), which are the regulators for gas, electricity and 
heat. 
On CHP, the effect of the liberalisation of the electricity market through the 1998 Act 
induced a gradual stagnation on the growth of CHPs in the Netherlands with its effect 
more pronounced around the year 2000. Key causes were the reduced fixed 
compensation for electricity exported to the grid, fall of market price for electricity 
leading to many CHPs shutting down during off-peak periods and no incentive for 
retired CHP plants to be replaced (GasTerra, 2010). In addition, they faced 
competition from large European energy suppliers (Verbong and Geels, 2007). 
However, by 2005, it started to show signs of growth again due to the increase in 
uptake from agriculture and waste incineration sectors with an 84% growth by 2006 
from 2005 (Daniëls et al., 2007). Key sector uptake from the agricultural sector were 
the horticultural companies that adopted CHPs due to the existence of heat buffers 
and consume some of the electricity produced locally with opportunity to sell the 
excess to the electricity at peak times. Thus, making it economical for its uptake. This 
made the agricultural sector as the second most important sector to uptake of CHP 
after the industries (Daniëls et al., 2007) and becoming a net exporter of electricity 
from CHP by 2007 (ECN, 2015).  
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In the Netherlands, CHPs more than 5MW must be registered with TenneT and report 
the capacity availability on an hourly basis (GasTerra, 2010). Furthermore, no licence 
is required to generate or supply electricity under the Electricity Act of 1998 apart from 
off-shore wind. However, if its intended for supply to small scale users of maximum 
3X80A, you are then subject to licence requirement by the ACM (Vlam and Oosterhuis, 
2016). While, Transmission and distribution of electricity and gas are subject to 
regulation. 
Key actors in the Netherlands CHP-DH sector apart from the ACM are Cogen 
Nederland, which is Dutch Association for the promotion of CHP, VEMW, the 
association for energy, environment and water, which has amongst others a strong 
interest in CHP-DH systems. Others are CertiQ, which is the issuing body for CHP 
Guarantees of Origin (GoO) that is also linked to feed-in schemes, and the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, which is the ministry responsible for CHP policies (IEA, 2008b). 
Another key actors are EnergieNed – This is the trade association for electricity, heat 
and gas producers, traders and suppliers and the other is Stichting Warmtenetwerk - 
The Dutch association for DH and Cooling (DHC) with members drawn from 
universities, municipalities, utilities, research organisations, consultants, suppliers, 
and contractors.  
The trajectory of diffusion of CHP in the Netherlands does not seem to follow the same 
path as District Heating, though they both seem to intersect in 1989 after the electricity 
Act and other governance mechanisms. Historically, the first DH system in the 
Netherlands was in Utrecht in 1923 and a second one in 1949 at Rotterdam before 
the next one was built in 1983 (Raven and Verbong, 2007). Prior to the oil crisis in the 
70s, heat sector was predominantly supplied by gas due to its abundance and there 
was little interest from the government to supply heat from the electricity sector (Jong, 
2004). However, like in the electricity sector, when government responded to the oil 
crisis by establishing a CHP committee, a special committee on DH (BAS) was also 
established in 1974 with members drawn from the utilities, Gasunie and the scientific 
community. The key focus of the special committee on DH is to investigate the 
potentials of DH systems and provide support to the local and regional authorities in 
decision making. This led to the development of 16 DH systems after embarking on 
about 50 feasibility studies (Raven and Verbong, 2007). This led to the growth of heat 
supply from DH systems. However, by mid-eighties, DH systems began to lose 
legitimacy. In part, because of lack of individual metering, sale of heat were below 
expectation and the fall of energy prices in 1985 (Blok and Farla, 1996). Other factors 
include the increase in interest rate to as high as 13% that inflated the cost of capital 
and technical difficulties in the operation of the network (Jong, 2004). Therefore, the 
operations of DH systems became uneconomical, which impeded the further growth 
of DH systems in the Netherlands.  
Key features of the Dutch energy landscape pre-1989 electricity act was that most DH 
systems were supplied from large centralised plants (IEA, 2008b) and many of the 
large electricity plants were owned by the provinces (regional) while the local 
authorities (municipalities) own the gas distribution companies. Suggesting why local 
gas companies opposed the development of DH systems, because of path 
dependencies in the supply of local heat demand (Jong, 2004). Therefore, most DH 
systems were developed by electricity companies and were struggling to survive 
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during this period. Recent data shows that there was about 400 DH schemes in the 
Netherlands by 2015 (Euroheat and Power, 2017b). 
However, it was the intervention of several key governance measures in the late 
eighties that changed the DH growth trajectory in the Netherlands. First was the 
campaign embarked by the district heating association in 1989 for the urgent 
intervention of government to revive the ailing DH sector (Jong, 2004). The 
government responded by offering many DH companies financial aids to escape 
bankruptcy (Raven and Verbong, 2007). Secondly, because of the effect of emission 
on climate, the government signed environmental agreement to reduce CO2 with the 
electricity sector. Consequently, the power producers introduced heat plans focusing 
on mainly using CHP-DH systems to meets its environmental targets by adding 
additional 1250MW capacity of CHP, because they consider CHP-DH system as a 
cost-effective solution to save energy (Jong, 2004). While, thirdly, as part of meeting 
environmental goals the electricity producers and distribution companies reached an 
agreement on sharing financial risk in deploying energy saving measures such as 
CHP-DH systems and lastly the impact of unbundling of the electricity sector through 
the Electricity Act 1989.The act allowed for horizontal integration of the gas distribution 
and electricity distribution companies but electricity production had to be separated 
from distribution (Blok and Farla, 1996).  
The introduction of competition in electricity market by the 1989 Electricity Act, also 
triggered many CHP systems to consider heat demand in their operational strategy. 
Thus many electricity distribution companies developed CHP-DH systems in 
cooperation with final heat users, making heat market strategic to CHP-DH 
developers/operators (Jong, 2004). These measures were considered as stage setting 
for the revival of DH systems in the Netherlands into the nineties.  
The regulation of heat in the Netherlands has been self-regulatory with heat tariff from 
large energy companies being capped based on Not-More-Than-Otherwise (NMDA) 
principle – which makes gas as the reference price - as being recommended by the 
energy association – EnergieNed, this is with a view to protect captive consumers from 
the DH companies’ monopoly position (Oei, 2016, Scheppers, 2009). While heat tariff 
from smaller suppliers, such as housing corporations are typically based on the actual 
cost of heat supply being computed by heat cost allocation agencies and most heat 
suppliers adopt a portfolio strategy by using profits from viable heat grids to 
compensate for loss-making grids (Scheppers, 2009). The heat sector is vertically 
integrated even after the electricity act had unbundled the electricity sector.  
However, since the liberalisation of the energy sector, The Netherlands had tried to 
introduce a heat act since 2003 that would efficiently capture the aspirations of heat 
consumers by replacing the existing self-regulation regime of the heat industry. After 
several years of deliberation, it was expected to have come into effect by 2011 but it 
didn’t due to some perceived challenges by the DH association. Such as the 
ownership of meters, which the heat act had allowed heat customers to procure and 
install their own meter, but the association had protested that customers don’t have 
the requisite expertise to maintain heat meters (Van der Zee, 2011). Consequently, it 
went for further review until January 2014 before the Netherlands had its first Heat Act 
came into effect. Key features were obligation for licence requirement to embark on 
heat supply and tariff regulation. However, it was still criticized by the regulators 
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(ACM), heat users and suppliers, because it was not seen to have sufficiently captured 
the role of owner associations in representing/protecting their members (heat end 
users). Secondly, the lessors of homes were excluded from the heat Act, when most 
often heat was part of the tenancy agreement with lessees, which may lead to conflict 
in interpretation of the tenancy laws, consumer protection under the civil code and the 
Heat Act. (CMS, 2017). 
However, after further reviews, a revised Heat Act that may have accommodated 
these observations and it’s expected to come into force by 1 January 2018. This 
revised bill is also expected to mandate a negotiated access to DH grids as oppose to 
regulated third party access and provide clarity and protection with regards tenancy 
roles in a heat supply contract. It’s also expected to include a mandatory tariff cap for 
small end users based on the NMDA principle with opportunities for heat users to 
terminate supply contract as long as the agreement was entered into after the 
amendment of the Act (CMS, 2017). 
The development of CHP systems in the Netherlands has been described as a 
success through the deployment of various governance mechanisms that targeted 
electricity production but the same cannot be said of District Heating (DH) systems. In 
part, due to early path dependencies of gas distribution companies in the supply of 
gas for heating (Raven and Verbong, 2007, Hekkert et al., 2007), lack of sufficient 
legitimacy for DH systems (Jong, 2004) and less priority given to heat in energy policy 
dialogue until lately (PROVOOST et al., 2015) despite heat demand making up about 
55% of final energy consumption in the end-user sector (ECN, 2015a). This suggest 
why CHP provides almost 35% of total electricity production in 2013 (DG ENER, 
2016), while DH supplies about 4% of total heat supply in 2013, in spite of natural gas 
providing 93% of the total heat supply in 2013 (Euroheat & Power, 2017). Indicating 
that the growth trajectory of CHP and DH systems in the Netherlands are not coupled, 
rather, heating is predominantly provided through house hold gas use, while 90% of 
DH were sourced from recycled heat and direct renewable sources (Euroheat & 
Power, 2017).  
Nonetheless, The National Energy Agreement initiated by the Social and Economic 
Council (SER) (an advisory board of Dutch government and parliament) was signed 
in 2013 between various energy actors and government with a view to meet national 
target as mandated under EU 2020 directive. Part of the Outcome of these agreement 
with government was that there will be incentives for decentralised generation such as 
CHP to generate electricity and heat that is locally consumed (PROVOOST et al., 
2015). Such as exemption from VAT, system tariffs and energy tax, which may provide 
a net advantage to a CHP provider of local energy of about 0.23/kwh (Vlam and 
Oosterhuis, 2016). Also of important note is the significance of CHP in the Netherlands 
2020 emission target, which CHP has been estimated to contribute about 16% to the 
national reduction objective (GasTerra, 2010). Suggesting that the National Energy 
Agreement is the first join-up governance instrument that attempts to capture 
electricity and heat production, but it’s not clear if DH was sufficiently captured. 
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4.2 Norway 
Norway is the largest gas producer in Europe (Deloitte, 2015) and is one of the few 
countries in the world with enormous renewable energy potential such that in 2015, 
98% of its electricity generation was from renewable energy, which includes:-  96% of 
hydro and 2% of wind energy (ENOVA, 2017). Drawing upon the history of CHP-DH 
system in Norway that dates to first half of the twentieth century, the first thermal power 
plant was installed in 1936 but it was not until in 1950 that the Prestegata district 
heating centre supplied heat to the city hall in Oslo (nfv, 2017).  
Norway is known to historically be endowed with hydro potential, though during the 
60s to the very early 70s fossil fuel contribution to household energy consumption was 
as much as 40% (Boeng and Holstad, 2013), but in response to the global oil crisis in 
70s which led to increase in energy prices, the government considered to explore more 
hydro potential in a view to stem the effect rising oil prices. Consequently, there was 
rise in river development and construction of dams, leading to wide spread 
condemnation from environmentalist that resulted in the developmental plan to identify 
rivers to be preserved and or not by the parliament in 1973 (Eikeland, 1998). This has 
contributed to the national position to currently develop 60% of its hydro potential, 
preserve 20% and reserve 20% for small scale development (Hagos et al., 2014). 
However, the oil crisis herald the beginning of the largest hydropower development in 
Norway with an increased capacity of 10,715MW hydro capacity from 1974 – 1989 
(Boeng and Holstad, 2013). 
Hydropower development has been burdened by various governance instruments 
instigated by environmentalist. Such as the 1979 White paper, which emphasised on 
the rational management of natural resources, then subsequently, the 1985 White 
paper that highlighted the need to consider the impact of electricity production on the 
environment in future energy policy (Eikeland, 1998). This was closely followed by the 
1988 White paper which suggested that electricity industry could contribute positively 
to the environment, if energy saving measures were deployed. However, none of these 
instruments disrupted the electricity industry as much as when request for 
liberalisation and competition through a market based trading system joined the 
energy policy debate. In part, because non-government actors, for example - 
academic economist, accused the government of taking advantage of the publicly 
owned vertically integrated electricity sector to set energy prices and leading to 
development of excess capacity (Eikeland, 1998).  
In response to the call for liberalisation and competition in the electricity sector, which 
had already begun to sweep through Europe, for instance the electricity liberalisation 
in UK, the 1990 Energy Act was introduced that instigated reforms to the electricity 
and heat sectors in Norway. The reform essentially came into force by the 1st of 
January 1990 and its key objective was efficient production of energy as an effective 
way to increase efficiency in the electricity sector through market based mechanisms. 
This led to the altering of the governance structure and introduction of competition in 
the electricity sector. A new high-tension transmission grid operator/manager – 
Statnett- was established, while the power production and distribution arms of the 
electricity sector were still mostly owned by municipalities with some privately owned 
utilities (Newbery, 2001a pg: 177). This is with a view that all utilities (public and 
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private) will be competing in the same electricity pool managed by Statnett, with the 
municipalities still retaining their franchises for area of operation. The energy act also 
stipulates that prospective actors require a licence to participate in electricity areas 
depending on the size of electrical output. For instance, less than 1MW output, a 
licence will be provided by municipalities, less than 10MW output, it would require a 
licence from Norwegian Water and Energy Directorate (NVE), while over 10MW would 
require a licence from the king’s council (NMPE, 2015). Currently, the state, county 
authorities and municipalities own about 90% of power production capacity, with 
limited ownership from foreign investors and the ten largest producers account for 
about 72% of national power production (NMPE, 2015).  
Sequel upon the introduction of the Energy Act, a moratorium was applied to the 
development of hydro dams and abolition of area franchises for municipalities with a 
view to curtail excess hydro production and further entrench competition (Eikeland, 
1998). By 1996, an integrated power system between Norway and Sweden had 
begun, with joint power exchange pool known as the Nordpool with the options to 
electricity consumers to choose their suppliers. However, due to the long dry season 
of 1995 and 1996, resulting in much of Norway’s hydro capacity being tapped, this 
instigated the government to begin to contemplate an alternative source of power 
generation from natural gas plant considering Norway’s huge gas reserves, in addition 
with further exploration of hydro resources. Consequently, two natural plants were 
approved by the parliament to be developed, but change of government, obligations 
under the Kyoto protocol and stiff opposition from environmentalist did not allow these 
projects to be executed (Eikeland, 1998). Furthermore, increased taxes on fossil fuels 
and Gothernburg Protocol which emphasises on air pollution, may all have impacted 
on the poor legitimacy of fossil fuel based plants (Boeng and Holstad, 2013). In part 
because it was argued that these natural gas plants would add to Norway’s carbon 
footprint. 
Therefore, historically, due to the huge hydropower capacity which often provides low 
energy prices, electricity heating and other regulatory mechanisms on fossil fuel based 
generation, the contribution of CHP has been insignificant to Norway’s energy profile. 
However, available data suggest that CHP contribution has increased from 0.08% to 
Norway’s gross electricity production in 2006 to about 0.28% in 2015 (Eurostat, 2017). 
This increment could partly be attributed to a few governance instruments that may 
have impacted on CHPs. Such as investment supports for renewable CHPs from 
Enova – A government agency supporting new technology advancements and 
supports from the Research Council of Norway that offer supports for research and 
development to CHPs to improve industrial development (Kempegowda et al., 2012). 
Despite the little increment seen in the growth of CHPs in Norway, she has being the 
largest gas producers in Europe (Deloitte, 2015), CHP technology was still seemly not 
considered as vital in the energy policy debate as even the recent green certificate 
market between Norway and Swedish electricity market started in 2012, renewable 
based CHPs in Norway were absent with only hydro and wind being considered. 
Therefore, no capacity from CHPs was expected or entitled to electricity certificate 
from Norway, while Sweden had captured CHP in the same scheme (NVE, 2017, NVE, 
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2014). Suggesting that the role of CHPs in Norway’s energy profile may continue to 
be insignificant. 
However, the technology trajectory of DH systems in Norway seems to be better 
favoured by various governance interventions, even though it still represents a small 
proportion of 3% of the total energy consumption in Norway (NMPE, 2015). This low 
penetration of DH systems is still attributed to the huge hydro resources which 
provides low electricity prices and electric heating. Nevertheless, the recent rising 
prices of electricity and commitment to meet several climate change goals, such as 
carbon neutrality by 2030 (Patronen et al., 2017) has greatly influenced the 
governance led penetration of DH systems. Key governance instrument was the 1991 
Energy Act, which introduced several measures that impacted on the selection 
environment of DH systems in Norway. The energy act, provided the framework for 
construction and operation of DH networks, as well as requiring DH developers to 
apply for a concession to develop one in an area that has been earmarked for DH by 
the municipalities. Furthermore, the act allows for DH companies with an output of 
over 10MW to obtain a licence from NVE (NMPE, 2015) and it also stipulates the 
pricing structure for heat from DH systems, which emphasis that the price of heat 
should not be higher than alternative heating source, which is usually referenced to 
the price of electric heating in the case of Norway. Sequel upon the approval and 
development of DH systems in a concession area, the municipality would then issue 
directives for any building built within the DH marked areas to mandatorily connect to 
the DH network. However, buildings that are mandated to connect to the DH systems 
are not obliged to use the heat supply from the DH network, but are also free to enter 
into heat contracts with other heat suppliers. Though, other heat suppliers are not 
allowed to develop new heat networks as there can only be one DH network in a 
concession area (Patronen et al., 2017, Aanensen and Fedoryshyn, 2014). The DH 
suppliers consider these mandatory connections as critical to their economics. 
The mandatory connections to DH is being regulated by the Planning and Building Act 
(P&B). This act (P&B) also places a limit on buildings on heat generated from electricity 
and fossil fuels. For instance, all buildings of over 500m2 should have a minimum of 
60% renewable heating, while buildings below 500m2, should have a minimum of 40% 
renewable heating. The P&B act also stipulates a ban on fossil fuel generated heat on 
all new and renovated buildings (NMPE, 2015, Juhler, 2013). Thus, stimulating the 
use of DH systems to provide heat for buildings. The combination of these governance 
mechanisms (Energy Act and P&B Act) and the ban on waste landfill in 2009, which 
stimulated the development of waste incineration plants to provide heat to DH 
networks, may well contribute to the significant uptake of waste fuel for input to DH, 
as about 50% of DH inputs came from waste incineration in 2016, with waste wood 
providing 21% (SN, 2017a). Considering that many DH operators see waste fuel as 
competitive to the electricity prices for heating, which may impact on the selection 
environment of heating sources by consumers.  
Other governance measures that seeks to influence the penetration of DH systems 
are some fiscal and regulatory measures adopted by the government. Such as the 
Energy fund established in 2012 and being administered by Enova SF, a state 
company owned by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE). The source of the 
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energy fund is from budgetary allocation from the state, levy on grid tariff and returns 
on the capital invested in projects (NMPE, 2015). One of the key objectives of the 
energy fund is to increase the use of energy carriers like DH for heating other than the 
use of electricity, oil or natural gas and its modus operandi is to provide funding support 
for projects like DH heating from renewable energy sources. In 2016, 22 DH projects 
benefitted from the energy fund with many application are for the expansion of already 
existing schemes and the scheme is expected to run till 2020 (ENOVA, 2017). Other 
fiscal measures include: the electricity tax for electricity used for energy production 
and DH production, which has been reduced in 2017 from 16.32ore/kWh to 
0.48ore/kWh (Patronen et al., 2017). 
The DH sector in Norway has been growing steadily since the introduction of the 
energy act in1991 with an average growth of consumption of DH of about 9% since 
2000 (Patronen et al., 2017). However, the last 10 -15 years had witnessed the most 
significant growth (Aanensen and Fedoryshyn, 2014) with the net DH production 
increasing over 95% from 3066GWh in 2007 to 5910GWh in 2016 (SN, 2017c). DH 
companies also increased by over 167% from 40 in 2007 to 107 in 2016 (SN, 2017b). 
This growth can largely be attributed to various governance instruments, rising price 
of electricity and environmental goals through renewable generation of heat. The 
largest consumers of DH are the service (60%) and residential (25%) sectors in 2016 
(SN, 2017a). These two sectors accounts for an average of 87% of total DH 
consumption from 2000 – 2015 (Patronen et al., 2017). Recent data shows that there 
were about 261 DH schemes in Norway by 2015 (Euroheat and Power, 2017b). 
DH schemes in Norway are mainly owned by the municipalities with Oslo having the 
largest DH scheme (Juhler, 2013) and about 90% of the major cities have DH systems 
(ENOVA, 2017). The key actors in the CHP-DH sector are (a) the Ministry of Petroleum 
and Energy responsible for overseeing the overall energy policy, (b) Norwegian Water 
and Energy Directorate (NVE) – the energy sector regulator for electricity and heat. 
Others are (c) ENOVA – responsible for promoting environmental friendly technologies 
(d) Norsk Fjernvarme (Norwegian District Heating Association) – responsible for 
advocacy for DH systems, (e) Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation – 
responsible for the regulation of mandatory DH connections (Patronen et al., 2017). 
In Norway, CHP and DH growth are not coupled as DH appears to have more focus 
from government than CHP. In part, because of the historical dependence on hydro 
resources for generation of electricity and heat, despite its huge gas reserves and 
secondly, CHP is considered to be mostly fuelled by natural gas, which is not attractive 
to environmentalist considering its carbon footprint. Thus, systematically locking out 
CHP from key energy governance mechanisms. However, the energy debate appears 
to lay emphasis on using renewable sources to provide alternative heating for Norway, 
resulting in increasing use of renewable fuel such as waste for DH and other 
governance mechanisms to influence the penetration of DH systems. This suggest 
that the pillars of Norway’s energy policy are energy efficiency and environment 
commitments.   
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4.3 Brief Comparisons 
The two countries (Netherlands and Norway) both appears to have been stimulated 
by the oil crisis to change its overall energy policy direction, though each taking a 
different path. For instance, Netherland choose to establish different commissions in 
response to the oil crisis for heat and CHP diffusion, while Norway decided to ramp up 
development of hydro power stations. However, it was not until the wave of 
liberalisation and competition in the energy sector started in Europe, which was led by 
the UK, that both introduced key governance instruments that disrupted the electricity 
and heat sectors. Netherlands introduced separate governance pathways for 
electricity and heat, though heat was in the back foot as a result of path dependency 
of gas heating. While Norway, had an integrated approach through an energy act, 
which attempts to capture electricity and heat sectors, but with minimal recognition of 
CHP contribution to electricity due to the dominant electricity production from hydro.  
A key distinction between the two countries was also the role of municipalities in 
planning of DH zones within their localities. There was little information on the roles of 
governance instruments in planning of DH zones by municipalities in the Netherlands 
and there were no mandatory connections to DH systems. However, in Norway, using 
the Planning and Building Act, municipalities could map out concessions areas for DH 
systems and mandate connection of new buildings to DH systems. Another distinction 
was that the Norway CHP-DH sector was driven by the public, as the state and 
municipalities own a large proportion of energy companies, while in the Netherlands, 
the private industries and horticulturist played a significant role in the uptake of CHP-
DH systems as well as the municipalities.  
FACT SHEET 
# Characteristics Netherlands Norway 
1 Electricity Act/Energy Policy Electricity Act Energy Act 
2 Heat Law/Planning and 
Building Act 
Heat Act 2014 Planning and Building 
Act 
3 Energy system drivers Gas  Hydro 
4 Regulatory mechanism for 
renewable CHPs 
FiT Nil 
5 Dominant fuel used for 
Electricity production 
Gas Hydro 
6 Dominant source of heating Gas  Electricity 
7 Dominant fuel used for CHP Gas Renewables 
8 Dominant fuel used for DH Renewables Renewables 
9 CHP to electricity production 35% 0.28% 
10 DH contribution to heat 
production  
4% 3% 
11 Ownership of CHP and DH 
systems 
Private/Public Municipalities 
12 Dominant DH uptake sectors Industries and 
Agriculture 
Service and 
Residential 
13 No of DH schemes by 2015 400 261 
14 Heat pricing  Referenced to gas Referenced to 
Electricity 
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A similarity between the two countries was that the dominant fuel for DH was 
renewables, despite both countries large gas reserves. In Netherlands, this was due 
to strategic position of gas in delivering heating to household through mature gas 
infrastructure. While in Norway, environmental consideration such as its carbon 
neutral ambition, was critical to the insignificant role of gas in its heating sector.  
Furthermore, both countries have similar heat pricing methodology, as they both have 
a policy that the heat price should not be more than the alternative source of heating. 
DH output was referenced to gas price in Norway, while it was referenced to electricity 
price in Norway. 
Furthermore, both countries energy policy was driven by liberalisation and 
competition, but the environmentalist in Norway exerted much more pressure on the 
government to chase energy liberalisation and competition with much focus on 
environmental goals. Which persistently seem to be locking out the local role for gas 
in national energy debate. However, the Netherlands had more consideration on 
energy efficiency alongside environmental goals, while promoting liberalisation and 
competition in the energy sector. Therefore, the role of gas in providing efficient energy 
through CHP-DH systems was captured in the long term environmental goals in the 
Netherlands. 
Summarily, the Netherland’s CHP-DH diffusion pathway appears a better choice to 
draw lessons from because of the potential applications or adoption of lessons that 
may impact the socio-economic fabric of the UK. For instance, the UK has a similar 
mature gas infrastructure like the Netherlands, which is the primary source of heating 
and therefore impacts on the selection environment of CHP-DH system as an 
alternative heating source. While in Norway, electricity from hydro power stations is 
the incumbent source of heating. Secondly, it’s not likely that the mandatory 
connection to DH systems as stipulated by the planning and building act in Norway in 
concession areas shall be applicable in the UK. 
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5.0 European Union & UK Governance Mechanisms on CHP- DH 
system and LA Engagement 
5.1 European Union Policy Drivers of CHP-DH systems  
The modern European Union’s energy policy crux can be said to be founded on 
the desire of the commission to have a single integrated energy market flow from 
the Single European Act (SEA) that was signed in 1986 and came into effect in 
1987 (EU, 1986). However, the SEA at its inception did not include electricity, gas 
and heat but rather focussed on energy resources, reinforcing the European Coal 
and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community with its focus 
on nuclear energy. Partly due to the un-interconnected nature of the grids within 
large part of the EU and vertical ownership structure of these assets by national 
champions like EDF in France, in the 12 member states including Denmark as 
the only Scandinavian country as at 1986. Nonetheless after several working 
papers and directives, the Maastricht treaty of 1992 eventually led to the 
emergence of electricity and gas directives of 1996 and 1998 to promote internal 
energy market (Langsdorf, 2011) and the 2007 Trans-European Networks (TEN) 
initiative to create synergies of energy grids (electricity supplies, oil, and gas 
pipelines) of member states (Davies, 2013). 
Furthermore, the Kyoto protocol adopted EU-wide in 1997 also influenced other 
policy levers like the 2001 Renewable Energy Directive (2001/77/EC) and the 
2003 Emission Trading Directive (2003/87/EC) with a view to reduce emissions. 
This stirred the convergence of energy and environment in the EU energy policy 
spectrum until in 2007 when the first energy action plan was introduced to 
improve security of energy supply, sustainability, and competitiveness across the 
continent through a set of strategies known as Energy 2020 strategy; which some 
consider as the foundation of modern EU energy policy (Langsdorf, 2011).  
This Energy 2020 strategy entails 20% reduction of Green House Gases (GHG) 
below 1990 baseline by 2020, increase energy consumption from renewable 
energy sources by 20% and a 20% increase in energy efficiency by 2020, which 
has been adopted by member states (Fabrizio, 2013) . Each Member State has 
a national target, with the UK bound to achieve a target of 15% of its energy from 
RE by 2020. The UK Government has stated it will aim to achieve this with three 
sub-targets, 30% of electricity demand, 12% of heat demand and 10% of 
transport demand from RE (DECC, 2009). 
Another key deliverable from the energy action plan was the EU’s Third Energy 
Package (TEP) introduced in 2009 which heralded several governance 
mechanisms focused on the electricity and gas industries such as the formation 
of European Network of Transmission System Operators – Electricity (ENTSO-
E) currently representing 42 transmission network operators from 35 countries. 
The key features of the TEP are a competitive and integrated energy market 
amongst member states. TEP covered five broad areas, which includes 
unbundling of energy (electricity and gas) suppliers from network operators; 
improve cooperation amongst grid network operators, establishment of ACER 
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(Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators), increasing the independency 
of regulators and transparency in retail markets (Dutton, 2015). However, climate 
change activists criticised the TEP for not doing enough to unbundle the energy 
industry in EU (Langsdorf, 2011).  
Nonetheless, there are several other governance mechanisms which may impact 
on the penetration of CHP-DH systems as shown in Table 2 below. These 
include: 
 Directives Objectives 
1 Cogeneration - Combined Heat and 
Power (CHP) Directive 2004/8/EC 
It seeks to promote high-efficiency 
CHPs based on ‘useful heat’ demand 
which is defined as the heat 
generated from CHPs that meets a 
specific heat demand (EU, 2004) 
2 Renewable Energy Directive 
(2009/28/EC) 
It mandates member states and LAs 
to evolve mechanisms or 
administrative ways such as planning 
to promote electricity and heat 
production and adoption of DH and 
cooling from renewable sources to 
meet the 20% renewable energy 
sources (EU, 2009a) 
3 Energy Efficiency Directive 
2012/27/EU 
It seeks member states to undertake 
a detailed assessment of CHP, DH 
and cooling potential with a view to 
deploying governance structures 
including heat maps to cost 
effectively deploy them and 
encourage developers of power 
plants above 20MW capacity to 
consider CHPs (EU, 2012). 
4 EU Emission Trading Directive 
(2003/87/EC) 
This directive introduced an EU 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) 
aimed at reducing GHG emission 
through promoting the use of more 
energy efficient technologies 
including CHPs. It is a cap and trade 
mechanism that targets energy 
intensive industry with more than 
20MW thermal input. Facilities 
receive tradeable emission 
allowances (EUA) provided by the 
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member states and can trade excess 
permits to those with a shortfall. 
5 Energy End-use Efficiency and 
Energy Services (Energy Services 
Directive) Directive 2006/32/EC 
This directive sought to promote the 
use of ESCO “Energy Service 
Company” to implementing energy 
services (EU, 2006c), which the 
CHP-DH industry hugely benefits 
from as one of the key governance 
structures to develop and manage 
CHP-DH projects (Werner and 
DHCAN, 2004). 
6 European Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive2010/31/EU 
This directive seeks member states 
to promote the use of alternative 
energy systems such as DH systems 
that would reduce the energy needs 
of new buildings for heating and 
cooling to a cost optimal level and 
also increase the number of nearly 
zero-energy buildings (EU, 2010a).  
Table 2: EU governance mechanisms that may impact on CH-DH systems 
Additionally vital policy frameworks that may impact on CHP-DH system are the 
2008 adoption of the “green paper towards a secure sustainable and competitive 
European energy market” to define the scope of the TEN - Energy to encompass 
the full energy transportation network (Davies, 2013). Which includes, gas, LNG 
terminals, underground storage, electricity transmission network and oil pipeline. 
However, heat network was not captured in the TEN-E initiative. Additionally in 
2009 a revised version of the energy action plan was introduced in the energy 
roadmap 2050 with a view to reducing emissions by 80% by 2050 compared to a 
1990 baseline through promotion of renewable energy sources for electricity, 
heating and cooling by synthesizing various scenarios and competition (EU, 
2010c). However, none of these scenarios involved the large-scale 
implementation of district heating, but instead focused on the electrification of the 
heating sector (primarily using heat pumps) and/or the large-scale 
implementation of electricity and heat savings (Connolly et al., 2014). Suggesting 
that the EU may not have evolved a joined-up policy framework for CHP-DH 
systems. 
5.2 Governance of CHP-DH in the UK 
Governance is entrenched through governance mechanisms or instruments 
(Levi-Faur, 2012 pg:13) that stimulates motivation for interaction that is sufficient 
to direct firms to the market, with the expectations of meeting actors’ specific 
vision and targets. These mechanisms are expected to lead to the development, 
diffusion and utilization of the technology and influence the direction of growth of 
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the technology (Bergek et al., 2008b). Governance mechanisms should have 
certain characteristics or outcomes which are intended to meet the desired goals 
of the policy formulator and stakeholders. These include amongst others, 
incentives to potential developers through guaranteed income, elimination of 
barriers to grid connection and market at reduced administrative cost, and it’s 
publicly accepted (Mendonça, 2007 pg:xvii). These mechanisms could be 
regulatory, market or public/private partnership driven (Hillman et al., 2011, 
Nilsson et al., 2012) 
Governance mechanisms that may impact on the development and penetration 
of CHP-DH systems in the UK can be broadly divided into five components 
namely, fiscal mechanisms (tax exemptions and rebates), financial/investment 
incentives (loans and grants), obligatory schemes (obligation on suppliers), price 
support (FiT, tendering/auction) and quantity obligation (renewable obligation 
certificates). Johnstone et al. (2010) had argued that investment incentives which 
also includes third party financing and investment guarantee may be more 
efficient in inducing innovation for high fixed cost RES technologies such as CHP-
DH systems. However, with increasing use of combinations of mechanisms for 
example the average use of mechanisms per country in the EU is about 3, this 
has shown more efficacy in inducing innovation of RES (Kitzing et al., 2012). In 
part because technologies respond differently to mechanisms in relation to their 
technological and commercial maturity and policy expectations as suggested by 
Johnstone et al. (2010). Hence a further narrative on the various governance 
mechanisms in both the electricity and heat sectors deployed in the UK that may 
impact on CHP-DH systems and the impact of local governance structure on its 
penetration. 
5.3 Electricity Governance Mechanisms  
The UK has deployed several governance mechanisms in the electricity sector to 
meet its renewable energy milestones that encapsulate energy security, 
sustainability and affordability over stipulated periods of time. As highlighted 
earlier these mechanisms with respect to the electricity sector has taken different 
shapes and the narrative below shall attempt to discuss them with a view to 
highlight the interaction with CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
5.3.1 Renewables Obligation (RO) 
The RO is a quantity obligation mechanism that required energy suppliers to 
present evidence that they had procured a certain volume of renewable electricity 
for every MWh to be determined by Secretary of State of Energy, through 
submission of Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs) to the regulator, Ofgem.  
The RO has been modified several times. Its initial conception was to be a 
technology neutral scheme because Government didn’t want to be seen as 
‘picking winners’ (DTI, 2001), therefore allowing suppliers to choose from any 
technology, but this was rapidly failing as less established technologies, at least 
some of which were essential to meeting UK RES-E targets were systematically 
priced out from the mechanism (Wood and Dow, 2011). Additionally other 
systemic failures were observed in the scheme, such as volume risk imposed by 
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the annual limits and sale of future power, excessive price uncertainty induced 
by competition, NETA/BETTA arrangement that aggravated the balancing risk 
due to RE plant intermittency, and market risk due to price volatility over the life 
of the scheme (Mitchell and Connor, 2004, Lipp, 2007). Further reviews of the 
RO were made to include banding of technologies and mitigate other risk such 
as introduction of guaranteed head room of about 8% gap between expected 
renewable output and the obligation level (Woodman and Mitchell, 2011).  
In 2012 the banding was further reviewed to include other technologies like the 
biomass conversion with CHP and enhanced co-firing of biomass with CHP. 
There were reductions in the number of ROCs for some other technologies like 
co-firing of biomass with CHP (standard) and Co-firing of energy crops with CHP 
(standard) (Table 3). A key point to note in the 2012 banding regime is that after 
April 2015, new CHP entrants won’t be able to be part of the RO, though this 
holds for all RES-E as the RO is being superseded by Contracts for Difference 
(CfD) mechanism. 
CHP Types 
ROCs/MWh 
Comments 
Year of 
modification 
2009 
Year of 
modification 
2012 
2010-2014 2013-2017 
Waste with CHP 1 1   
Co-firing of biomass 
with CHP (standard) 1 1.5 
Unit by unit approach and close 
band by April, 2015 
Co-firing of biomass 
with CHP (enhanced) NA 1.5 
Unit by unit approach and close 
band by April, 2015 
Co-firing of energy 
crops with CHP 
(Standard) 1.5 2 
Band to be closed subject to 
consultation and close to new 
entrants by April, 2015 
Dedicated energy 
crops with CHP 2 2 
This would regress to 1.9 in 
2015/16 and 1.8 in 2016/17 
Dedicated biomass 
with CHP 2 2 
Close to new entrants by April, 
2015 
Biomass conversion 
with CHP 
NA 1.5 
Close to new entrants by April, 
2015 
Table 3: CHP Technologies to benefit from renewable obligation 
Source:(DECC, 2012f) 
However, these modifications of the RO scheme did not seem to mitigate the 
inherent failures associated with the scheme. Firstly, the balancing risk that arises 
from the current complex BETTA arrangement places high cost of membership 
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and penalties on intermittent generators and reinforces the lock-in of the large 
plants. This balancing risk drives small generators to sign contracts with 
consolidators or suppliers at a premium of either shearing embedded benefits or 
reduced market rate. Secondly, the impact due to delay in planning approvals 
and lack of grid access can greatly impact on renewable CHPs leveraging on the 
RO as there is no guaranteed connection to the grid (Wood and Dow, 2011). 
Thirdly, in modelling the RO banding, the input parameters were capital cost, 
operational cost, cost of capital, capacity limits and capital grants (OXERA, 2007). 
While the outputs were levy exemption certificate (LEC), electricity prices and 
ROC as revenues, but they didn’t recognise additional revenues that could accrue 
to a CHP developer such as heat. In part, because heat has been considered as 
a by-product, indicating the impact of revenue from heat was not fully captured. 
The non-evaluation of the revenue risk completely could have also led to CHPs 
not appropriately allocated the desired ROC value and some cases reduced ROC 
from 2010 banding value such as co-firing biomass CHP. The uncomplete 
allocation risk is compounded by the fact the trading arrangement does not still 
internalise the externalities of electricity exports such as carbon reduction from 
CHP-DH systems. Thus the revenue flows of CHP generators still don’t reflect 
the environmental benefits of reduced CO2 emission. This is partly due to the 
usual practice of policy makers not to fully converge the cost risk with the revenue 
risk, which is typically presented as a business case to an investor (Gross et al., 
2010). 
Lastly the constant review and changes of the RO mechanism would suggests 
policy uncertainty, with the RO scheme suffering an almost annual changes since 
inception (Woodman and Mitchell, 2011). Policy uncertainty is perceived as a risk 
especially for new entrants under the RO scheme (Wood and Dow, 2011), which 
would leave CHP developers struggling to put up a financial forecast for the 
economic life of the system, hence may attract a premium from financers or equity 
holders. 
However, the Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) mechanism was introduced to help mitigate 
some of these risks for small capacities while the Contract for Difference (CfD) 
will be introduced to replace the reformed RO for large renewable capacities on 
a longer term, but the narration below would highlight how far these risks have 
been militated against or reduced. 
5.3.2 Feed-In Tariff (FiT) 
The Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) mechanism is a price support mechanism that 
guarantees a fixed price for each unit of electricity produced by eligible RES-E. 
The UK FiT is available only to specific RES-E technologies below 5MW, namely: 
microCHP, anaerobic digestion (AD), hydro, solar photovoltaic (PV), and wind. 
FiT mechanisms typically grant priority grid access to RES-E generators to feed 
in their power at a fixed price with a view to accelerate technological penetration 
to a point of commercial maturity (Mendonça, 2011). The thrust of the UK FiT is 
to provide price and market certainty to generators with a cap of 5MW for eligible 
installation with an estimated rate of return of 5-8% over the life of the project 
(DECC, 2009b).  
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The scheme was the only support for <50kW generators while those above 50KW 
to 5MW had the option to choose between the RO or FiT scheme. The scheme 
provided about 1.2% (3.8TWh) of renewable electricity to the total electricity 
production in the UK (299.2TWh) during 2014-15 (Ofgem, 2016b). However the 
technologies covered under the FiT scheme suggest that the scheme may not 
have a significant impact on CHP-DH systems. In part because microCHPs are 
more akin to providing energy to individual buildings (Hawkes and Leach, 2008b) 
than a multi building, which could be considered the remit of larger CHPs. 
Secondly, the policy thrust of the FiT mechanism is also to drive energy efficiency 
in energy use by rewarding self-generation rather than seeing it as any other 
investment (DECC, 2009b). Hence the UK FiT scheme may have little 
significance on CHP-DH systems. 
5.3.3 Electricity Market Reform  
In 2012 the UK introduced the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) policy with its 
objective of attracting investment into low carbon technologies to meet climate 
change targets, while securing the supply of electricity at a minimal cost to tax 
payers as the UK seeks to meet the overall energy target moving forward to 2050. 
EMR is a mixed policy bag of regulatory and economic incentives. It’s 
encapsulated into four policy mechanisms, namely: Contract for Difference (CfD), 
Capacity Market (CM), Carbon Floor Price (CPF) and Emissions Performance 
Standard (EPS).  
5.3.3.1  Contract for Difference (CfD) 
CfD is a price support mechanism delivered through auctioning introduced by the 
UK Government with the objective of militating against volatile wholesale 
electricity prices by reducing investment risk to renewable energy generators 
through a top-up on the electricity market price to a pre-agreed amount known as 
the ‘strike price’. This means generators would receive revenue for selling their 
electricity into the market plus an additional payment when the market price is 
below the strike price as shown in Figure 8. Conversely if the market price is 
above the strike price, the generators pay back the difference.  
 
Figure 8: Operation graph of the CfD 
Source:(DECC, 2012d) 
95 | P a g e  
 
Key features of the CfD scheme is that, it’s a multi-unit, sealed bids and uniform 
price auction (Fitch-Roy and Woodman, 2016). Indicating that bidders through 
multiple bids can adjust their strike price depending on capacity or delivery year 
in a sealed manner with the last accepted offer below the maxima capacity or 
administrative strike price becoming the uniform price for all successful bidders 
in a given delivery year commonly referred to as pay-as-cleared (OXERA, 2014). 
The CfD is banded into three groups: established technologies, less established 
technologies and biomass conversion as shown in Table 4 with Government 
recently revising delivery period from 2020 to 2026 (DBEIS, 2016b).  
Table 4 below shows the various technologies that shall benefit from the CfD 
scheme and bands of strike prices 
Pot 1 (Established Technologies) 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 
Energy from Waste (with CHP) 80 80 80 80 80 
Hydro 100 100 100 100 100 
Landfill Gas 55 55 55 55 55 
Solar PV>5MW 120 120 115 110 100 
Onshore Wind 95 95 95 90 90 
Sewage gas 75 75 75 75 75 
Pot 2 (Less Established 
Technologies) 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 
Advanced Conversion 
Technologies (With or without CHP) 155 155 150 140 140 
Anaerobic Digestion (with or 
without CHP) 150 150 150 140 140 
Dedicated Biomass (with CHP) 125 125 125 125 125 
Geothermal (with or without CHP) 145 145 145 140 140 
Offshore Wind 155 155 150 140 140 
Remote islands Onshore Wind       115 115 
Tidal Stream 305 305 305 305 305 
Wave 305 305 305 305 305 
Pot 3 (Biomass Conversion) 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 
Biomass Conversion 105 105 105 105 105 
Table 4: Strike prices for renewable technologies (£/MWh) 
Source: (Grant Thornton and Pöyry, 2015b) 
The scheme is to be funded by consumers through suppliers but a budgetary 
framework of determining the yearly allocation is done by the Secretary of State 
under the Levy Control Framework (LCF). National Grid shall administer the 
scheme, with the Electricity Settlement Company (ESC) to process payments but 
a separate company, the Low Carbon Contracts Company Limited (LCCC), as its 
implementation coordinator. The basic qualification requirements to participate in 
the auction are planning consent, a grid connection offer, incorporation detail, to 
be non-beneficiaries of RO, FiT and capacity mechanism schemes. Plants above 
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300MW must show evidence of a supply chain (Grant Thornton and Pöyry, 
2015b). Which is an evidence that applicants with over 300MW low carbon 
electricity generation, has documentation showing plans of contributing to 
development of skills, innovation and competition in the low carbon electricity 
market (DECC, 2015n). 
The CfD is an attempt to reduce or eliminate some of the perceived risk exhibited 
in the RO, such as price uncertainty, carrying of ROCs and discounts applied to 
only the wholesale electricity price and not the entire revenue stream (DECC, 
2013i). However, other forms of risk may emerge, such as the linkage of the 
funding of the scheme to the treasury which is dependent on the fiscal policies 
from the treasury. Qualification risk may also emerge, it has been suggested CfD 
may favour large incumbent developers with the financial muscle to get faster 
grid connection offers and planning consents with construction/delivery risk of 
new projects on strict time lines (Grant Thornton and Pöyry, 2015b). However, 
investors are able to choose between CfD and RO during the transition years 
2014/15 – 2016/17. 
The first round of CfD auction awarded in February, 2015 was for a total of 2.1GW 
capacity across 27 projects with about 4% (94.75MW) from energy from waste 
with CHPs (DECC, 2015r). The next round of auction is slated to be in November, 
2016. However the scheme was burdened with delays and uncertain schedules, 
partly as a result of Governments underestimation of the complexity of the 
scheme and an initial non-engagement with stakeholders (Grant Thornton and 
Pöyry, 2015b).  
A more elaborate discussion on the impact of the CfD auction process on CHP-
DH system was undertaken in chapter 9 of this research work in responds to a 
research question. 
5.3.3.2  Capacity Market Mechanism (CM) 
Capacity mechanism is one of the corner stones of the government electricity 
market reform regime. It seeks to provide security of supply of electricity to the 
grid and ensure system stability as the grid may experience a potential closure of 
about 14GW of existing plants by 2020 (HoC, 2015). In part because of increasing 
low profit for gas plants due to market uncertainty, ageing of nuclear plants and 
regulatory pressure on coal plants by the EU’s Large Combustion Plant Directive 
(LCPD) forcing closure of older coal plants (Ofgem, 2013c).  
The main objective of this mechanism is to incentivise sufficient investment in the 
reliable capacity required to meet demand (DECC, 2013i). The CM auctions 
contracts every four years ahead of year delivery of capacity (this is known as T-
4). A second, annual auction is held one year ahead (known as T-1) with 
Demand-Side Response (DSR) from 2016. The scheme after an initial delay held 
its first auction in December 2014 and another in 2015. 
The scheme is to provide capacity through the following routes, which includes 
new plants, existing plants, electric storage, new and existing DSR and 
interconnection, which were all segregated into three distinct groups for 
contracting as shown in Table 5. While the cost is to be passed on to consumers 
through electricity suppliers, but its budgetary framework is still under the LCF. 
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However the Government plans to set a separate budget for the Capacity Market 
when there is greater certainty on the size of the costs involved (HoC, 2015). 
Similar to CfD, the scheme is to be administered by System Operator, NG, with 
Electricity Settlement Company (ESC) providing settlement of invoices to both 
suppliers and Capacity Market Units (CMUs) similar to the function of Elexon in 
the electricity market. While Ofgem will provide dispute resolution between NG 
and the CMUs, and own and manage the CM rules after the first auction (DECC, 
2014k). 
 
Contract Duration Type of Plant Price Cap 
1 Year Existing £75/KW/Year 
3 Years Refurbished £125/KW/Year 
15 Years New Build £250/KW/Year 
Table 5: Fee Bands of CM commitment to electricity consumers 
Source: (NG, 2016a) 
Two separate auctions were conducted by NG in 2014 and 2015. Table 6 breaks 
down the clearing prices and capacity procured is both auctions. Following a 
consultation of these two auctions, the Government will introduce some changes 
to the CM, bringing forward another auction to January 2017.This is partly due to 
the impact of construction/delivery risk to the scheme as there is beginning to be 
signs of some plants backing out of the capacity agreement and opting to pay the 
penalty instead (DECC, 2016c). Consequently the termination fees and credit 
cover for the scheme has been increased and plants that fail to deliver from two 
years of award will be now be disqualified from future capacity auctions (DECC, 
2016c).  
This suggests that the scheme could already be showing signs of “missing 
money” syndrome (Joskow, 2013), whereby price caps have disincentivised 
bidders as the prices may be suppressed to attract awards. 
 Clearing 
Price (£) 
Awarded 
Capacity 
(GW) 
Total 
Auction 
Entry 
(GW) 
CHP & 
Autogeneration 
awarded (%) 
CHP & 
Autogeneration 
that exited (%) 
2014 T-4 19.40 49.3 64.96 8.6 3.45 
2015 T-4 18.00 46.35 57.72 9.07 0.56 
Table 6: Performance of CHP at the two CM auctions  
Source: (NG, 2015a, NG, 2015d) 
CHPs between 2- 50MW are eligible to participate in the CM auction scheme, 
recognising CHPs ability to provide dedicated generation for a specified period of 
time. Further, smaller CHPs units can aggregate and present a joint output to 
collectively provide 2MW of capacity as a CMU. CHPs can also participate in the 
demand side response (DSR). However they are inhibited from participating if 
they are already beneficiaries of RHI, FiT, CfD, RO, long term STOR (Short Term 
Operating Reserves) or any other low carbon support governance instrument. 
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Nonetheless, they can participate if they have short term STOR or balancing 
services contract (DECC, 2014i). 
A further discussion on the interaction of the CM scheme and the CHP-DH 
systems has been undertaken chapter 9 as a response to a research question  
5.3.3.3  Carbon Price Floor (CPF)  
CPF was introduced to stabilise the price of carbon and thus incentivise low 
carbon development. This is as a result of the uncertain price of carbon or not 
high enough to encourage sufficient investment in low carbon electricity 
generation in the UK (DECC, 2011c), partly due to low price of carbon at the EU 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Hence a scheme to help balance the price 
of carbon in a collaborative manner with the EU ETS to spur the desired 
investment in low carbon technologies.  
The carbon floor price is a combination of regulatory and taxation mechanism 
that obliges UK based carbon emitters to pay for the right to pollute as a top up if 
the market price for carbon falls below the reference price. The targeted sectors 
are the energy intensive industries such as the steel, chemicals, cement 
industries and power generators. Vital to this mechanism is the price of carbon at 
the EU level, which is directly related to the volume of carbon allowance in the 
market. The UK CPF seeks to distinguish between the existing climate change 
levy which was a downstream tax with CPF as an upstream tax, requiring 
generators now be charged at the relevant carbon support rate depending on the 
fuel type being used.  
The government launched the scheme in 2013 at a fixed support price of 
£4.94/tCO2 for carbon which represents the difference between the government 
target carbon price and the market price of carbon in the EU ETS. The 
Government estimated that the total price of carbon (support plus EU ETS) would 
rise to £15.7/tCO2 and would rise along a straight line to reach £30/tCO2 in 2020, 
then continue to rise to £70/tCO2 by 2030 as seen in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9: Carbon price floor to 2020 
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Source: (DECC, 2012d) 
However, the Government’s projection for carbon price continentally has been 
below expectation as the carbon price at the time of announcement in March 
2011 it was around £15/tCO2 but by January, 2013 it had fallen to £4/tCO2 (Ares, 
2013) and was hovering around £5t/CO2 in the first quarter of 2016 (Garside, 
2016). This is inconsistent with the Government’s expectation of about £20t/CO2 
by 2016 (see Figure 9). Resulting in Government’s review of the CPF policy by 
pegging the CPS to £18t/CO2 from 2016 to 2020 (HMRC, 2014). In part due to 
the excessive supply of permits at the continental level, the increased levy on the 
UK industries without a corresponding levy on their counterparts in Europe and 
the risk of carbon leakage (the relocation of production to less taxed areas). 
Suggesting that there is no clarity on the long term view of the CPF scheme for 
CHP developers to develop business models on its back. 
Furthermore, the UK manufacturing association is agitating for the scheme to be 
scrapped against a claimed projected increase on electricity bills for medium-
sized manufacturers (Stace, 2013) as British firms in the EU ETS, including the 
struggling steel industry, pay an additional £18t/CO2 more than their European 
counterparts (Carbonnel, 2016). A further discussion on the interaction with CHP-
DH systems in the UK is captured in section 9.2.1.3 as a response to a research 
question. 
5.3.3.4  Emission Performance Standards (EPS)  
EPS is a performance regulatory mechanism to curb carbon emissions from new 
plants by setting standards above which an emission control technology is to be 
adopted or face closure. The EMR has set 450gCO2/kWh as the EPS for any new 
entrants into the electricity production sector with exceptions for new coal and 
gas power plants fitted with carbon capture and storage demonstration plant until 
2045 (DECC, 2011). The impact on CHP is almost negligible as most CHPs have 
certification from CHPQA which exempts them from EPS as good quality CHPs. 
5.4 Heat Governance Mechanisms 
The UK committed to a 15% legally binding national target for consumption from 
renewables as part of the 2009 EU Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC). A 
cornerstone of the UK’s target is to generate 10-12% of heat demand from 
Renewable Energy Source – Heating (RES-H) (DECC, 2009). The UK spends 
about £32billion annually on the provision of heat energy and heat accounts for 
a third of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) and nearly half (44%) of energy 
consumption(DECC, 2013a). 
Several governance instruments have been developed to RES-H through 
traditional instruments such as grants (e.g. Community Energy Programme - that 
offered grants to develop CHP-DH projects as in Aberdeen and Birmingham but 
closed in 2007) (Webb, 2016a pg:139) or loans (Green Deal). More recently the 
UK introduced the world’s first tariff mechanism specifically designed to stimulate 
the growth of RES-H with the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI), which has some 
potential to support CHP-DH. 
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5.4.1. Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) 
This is a tariff mechanism introduced to encourage the deployment of renewable 
heating technologies. It is administered by Ofgem though DECC sets the tariffs 
based on forecast budget and technology diffusion. The scheme is to encourage 
the generation of heat from renewable technologies for space heating, water 
heating and process heating. Applications are classified into two distinct groups’ 
non-domestic buildings, which covers heating in commercial, public, industrial 
sector and district heating while the second group covers domestic buildings. The 
domestic group covers single domestic properties, owner-occupiers, private 
landlords, registered providers of social housing, self-builders and third party 
owners of a heating system, though new builds are not eligible to benefit from the 
scheme (DECC, 2013l). However, in relation to this research that has its focus 
on CHP-DH system. The domestic RHI known as Phase II of the RHI scheme 
would have little relevance because it does not support district heating, hence 
only discussion on the non-domestic RHI (Phase I) would be taken forward.  
The non-domestic RHI tariff seeks to provide 12% rate of return to the reference 
installation which is linked to the Retail Price Index (RPI) to reduce the impact of 
inflation while also regularly degression for new entrants. Triggering degression 
allows the Government to limit spending on the scheme by bringing down 
deployment in line with affordable budget. The principle behind the tariff design 
is to compensate for the additional cost for generating heat from renewables 
rather than compensating for the full cost of equipment or fuel used (Connor et 
al., 2015). The scheme provides twenty years of payment of the tariff and is 
currently expected to be open to new entrants until 2021. 
The RHI’s introduction was subject to substantial delays arising from a number 
of factors such as change of political leadership; support routes, fiscal economy 
and low learning experience on RES-H (Connor et al., 2015). For example the 
leadership change came with the coalition Government’s emergence at the 2010 
general election, and a desire to switch the funding source from consumer energy 
bill to the general budget (DECC, 2011f).  
RHI phase I performance from the start of the scheme till date (2nd Quarter, 2016) 
according to the latest report by Ofgem (2016a) shows solid biomass boiler as 
greatest beneficiary with 93.53% of accredited installations, followed by GSHP 
3.1%, solar thermal with 1.5%, ASHP (0.92%), Biomethane (0.31%), Biogas 
(0.3%) and (WSHP (0.25%). Below is the overview of key characteristics of the 
non-domestic RHI in Table 7. 
 Phase I 
Sector Non-Domestic 
Commencement 2011 
Rate of Return 12% 
Metering Metered 
Payment 20 Years 
Most technology Uptake Solid Biomass Boiler (93.53%) – 
by 2nd  Quarter 2016 
Table 7: Overview of key characteristics of Non-domestic scheme of the RHI 
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Source: Ofgem (2016a), Ofgem (2016d) and (Connor et al., 2015) 
The tariff structure going forward to the next phase has been reviewed to reflect 
new cost data, heat loads and capacity factors. These new concerns have been 
reflected in the new tariff bearing in mind the level of deployment of each 
technology and the need not to incentivise over-production of heat or waste 
renewable heat. The resultant effect was the introduction of tiered and increased 
tariff for GSHP, 100% increase for large biomass, while small and medium 
biomass remained unchanged (see Table 8).  
Table 8: Non-domestic RHI distribution for Phases I and II 
Tariff 
Eligible 
Technolo
gy 
Eligible 
sizes 
Tariff 
(p/kWh
) 
ending 
2013 
Tariff 
(p/kW
h) 
2014/1
5 
Duratio
n 
Measuring 
/Payment 
methodolo
gy 
Comments/ 
Amendment
s 
Small 
commercial 
biomass 
Solid 
biomass 
including 
solid 
biomass 
contained 
in 
municipal 
solid waste 
(including 
CHP) 
Less 
than 
200KW 
Tier1: 
8.6 
Tier1: 
8.6 
20 
Years 
Metering or 
Heat Loss 
calculation:  
Tiered tariff 
to provide 
for capital 
cost in tier 1 
then 
operational 
cost from 
tier 2. This is 
calculated 
on a 15% 
load factor 
basis by 
1314hrs of 
Opes * 
capacity 
size  
2014 Tariffs 
are subject to 
existing 
budget 
management 
mechanism;   
Required to 
now submit a 
RHI emission 
certificate or a 
valid 
environmenta
l permit 
Tier2: 
2.2 
Tier2: 
2.2 
Medium 
commercial 
biomass 
200kW
<1000k
W 
Tier1: 
5.3 
Tier1: 
5.3 
Tier2: 
2.2 
Tier2: 
2.2 
Large 
commercial 
biomass 
1000k
W and 
above 
1 2 
Metering or 
Heat Loss 
calculation 
Required to 
now submit a 
RHI emission 
certificate or a 
valid 
environmenta
l permit 
Small 
commercial 
heat pump 
Ground 
sources 
heat 
Less 
than 
100KW 
4.8 
7.2 -
8.2 
Metering or 
Heat Loss 
calculation 
Value for 
money cap 
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Large 
commercial 
heat pumps 
pumps; 
water 
source 
heat 
pumps; 
deep 
geothermal 
100kW 
and 
above 
3.5 
introduced for 
both tiers 
All solar 
collectors 
Solar 
collector 
Less 
than 
200KW 
9.2 
10.0 - 
11.3  
Value for 
money cap 
introduced for 
only tier 1 
Biomethane 
and biogas 
combustion 
Biomethan
e injection 
and biogas 
combustio
n,  
Biomet
hane - 
all 
scales; 
Biogas 
combus
tion 
except 
combus
tion, 
except 
from 
landfill 
gas - 
less 
than 
200kW 
7.3 
  
  
Source: (DECC, 2013m) 
A detailed discussion on the impact of RHI on CHP-DH systems is undertaken in 
chapter 9. 
5.5 Fiscal/Financial and Obligatory Mechanisms 
Fiscal and financial mechanisms are policy instruments from the state that 
defines the spending and taxation regimes on a technology, which can be used 
to stimulate innovation of the technology to compete in the market (Brown and 
Chandler, 2008). While the obligatory mechanisms places targets on energy 
suppliers/generators to deploy energy efficient measures in the domestic sector. 
The predominant tools used in the fiscal/financial mechanism are tax incentives, 
loans, grants or subsidies. Below is a brief narration of various fiscal/financial and 
obligatory mechanisms which has been operational in the last five years that may 
have impact on the penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
 Climate Change Levy (CCL) is the tax on consumption of gas, electricity 
or other fuel by business and industrial entities but it excludes consumption 
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of renewables. More detailed narrative on its impact on CHP-DH system 
is undertaken in section 9.2.1.3. 
 Enhanced Capital Allowance (ECA) scheme allows businesses in the UK 
to write off 100% of investment of CHP parts against taxable profits in the 
year of purchase as long as the equipment is listed in the Energy 
Technology Product List (ETPL) (Carbon Trust, 2015) 
 Tax exemptions from business rates on CHP plant parts and machinery 
but not for heat recovery plant and boilers (DECC, 2015c) 
 The UK had and still deploys several grant/loans mechanisms that may 
impact on the growth of CHP-DH system. Such as the HNDU schemes to 
Local Authority’s to facilitate the development of DH schemes. 
 Low Carbon Infrastructure Fund (LCIL): This was a one-off funding 
scheme launched in 2009 to support the delivery of DH infrastructures as 
part of the development of new homes or refurbishment of existing homes 
in England. It was a £26m fund, administered by Homes and Communities 
Agency (HCA) in partnership with Department of Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) and Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) (HCA, 2011). The scheme benefited about 13 LAs, connected 
24,167 new and existing homes using five different technologies (HCA, 
2011).  
 Community Energy Savings Programme (CESP). This is an obligatory 
mechanism that requires major energy suppliers/generators to fund 
energy efficient projects to the tune of about £350m targeted at low income 
areas in partnership with local authorities and housing associations (CAG 
et al., 2011). Though smaller energy suppliers with less than 250,000 
customers were not obligated to join, the cost of the scheme was passed 
on to the consumers through their energy bills (HoC, 2013). The scheme 
operated from 2009 to 2012 but supported CHP-DH systems in the area 
of upgrade, connecting and metering of DH networks, and DH benefited 
about 8% of the uptake by the end of the scheme (Ofgem, 2013h). A 
further discussion on its interaction with CHP-DH systems is undertaken 
in chapter 9.  
 Energy Companies Obligation (ECO) – (successor to formerly Carbon 
Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) and the Community Energy Savings 
Programme (CESP)): This is an obligation on energy suppliers to install 
energy saving measures in UK homes with green deal as the scheme 
partner from where suppliers will seek the required fund for the scheme 
(DECC, 2013c), which will be repaid by consumers through energy bills. 
Energy suppliers shall receive targets from Ofgem based on their share of 
gas and electricity in the market set by DBEIS (Ofgem, 2015f), with the 
scheme being implemented in two phases namely: ECO1 (Jan 2013- 
104 | P a g e  
 
March 2015) and ECO2 (April, 2015 – March 2017)(Ofgem, 2016f). 
Connections of DH networks can benefit from the scheme and is the only 
measure in the scheme that does not require a green deal report or a 
chartered surveyor’s report (Ofgem, 2015f). Further discussion is 
undertaken in Chapter 9 on its relevance on CHP-DH penetration. 
5.6 Impact of local governance structure on UK CHP-DH 
penetration 
5.6.1 The context of LAs engagement in the governance of CHP-DH 
systems in the UK 
Cities under the jurisdictions of Local Authority’s (LA) account for approximately 
two-thirds of the world's primary energy consumption, enabling vital economic 
and social activities but also creating significant environmental impacts at both 
local and urban areas (Keirstead and Schulz, 2010). LAs hold a strategic position 
in developmental projects by virtue of being the custodians of the planning 
powers and the duty to promote the social, economic and environmental well-
being of their community. More importantly, many have suggested that the long-
term static position of local authorities places a responsibility on them to play a 
significant role in achieving the national goal of developing a low-carbon economy 
and meeting local energy obligations (Keirstead and Schulz, 2010, Kelly and 
Pollitt, 2011, Bulkeley et al., 2011, Carbon Trust, 2012b). This desire by LAs to 
play a role in achieving national environmental targets is reflected in the 
memorandum of understanding signed between DECC and representatives of 
LAs, known as the Nottingham Declaration of 2011. This allowed LAs 
represented by the Local Government Group (LGG) to pledge to support the state 
on their commitment to national energy targets by jointly designing a mechanism 
to combat GHG emission and monitor energy reductions (DECC, 2011a).  
In contrast, out of the 434 LAs in the UK, there are only a few examples of local 
authority-led CHP-DH systems in the UK (e.g. Kirklees, Peterborough, Leicester, 
Birmingham, Woking, Southampton, Nottingham, Islington, Devon County, 
Shetland, Sheffield, Newcastle, Coventry, Tower Hamlets, Highland Council, 
Leeds, South Gloucestershire DC, London Borough of Hackney and Aberdeen 
(LEP, 2007, Gearty, 2008, Kelly and Pollitt, 2011, HCA, 2011, SWM, 2014, 
Hawkey and Webb, 2016 pg:126-131)). This meagre LA participation in CHP-DH 
system can be attributed to a number of exogenous and endogenous factors 
which may have influenced their participation in developing CHP-DH systems. 
Key amongst the exogenous factors is that the state exerts the power to evolve 
energy policies in the UK (Bale et al., 2012). LAs in the UK have a long history of 
being under the apron of the state, such that any significant regulatory and 
financial activity that is not statutory or endorsed by the state may be considered 
ultra vires (meaning outside the authority, therefore it becomes null and void) 
(HoC, 2014a, Tingey et al., 2016 pg:158). This command and control stature of 
the state may have contributed to the erosion of the institutional self-esteem of 
the generality of LAs to be able to evolve innovative energy policies such that 
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some have considered energy security as not their business but a mandate of 
the state and can only manage fuel poverty (Keirstead and Schulz, 2010).  
However, several successive governments have made attempts to devolve 
powers to the LAs to empower them in the governance of electricity and heat 
arena in the UK partly due to national concern to meet environmental and energy 
targets. The devolution of powers seeks to stimulate the LAs to evolve innovative 
energy policies to jointly combat the national challenge. For instance in 2010 
Government lifted the ban on LAs selling excess power generated from 
renewable energy to the National Grid thus allowing LAs to enter into partnership 
with the private sector or local communities to invest in renewable projects and 
enabling them to benefit from various Government incentives. Such as FiT, RO 
and RHI, with a view for LAs to jointly participate in meeting environmental targets 
(DECC, 2010a).  
Consequently, Kelly and Pollitt (2011) suggested that UK LAs are beginning to 
take responsibility for local energy concerns as they realise the concerns for 
residents being exposed to fuel poverty amidst increased tension between 
environmental effects locally and economic survival of residents. However, they 
suggest that many LAs are focussed on delivery of energy-related services rather 
than strategic coordination, with most UK local authorities taking little or no 
strategic role in energy provision.  
These energy strategies will have to be encapsulated in energy policies by LAs 
which will enable them to translate policy outputs “the political decisions taken, 
the laws passed and the money spent” to the desired policy outcomes “the results 
or consequences of the outputs” (Newton and Van Deth, 2010 pg:324). 
Interestingly, as the state showed signs of devolution of powers to the LAs, it was 
not clear if the remit of evolution of energy policy was also devolved. For instance 
the London Borough of Merton introduced a novel energy policy in 2003 requiring 
all new non-residential developments above 1000m2 to incorporate an allowance 
for at least 10% of its energy requirements from a renewable energy source 
(TCPA, 2006). The state initially considered it an affront to its mandate in energy 
policy formulation but later conceded that other LAs could adopt a similar policy 
route to actualise their energy targets (Keirstead and Schulz, 2010). 
Consequently, this innovative approach is commonly known as the “Merton rule” 
and has been adopted by many other LAs, for instance it can be considered an 
enabler in the Southampton district heating scheme (Gearty, 2008). Hence the 
strategic role of LAs in the energy arena may still have the scar of the command 
and control stature of the state. 
Other impact of the state is that the LAs are not financially self-regulated because 
of limited taxation freedom, unlike some of their northern European counterparts 
with higher financial autonomy (Keirstead and Schulz, 2010). The LAs rely on the 
state for about two thirds of their annual budget (Tingey et al., 2016 pg:158) and 
for every £1 derived from taxation the state controls and allocates 91 pence 
(Crewe, 2016). Therefore vying into capital intensive investments like CHP-DH 
systems by LAs is strongly tied to the support from the state. Evidently that’s why 
the LAs have to depend on the financial gesture of the state to provide the inertia 
for CHP-DH schemes through grants and loans since the early publicly known 
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CHP-DH scheme in Pimlico to lately the HNDU supports to LA (Diamant and 
McGarry, 1968 pg:172, DECC, 2015b, Webb, 2016a pg:139).  
Another exogenous factor is the centralisation of energy systems in the UK with 
communities owning about 0.08% of the total installed electricity capacity and 
0.3% of renewable electricity capacity (Julian, 2014). Suggesting that LAs may 
have limited participation in the electricity arena in the UK which could be 
attributed to several electricity market failures earlier discussed in chapter 2. 
However, key to note is that since nationalisation of the energy industries in the 
1940s, electricity and gas were taken out of the hands of local authorities in the 
UK and subsequent privatization of these industries in the 1980s & 1990s which 
allowed the expertise to reside within the private sector. Hence LAs have been 
hindered by limited expertise and capacity in energy development and 
management (Webb, 2016a pg:137, Bale et al., 2012). 
The planning system is another area which the state overtly controls. The UK had 
been practicing a more centralised planning system but there has been a gradual 
shift of devolution of planning powers to LAs since the liberalisation of the energy 
sector (Lehtonen and Nye, 2009). A more detailed discussion on planning was 
undertaken in section 2.2.8.  
A key endogenous factor that impacts CHP-DH governance in the LAs is the 
political will of LA leadership. The successes of local energy strategies depend 
strongly on buy-in by both political leadership and employees of the LAs (Kelly 
and Pollitt, 2011, Bale et al., 2012). It is difficult to get an LA mandated CHP-DH 
project through an LA partly because of the huge financial implication without the 
political capital from the leadership. For instance in the Aberdeen DH system, a 
member of the board went against the advice of the council’s legal team that the 
project should be abandoned due to high risk of tenant non-payment. A 
commitment of the deputy leader of Birmingham Council was also key to the 
success of the Birmingham DH scheme against fears on financial cost (Webb, 
2016a pg:142-144) 
Summarily, a combination of both exogenous and endogenous factors on the LAs 
has seemly impacted their participation in the development of CHP-DH in the UK 
with the motivation to meet environmental and economic goals as key drivers. 
However, these goals have been hampered largely by the tension between 
hierarchical governance structures and local innovation even in the recent drive 
of devolution of power to the LAs. A more detailed discussion was undertaken in 
chapter 8 on the roles LAs can take to overcome these tensions in response to a 
research question.  
5.6.2 Ownership/Governance of Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) by 
LAs 
Development of energy projects, including CHP-DH systems, is associated with 
risk and expertise; just as crucial is the requirement of breadth of skills to engage 
in a CHP-DH development. The local authorities often don’t have the requisite 
expertise to develop such energy systems, partly due to the provisions on self-
regulation status of LAs in the UK and the budget cuts from 2011 to 2015 which 
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has further reduced its potential (LGA, 2013b). Therefore, like any project 
developer, minimisation of multiple risks is usually high on the priority list. 
Given that risk should be assigned to the parties that would best manage it, a 
model of risk allocation is usually applied to define the owners of various risk and 
the control. These considerations help LAs to facilitate the decision process on 
how best to manage technical, economic and financial drivers in a project like 
CHP-DH system, while still focused on their primary duty of local governance. 
Hence the development of a business model that would re-balance these 
priorities in favour of public goods and environment which are their primary 
concerns. Generally, these models are frequently referred to as “Energy Service 
Companies” ESCOs. LAs have found the use of ESCOs as a credible vehicle in 
developing CHP-DH systems with a view to operating them at arm’s length from 
a parent company (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010) thereby insulating themselves from 
unbearable risk such as project or financial risk. 
The EU had given a direction to understanding the fundamentals of the concept 
of ESCOs via the Energy End-use Efficiency and Energy Services (Energy 
Services Directive) Directive (2006/32/EC) (EU, 2006c). In it, the EU 
acknowledges the crucial role of establishing the terminology “ESCO” and 
advanced a definition of the term “energy service company” (ESCO) as “a natural 
or legal person that delivers energy services and/or other energy efficiency 
improvement measures in a user's facility or premises, and accepts some degree 
of financial risk in so doing” (EU, 2006c). It goes further in defining the agreement 
that binds the beneficiary and an ESCO (the provider of the energy efficiency 
improvement measure) as ‘energy performance contracting’ where investments 
are paid for based on a contractually agreed level of energy efficiency 
improvement. 
ESCOs can be confused with Energy Service Providers (ESPs) which are 
companies that provide energy services to energy users for a fixed fee depending 
on the agreed energy savings or the ESP runs the risk of paying the LA/client the 
value of unrealised energy savings that was agreed upon (LEP, 2007). While the 
ESCOs are possible vehicles for sharing or taking over LA/client financial or 
project risk for the energy system, in this case CHP-DH systems. In the UK, 
energy efficiency projects/CHP-DH systems are predominantly developed 
through creating an ESCO via a competitive tender process in accordance with 
EU procurement legislation (LEP, 2007). Therefore the procurement of ESCOs 
depends significantly on site-specific conditions, largely determined by how risk 
averse the LA is and the motivation behind the scheme. It also depends on the 
energy policy direction of the government and the position it allocates to CHP-DH 
in its overall energy policy portfolio. It effectively leaves each LA to dictate its 
choice of governance structure to adopt, within the constraints already laid out. 
On deciding on the motive or strategy of the scheme and risk allocation pattern 
by the LA’s, the choice of ESCO governance model to finance the project 
becomes vital. The ESCO governance model that is often adopted depends on 
the form financial mechanism to fund the project which largely depends on the 
risk allocation. ESCO governance models for projects are either guaranteed 
savings or shared savings arrangement (Okay and Akman, 2010). In a 
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guaranteed savings scheme, the ESCO will cover the technical risk by 
guaranteeing the energy savings and shields the LA from any performance risk 
but leaves the LA with the credit risk to repay the loan from the lenders (Marino 
et al., 2011). While in shared savings scheme, the ESCO could cover the 
technical and credit risk but the LA receives a share of the energy savings in 
accordance with the pre-agreed percentage in the energy performance contract 
(EPC). However, in both arrangements the enumerations of the ESCO is directly 
tied to the energy savings achieved (Bertoldi et al., 2006, Marino et al., 2011) 
which also creates additional revenue for the LAs. Below in Figure 10 is the 
schematic diagram of financing mechanisms generally applicable in ESCO 
arrangements. 
 
Figure 10: ESCO Financing Mechanism 
Source: Adapted from (Bertoldi et al., 2006, Morgado, 2014) 
In furtherance of the governance model of financing that the CHP-DH system 
could take, an agreed ownership structure will have to emerge to reflect the 
motive or strategy of the scheme. In the UK there are three common ownership 
variants of ESCOs being practiced by LAs (Hawkey and Webb, 2016 pg:125-
129). Firstly, a private sector led ESCO where the ESCO is wholly owned by the 
private sector. In this category, the LA has little or no influence on ESCO 
operations and reduced risk exposure; it is therefore often driven by commercial 
rather social motives. The LA can partake in profit sharing partly because of their 
role in the ESCO facilitation and secured demand provision. For instance in the 
Southampton Geothermal Heating Company Limited, a limited company by 
shares with Utilicom as the sole owner but shares profit with the council as when 
declared (LEP, 2007). Another example is the Barkantine Heat and Power 
Company (BHPC) a wholly owned subsidiary of the London Electricity Group with 
a 40% excess profit sharing agreement every two years with Tower Hamlets 
(LEP, 2007). 
The second model sees the ESCO partially owned by the LA, typically with an 
interest <20% with the remainder being held by one or more private entities, again 
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indicating more commercially driven rather than social perspective. This may take 
the shape of joint venture agreements between the ESCO and the LA to specify 
the functions and objectives of the ESCO with their respective roles. The risk is 
shared amongst both parties, with the LA having a little more risk than in the first 
model and with a measure of influence on the ESCOs strategic direction. A typical 
example is the Woking Council partnership with a Danish company in the 
Thameswey Energy Limited ESCO, where the LA initially had 19% stake in the 
joint venture before taking a 90% stake after changes in Danish tax law and UK 
accounting rules governing LAs (Hawkey and Webb, 2016 pg:128-129) 
The third ESCO model is when the LAs seeks to own a greater percentage 
(>20%) of the ESCO or its entirety, thus having a high degree of influence. This 
also means that the LA will bear a greater burden or all of the risk. The key driver 
for this governance option is the ability to steer the strategy towards social, 
environmental and economic directions. This option is also being adopted if 
private partners don’t see the scheme as viable enough to warrant their take up 
but may rather participate on contractual terms. For instance the Aberdeen CHP-
DH ESCO, where the LA created an ESCO limited by guarantee, suggesting it’s 
not a profit-oriented company (APBenson, 2011). 
There is no format or institutionalised procedure for ESCO formation, or support 
other than that an ESCO can claim capital tax allowances on the investment it 
makes (Bertoldi et al., 2006). However, the adoption of ESCO models by LAs in 
developing CHP-DH schemes could result in several positive outcomes 
benefiting both parties. For instance, the LAs would receive local energy 
developments plans including new energy planning strategies to installing DH 
networks and heat maps for the long-term development of CHP-DH scheme. For 
example the Aberdeen ESCO arrangement brought forward plans which would 
have normally taken more than 10 years to implement (APBenson, 2011). While 
the LAs in turn provide things like long term guarantees to take heat and/or power 
from the system, facilitate and guarantee planning right, right of way and locations 
for installation of CHP equipment and DH pipes (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010).  
Conversely, the operationalisation of an ESCO may encounter several 
challenges. For instance, Vine (2005) suggested that an ESCO may compete for 
scarce capital with small plants coupled with the lack of verification and 
monitoring mechanism for performance, it is considered more risky than supply 
side only (electricity or heat production only) projects to attract finance. Others 
are non-availability of governance framework to reflect the workings of an energy 
efficiency project.  
Further discussion on the potentials of ESCOs models by LAs on the penetration 
of CHP-DH systems in the UK has been undertaken in chapter 7 in response to 
a research question. 
5. 7 Gas grids in the UK heat sector   
Gas network is a key infrastructure to the penetration and performance of CHP-
DH system in the UK, in part because two thirds of fuel used by CHPs is supplied 
by gas network in the form natural gas. For instance, in 2014, natural gas makes 
110 | P a g e  
 
up about 67% of fuel used by CHPs (DECC, 2015g). The role of gas in the heating 
and electricity sector has a long history of being embedded in the UK’s energy 
consumption culture. Pipelines has been used to supply gas to buildings in the 
UK for over 200 years (Dodds and McDowall, 2013, KPMG, 2016), since 1812 
when London gas-light and coke company was established as the first UK gas 
company (Falkus, 1967). Suggesting the significance of gas network on the 
social, environmental and economic life of the society and the diffusion of CHP-
DH systems in the UK. DECC reports gas as the dominant fuel for CHPs in the 
UK at 67% in 2014 and estimates that this will continue until 2035 (DECC, 2015g) 
(see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: CHP forecast with dominant fuel 
Source: (FE, 2015a) 
Gas production and supply in the UK is known to have undergone three key 
phases of transformation as alternative to coal as the primary source for electricity 
and heat production due to economic and environmental pressures. These 
includes; coal carbonization, oil gasification and natural gas eras (Arapostathis et 
al., 2013). According to Arapostathis et al. (2013), the 19th century witnessed coal 
as the primary source of manufacturing gas through carbon carbonisation from 
low grade coal, which was initially used for lighting by commercial and middle-
class consumers and later for cooking but not for heating for a number of reasons. 
Such as the high cost of gas compared to coal and incomplete combustion of 
town gas leading to accumulation of soot and odours in buildings (Dodds and 
McDowall, 2013). The manufacturing of gas from coal “town gas” herald the 
development of gas pipelines locally by municipals and private companies. 
However, after widespread development of town gas network to buildings, 
advertisement and legitimization though installation of prepaid meters, gas share 
for lighting, cooking and heating began to widen until cost of production was 
beginning to be a concern to the government, as the government had nationalised 
and amalgamated the gas industries by the 1948 Act (Arapostathis et al., 2013). 
The 1948 Act created the establishment of the Gas Council and 12 Area Gas 
boards responsible for the regions, which then sought for alternative ways to 
reduce the cost of gas production by manufacturing gas from oil through refineries 
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in the middle of the twentieth century, shortly after the second world war. 
However, by 1960, coal carbonisations was still the dominant gas production 
method in the UK until the emergence of natural gas, which was initially imported 
as liquified natural gas from America and Venezuela and later the discovery of 
the UK’s North Sea gas in the late 1950s (Arapostathis et al., 2013).  
Subsequently, the discovery of the North Sea gas, which was seen to have a 
higher caloric value and quality than the town gas but with similar fast burning 
properties will meet the desire and aspirations of the Gas Council to provide a 
cheaper, more environmental and sustainable fuel for both electrification and 
heating (Arapostathis et al., 2013). However, to meet the growth in demand and 
capacity that would follow the adoption of natural gas, the existing town gas 
network had little interconnectivity between regions, with little storage capacity 
and existing gas burners also lacked the capability to be used with natural gas 
(Arapostathis et al., 2014). Therefore, two major issues stood on the way to the 
widespread use of natural gas, which were the upgrade of local gas network to 
high (transmission) and low (distribution) -pressure gas networks between 
regions, though many town gas networks to buildings were left and the 
conversion of gas burners to be suitable for natural gas. This led to a national 
conversion programme by the Gas council of appliances to be natural gas 
complaint from 1966, leading to the conversion of more than 40 million appliances 
by 1977 (HoP, 2017). While a development of high pressure national gas 
transmission network known as the NTS (National Transmission System) was 
started and by 1977, the low pressure gas network replacement programme 
known as the Iron Main Replacement Programme (IMRP) was also started to 
replace all iron pipes that were within 30m of any building with polyethylene pipes 
(Dodds and McDowall, 2013). The focus of the IMRP is to reduce leakages on 
the low pressure networks with a view to improve safety concerns and it’s slated 
to be finished by 2032 (HoP, 2017).  
These expansion in gas infrastructure alongside rising demand for gas and other 
governance activities such as the privatization of the gas industry in 1986, which 
triggered the “dash for gas” in 1990s that resulted in about 20GW capacity of gas 
plants at an average growth of 2.1GW/year between 1991 and 2001 (McGlade et 
al., 2016),  which all contributed to the significant displacement of coal by natural 
gas as the major primary energy source in the UK. Culminating in the share of 
coal as primary energy supply of 40% in 1970 being halved to 20% in 2012 and 
the share of gas rising from 5% in1970 to 35% by 2012 and a 20% reduction 
carbon emission  (McGlade et al., 2016). 
Since the 1986 privatization of the gas industry and the subsequent Utility Act 
2000, a regulator was established for the industry known as Office of Gas Supply 
(Ofgas), which was later amalgamated in 1999 with the Office of Electricity 
Regulation (Offer) to be later known as Office of Gas and Electricity Market 
(Ofgem). The establishment of a regulator has seen more robust regulation given 
the participation of variety of actors, stability and lock-in attributes of gas grid as 
an infrastructure. A key aspect of the regulation of gas infrastructure (also with 
electricity infrastructure) was the methodology to incentivise investment and 
control price. The gas industry has witnessed two major regulatory frameworks 
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which are the Retail Price Index-X (RPI-X) and RIIO (Revenue = Incentive + 
Innovation + Output) frameworks since privatisation. The first regulatory 
approach was the RPI-X, which is a price cap regulation that is based on 
incentives to control prices, where the expected revenues are fixed for a period 
of five years but offers opportunities for reviews during the period for adjustments, 
such as inflation or increase in customer base (Ofgem, 2009b). The RPI suggest 
that the price increases only with the rate of inflation, while encouraging efficiency 
by a factor known as X (Simmonds, 2000). The X reflects the potential cost 
savings by the company due to increase in efficiency or technological progress 
(King, 1998) and the value of X started with an efficiency factor of 2% (Simmonds, 
2000). The price control framework under RPI-X, was focused on two types of 
incentive measures namely: efficiency incentives -  innovation in reducing cost 
and Interruption incentive – improvement of quality of service (Ofgem, 2009b). 
However, in spite of the advantages of the price cap regulation under the RPI-X 
frame such as improvement of quality of service, reduced prices and incentivising 
investment of more than £35bn since privatisation, the RPI seemed to be 
challenged by the role of new dynamics in energy arena like climate change in 
infrastructure governance (Ofgem, 2010b). Thus, the evolution of the RPI-X 
framework to RIIO to capture the necessity of network companies to provide 
services that is value for money in a sustainable way that reflects its impact on 
the environment. The RIIO is also indexed to the RPI as against Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) that is being used in Australia (King, 1998). In part because corporate 
and Government bonds in the UK are tied to RPI and not CPI, which would allow 
network companies to seek finance to deliver their plans at a reasonable cost 
(Ofgem, 2010c). The key elements of the RIIO frameworks are namely:  a) An 
ex-ante (upfront) control of revenues by network companies to deliver outputs 
efficiently, b) time limit of eight years for each control period  and c) Returns to 
network companies shall be based on Regulated Asset Value (RAV) – 
capitalising all network cost at a fixed percentage, while also considering the 
depreciation (Ofgem, 2010c). The model presents comfort to equity and debt 
investors in a view to make the industry attractive for financing. The RIIO 
framework demands a business plan from each network company before the 
commencement of the regulatory period, explaining how they would achieve 
several outputs outlined in the frameworks. The expected outputs to be reported 
on are namely: customer satisfaction – improve customer response, conditions 
for connections – improve connection processes, reliability and availability -  
security of supply, safety – reduce accidents, environmental impact – reduced 
carbon foot print and social obligations - reduce fuel poverty (Ofgem, 2010c). The 
first regulatory period of RIIO framework for gas infrastructure (including 
electricity) started in 1st April 2013 and ends on 31st March, 2021, though with a 
four year review period within the eight years (Ofgem, 2015g).  Therefore, the 
RIIO seeks to incentivise gas network owners to invest in the development of the 
grid in a sustainable manner by guaranteeing investments. Furthermore, the RIIO 
framework uses an uncertainty mechanisms to reduce the exposure of investors 
to risk outside their control, such as allowing the increase/decrease of revenue 
depending on volume/new customers  (Ofgem, 2010c). 
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In addition to these regulatory incentives for the development of gas grids, natural 
gas supplies to non-commercial and domestic premises benefit from a reduced 
VAT rate and exclusion from Climate Change Levy (CCL). This is known as 
qualifying use. Gas supplies to low usage in the threshold of 5 therms or 145kWhr 
per day or 150 therms or 4,397kWhr per month shall also attract a reduced VAT 
rate (HMRC, 2016). However, the use of natural gas by businesses and non-
domestic customers shall attract a standard  VAT rate and CCL (plus VAT on 
CCL)  (EDF, 2018). Therefore, drawing on the incentive to develop gas networks 
by guaranteeing investment through the RIIO framework and the fiscal incentives 
to gas consumers from gas network in the way of reduced VAT rate may have 
reinforced the lock-in of gas network in the heating sector. Especially considering 
the absence of a regulator for the heating sector, which makes the regulation of 
DH sector through laissez-faire - little or no interference from the state/LA, with 
no price regulation and the discovery of the North Sea gas which has a higher 
combustion property than town gas may all have culminated in the dominance of 
gas grid in the provision of heating. The resultant is natural gas is providing about 
70% of heat energy consumption in the UK with about 90% of households in the 
UK being supplied natural gas from the gas network and gas network supplying 
more than twice the energy delivered by electricity network (HoP, 2017).  
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6.0  Research Objectives and Methodology  
6.1 Introduction 
This research seeks to provide a conceptual and empirical insight into the performance 
of CHP-DH technology in the UK by particularly interfacing Technological Innovation 
System (TIS) functional approach and governance concept with a view to investigate 
on how governance mechanisms can be improved to stimulate its diffusion and 
address system failure. The research addresses three broad research questions that 
includes: Firstly, what governance structures that permeate the CHP-DH landscape in 
the UK and the dominant risk profile. Secondly what innovative roles Local Authorities 
as part of governance hierarchy and a prime mover in the TIS structure can play in the 
stimulation of investment and growth of CHP-DH system. Thirdly, what is the impact 
of existing policy & governance mechanisms on CHP-DH systems in the UK? 
In pursuit of these objectives, an in-depth conceptual understanding of governance 
and technological innovation systems perspective was sought and discussed in 
chapter 3 with the aim of using the TIS functional approach to reveal the blocking or 
inducing mechanisms to the diffusion of CHP-DH system in the UK (Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004). The performance of the system functions shall reveal areas that may 
require governance intervention. 
This chapter shall also outline the analytical procedure and methodological pathway 
adopted to address the research questions, highlight the rationales for chosen 
methodologies and challenges for future research. 
6.2 Research Objectives 
CHP-DH systems are infrastructures and thus socio-technical systems that possesses 
technical, economic, political, social and environmental characteristics. For instance, 
it has been shown to contribute to efficient use of energy, reduction of GHG and 
reduction of fuel poverty. These kinds of benefits has been desirable by the European 
Union (EU) as it seeks through its Energy 2020 strategy to achieve 20% reduction of 
Green House Gases (GHG) below 1990 baseline by 2020, increase energy 
consumption from renewable energy sources by 20% and a 20% increase in energy 
efficiency by 2020 through various instruments (Fabrizio, 2013)  as part of the EU 
responds to the UNFCCC climate change agreement.  
The UK initially responded in 2000 to the UNFCCC climate change agreement by 
introducing the framework to achieve its Kyoto targets of 12.5% below 1990 levels 
over the period 2008 – 2012 through the Climate Change programme. Part of this 
target was to double the capacity (electrical) of Combined Heat and Power (CHP) by 
2010 (DETR, 2000) with a view to simultaneously generate the two critical energy 
vectors (electricity and heat) at reduced emission levels compared to separate 
generation of electricity and heat. However, the target was missed with CHP-DH 
contribution to energy demand still at less than 10% of the electricity demand, and 
about 2% of heat demand. Furthermore, CHP-DH systems as networked-based 
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infrastructures are capital goods producer/service delivery that may require public 
intervention (Finger et al., 2005). This indicates that there may be a problem that may 
warrant Government intervention through governance mechanism since market and 
firms fail to meet set objectives in a market economy like the UK (Edquist, 1999).  
The low penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK is not due to technological maturity 
since various literature suggest that CHP-DH system built in the 50s in London by 
Pimlico is considered as one of the first successful large schemes in the UK amongst 
others to showcase the technology on the back of supplying heat to housing estates 
(Martin and Thornley, 2013, Diamant and McGarry, 1968 pg 172, Roelich et al., 2013). 
Hence the focus of the research is to investigate the underlying barriers that are 
militating against the growth of the technology and offer insights to alternative 
governance routes to its growth by considering the role of the LAs as the TIS prime 
movers. The summary of the research questions are as follows: 
1. What are the features and drivers of the governance approaches that 
permeates the CHP-DH landscape in the UK and the inherent risk profile of the 
industry 
2. What are the significant barriers to CHP diffusion in the UK and the possible 
governance interventions to influence CHP-DH diffusion by the LAs as TIS 
prime mover 
3. What are the prevailing governance mechanisms on CHPs and District Heating 
in the UK and their impacts 
Firstly, in understanding the underlying barriers that the CHP-DH is experiencing, it 
was pertinent to understand what the landscape holds in various perspective such as 
operational and what are the factors that dis-incentivised developers the most in taking 
opportunities that the CHP-DH industry tends to offer. Therefore, this leads to the 
question of what governance approaches permeates the CHP-DH landscape in the 
UK and the inherent risk profile of the industry, which includes:  
 What are the underlying technical and operational characteristics of the CHP-
DH landscape? 
 What are the dominant economic and management models that reside in the 
governance structure? 
 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the dominant economic and 
management models? 
 Dominant risk profile of the CHP-DH industry. 
Secondly, the understanding of both the governance approaches in the landscape and 
the dominant risk profile would further provide insight to the discussion on the 
significant barriers that are militating against the CHP-DH system in the UK and the 
role LAs could play as prime movers and part of hierarchies of governance to create 
opportunities for a bottom-up approach to facilitate the diffusion of CHP-DH in the UK. 
This herald the next research question, what are the underlying significant barriers 
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that feed these risk profile and possible roles of the LAs in facilitating the diffusion of 
CHP-DH systems in the UK, which includes: 
 What are the significant barriers and possible alternative pathways to 
ameliorate their effect in the penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK.  
 What possible roles Local Authorities as part of governance hierarchy and as 
prime movers of CHP-DH TIS can play in the stimulation of investment and 
growth of CHP-DH systems 
Thirdly, since many empirical evidences abound that governance mechanisms can 
influence the rate and direction of technological change and the UK is known to have 
deployed several mechanisms in the electricity and heat sectors. It may be necessary 
to investigate existing inclined mechanisms as determined by the CHP-DH actors and 
with a view to highlight their impact on the diffusion of CHP-DHs in the UK and possible 
Government’s interventions to address the deficiencies of these mechanisms towards 
CHP-DH systems. Hence, the fourth and last research question is, what are the 
prevailing governance mechanisms on CHPs and District Heating in the UK and their 
impacts. This includes: 
 What is the dominant current governance mechanisms for (i) CHP and (ii) DH 
Networks in the UK and how do they influence the diffusion of CHP-DH 
systems 
 The strength and weakness of the EMR governance mechanism on CHP-DH 
system 
 How can these mechanisms be improved upon to increase its influence on 
CHP-DH systems? 
6.3 Research Strategy and Design 
Research strategy is defined as the broad orientation taken in addressing research 
questions (Robson, 2002 pg:78). The research strategy adopted in this methodology 
is a flexible path research approach. This is largely because the methodology was 
more focused on the investigation of the forms of interactions amongst the various 
elements of the CHP-DH technology system in the UK, which depicts complex and 
dynamic outcomes and possible governance intervention to address the system 
failure. Furthermore, there is no consensus on how governance mechanisms should 
be investigated with a view to determine its effectiveness (Torfing, 2012 pg:109), but 
many available indicators, such as the quality of coordination, are based on 
subjectivity and surveys (Norris, 2011 pg:188). 
Therefore, in analysing the interactions between the various governance 
arrangements (actors and institutions), qualitative and quantitative insights were 
required to develop a meaningful contribution to persuade policy makers. This choice 
of flexible pattern offers the opportunity to extract the thoughts and impression of all 
identified stakeholders in the CHP-DH arena on the processes and impacts of 
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governance mechanisms. This is with a view to developing a narrative of each process 
and update previous narratives in an iterative manner as opposed to developing a 
fixed narrative at the end of an experiment. The strategy will involve assembling 
qualitative and quantitative data for narration extracted through interviews and 
questionnaires from UK actors (Kidder and Fine, 1987).  
6.4 Research Framework 
The research framework seeks to couple the purpose of this research with the 
research questions and the underlining theory adopted. The framework would also 
unveil a two phase methodological pathway (Functional pattern and Mapping of 
functions) in determining the alternative governance measures that may be required 
to address the CHP-DH system failures and the method of analysis of data from the 
agents which will provide the pathway upon which the research can draw a narrative 
in relation to the research questions briefly enumerated earlier on (Robson, 2002 
pg:80-81). 
Carlsson et al. (2002) had proposed three criteria’s that would lead to an analytical 
framework of a TIS. They include firstly, what is the level of system analysis. Secondly, 
how is the system boundary determined - which is how the system will be delineated 
and the important actors be identified. Thirdly, how can the performance of the system 
be measured. In response to the first criteria, The research is focused on CHP-DH 
technology within the UK only and since the CHP-DH system is technically matured 
but commercially immature due to low penetration (Foxon et al., 2005), the focus will 
be on its rate of diffusion and utilization in the UK. Essentially indicating that the unit 
system analysis is the CHP-DH system in the UK.  
Furthermore, in response to the second criteria, the research shall delineate the 
system through information from literatures and industry networks to ascertain the 
actors, networks and institutions that can influence the diffusion of CHP-DH systems 
in the UK. While the systems innovation functional pattern was adopted to measure 
the performance of the system in response to the third criteria, which was discussed 
in-depth in chapter 3. Subsequently, the functional pattern shall be mapped to unveil 
the blocking and inducing mechanism which permeates the CHP-DH technology. 
Below are the descriptions of these two TIS methodological pathways.  
6.4.1 Analytical Procedure 
Innovation systems often depends on the system failure approach (described in 
chapter 3) as an alternative to the market failure approach often used by 
government/policy makers to address the failure of infrastructures or socio-technical 
systems. However, the systems failure approach has been criticised for only capturing 
the structural elements of the system and not the processes that are characterized by 
a socio-technical system (Bergek et al., 2008b, Bergek et al., 2010, Hekkert et al., 
2007b). The TIS tool set for capturing both the structural and dynamic activities in a 
socio-technical system is known as system functions approach. The TIS functional 
analytical approach seeks to explain how the socio-technical system work and 
performs in relation to the structure rather than how the system  is composed (Markard 
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and Truffer, 2008b). Therefore, the TIS functional approach will be adopted to access 
the performance CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
Adopting the functionality pattern approach of a TIS framework to assess the 
performance of CHP-DH systems within the UK may offer several benefits to this 
research due to its “diagnostic” (Kern, 2015) and “explanatory” (Markard et al., 2015) 
capacities. Firstly, it presents the tool to describe the status of CHP-DH system in the 
UK with a view to determining the mechanisms that are blocking or inducing innovative 
activities within the system, thereby offering the opportunity to map these functions to 
provide a picture of the system performance (Johnson, 2001). Secondly, it would 
provide clarity on where governance measures can be introduced to weaken the effect 
of the blocking mechanisms on the CHP-DH TIS (Hekkert et al., 2007b). 
The TIS functional framework is made up of seven functions as described in chapter 
3 are namely: a) entrepreneurial activities, b) knowledge development c) knowledge 
diffusion through networks, d) guidance of the search, e) market formation, f) resource 
mobilization, g) creation of legitimacy/counteract resistance to change (Hekkert et al., 
2007b, Hekkert and Negro, 2009, Bergek et al., 2008b, Bergek et al., 2008a).These 
functions of the TIS are capable of influencing the performance of the system either 
positively or negatively so as to allow for insight of the impact of the various 
contributors on performance 
In explaining the development of a TIS using the functional approach, there are two 
distinct phases that defines the technological transformation of a socio-technical 
system. They are the formative and growth/market expansion phases (Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004). The formative phase shall be explained using information obtained 
during the descriptive phase of the research and the period of analysis shall be from 
first CHP-DH systems at about the beginning of the twentieth century to the decade of 
the first governance mechanism was introduced to influence the penetration of CHP-
DH systems in the UK. The first governance measure was the 1977 Marshall report, 
that assessed the national potential of DH schemes in the UK (Russell, 2010, Kelly 
and Pollitt, 2010), influenced by the oil shock of the early 70s (Babus'Haq and Probert, 
1996). This is in view of the fact that governance emerges through four key iterations 
namely: processes (modes of social coordination of interaction and steering functions), 
structures (formal and informal Institutions and actors), mechanisms (Instruments of 
compliance and control) and strategies (design and adaptation of institutions and 
mechanism) (Börzel and Risse, 2010, Risse, 2012 pg:700, Levi-Faur, 2012 pg:8). 
Therefore, the Marshall report can be considered as a governance measure since it 
provided the strategy to increase the penetration of CHP-DH in the UK. 
Consequently, the formative phase which is determined by time dimension and early 
of entry of actors shall be from 1910 to 1980. The next phase of description shall be 
the market/growth phase. This phase consist of three phases, which includes: (a) 
nursing market – when market begins to evolve and with limited size, (b) bridging 
market – enlargement of actors and increased market size, (c) mass market – when 
market is fully evolved and self-sustaining (Bergek et al., 2008a, Bergek et al., 2008b). 
This research shall seek to explain this development phase with a view to determine 
the market development phase that the UK CHP-DH system is in, drawing on the 
combination of descriptive and exploratory phases of this research. 
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6.4.2  Mapping of TIS functions 
The second pathway is integrating the TIS functions with the governance layer with a 
view to improve the functions of the system by introducing mechanisms that would 
seek to weaken the blocking mechanisms in the TIS. The governance layer will provide 
more potential for proactive governance to collective problems and mitigations as 
market and state-led governance are considered too rigid and reactive, largely due to 
the complexity and multi-layered fashion of society (SØRensen and Torfing, 2009). 
Consequently, governance approach was adopted for this research, because of its 
reliance on social initiatives for sustainable development and diffusion of technology 
and contribution to social goals rather than conventional policy instruments which 
tends to be more top-down without much consideration to social initiatives (Hillman et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, governance is entrenched through regulatory instruments 
(Levi-Faur, 2012 pg:13), it also encourages the development of technological 
innovations via actors internal capabilities, resources (Griffiths and Zammuto, 2005) 
and legitimacy (Börzel and Risse, 2010). This will further capture the role of the LAs 
as prime movers in the TIS structure to draw from their political, structural and 
relational resources (Farla et al., 2012). Such as social capital -trust, norms and 
networks (Pollitt, 2002), ability to implement socially binding decisions (Offe, 2009)  
and as part of hierarchies of governance in the UK to influence the functions of TIS by 
providing a bottom-up response to the various weaknesses of the system functions. 
The integration of these approaches (TIS and Governance) shall be represented in 
mapping of the TIS functions with key governance interventions by mapping the 
dynamics relative to the causal relation of the actors, institutions and networks within 
the CHP-DH TIS structure. These functions shall describe the ‘positive or negative 
contributions’ (Bergek et al., 2008b) of the performance of CHP-DH TIS. Therefore the 
research shall sought for promoters and obstacles to the diffusion of CHP-DH 
technology in the context of governance mechanisms amongst the actors, institutions 
and networks, by linking the functions or attributes of TIS to prevailing inducement and 
blocking mechanisms as depicted in Figure 12 (Bergek et al., 2008b). 
 
  
   
 
In operationalizing the methodological pathways, the various components (actors, 
institutions and networks) that constitute the structure of CHP-DH system in the UK 
are identified, which shall feed into the contact list to obtain qualitative and quantitative 
data.  
 
Figure 12: Mapping of TIS functions  
Blocking 
Mechanism 
Key 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
Functions of 
TIS 
Inducement 
Mechanism 
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Figure 13: Operationalizing TIS and Governance Concepts 
The output of the quantitative and qualitative processes shall provide insight to the 
functional pattern, which shall seek to diagnose and explain the development phases 
of the TIS and provide patterns of the system dynamics that has bearing on the 
technological performance. Consequently, the functionality shall be assessed to unveil 
the critical inducement and blocking mechanisms that may warrant governance 
intervention which would seek to reduce system failures or policy erros (Klijn et al., 
2012pg:298). 
6.5 Research Design 
6.5.1 Overview of Research Design 
The research design method shall describe the various methods deployed in the 
research to achieve the set objectives. Its overall approach has been a mixed method 
of both qualitative and quantitative methods. Drawing from the classification of the 
paths of enquiry by Robson (2002 pg:59). The research design method could be 
classified into three groups as below: 
Descriptive:  
 To portray an accurate profile of persons, networks, institutions, events or 
situations that have/can influence the diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK 
from literature reviews  
 To acquire extensive knowledge of the prevailing governance arrangement that 
may impact on CHP-DH system in the UK 
Exploratory: 
 To find out what is happening, particularly in little-understood situations 
 To seek new insights 
 To ask questions 
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 To assess phenomena in a new light 
 To generate propositions for future research 
Explanatory 
 Seeks an explanation of a situation or problem, traditionally but not necessarily 
in the form of casual relationship 
 explains patterns relating to the phenomenon being researched 
 identifies relationships between aspects of the phenomenon  
Answering these questions and drawing on the classification enumerated above 
requires a better understanding of the two broad strands of literature that forms the 
platform for quantitative and qualitative analysis. Figure 14 presents a diagrammatic 
view of the adopted research methods to address the research questions of this 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The descriptive phase leads to a better understanding of the governance style of best 
practice of CHP-DH deployment through review of literature from the Netherlands and 
Norway, status of CHP-DH is in the UK and its actors, which is vital to the researchers 
objective of capturing the innovation process being investigated (Carlsson et al., 
2002). The descriptive stage was followed by the exploratory phase. This entailed 
consideration of the various ways, such as, collection and sampling of data, surveying, 
and conducting interviews with the actors identified from the descriptive phase. Lastly 
the explanatory stage shall entail the data collection, analysis and interpretation from 
the exploratory phase. 
Descriptive 
   
     Exploratory 
 
        Explanatory 
 Seek knowledge and 
understanding of 
theories through 
literature review 
 Identify the range of 
elements in the 
spectrum of study 
 Review documents on 
prevailing 
instruments and 
policies 
 Research on other 
modes of practice of 
CHP-DH  
 Explanation of 
findings 
 Diagnose the 
findings to seek 
for gaps 
 Explain possible 
remedies 
 Sampling 
 Cluster 
 Multistage 
 Purposive 
 Snowballing 
 Online 
Questionnaire 
 Hybrid (close and 
open ended 
 Interview 
 Semi-structured 
 Content analysis 
 Discussion with 
professionals 
Figure 14: Diagrammatic view of the adopted methodology 
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6.5.2 Research Methods – Discussion and Rational for choice of method 
There are two key research approaches that has dominated research in social science 
historically. They are quantitative research or qualitative research methods. These 
methods are models used to describe or explain the relationships between actions 
and/or events as we seek to understand the world around us (Black, 2005 pg:7). 
Quantitative methods describe the investigation of variables of interest and measures 
them in a prescribed way that seeks to explain the output in a non-judgemental and 
mechanistic way to form a statistical inference (Robson, 2011 pg:163). Suggesting 
that the result is in the form of numbers and statistics. It’s often recommended to be 
used during the later phase of the research, as the researcher’s vision is clearer as to 
what he/she is looking for (Miles and Huberman, 1994 pg:40). Furthermore, 
quantitative data collection is often quick, and analysis consumes less time since its 
often done with statistical software and more useful for large population. In quantitative 
research,  the research results are relatively independent of the researcher, providing 
more precise results with high potential credibility with policy makers (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). However, it is not without its weaknesses such as the research 
categories or theories used may not reflect local understandings. Others are 
generated knowledge may be too abstract for specific local application and the 
researcher usually is more likely to be too focused on theory or hypothesis testing 
rather than generation (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Whilst, qualitative method seeks to use exploratory approaches, with a view to 
produce textual data instead of numerical data or statistics (Roberts et al., 2006).  It is 
necessary to understand the phenomena in qualitative research because context is 
important, and the description of the situation is often from the perspective of those 
involved. Suggesting that the researcher is distanced from the participants with 
emphasise on subjectivity rather than objectivity (Robson, 2011 pg:19). The scale of 
persons or situations researched are usually small but resulting data are richer and 
more time consuming with little room to generalise (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 
Robson, 2011 pg:19). Qualitative method is also burdened with its weaknesses. Such 
as difficulties to test theories and hypothesis, greater influence by researcher biases, 
requires more time compared to quantitative methods to collect and analyse data and 
its often less credible with policy maker compared to quantitative (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
Mitchell (2008 pg:2) argues that narrow economic quantitative approaches alone 
without the combination of qualitative social science approaches in framing 
government policy often leads to an under-valued output. Therefore, the research 
approach sought to combine the strengths of qualitative and qualitative research 
methods through a systematic approach and theoretical propositions, which is other-
wise known as mix-method approach. The mix-method approach would seek to 
minimise the weakness of either quantitative or qualitative methods using the 
strengths of the other, since both methods use empirical observations to answer the 
same research question (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). It would also provide the 
research triangulation so as to enhance validity and production of a more complete 
research output (Robson, 2011 pg:167). The mix-method has the potential to address 
a wider range of questions and has the ability to deal with complex phenomena and 
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situations (Robson, 2011 pg:167). However, the drawback of using a mix-method 
approach is that it is more expensive and time consuming with more difficulties for a 
single researcher to carry out both approaches (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Contextually, the form and nature of governance of electricity and heat markets in 
relation to CHP-DH is underpinned by complex interactions between the elements in 
the TIS structure. These interactions of elements in both electricity and heat markets 
would require effective social coordination and the governing rules to bound all 
participants (Bevir, 2011). Therefore this research takes a qualitative approach that 
presents the capacity for gaining insights on the social relations and behaviour of the 
array of actors, policy impact on the participants and opening the horizon to reconcile 
the divergent views (Kidder and Fine, 1987, Ritchie and Spencer, 2002 pg:305). 
Furthermore in interrogating the correlation between the innovation system functions, 
qualitative approach offered insights to their relationship between the governance 
mechanism and actors (Hekkert and Negro, 2009).  
Consequently, as the research focuses on the investigation of the CHP-DH TIS in the 
UK with a view to understand the relationship amongst elements of the TIS structure 
that requires governance intervention and address the system failure by weakening 
the blocking mechanisms of the system functions. A quantitative method was 
integrated with the qualitative method so as add credibility to the research for policy 
makers and politicians across the hierarchies of governance to consider the research 
contribution to the policy debate on the status of CHP-DH as a scientific proof for 
government intervention. Secondly, the quantitative method would create the 
opportunity to repeat and extend the research to capture larger population (Black, 
2005 pg:20). 
Find below in Table 9 that shows the overview of the features of the adopted mix-
method research methodology 
 
 Quantitative Qualitative 
Aim The aim is to gauge the 
perception of actors in a 
numerical pattern with a view 
to explain observation 
The aim is to extract detailed, 
complete description of what 
is observed 
Purpose Generalization, prediction, 
causal explanations 
Contextualisation, 
interpretation and 
understanding perspectives 
Objective/Subjective Objective – Seeks precise 
measurement and analysis 
Subjective – individual actor’s 
interpretation of events is 
important 
Data Collection Structured questionnaire  Semi-structured interview  
Tools  Online survey tool – Survey 
monkey 
Face-to-Face and Voice-to-
voice interviews 
Output Data is in the form of numbers 
and statistics 
Data in the form of words 
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Sample Large number of actors 
representing the population 
that form the sample frame  
Small number of samples of 
actors selected from the 
sample frame based on their 
role and categories  
Analytical tools SPSS Software NVIVO Software 
Analysis Statistical Interpretive – Thematic and 
Citation 
Researcher role Researcher aimed to remain 
objectively separated from the 
subject matter 
Researcher aimed to become 
subjectively immersed in the 
subject matter 
Table 9: Features of research methodology 
Source: Adapted from MacDonald and Headlam (2011) 
In drawing on the strengths of one or more of the methodology techniques to 
compensate for the weakness of another, triangulation technique was also used. 
Triangulation technique is a multi-method approach that entails using several methods 
to validate the findings of one or more methods (MacDonald and Headlam, 2011). 
Data was collected from multiple sources such as quantitative and qualitative sources 
to enhance the rigour of the process and lend more credence to the validity of the data 
collected. Another purpose of the triangulation is to complement data already collected 
(Brannen, 2005) from other sources by reinforcing already informed knowledge and 
integrate data (Whyte, 1984) that was hitherto not earlier captured. The use of semi-
structured face-to-face and voice-to-voice interviews as highlighted was very useful in 
extracting thought and opinions not solicited from questionnaire respondents due to 
its flexibility and open ended format but guided by the research boundaries. (Evans 
and Mathur, 2005, Kajornboon, 2005).  
The strength of the quantitative method used here which was a voluntary 
questionnaire approach via a web-based software had been earlier highlighted but in 
addition because this was a resource bound academic research bound by time and 
cost. Online survey is known to have the potential to reduce time and cost, in part, 
because of its fast response time, no intermediary barriers and ease of data collation 
(Daley et al., 2003, Trouteaud, 2004, Evans and Mathur, 2005). Scholl et al. (2002) 
also argues that web-based surveys can significantly improve the representativeness 
of sample sizes. Therefore, the research leveraged on the spread of internet 
technology and access across the UK by using web-based survey to improve sample 
representativeness and response time at a cheaper administration cost comparatively 
with other modes of survey such as mail/post. The convenience of web-based survey 
also afforded the opportunity to contact over a thousand actor’s multiple times 
including many others that offered to opt out during the six months period of the 
quantitative data gathering (April to September 2015). 
6.5.2.1  Challenges of methodology approach 
Frequently, qualitative method takes much longer time and requires more clarity of 
objectives during the design stages as against the quantitative method (Berg, 2009 
pg:2). Furthermore, the challenge of the qualitative methods is that it has high 
propensity to throw up similar evidences, which may raise questions on its validity and 
self-bias level and it can precipitate a massive unreadable document (Yin, 2003pg:10-
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12). In remedying these challenges, a clear and systematic approach was adopted in 
the methodology using multi methods or triangulation within a carefully planned time 
line until data saturation point was seen to be reached. 
However, triangulation is not without its limitations or challenges. Triangulation would 
ordinarily require more time and cost as supposed to other methods, thereby putting 
pressure on available budget and time resource. It is also not an easy process to 
replicate, more so if the method is a qualitative one (Jick, 1979). It may also mean 
practical difficulties in managing a high degree of conflicting data (Robson, 2002 
pg:175). The antidote to this constraint was a carefully crafted clear and focused set 
of questions and a well thought out research strategy to avoid repetition and budget 
overrun. Mathison (1988) had stated that an alternative conception of triangulation 
could emerged in the process of triangulation. This was the emergence of inconsistent 
and contradictory data in addition to converged data. This is expected as actor’s 
opinions and perceptions of the system functionalities differed in a number of ways. 
For instance, as most respondents think a regulator is required for the heat industry, 
a few other respondents think the market doesn’t need one because of the low level 
of penetration of CHP-DH systems. However, the converged data gave a direct link to 
a dominant proposition. In addition to the differing opinions, a more robust 
understanding of the directional perception of the actors, dominant landscape and the 
system dynamics were deduced to ensure “theoretical validity” (Onwuegbuzie and 
Leech, 2007). 
Another challenge was the difficulty in scheduling an interview, largely due to the busy 
schedule of respondents. This required a flexible approach on the part of the 
interviewer. On the quantitative front, because the questionnaires were sent 
voluntarily, and many were sent unsolicited, the response rate was affected negatively 
due to non-response bias. Furthermore, the online surveying tool also had its own 
difficulties in gathering data, which is discussed in the session (6.7.1). 
6.6 Population and Sampling 
6.6.0  Population 
Population is the target group which the researcher would seek to engage in a study 
to deduce a result that can be generalizable. Population can be referred to as all the 
cases of interest (Robson, 2011 pg:270) or the group that shares a set of common 
traits (Black, 2005 pg:111) or a group of all the elements of interest (Anderson et al., 
1993). Population is not restricted by size or geography (Diehl and Gay, 1992) but 
rather it depends on a common unit of interest, which is often referred to as parent or 
study population (Ritchie et al., 2003 pg:86) 
In line with Carlsson’s (2002) position, the two key questions to ponder on in identifying 
the structure in the CHP-DH TIS are firstly, how to identify specific actors in a system 
and secondly whether they belong to that system. While Ritchie et al. (2003 pg:87) 
also notes that defining your study population involves two stages. The first is 
specifying the collective unit of interest required and secondly, identify the persons 
required within them. Therefore, the study population or target group for this research 
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for both the quantitative and qualitative methods have CHP and DH as the common 
element of interest and those that have the capacity to influence the deployment of 
CHP-DH in the UK such as LAs or government agency. The population of the CHP-
DH TIS to be investigated consist of all NHS hospitals that have or developing CHP-
DH systems, Universities with CHP-DH systems, all LAs with or without CHP-DH – 
because of their role as the TIS prime mover with distinct capacity to influence the 
adoption of CHP-DH, housing associations, industries with CHP-DH, housing estates 
with CHP-DH systems. Others include, CHP manufacturers/suppliers, DH pipe 
manufacturers/suppliers, industry networks, consultants, CHP-DH developers, CHP-
DH operators, Government agencies, regulators, NGOs, transmission/distribution 
network operators and electricity suppliers. 
Secondly, industry networks/associations were identified to catalogue actors that 
participate in the CHP-DH industry. Such as Association for Decentralised Energy 
(ADE), UK District Energy Association (UKDEA), Energy Network Association (ENA), 
Renewable Energy Association (REA), Euro Heat and Power. Internet research was 
used to collate NHS hospitals with CHP-DH from the NHS estates list, universities with 
CHP-DH systems were gotten online from the Higher Education Statistics Agency 
(HESA) and online details of all LAs in the UK. CHP-DH actors/networks were also 
gotten from workshop attendants list and conferences, such as the Vanguard DH 
conference. The Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics from DECC was used to 
discover industries with large scale CHP-DH systems, while the UK National Statistics 
Office (NSO) as the source for state institutions and actors, that are relevant to CHP-
DH penetration in the UK and the culmination was a database of contact details (email, 
phone numbers and addresses) created in excel software of all relevant actors, 
institutions and networks. 
The target persons representing these organisations differ in positions and role. For 
instance, in NHS hospitals - the estate directors/manager were contacted, Universities 
– Head of Engineering/Energy managers, LAs – Energy Managers and Planners, 
Operators and Developers – Technical/Operations directors, Government agencies – 
Policy managers, with many others having policy advisers, technical directors, head 
engineering as officers knowledgeable to speak about the topic of this research. 
Subsequently, unsolicited introduction letters were sent to the actors to intimate them 
of the research and confirm the appropriate channel for further communication and for 
those without email contacts but with phone numbers, they were reached to seek for 
further contact details. This was a process with several iterations before a more robust 
database of actors was developed using excel which is known as my sample frame. 
6.6.1  Sampling 
A sample is a subset of the population to be studied (Anderson et al., 1993 pg:209) 
and the process of selecting a sample from the population is known as sampling. Out 
of the study population a sample frame had been developed from the study population. 
Therefore, the sample frame would constitute a representative sample for the 
population study since its not possible to contact all the units in the population (Bryman 
and Cramer, 2011 pg:5). In enhancing and further populating the sample frame a 
cluster sampling strategy was used to divide the actors into clusters of similar 
characteristics, for instance stakeholders operating CHP-DH systems, manufacturers 
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of CHPs, DH pipe installers, developers, consultants, state institutions and LAs. This 
provided the inputs for purposive sample size for the qualitative data collection. Kothari 
(2004) notes that the size of the sample may not be too large or too small but 
importantly it should be optimum, and an optimum sample size is one that fulfils 
representativeness, requirement of efficiency, reliability and flexibility. In militating 
against researchers’ bias in the sampling process, a snowball sampling approach was 
adopted. A snowball approach is an approach that will allow the use of key contacts 
and documents to signpost the research to more contacts and documents until the 
sampling frame becomes saturated and no new contact will offer additional significant 
information or data (Bernard, 2006 pg:193). The sample frame size was the sample 
size for the quantitative research, since a large sample size is required for statistical 
inference and allows for the study to be generalized (Robson, 2011 pg:271). While a 
purposive sampling strategy was used to select a smaller size of sample from all each 
category in the sample frame for the qualitative research. This sampling approach 
provided the opportunity to the researcher to generate a representative sample of the 
target population and gain insight of more relevant actors after the initial actors have 
been identifies.  
6.7 Development of Questionnaire and Interview Questions 
Structured questionnaires were developed with pre-determined questions that were 
focused on the research objectives with a view to gather quantitative data, while semi-
structured interview questions were also developed to engage actors through face-to-
face and voice-to-voice interviews to gather qualitative data. Structured questionnaires 
are questionnaires with concrete, definite and pre-determined questions, so that all 
respondents will answer the same sets of questions (Kothari, 2004 pg:101), while 
semi-structured interviews are interviews with non-standardized questions, 
considering the vast themes and issues to cover, it would allow for further probing and 
flexibility as the interview progresses (Kajornboon, 2005).  
Insight from the descriptive phase was used firstly to prepare questionnaires for online 
completion in three distinct groups: (i) LAs, (ii) CHP operators (This group also 
contained LAs that are CHP-DH operators) and (iii) Consultants (this group also 
contained networks/associations). Ritchie et al. (2003 pg:91) notes that it is important 
to avoid complex categorisations, so the questionnaires were developed and used in 
a hybrid form, with focused questions prepared with the opportunity for participatory 
questions from the stakeholder to allow for flexibility. Feedbacks from an initial 
interview session with an industry network actor and pre-test comments during a pilot 
test on the questionnaires from research colleagues were vital inputs to the 
development of the questionnaire, because of the necessity to reduce design errors 
and improve clarity (Daley et al., 2003, Gunn, 2002). 
The first set of questionnaires were targeted at CHP-DH operators only. This was 
targeted at them because it sought answers that are related specifically to their CHP-
DH asset sizes, operations and connectivity. The questionnaires to the CHP-DH 
operators had thirty-seven (37) questions. The second set of questionnaires were 
targeted at LAs specifically because it had questions relating to their local energy 
policies and CHP-DH penetration and it has seventeen (17) questions in total. The 
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third set of questionnaires was targeted generally at the other actors and was 
described as consultants. It had twenty-six (26) questions and the questions were 
more generic questions. These questionnaires were as a result of a rigorous process 
of several iterations of discussions and editions with my supervision team, before a 
final confirmation was given for the questionnaires to be sent for a pilot run through 
other research colleagues. The inputs and suggestion from these two colleagues were 
taken into consideration to improve and modify the questionnaires.  
In the gathering of the qualitative data, interview questions that focused on the purpose 
of the research were prepared for each category of actor depending on the sector that 
the actor belong. For instance, the question set for a DH pipe supplier is different from 
the question set of an electricity supplier. In total, fourteen (14) separate sets of 
questions were prepared for the various groups including interview sessions held after 
the quantitative data collection and the writing phase of the research. Though many 
question sets had some generic questions in them but with additional questions that 
pertain to the sector in question. The questions were developed based on data 
gathered during the descriptive phase of the research and snowballing strategy by 
developing questions for actors depending on response from previous actors. For 
instance, some LAs comments on the state of heat maps allowed for modification of 
the question set for a government agency to capture their concern. The qualitative 
research questions were semi-structured and as such respondents were allowed to 
ask questions not mentioned in the question set or the researcher could ask additional 
questions that were consider necessary in the course of the interview.  
6.8 Data Collection  
Empirical data collection stage within the exploratory phase entailed using two modes, 
which consisted of a structured online questionnaire for the quantitative data via a 
web-based software known as survey monkey. While semi-structured interviews were 
used to get qualitative data via a face-to-face and voice-to-voice interviews. The mix 
mode of both online questionnaire and interview is evidenced as helping balancing 
cost and errors in survey results (Groves et al., 2009 pg:178). This stems from the fact 
that actors in the CHP-DH environment are scattered all over the UK and the use of 
online survey is a vital medium to collect data from different parts of the country (Evans 
and Mathur, 2005). In gathering the quantitative data, personalised emails of 
respondents were used, as this is known to improve response rates from web based 
survey (Cook et al., 2000). The response rate from this research are as shown in Table 
10, with the LA group indicating the highest response rate of about 45% and the 
average response rate from all three groups from the survey as 28.9%. 
Response Rate (%)Source: www.surveymonkey.com 
Groups 
Total Actors 
contacted 
Total 
Response 
Response 
Rate 
LA 329 148 44.98% 
CHP OPS 675 129 19.11% 
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Consultant/Associations 128 29 22.65% 
Overall Research 
Results 
1132 306 28.91% 
Table 10: Response rate of survey 
Response Rate (RR) is a known indicator of the quality of surveys but there is no 
consensus range of response rates from the research community as it depends on the 
methodology being used, type of population and other subjective conditions such as 
response facilitation approaches (Baruch and Holtom, 2008). To further show the 
incongruity in the acceptable range of RR, Sheehan and McMillan (1999) also 
catalogued several published surveys done with response rates from 6% to 75% using 
emails but Mathur et al. (2013) insist that a 5.75% response rate is “fair” for web based 
surveys because of variables. 
Many literatures notes, the low response rate of web-based survey research compared 
with traditional mail or telephone surveys (Sills and Song, 2002, Cook et al., 2000, 
Bech and Kristensen, 2009). Additionally the difficulties of a web-based survey to 
obtain a sample frame that will not precipitate coverage error, non-response error and 
measurement error (Cole, 2005). However, other studies such as Pealer et al. (2001) 
and Mehta and Sivadas (1995) suggest that web based survey may produce as good 
a response rate as other forms of survey. While, Parker (1992) and Kaplowitz et al. 
(2004) argue that web based surveys may even produce a more useful response rate 
than other survey methods. Therefore, several measures were adopted to improve the 
response rate and result validity by minimising the associated errors such as coverage 
errors, using internet to generate sample frames from NHS estate contact list, DECC 
Energy digest with list of large CHP operators. Other measures like, sending of follow 
up emails after sending the questionnaires and reminder emails after a week. This has 
had significant effect in improving the response rate (Trouteaud, 2004). The 
researcher took a further measure of using Freedom of Information Act (FOI) request 
for energy manager contacts from public institutions and Local Authorities. However, 
some public institutions insisted they were not obliged to give out contact details of the 
energy manager, but many responded positively, and this increased the response rate. 
Other scholars have stated that response rate though an important indicator of the 
quality of a survey, is not the only useful indicator and may not be as important as 
response representativeness (Cook et al., 2000, Schouten et al., 2009, Groves and 
Peytcheva, 2008, Heerwegh et al., 2007). Schouten et al. (2009) argues that a more 
impressive indicator is the composition of the response relative to the size of the 
population to be surveyed. They suggest that larger response rates may not always 
indicate representativeness, that at best larger response rates would reduce the risk 
of non-response bias. Rather they empirically showed that mixed methods of data 
collection, such as telephone call back for a purposive sample size would reflect a high 
representativeness of the sample size. Bech and Kristensen (2009) also argue that 
web-based surveys can exhibit a better sample representativeness than other 
traditional survey methods even with a lower response rate. Therefore, in view of 
improving the response representativeness, questionnaires were administered 
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voluntarily to a purposive sample of actors and then follow ups of reminder email and 
telephone calls were made to non-respondents.  
As part of the exploratory stage, qualitative data was assembled by interviewing actors 
from a wide spectrum of the CHP-DH industry. Interview is a common avenue to gauge 
and draw insights from actor’s perception and it also offered the researcher the 
opportunity to modify or update its enquiry pattern (Robson, 2002 pg:273). The 
interview approaches used were face-to-face and voice-to-voice approaches. The 
interviews were semi-structured to allow more flexibility and responsiveness, while 
having a focused engagement. This is as oppose to the fully structured or unstructured 
interviews that do not integrate flexibility for the actor or the researcher.  
Forty-six interviews were conducted cutting across eleven delineated spheres of the 
CHP-DH industry in the UK with another four actors choosing to respond via written 
submission. In arriving at the sample size for the qualitative data, a multi-stage 
sampling was used, since clustered sampling strategy had been used to divide the 
samples into groups of similar characteristics such as LAs and Universities with CHP-
DH systems were grouped together, and purposive sampling strategy was used to get 
samples from the groups in the sample frame based on their roles and portfolio. This 
suggest that the rationale for the selection of sample for the interviews is purely based 
on my judgement of how influential the actor may be due to its position (Robson, 2011 
pg:275).Therefore samples were selected purposively from each category until I was 
successful to arrange an interview. This iterative process starts with sending letters to 
selected samples from the sample frame requesting for interviews before scheduling 
interviews with actors that are happy to. The entire period for qualitative data gathering 
started before and continued long after the quantitative data gathering. This was 
because the first interview session conducted few months before the commencement 
of the questionnaire distribution which was with a policy consultant with one of the 
industry networks provided useful inputs to the development of the questionnaires. 
Subsequently, interviews were arranged based on availability by respondents and 
responses from questionnaires. Suggesting that purposive sampling strategy was 
further used in selecting samples from the questionnaire responses – some 
respondents gave additional textual backup to their decision, which in the researcher’s 
judgement needed further interrogation with the respondent. 
Furthermore, more interviews were conducted after research findings were being 
reported, this was with a view to seek feedback from actors on some 
recommendations of the research. This resulted in the entire qualitative data gathering 
to span through 24months (February 2015 – February 2017).  As with the response 
rate, there is no established test to ascertain the sample size to attain qualitative data 
saturation (Guest et al., 2006). Therefore, interview targets were drawn purposively 
from the sample frame and enhanced purposive sampling from some questionnaire 
responses until theoretical saturation was achieved.  
All interviews were taped, transcribed, codified and analysed. The list of interviewees 
and the coding format used for the analysis is contained in appendix 1, while the 
various interview transcriptions are also attached digitally in a memory disk. The third 
and final phase saw the synthetisation of the collated data from both the quantitative 
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and qualitative methodologies for explanation and recommendation of further 
pathways that may influence the penetration of CHP-DH system in the UK.  
A major challenge to note in the qualitative data gathering was the difficulty to get an 
interview scheduled as there was strong apathy to give interviews considering that it 
could be time consuming and it was considered by many as a distraction to their 
primary job. Furthermore, the transcription process that followed the interview process 
was a painful, long and difficult one that precipitated huge documentary evidence. 
While a similar challenge was evident in collecting the quantitative data because many 
respondents felt that they have been inundated with similar request, surrounding 
energy efficiency and energy policy. However, it was much easier to get respondents 
to respond to a questionnaire than arrange an interview, because the questionnaires 
could be filled at any location, while a more serene environment is needed to grant an 
interview. Below are particular challenges that ensued using the online software during 
the quantitative data gathering. 
6.8.1  Challenges of Survey Software 
The online software (survey monkey) was used and it was generally useful and 
efficient but not optimal. Partly, this was because some inherent challenges associated 
with online survey set out by Evans and Mathur (2005) and Sills and Song (2002), 
emerged. In respect to this research three challenges were experienced with the 
online software, which are narrated as follows:  
 Perception of mail: Firstly, most often the sent mail (unsolicited and solicited) 
would reside in the junk or spam folder of the respondents and initially this 
caused a bit of uncertainty as to whether mails were reaching its destination. 
However, after a few replies the researcher was assured of the mails being 
received by the receipt of some replies, but as a remedy to that challenge, a 
paragraph was included in the follow up mail to indicate the possibility of the 
survey mail being in their junk folder. This mitigated this challenge a great deal, 
but another challenge ensued, which was irredeemable by either the 
respondents or the researcher and that was the system virus protection 
deployed in various respondent’s software environment. As a result of virus 
protection, mails sent to many respondents were blocked by their local IT 
systems. This was uncovered after several phone calls and follow up emails, 
which led to directly sending the respondents a web link. However, a secondary 
problem emerged with this solution as the responses from these respondents 
couldn’t be identified individually via their address, since the responses came 
back without addresses. Therefore, respondents from web link couldn’t be used 
to categorise respondents for further research, such as if the need arises to 
segregate university CHP-DH operators from hospital operators, but for the 
purpose of this research all were subsumed in the respondents list/group. 
 Systematic – Software operation: Another major challenge which ensued 
was mainly that of the software developers, because in a few instances it took 
6-8 hours for respondents to receive the link to the questionnaire due to either 
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system (survey monkey) congestion or malfunction. Several complaints to the 
software developers led to this being fixed but not before many respondents 
were left frustrated and discouraged. However, respondents were reassured on 
resumption of the system, but this impacted on the response rate negatively. 
 Systematic - Data Administration: Survey monkey software does not provide 
the opportunity to automatically generate the response rate of a survey, rather 
it provides only the total number of responses (completed and partial) and 
expects the researcher to manually download the contacts in the sent list so as 
to access the total number of contacted respondents in a list. If a survey is 
conducted with several email lists with reminder contacts, it proves a challenge 
in arriving at the total contact list. In part because the researcher has to 
manually go through each sent list and extract the email contacts so that the 
final contact list does not contain duplicates. Therefore, for research like this 
with over a hundred sent list and with some mail list containing over a hundred 
email contacts, it can prove challenging.  
6.9 Reliability/Validity Test 
Reliability and validity are important in both quantitative and qualitative research in 
reducing errors and improving the trustworthiness of the research (Roberts et al., 
2006). Reliability is define as when a procedure of research such as questionnaire can 
produce similar results in a different circumstance, while validity is the closeness of 
what is being measured and what is intended to be measured (Roberts et al., 2006). 
However, reliability and validity are defined differently in quantitative and qualitative 
methods. For instance, in quantitative research, reliability means if the result can be 
replicated and viability means if the means of measuring is accurate and measuring 
what they are intended to measure. While in qualitative research, reliability and validity 
concepts are used interchangeably and it reflects the credibility, transferability and 
trustworthiness of the research (Golafshani, 2003). Nonetheless, both research 
method strive to demonstrate and show that the results are credible, but credibility in 
quantitative research is a function of the instruments used, while in a qualitative 
research, it is a case of the researcher being the instrument (Golafshani, 2003).  
In gathering the quantitative data, the three sets of questionnaires as earlier 
highlighted was the instrument of investigation. An initial pilot run of the questionnaires 
with two of my research colleagues to ensure the questions were relevant and 
appropriate and to further improve the validity of quantitative data (Roberts et al., 
2006). Secondly, the instrument of gathering quantitative data was an online survey 
software (Survey monkey) and analysis was done with a statistical analytical software 
(SPSS) which ensures consistencies of result output. In determining the internal 
reliability of the quantitative data, a Cronbach’s Alpha test was used in the SPSS 
software. Cronbach’s Alpha is the widely used indictor for the internal consistency of 
an instrument and if its result is 0.7 and above, its considered reliable (Bryman and 
Cramer, 2011 pg:78, Black, 2005 pg:279). The results of the statistical reliability test 
for the three groups are CHP-OPS - .879, LAs - .891 and Consultant - .877. Therefore 
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using reliable software’s for quantitative data gathering and analysis to generate 
consistent results contributes to the reliability and validity of the research (Kothari, 
2004 pg:74).  
The interviewees selected for the qualitative research were carefully selected based 
on their advisory or decision-making portfolios they held in their organisations, which 
lend credence to them being experts with contemporary knowledge of the CHP-DH 
industry and enhances the credibility of the research. In gathering the qualitative data, 
adequate care was taken to improve the reliability of the qualitative data by ensuring 
the accuracy of the tape-recording of the interviews, by using a digital voice recorder 
(Philips voice tracer) and careful transcription of the interview (Roberts et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, triangulation was used to improve the validity of the qualitative data as 
several data gathering sources were adopted to confirm the data and acceptance of 
completeness by cross-checking with already published literatures (Halcomb and 
Andrew, 2005). Also, of note, was the use of NVIVO software (a computerized a data 
analysis software) as the analytical tool for the qualitative data. The use of this 
software provided the opportunity to systematically code the transcripts, detect 
patterns that are categorized as themes and store the data for easy retrieval, which 
enhances the reliability of the research. However, there are other ways to reduce 
researcher bias and increase the research validity that was not used by the 
researcher, such as feedback to all the respondents on the outcome of the data 
analysis obtained from them for validation of their impression or perception. This 
method was not adopted due to resource limitations of this research relating to time 
and cost. 
Qualitative research is described by Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007) as incapable of 
being assessed for validity, “rather validity is relative to purpose and circumstance”. 
They argue that instead of an assessment being used to admit or dismiss varying 
interpretations of data or evaluate or increase legitimation or both, other measures 
such as audit trail, sample representativeness and triangulation can be used. 
Therefore, to improve the validity of this research, other measures were taken in 
addition to data triangulation. This included an audit trail, which required the 
researcher to keep detailed records of all activities during the research process, from 
reviewed documents, transcripts of interview and responses to questionnaires. 
Transcripts and questionnaire responses are attached as appendices to this research. 
Generally, carefully research design pathway was taken to capture the heterogenous 
actors and dynamic interaction between actors that can influence the diffusion of CHP-
DH in the UK. Such as the interaction between LA planners and Energy managers 
within the same council by seeking contribution from both actors. This deliberate 
approach in designing the research is with a view to improve the reliability of the 
research (Kothari, 2004 pg:32-33).  
6.10 Data Analysis 
Quantitative data analysis was done using SPSS (statistical analytical software 
package). All questions from all three groups will be analysed to draw on descriptive 
and inferential analysis. While the qualitative data was analysed using NVIVO software 
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and the output from the software was used in two different ways. They were used in 
generation of thematic inference – meaning a common theme was identified and 
drawn from the interviews and secondly, citations were directly quoted from the main 
body of interviews. This enable me to triangulate the qualitative data and derive 
complimentary and common text units that supports similar pattern with the 
quantitative data.  Using NVIVO helped saved time by tracing common themes from 
the large body of text quickly. However, the researcher considers NVIVO as not too 
user friendly, because of how much time and effort is required to study the software to 
be able to navigate through its functions and this also goes for SPSS, which requires 
more pre-analysis studies to understand the various analytical methodologies and 
interpretation techniques before actual analysis.   
6.11 Ethical considerations 
This research was subject to certain ethical issues. For instance, as part of the 
qualitative process of interviewing participants for a recorded interview, a consent form 
was prepared for this thesis by the University of Exeter, which was given to me to send 
to participants before any interview commences. This was with a view to extract their 
consent to record the interview before it commences. The form captures the purpose 
of the interview and informs the interviewee that the interview shall be recorded, and 
it is part of an academic project which the University can use in a number of ways. 
Such as research teaching, printed publications, exhibition and so on. The form also 
seeks to assuage the interviewees that the recorded information and personal 
details/information provided during the interview shall be used in accordance with the 
UK data protection act.  
Similarly, each questionnaire had a consent page at the beginning of the survey and 
the survey cannot continue until the participants gives its consent by clicking a next to 
agree button. The consent page also seeks to assure participants of the confidentiality 
of their personal data according to the data protection act. It also informed the 
participants of the various ways the university may use the data but in an anonymous 
way to conceal their details except the group/category they belong to in the research 
categorisation list. Secondly, the participants were informed that they have the choice 
at any time during the survey to withdraw their consent if they wish.    
6.12 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter seeks to capture the objectives of this research and the methodology that 
would be adopted to provide answers to the research questions. The research 
objectives were summarized into four questions and a flexible methodological 
research approach was adopted. The methodological approach consists of both 
quantitative and qualitative pathways, which will set the scene for analysis and 
discussion to address the objectives of this research. The next three chapters shall be 
discussing the results with a view to use them to answer the research questions as 
earlier enumerated.
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7.0 Results – Statistical Outputs and Governance Map 
 
This chapter captures the statistical results that seeks to provide analytical inputs to 
the discussion chapter. It also contains the interpretation of the statistical outputs. The 
sequencing of the statistical results in this chapter shall take the form of three sections, 
which shall capture responses to quantitative questions considered in each of the 
discussion chapters. Therefore, this chapter is divided into the three sections, namely, 
Firstly, Prevailing Landscapes of CHP-DH systems in the UK and risk profile. 
Secondly, CHP barriers and alternative LA roles, thirdly, Governance mechanisms. 
This chapter also captures the CHP-DH industry governance map drawing upon the 
governance structure and mechanisms that are prevailing in the electricity and heat 
sectors in the UK, which may impact on the penetration of CHP-DH system in the UK. 
7.1 Results - Prevailing Landscapes of CHP-DH systems in the 
UK and risk profile 
 
Q 1. What is the capacity of your CHP in operation (Percentage) n=97 
CHP Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 Total 
< 5 MWe 73 (76) 24 (70.6) 11 (68.8) 6 (66.7) 4 (57.1) 4 (80.0) 4(80.0) 3 (75.0) 3 (75.0) 4(80.0) 136 
(73.9) 
6 – 10 MWe 9 (9.3) 5 (14.7) 2 (12.5) 0 1 (14.3) 0 0 0 0 0 17 (9.2) 
11 – 50 MWe 6 (6.25) 1 (2.9) 0 1 (11.1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 (4.3) 
51 – 100 MWe 1(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (0.5) 
> 100 MWe 7(7.2) 4 (11.8) 3 (18.8) 2 (22.2) 2 (28.6) 1 (20.0) 1(20.0) 1 (25.0) 1 (25.0) 1(20.0) 22 (11.9) 
Total 96 (100) 34 (100) 16 (100) 9 (100) 6 (100) 5 (100) 5 (100) 4 (100) 4 (100) 5 (100) 184 (100) 
Table 11: Electrical portfolio of CHP systems in the UK 
Table 11 above shows that the dominant percentage of CHP electrical capacity sizes 
for all sites from respondents is less than 5MWe. For instance, 73.9% of the electrical 
capacity of CHP in operation by the respondents are less than 5MWe. Therefore 
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<5MW electrical capacity is the dominant capacity range in the UK CHP-DH 
landscape. 
Q 2. What is the capacity of your heat network operation (Percentage) n=94 
CHP Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 Total 
< 5 MWth 52 (55.9) 21 (65.6) 10 (66.7) 5 (55.6) 3 (50.0) 3 (60.0) 3 (60.0) 3 (75.0) 3 (75.0) 4 (66.7) 106 (59.6) 
6 – 10 MWth 15 (16.1) 4 (12.5) 0 1 (11.1) 2 (33.3) 1 (20.0) 1 (20.0) 0 0 1 (16.7) 25 (14) 
11 – 50 MWth 14 (15.1) 3 (9.4) 1 (6.7) 1 (11.1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 (10.7) 
51 – 100 MWth 7 (7.5) 2 (6.3) 1 (6.7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 (5.6) 
> 100 MWth 5 (5.4) 2 (6.3) 3 (20.0) 2 (22.2) 1 (16.7) 1 (20.0) 1 (20.0) 1 (25.0) 1 (25.0) 1(16.7) 18 10.1) 
Total 93 (100) 32 (100) 15 (100) 9 (100) 6 (100) 5 (100) 5 (100) 4 (100) 4 (100) 5 (100) 178 (100) 
Table 12: Heat Network Portfolio pattern 
Table 12 above shows that the dominant percentage of the size of heat capacity in 
CHP-DH systems for all sites from respondents is less than 5MW th. For instance, 
59.6% of the heat capacity of CHP-DH systems in operation by the respondents are 
less than 5MWth. Therefore <5MWth heat capacity is the dominant capacity range in 
the UK CHP-DH landscape. 
Q 3. What is the mode of operation of your CHP plant (Percentage) n=97 
CHP Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 
6 
Site 7 Site 
8 
Site 9 Site 
10 
Total 
Heat Led 53 
(53.5) 
15 
(44.1) 
10 
(66.7) 
4 (50.0) 4 (80.0) 4 
(100) 
4 (100) 3 
(100) 
3 (100) 4 (100) 104 (58.1) 
Electricity 
Led 
39 
(39.4) 
15 
(44.1) 
3 (20.0) 3 (37.5) 1 (20.0) 0 0 0 0 0 61 (34.1) 
Standby 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0) 
No answer 7 (7.1) 4 (11.8) 2 (13.3) 1 (12.5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 (7.8) 
Table 13: Dominant Mode of Operation of CHP-DH plants 
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Table 13 above shows that the dominant mode of operation of CHP-DH systems in 
the UK heat led. For instance, 53.5% and 44.1% of the first and second sites 
respectively of the respondents are heat led operated. Therefore, the dominant 
operational pattern in the UK CHP-DH landscape is heat lead operation.  
Q 4. What is the length of your heat network? (Percentage) n=98 
Length Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 Total 
< 1 KM 38 (39.2) 20 (55.6) 11 (68.8) 6 (66.7) 4 (66.7) 3 (60.0) 3 (60.0) 3 (60.0) 3 (75.0) 3 (60.0) 94 (50.2) 
2 – 5 KM 34 (35.1) 7 (19.4) 1 (6.3) 0 1 (16.7) 1 (20.0) 1 (20.0) 0 (20.0) 0 0 45 (24.1) 
6 – 10 KM 8 (8.2) 2 (5.6) 1 (6.3) 2 (22.2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 (7) 
11 – 20 KM 3 (3.1) 1 (2.8) 1 (6.3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 (2.7) 
> 20 KM 4 (4.1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 (2) 
No Answer 10 (10.3) 6 (16.7) 2 (12.5) 1 (11.1)  1 (16.7) 1 (20.0) 1 (20.0) 1 (20.0) 1 (25.0) 2 (40.0) 26 (14) 
Table 14: Dominant length of heat network in the UK 
Table 14 above shows that the dominant percentage of the length of heat networks in 
CHP-DH systems for all sites from respondents is less than 1KM. For instance, 39.2% 
and 55.6% of the heat network length of CHP-DH systems in operation in the first and 
second sites respectively of the respondents are less than 1KM. Therefore <1KM is 
the dominant heat network length in the UK CHP-DH landscape. 
 
Q 5- What is your assessment of the level of maturity in the UK district heating 
supplier chain? CHP Operator and Consultants  
 Group Total 
CHP operator Consultants 
What is your assessment of 
the level of maturity in the 
UK district heating supplier 
chain? 
Mature 
Count 6 0 6 
% within Group 4.4% 0.0% 3.7% 
Infancy but growing 
Count 42 21 63 
% within Group 30.7% 77.8% 38.4% 
Infancy and stagnant 
Count 23 4 27 
% within Group 16.8% 14.8% 16.5% 
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Non-existence 
Count 8 0 8 
% within Group 5.8% 0.0% 4.9% 
No answer 
Count 58 2 60 
% within Group 42.3% 7.4% 36.6% 
Total 
Count 137 27 164 
% within Group 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 15: Assessment of CHP-DH industry in the UK 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 23.370a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 26.316 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
15.046 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 164   
a. 3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .99. 
 
Table 16: Chi square - Assessment of maturity 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .377 .000 
Cramer's V .377 .000 
N of Valid Cases 164  
Table 17: Measure of association (effect size) 
Results from Table 16 above shows that the expected count of the cells is 30% which 
is more 20% (i.e > 5), therefore the assumptions are violated and we will use likelihood 
ratio values instead of the chi square figures. The likelihood ratio value was 26.316 
and its corresponding p value was 0.000<0.05 (likelihood ratio =26.316, df = 4, p = 
.000). Since the p value was less than 0.05, we can conclude that, there is a significant 
difference in the level of maturity in the UK district heating supplier chain between the 
CHP operators and consultants. Therefore, we can draw upon the descriptive results 
from Table 15 above which indicates that about 30.7% of the CHP operators and 
77.8% of the consultants expressed that the level of maturity in the UK district heating 
is at infancy but growing. Hence, there is evidence to conclude that the level of maturity 
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of the CHP-DH industry in the UK is at infancy but growing. Furthermore, drawing from 
the results of Table 17,  the value of Cramer’s V  is 0.377, which suggest that measure 
of association or effect size that shows the proportionality of variability of the groups 
within the study tends to a medium effect (i.e 0.5) according to  Fritz et al. (2012).  
 
Q 6. How do you trade electricity from CHPs? (Percentage) n=98 
CHP Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 Total 
Consolidator 5 (4.9) 1 (2.9) 1 (6.7) 1 (11.1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 (4.2) 
Bilateral 3 (2.9) 0 0 1 (11.1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 (2.1) 
Direct supplier 13 (12.6) 6 (17.1) 3 (20.0) 1 (11.1) 2 (33.3) 2 (33.3) 2 (40.0) 1 (25.0) 1 (25.0) 1 (20.0) 32 (16.7) 
Onsite 70 (68.0) 24 (68.6) 9 (60.0) 5 (55.6) 3 (50.0) 3 (50.0) 3 (60.0) 3 (75.0) 3 (75.0) 3 (60.0) 126 (66) 
No answer 12 (11.7) 4 (11.4) 2 (13.3) 1 (11.1) 1 (16.7) 1 (16.7) 0 0 0 1 (20.0) 21 (11) 
Table 18: Mode of Electricity Trading from CHP 
Table 18 above shows that the dominant percentage of how electricity is traded from 
CHPs in the UK is rather consumed onsite. For instance, 68.0% and 68.6% of the 
respondents with their first and second sites respectively consume their electricity 
onsite. Therefore, most respondents of different sites trade electricity from their CHPs 
Onsite. 
Q 7 - What nature of electricity distribution is adopted in distributing 
electricity from CHP (n – 95) 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Only on Private network 51 53.7 53.7 53.7 
Only on Public network 3 3.2 3.2 56.8 
Mostly on Private network 15 15.8 15.8 72.6 
Mostly on Public network 5 5.3 5.3 77.9 
Mostly hybrid of both 4 4.2 4.2 82.1 
No answer 17 17.9 17.9 100.0 
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Total 95 100.0 100.0  
Table 19: Path of Electricity Distribution 
 
Figure 15: Graph of Electricity distribution adopted 
Results from Table 19 and Figure 15 suggest that 53.7% of respondents distribute 
their electricity only through private networks. This suggests that private network is the 
dominant path of how CHPs in the UK distribute their electricity. 
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Q 8 - What economic model is adopted for the CHP – DH project? (Percentage) 
n = 86 
Economic model Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 Total 
Fully 
commercial 
23 (26.7) 12 (42.9) 7 (63.6) 5 (83.3) 3 (100) 3 (100) 3 (100) 2 (100) 2 (100) 2 (66.6) 62 (42.2) 
Partially 
commercial with 
profit caps 
5 (5.8) 1 (3.6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 (4.1) 
Cooperative / 
Non Profit 
20 (23.3) 4 (14.3) 1 (9.1) 1 (16.7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 (17.7) 
No answer 38 (61.0) 11 (39.3) 3 (27.3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (33.3) 53 (36) 
Table 20: Economic Model of CHP-DH industry 
Table 20 above shows that the dominant percentage of the adopted economic model 
by respondents is fully commercial.  
Q 9 - What are your class of heat consumers? (Percentage) n = 84 
Class of heat 
consumers 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 Total 
Domestic 13 (14.0) 1 (3.0) 1 (6.3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 (8.3) 
Industry 12 (12.9) 3 (9.1) 2 (12.5) 2 (22.2) 2 (28.6) 1 (20.0) 1 (20.0) 1 (25.0) 1 (25.0) 1 (20.0) 26 (14.4) 
Commercial 34 (36.6) 13 (39.4) 9 (56.3) 3 (33.3) 1 (14.3) 2 (40.0) 2 (40.0) 1 (25.0) 1 (25.0) 1 (20.0) 67 (37.2) 
Mixed 22 (23.7) 10 (30.3) 3  (18.8) 4 (44.4) 2 (28.6) 2 (40.0) 2 (40.0) 2 (50.0) 2 (50.0) 3 (75.0) 53 (29.4) 
No Answer 12 (12.9) 6 (18.2) 1 (6.3) 0  2 (28.6) 0 0 0 0 0 19 (10.6) 
Table 21: Heat Customer profile in the UK 
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Table 21 above indicates that the dominant class of heat customers by respondents 
are commercial ones with 67% of total sites respondents.  
Q 10 -  What form of management model is used for the CHP – DH project? 
(Percentage) n = 82 
Management 
model 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 Total 
Fully integrated 
Energy Services 
Company 
(ESCO) 
23 (28.0) 8 (28.6) 6 (54.5) 3 (50.0) 1 (33.3) 1 (33.3) 1 (33.3) 0 0 1 (33.3) 44 (30.8) 
Same 
production, 
distribution and 
supply entities 
4 (4.9) 1 (3.6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (33.3) 6 (4.2) 
Separate 
production and 
distribution with 
different supply 
entity 
3 (3.7) 1 (3.6) 1 (9.1) 1 (16.7) 1 (33.3) 1 (33.3) 1 (33.3) 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 0 11 (7.7) 
Same production 
and supply with 
different 
distribution 
entity 
1 (1.2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (0.69) 
Same 
distribution and 
supply with 
different 
1 (1.2) 1 (3.6) 0 1  (16.7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 (2.1) 
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production 
entity 
No answer 50 (61.0) 17 (60.7) 4 (36.4) 1 (16.7) 1 (33.3) 1 (33.3) 1 (33.3) 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 1 (33.3) 78 (54.5) 
Table 22: Management used for CHP-DH project 
Table 22 above did not offer clear indication of the type of management model adopted 
by the respondents due to the high value of no answer. However, from the respondents 
that chose a mode of management, more respondents indicated a fully integrated 
energy services company (ESCO) model as the management model adopted   
 
Q 11 - Is there any CHP-DH project in the area covered by your 
Local authority 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 60 43.5 45.8 45.8 
Don’t Know 19 13.8 14.5 60.3 
Not at all 52 37.7 39.7 100.0 
Total 131 94.9 100.0  
Missing System 7 5.1   
Total 138 100.0   
Table 23: CHP-DH Projects in LAs 
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Figure 16: CHP-DH projects in LA 
From the Table 23 above and Figure 16, we can observe that, 45.8% of the LAs 
expressed that, there is CHP – DH project in the area covered by their local authority. 
While about 14.5% of the respondents don’t know and 39.7% of LAs don’t have at all.  
The following bar chart in Figure 16, also shows taller bar corresponding to the same. 
 
 
Q 12 - Is your local authority directly involved in any CHP-DH project? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 
Been involved 14 10.1 10.1 10.1 
Ongoing 46 33.3 33.3 43.5 
Considering 35 25.4 25.4 68.8 
Not considering 30 21.7 21.7 90.6 
No answer 13 9.4 9.4 100.0 
Total 138 100.0 100.0  
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Table 24: LA involvement in CHP-DH project 
 
Figure 17: LA involvement in CHP-DH project 
 
From the Table 24 and Figure 17 above we can observe that, 33.3% of the LAs 
expressed that, their local authority is directly involved in any CHP – DH project. 
Following the bar chart in Figure 17, it also shows taller bar corresponding to the same. 
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Q 13 - Risk Analysis Profile of the CHP-DH industry in the UK 
 
Table 25: Risk profile descriptive table 
 
 
 
Policy 
uncertainty
Absence 
of State 
capital 
incentive
Lack of 
local 
authority 
incentive
Absence 
of 
regulatory 
regime for 
heat
Absence of 
a heat 
market in 
the UK
Electricity 
off-take 
risk
Heat off-
take risk
Developm
ental/Con
nection to 
electricity 
grid risk
Potential 
for change 
in the 
taxation 
regime
Tradition 
of private 
provision 
of public 
goods
Level of 
public 
opposition 
to project
Mean 3.1053 3.2316 2.8421 2.6316 2.6632 2.4632 2.5474 2.8105 3.1263 1.8842 2.0526
N 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Std. 
Deviation
1.32467 1.28372 1.41659 1.41461 1.56158 1.49332 1.58294 1.51092 1.44577 1.44298 1.25790
Mean 3.4074 3.0741 2.6296 3.0370 2.9259 2.1481 3.1481 2.5926 3.0741 1.7037 1.6667
N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Std. 
Deviation
1.69296 1.46566 1.39085 1.45395 1.43918 1.40613 1.32153 1.18514 1.43918 1.29540 1.14354
Mean 3.1957 3.4203 3.2101 2.9348 2.9565 2.1377 2.3043 2.9710 2.6739 2.0217 2.0290
N 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
Std. 
Deviation
1.41864 1.34984 1.43701 1.41528 1.46427 1.56229 1.67249 1.54231 1.51471 1.53531 1.36131
Mean 3.1846 3.3154 3.0154 2.8346 2.8462 2.2577 2.4808 2.8731 2.8808 1.9385 2.0000
N 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
Std. 
Deviation
1.41304 1.33867 1.43581 1.42223 1.49884 1.52424 1.62141 1.49750 1.49297 1.47700 1.30340
Report
LAs
Total
Group
CHP 
Operators
Consultants
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Land 
acquisition 
and 
compensation
Availability 
of finance
Financial 
attraction 
of project 
to 
investors
Cost of 
Finance
Delay in 
planning 
permission
Planning 
permissio
n risk
Unavailabili
ty of CHP-
DH 
constructio
n Skills
Constructi
on time & 
cost 
overrun
Operation 
cost 
overrun 
and 
revenue 
expectation
Local 
authority 
experienc
e in Public 
Private 
Partnershi
p/Public 
Finance 
Initiative
Mean 2.0421 3.4105 3.2316 3.2737 2.7895 2.7474 2.5684 2.8000 3.0842 2.4737
N 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Std. 
Deviation
1.32019 1.44026 1.57408 1.25004 1.51513 1.50155 1.54129 1.37299 1.30191 1.50773
Mean 1.5185 2.5556 2.8148 2.3704 2.0370 2.0370 2.8889 2.2222 2.5556 2.6667
N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Std. 
Deviation
1.01414 1.67179 1.38778 1.44510 1.05544 1.31505 1.33973 1.39596 1.42325 1.73205
Mean 2.3913 3.4420 3.3913 3.0000 2.4855 2.4203 2.7609 2.8116 2.9783 3.0435
N 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
Std. 
Deviation
1.44199 1.39351 1.44704 1.63448 1.37886 1.39766 1.43753 1.47757 1.53055 1.37161
Mean 2.1731 3.3385 3.2731 3.0346 2.5500 2.5000 2.7038 2.7462 2.9731 2.7962
N 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
Std. 
Deviation
1.38276 1.46017 1.49337 1.50249 1.41469 1.43992 1.46543 1.43756 1.44234 1.48115
Report
Group
CHP 
Operators
Consultants
LAs
Total
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Risk Analysis Profile of the CHP-DH industry in the UK 
ANOVA Table 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Policy uncertainty * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 1.955 2 .978 .488 .615 
Within Groups 515.183 257 2.005   
Total 517.138 259    
Absence of State capital 
incentive * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 3.758 2 1.879 1.049 .352 
Within Groups 460.380 257 1.791   
Total 464.138 259    
Lack of local authority 
incentive * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 12.105 2 6.052 2.981 .053 
Within Groups 521.834 257 2.030   
Total 533.938 259    
Absence of regulatory regime 
for heat * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 6.407 2 3.204 1.591 .206 
Within Groups 517.481 257 2.014   
Total 523.888 259    
Absence of a heat market in 
the UK * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 5.034 2 2.517 1.121 .327 
Within Groups 576.812 257 2.244   
Total 581.846 259    
Electricity off-take risk * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 6.322 2 3.161 1.364 .257 
Within Groups 595.413 257 2.317   
Total 601.735 259    
Heat off-take risk * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 16.742 2 8.371 3.239 .041 
Within Groups 664.162 257 2.584   
Total 680.904 259    
Developmental/Connection to 
electricity grid risk * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 3.819 2 1.910 .851 .428 
Within Groups 576.992 257 2.245   
Total 580.812 259    
Potential for change in the 
taxation regime * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 12.642 2 6.321 2.877 .058 
Within Groups 564.662 257 2.197   
Total 577.304 259    
Tradition of private provision 
of public goods * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 2.725 2 1.362 .623 .537 
Within Groups 562.291 257 2.188   
Total 565.015 259    
Level of public opposition to 
project * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 3.379 2 1.690 .994 .371 
Within Groups 436.621 257 1.699   
Total 440.000 259    
Land acquisition and 
compensation * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 19.770 2 9.885 5.343 .005 
Within Groups 475.442 257 1.850   
Total 495.212 259    
Availability of finance * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 18.523 2 9.262 4.460 .012 
Within Groups 533.692 257 2.077   
Total 552.215 259    
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Financial attraction of project 
to investors * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 7.763 2 3.881 1.750 .176 
Within Groups 569.849 257 2.217   
Total 577.612 259    
Cost of Finance * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 17.508 2 8.754 3.967 .020 
Within Groups 567.181 257 2.207   
Total 584.688 259    
Delay in planning permission * 
Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 13.127 2 6.563 3.339 .037 
Within Groups 505.223 257 1.966   
Total 518.350 259    
Planning permission risk * 
Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 12.477 2 6.239 3.057 .049 
Within Groups 524.523 257 2.041   
Total 537.000 259    
Unavailability of CHP-DH 
construction Skills * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 3.116 2 1.558 .724 .486 
Within Groups 553.081 257 2.152   
Total 556.196 259    
Construction time & cost 
overrun * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 8.278 2 4.139 2.019 .135 
Within Groups 526.968 257 2.050   
Total 535.246 259    
Operation cost overrun and 
revenue expectation * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 5.884 2 2.942 1.419 .244 
Within Groups 532.928 257 2.074   
Total 538.812 259    
Local authority experience in 
Public Private 
Partnership/Public Finance 
Initiative * Group 
Between Groups (Combined) 18.773 2 9.386 4.391 .013 
Within Groups 549.423 257 2.138   
Total 568.196 259 
   
Table 26: Risk profile - ANOVA Table 
Measures of Association (Effect Size) 
 Eta Eta Squared 
Policy uncertainty * Group .061 .004 
Absence of State capital incentive * Group .090 .008 
Lack of local authority incentive * Group .151 .023 
Absence of regulatory regime for heat * Group .111 .012 
Absence of a heat market in the UK * Group .093 .009 
Electricity off-take risk * Group .103 .011 
Heat off-take risk * Group .157 .025 
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Developmental/Connection to electricity grid risk * 
Group 
.081 .007 
Potential for change in the taxation regime * Group .148 .022 
Tradition of private provision of public goods * Group .069 .005 
Level of public opposition to project * Group .088 .008 
Land acquisition and compensation * Group .200 .040 
Availability of finance * Group .183 .034 
Financial attraction of project to investors * Group .116 .013 
Cost of Finance * Group .173 .030 
Delay in planning permission * Group .159 .025 
Planning permission risk * Group .152 .023 
Unavailability of CHP-DH construction Skills * Group .075 .006 
Construction time & cost overrun * Group .124 .015 
Operation cost overrun and revenue expectation * 
Group 
.104 .011 
Local authority experience in Public Private 
Partnership/Public Finance Initiative * Group 
.182 .033 
Table 27: Measurement of Association 
                            Summary of p and effect size values 
Risk Factor P value Eta 
Square 
(n2) 
Associated 
Cohen’s d 
value (Fritz et 
al., 2012) 
Measure of effect 
according to 
Cohen (1992) 
Heat off-take 0.041 0.025 >0.3 Towards medium 
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Land acquisition 
and compensation 
0.005 .04 >0.4 Towards medium 
Availability of 
finance 
0.012 0.034 <0.4 Towards medium 
Cost of finance 0.02 0.03 >0.3 Towards medium 
Planning 
permission  
0.049 0.023 0.3 Towards medium 
Delay in planning 
permission 
0.037 0.025 >0.3 Towards medium 
LAs experience in 
PPP 
0.013 0.033 >0.3 Towards medium 
Table 28: Summary of p and effect size values 
Drawing from the ANOVA statistical analysis in Table 26, it shows that, Heat off take 
risk, land acquisition and compensation, availability of finance, cost of finance, delay 
in planning permission, planning permission risk and Local authority experience in 
Public Private Partnership/Public Finance had significant difference between CHP 
operators, Consultants and LAs. This suggest that these risk profile have more impact 
on investors decision in the development of CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
Furthermore, results from Table 28 suggest that the measure of contribution of an 
effect (taken from Table 27) of each risk factor to the observed variables, when the eta 
squared value from the ANOVA analysis is associated with the Cohen’s d values is 
almost a medium effect since they are all greater than or equal to 0.3 (Fritz et al., 
2012). Hence, land acquisition and compensation have the largest effect and closely 
followed by availability of finance. 
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Q 14 - What is the dominant perceived challenge in the UK before the 
construction of a CHP-District heating system? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Planning Consent 1 3.7 4.0 4.0 
Electricity market 3 11.1 12.0 16.0 
heat load 11 40.7 44.0 60.0 
Lack of capital 6 22.2 24.0 84.0 
Others (Please comment) 4 14.8 16.0 100.0 
Total 25 92.6 100.0  
Missing System 2 7.4   
Total 27 100.0   
Table 29: Perceived challenges for CHP-DH Construction by Consultants 
 
 
Figure 18: Bar Chart - perceived challenges for CHP-DH construction 
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Results from Table 29, which are responses from consultants on the dominant 
challenge they experience before construction. Over 40% of the respondents consider 
heat load as the most challenging before lack of capital, while another 24% considers 
lack of capital as the dominant challenge. The bar chart in Figure 18 also shows a 
similar trend.  
 
 
Q 15 - What do you think is biggest government induced barrier to your 
operations? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Planning permits 3 3.2 4.1 4.1 
Taxation 14 14.7 18.9 23.0 
market 17 17.9 23.0 45.9 
Requisite skill 8 8.4 10.8 56.8 
Regulatory 21 22.1 28.4 85.1 
Suggest any 11 11.6 14.9 100.0 
Total 74 77.9 100.0  
Missing System 21 22.1   
Total 95 100.0   
Table 30: Biggest induced barrier to CHP-DH operations 
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Figure 19: Bar chart - Biggest induced barrier to operations 
 
Results from CHP-OPs respondents as shown in Table 30 shows that over 28% 
respondents consider regulatory as the biggest, followed by the market with 23%. 
Similarly, the bar chart in Figure 19 have a similar trend. 
 
Q 16 - Private land owners are very receptive to CHP-DH projects 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Tend to agree 6 22.2 22.2 22.2 
Neither 7 25.9 25.9 48.1 
Tend to disagree 7 25.9 25.9 74.1 
Strongly disagree 1 3.7 3.7 77.8 
No answer 6 22.2 22.2 100.0 
Total 27 100.0 100.0  
Table 31: Land owners reception to CHP-DH projects 
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Figure 20: Bar hart - Private land owners reception to CHP-DH 
 
Consultants were asked if they consider private land owners as receptive to the CHP-
OPs projects. The results shown in Table 31 shows that respondents were strongly 
divided amongst tend to agree (~22%) and tend to disagree (~26%), especially when 
considering about 26% of respondents that are in neither position. Following the bar 
chart in  Figure 20 also shows taller bar corresponding to the same.  
 
 
Q 17 - Local authorities have the necessary capacity to engage 
energy services companies (ESCO) for their areas 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 6 4.3 4.4 4.4 
Tend to agree 32 23.2 23.5 27.9 
Neither 21 15.2 15.4 43.4 
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Tend to disagree 48 34.8 35.3 78.7 
Strongly disagree 19 13.8 14.0 92.6 
No answer 10 7.2 7.4 100.0 
Total 136 98.6 100.0  
Missing System 2 1.4   
Total 138 100.0   
Table 32: LAs capacity to engage ESCOs 
 
Figure 21: Bar chart - LAs capacity to engage ESCOs 
LAs were asked if they think they have the necessary capacity to engage energy 
services companies for their areas. Results from Table 32, shows that 35% of 
respondents tend to disagree, while another ~24% tend to agree. When only 14% 
strongly disagree and 4.4% strongly agree. The bar chart in Figure 21 also shows a 
similar pattern. 
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Q 18 - Planning officers in the Local authorities are skilled enough to offer 
proactive guidance to district heating and CHP planning applicants  
 
Group 
Total LA Consultants 
Planning officers in the Local 
authorities are skilled 
enough to offer proactive 
guidance to district heating 
and CHP planning 
applicants 
Tend to agree Count 26 4 30 
% within Group 18.8% 14.8% 18.2% 
% of Total 15.8% 2.4% 18.2% 
Neither Count 18 5 23 
% within Group 13.0% 18.5% 13.9% 
% of Total 10.9% 3.0% 13.9% 
Tend to disagree Count 60 13 73 
% within Group 43.5% 48.1% 44.2% 
% of Total 36.4% 7.9% 44.2% 
Strongly disagree Count 22 1 23 
% within Group 15.9% 3.7% 13.9% 
% of Total 13.3% 0.6% 13.9% 
No answer Count 12 4 16 
% within Group 8.7% 14.8% 9.7% 
% of Total 7.3% 2.4% 9.7% 
Total Count 138 27 165 
% within Group 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 83.6% 16.4% 100.0% 
Table 33: Are LAs planning officers skilled enough 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.097a 4 .393 
Likelihood Ratio 4.801 4 .308 
Linear-by-Linear Association .011 1 .917 
N of Valid Cases 165   
a. 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.62. 
Table 34: Chi square - Are LAs planning officers skilled 
 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .158 .393 
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Cramer's V .158 .393 
N of Valid Cases 165  
Table 35: Measure of association (effect size) 
Results from Table 34 above shows that the expected count of the cells is 40% which 
is more 20% (i.e > 5), therefore the assumptions are violated and we will use likelihood 
ratio values instead of the chi square figures. The likelihood ratio value was 4.801 and 
its corresponding p value was 0.308>0.05 (likelihood ratio =4.801, df = 4, p = .308). 
Since the p value was greater than 0.05, we can conclude that, there is no significant 
difference between the LAs and consultants if the planning officers in the local 
authorities are skilled enough to offer proactive guidance to district heating and CHP 
planning applicants. Therefore, we will fail to reject the null (Ho) hypothesis, which is 
planning officers in the local authorities are skilled enough to offer proactive guidance 
to district heating and CHP planning applicants. Furthermore, we can draw upon the 
descriptive results from Table 33 above which indicates that about 43.5% of the LAs 
and 48.5% of the consultants expressed that they tend to disagree, while 15.9% of LA 
and  3.7% of consultants strongly disagree that planning officers in the local authorities 
are skilled enough to offer proactive guidance to district heating and CHP planning 
applicants. This suggest that there is evidence that planning officers are not skilled 
enough to offer proactive guidance to CH-DH applicants. However, the support is 
weak due to the non-significant result, therefore the data are inconclusive. 
Furthermore, drawing from the results of Table 35,  the value of Cramer’s V  is 0.158, 
which suggest that measure of association or effect size that shows the proportionality 
of variability of the groups within the study tends to be a small effect (i.e <0.2) 
according to  Fritz et al. (2012).  
 
 
Q 19 - I consider the existing process to receive planning consent to be 
transparent enough to gain the confidence of the applicants for CHP-DH 
projects and locals  
 
 
Group 
Total LA Consultants 
I consider the existing 
process to receive planning 
consent to be transparent 
enough to gain the 
Strongly agree Count 6 0 6 
% within Group 4.4% 0.0% 3.7% 
% of Total 3.7% 0.0% 3.7% 
Tend to agree Count 54 12 66 
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confidence of the applicants 
for CHP-DH projects and 
locals 
% within Group 39.7% 44.4% 40.5% 
% of Total 33.1% 7.4% 40.5% 
Neither Count 29 6 35 
% within Group 21.3% 22.2% 21.5% 
% of Total 17.8% 3.7% 21.5% 
Tend to disagree Count 16 4 20 
% within Group 11.8% 14.8% 12.3% 
% of Total 9.8% 2.5% 12.3% 
No answer Count 31 5 36 
% within Group 22.8% 18.5% 22.1% 
% of Total 19.0% 3.1% 22.1% 
Total Count 136 27 163 
% within Group 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 83.4% 16.6% 100.0% 
Table 36: Transparent planning consent 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.682a 4 .794 
Likelihood Ratio 2.661 4 .616 
Linear-by-Linear Association .028 1 .867 
N of Valid Cases 163   
a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .99. 
Table 37: Chi square - Transparent planning consent 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .102 .794 
Cramer's V .102 .794 
N of Valid Cases 163  
Table 38: Measure of association (effect size) 
Results from Table 37 above shows that the expected count of the cells is 20% (i.e = 
5), therefore the assumptions are violated and we will use likelihood ratio values 
instead of the chi square figures. The likelihood ratio value was 2.661 and its 
corresponding p value was 0.616>0.05 (likelihood ratio = 2.661, df = 4, p = .616). Since 
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the p value was greater than 0.05, we can conclude that, there is no significant 
difference between the LAs and consultants in considering the existing process to 
receive planning consent to be transparent enough to gain the confidence of the 
applicants for CHP-DH projects and locals. Therefore, we will fail to reject the null (Ho) 
hypothesis, which is the existing process to receive planning consent to be transparent 
enough to gain the confidence of the applicants for CHP-DH projects and locals. 
Furthermore, we can draw upon the descriptive results from Table 36 above which 
indicates that about 39.7% of the LAs and 44.4% of the consultants expressed that 
they tend to agree, while 4.4% of LA and  0% of consultants strongly agree that the 
existing process to receive planning consent is transparent enough to gain the 
confidence of the applicants for CHP-DH projects and locals. However, the support is 
weak due to the non-significant result, therefore the data are inconclusive. 
Furthermore, drawing from the results of Table 38,  the value of Cramer’s V  is 0.102, 
which suggest that measure of association or effect size that shows the proportionality 
of variability of the groups within the study tends to be a small effect (i.e <0.2) 
according to  Fritz et al. (2012).  
 
Q 20 - In addition to planning permission there are many other consents that 
are required to commence development of a CHP-DH project, such as 
environmental permits or street works licence. There is room for a single 
consent regime or to at least reduce the consent 
 
 
Group 
Total LA Consultants 
In addition to planning 
permission there are many 
other consent that are 
required to commence 
development of a CHP-DH 
project, such as 
environmental permits or 
street works licence. There 
is room for a single consent 
regime or to at least reduce 
the consent 
Strongly agree Count 13 2 15 
% within Group 9.4% 7.4% 9.1% 
% of Total 7.9% 1.2% 9.1% 
Tend to agree Count 60 14 74 
% within Group 43.5% 51.9% 44.8% 
% of Total 36.4% 8.5% 44.8% 
Neither Count 23 4 27 
% within Group 16.7% 14.8% 16.4% 
% of Total 13.9% 2.4% 16.4% 
Tend to disagree Count 20 0 20 
% within Group 14.5% 0.0% 12.1% 
% of Total 12.1% 0.0% 12.1% 
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No answer Count 22 7 29 
% within Group 15.9% 25.9% 17.6% 
% of Total 13.3% 4.2% 17.6% 
Total Count 138 27 165 
% within Group 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 83.6% 16.4% 100.0% 
Table 39: Single consent planning regime 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.695a 4 .223 
Likelihood Ratio 8.791 4 .067 
Linear-by-Linear Association .110 1 .740 
N of Valid Cases 165   
a. 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 2.45. 
Table 40: Chi Square - Single consent planning regime 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .186 .223 
Cramer's V .186 .223 
N of Valid Cases 165  
Table 41: Measure of association (effect size) 
Results from Table 40 above shows that the expected count of the cells is 40% (i.e =  
> 5), therefore the assumptions are violated and we will use likelihood ratio values 
instead of the chi square figures. The likelihood ratio value was 8.791 and its 
corresponding p value was 0.067>0.05 (likelihood ratio = 8.791, df = 4, p = .067). Since 
the p value was greater than 0.05, we can conclude that, there is no significant 
difference between the LAs and consultants that a single consent regime for planning 
is required. Therefore, we will fail to reject the null (Ho) hypothesis, which is that there 
is room for a single consent regime or to at least reduce the consent. Furthermore, we 
can draw upon the descriptive results from Table 39 above which indicates that about 
43.5% of the LAs and 51.9% of the consultants expressed that they tend to agree, 
while 9.4% of LA and  7.4% of consultants strongly agree that the there is room for a 
162 | P a g e  
 
single consent regime or to at least reduce the consent. However, the support is weak 
due to the non-significant result, therefore the data are inconclusive. 
Furthermore, drawing from the results of Table 41,  the value of Cramer’s V  is 0.186, 
which suggest that measure of association or effect size that shows the proportionality 
of variability of the groups within the study tends to be a small effect (i.e <0.2) 
according to  Fritz et al. (2012).  
 
Q 21 - A conveyor belt (one-stop shop) approach with a definite time for the 
planning system should be introduced  
 
 
Group 
Total LA Consultants 
A conveyor belt (one-stop 
shop) approach with a 
definite time for the planning 
system should be introduced 
Strongly agree Count 12 2 14 
% within Group 8.8% 7.7% 8.6% 
% of Total 7.4% 1.2% 8.6% 
Tend to agree Count 55 9 64 
% within Group 40.4% 34.6% 39.5% 
% of Total 34.0% 5.6% 39.5% 
Neither Count 25 7 32 
% within Group 18.4% 26.9% 19.8% 
% of Total 15.4% 4.3% 19.8% 
Tend to disagree Count 22 0 22 
% within Group 16.2% 0.0% 13.6% 
% of Total 13.6% 0.0% 13.6% 
Strongly disagree Count 3 1 4 
% within Group 2.2% 3.8% 2.5% 
% of Total 1.9% 0.6% 2.5% 
No answer Count 19 7 26 
% within Group 14.0% 26.9% 16.0% 
% of Total 11.7% 4.3% 16.0% 
Total Count 136 26 162 
% within Group 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 84.0% 16.0% 100.0% 
Table 42: A conveyor belt approach for planning 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.751a 5 .170 
Likelihood Ratio 10.846 5 .055 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.044 1 .307 
N of Valid Cases 162   
a. 5 cells (41.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .64. 
Table 43: Chi square - A conveyor belt approach for planning 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .219 .170 
Cramer's V .219 .170 
N of Valid Cases 162  
Table 44: Measurement of association (Effect size) 
 
Results from Table 43 above shows that the expected count of the cells is 41.7% (i.e 
= 5), therefore the assumptions are violated, and we will use likelihood ratio values 
instead of the chi square figures. The likelihood ratio value was 10.846 and its 
corresponding p value was 0.055>0.05 (likelihood ratio = 10.846, df = 5, p = .055). 
Since the p value was greater than 0.05, we can conclude that, there is no significant 
difference between the LAs and consultants that a conveyor belt (one-stop shop) 
approach with a definite time for the planning system should be introduced. Therefore, 
we will fail to reject the null (Ho) hypothesis, which is that a conveyor belt (one-stop 
shop) approach with a definite time for the planning system should be introduced. 
Furthermore, we can draw upon the descriptive results from Table 42 above which 
indicates that about 40.4% of the LAs and 34.6% of the consultants expressed that 
they tend to agree, while 8.8% of LA and  7.7% of consultants strongly agree that a 
conveyor belt (one-stop shop) approach with a definite time for the planning system 
should be introduced. However, the support is weak due to the non-significant result, 
therefore the data are inconclusive 
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Furthermore, drawing from the results of Table 44,  the value of Cramer’s V  is 0.219, 
which suggest that measure of association or effect size that shows the proportionality 
of variability of the groups within the study tends towards a medium  effect (i.e >0.2) 
according to  Fritz et al. (2012).  
7.2 Results - Barriers and Alternative LA roles 
 
Q 22 - There should be a one-stop shop for the necessary information on different 
technologies to CHP and sources of heat to District Heating network  
 Group Total 
CHP Operators Consultants LAs 
There should be a one-stop 
shop for the necessary 
information on different 
technologies to CHP and 
sources of heat to District 
Heating network 
Strongly agree 
Count 33 5 35 73 
% within Group 37.1% 18.5% 25.4% 28.7% 
Tend to agree 
Count 35 12 67 114 
% within Group 39.3% 44.4% 48.6% 44.9% 
Neither 
Count 6 5 22 33 
% within Group 6.7% 18.5% 15.9% 13.0% 
Tend to disagree 
Count 5 4 6 15 
% within Group 5.6% 14.8% 4.3% 5.9% 
Strongly disagree 
Count 1 0 1 2 
% within Group 1.1% 0.0% 0.7% 0.8% 
No answer 
Count 9 1 7 17 
% within Group 10.1% 3.7% 5.1% 6.7% 
Total 
Count 89 27 138 254 
% within Group 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 45: One stop information 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.958a 10 .101 
Likelihood Ratio 15.477 10 .116 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.050 1 .823 
N of Valid Cases 254   
a. 6 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .21. 
Table 46: Chi square - One stop information 
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Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .251 .101 
Cramer's V .177 .101 
N of Valid Cases 254  
Table 47: Measurement of association (effect size) 
Results from Table 46 above shows that the expected count of the cells is 33.37% (i.e  
> 5), therefore the assumptions are violated and we will use likelihood ratio values 
instead of the chi square figures. The likelihood ratio value was 15.477 and its 
corresponding p value was 0.116>0.05 (likelihood ratio = 15.477, df = 10, p = .116). 
This suggest that there is no significant difference in the agreements of the 
respondents regarding there should be a one stop for the necessary information on 
different technologies to CHP and sources of heat to District Heating network. Hence, 
we will fail to reject the null (Ho) since there is evidence that there is no significant 
difference that there should be a one stop shop for the necessary information on 
different technologies to CHP and sources of heat to District Heating network. 
Consequently, from Table 45 above, we can observe that, 39.3% of the CHP 
operators, 44.4% of the consultants and 48.6% of the LAs tend to agree that there 
should be a one stop for the necessary information on different technologies to CHP 
and sources of heat to District Heating network. However, the support is weak due to 
the non-significant result, therefore the data are inconclusive. 
furthermore, drawing from the results of Table 47,  the value of cramer’s v  is 0.177, 
which suggest that measure of association or effect size that shows the proportionality 
of variability of the groups within the study is less than 0.2 so it’s a small effect (i.e 
<0.2) according to  Fritz et al. (2012).  
 
Q 23 - Has the local authority developed heat maps for its 
area? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Yes 46 33.3 33.3 33.3 
In development 31 22.5 22.5 55.8 
Considering 24 17.4 17.4 73.2 
Not considering 15 10.9 10.9 84.1 
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No answer 22 15.9 15.9 100.0 
Total 138 100.0 100.0  
Table 48: LAs with heat maps 
 
Figure 22: LAs with heat maps 
From the Table 48 above we can observe that, 33.3% of the LAs expressed that, their 
local authority has developed heat maps for its area. Following the bar chart in Figure 
22, it also shows taller bar corresponding to the same. 
 
Q 24 -The absence of a national integrated CHP and District Heating strategy could 
hamper the growth of CHP/DH technology in the UK  
 
Group 
Total LA Consultants 
The absence of a national 
integrated CHP and District 
Heating strategy could 
hamper the growth of 
CHP/DH technology in the 
UK 
Strongly agree Count 37 3 40 
% within Group 27.4% 12.0% 25.0% 
% of Total 23.1% 1.9% 25.0% 
Tend to agree Count 70 0 70 
% within Group 51.9% 0.0% 43.8% 
% of Total 43.8% 0.0% 43.8% 
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Neither Count 14 10 24 
% within Group 10.4% 40.0% 15.0% 
% of Total 8.8% 6.3% 15.0% 
Tend to disagree Count 5 9 14 
% within Group 3.7% 36.0% 8.8% 
% of Total 3.1% 5.6% 8.8% 
Strongly disagree Count 3 3 6 
% within Group 2.2% 12.0% 3.8% 
% of Total 1.9% 1.9% 3.8% 
No answer Count 6 0 6 
% within Group 4.4% 0.0% 3.8% 
% of Total 3.8% 0.0% 3.8% 
Total Count 135 25 160 
% within Group 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 84.4% 15.6% 100.0% 
Table 49: Absence of a national integrated strategy for CHP-DH 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 58.945a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 58.209 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 19.563 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 160   
a. 4 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .94. 
Table 50: Chi square - Absence of national integrated strategy 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .608 .000 
Cramer's V .608 .000 
N of Valid Cases 161  
Table 51: Measurement of association (effect size) 
Results from Table 50 above shows that the expected count of the cells is 33.3% (i.e  
> 5), therefore the assumptions are violated and we will use likelihood ratio values 
instead of the chi square figures. The likelihood ratio value was 58.209 and its 
corresponding p value was 0.000<0.05 (likelihood ratio = 58.209, df = 5, p = .000). 
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This suggest that there is a significant difference in the agreements of the respondents 
regarding the impact of the absence of a national integrated strategy on growth of 
CHP-DH in the UK. Hence, we will reject the null (Ho) since there is evidence that 
there is a significant difference between the LAs and consultants and therefore, we 
conclude that the absence of a national integrated CHP-DH strategy impacts on its 
growth in the UK. Consequently, from Table 49 above, we can observe that, 43.8% of 
the total respondents tend to agree, while 25% of the total respondents strongly agree 
that the absence of a national integrated CHP-DH strategy impacts on its growth in 
the UK. Furthermore, drawing from the results of Table 51 the value of Cramer’s V  is 
0.608, which suggest that measure of association or effect size that shows the 
proportionality of variability of the groups within the study is greater than .5, and 
therefore it has large effect (i.e >.5) according to  Fritz et al. (2012).  
 
Q 25 - The UK needs to develop a body of regulation concerning heat provision and its 
infrastructure such as DH systems.  
 Group Total 
CHP Operators Consultants LAs 
The UK needs to develop a 
body of regulation concerning 
heat provision and its 
infrastructure such as DH 
systems. 
Strongly agree 
Count 21 6 23 50 
% within Group 23.9% 22.2% 16.8% 19.8% 
Tend to agree 
Count 42 14 78 134 
% within Group 47.7% 51.9% 56.9% 53.2% 
Neither 
Count 17 5 20 42 
% within Group 19.3% 18.5% 14.6% 16.7% 
Tend to disagree 
Count 3 1 3 7 
% within Group 3.4% 3.7% 2.2% 2.8% 
Strongly disagree 
Count 3 0 2 5 
% within Group 3.4% 0.0% 1.5% 2.0% 
No answer 
Count 2 1 11 14 
% within Group 2.3% 3.7% 8.0% 5.6% 
Total 
Count 88 27 137 252 
% within Group 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 52 :UK needs body of regulation 
 Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.470a 10 .583 
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Likelihood Ratio 9.188 10 .514 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.154 1 .283 
N of Valid Cases 252   
a. 9 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .54. 
Table 53: Chi square - UK needs body of regulation 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .183 .583 
Cramer's V .130 .583 
N of Valid Cases 252  
Table 54: Measurement of association (effect size) 
Results from Table 53 above shows that the expected count of the cells is 50% (i.e  > 
5), therefore the assumptions are violated and we will use likelihood ratio values 
instead of the chi square figures. The likelihood ratio value was 9.188 and its 
corresponding p value was 0.514>0.05 (likelihood ratio = 9.188, df = 10, p = .514). 
This suggest that there is no significant difference in the agreements of the 
respondents regarding the need for a body of regulation for the UK CHP-DH. Hence, 
we will fail to reject the null (Ho) that the UK needs a body of regulation concerning 
heat provision and its infrastructure such as DH systems, since there is evidence that 
there is no significant difference. Consequently, from Table 52 above, we can observe 
that, 53.2% of the total respondents tend to agree, while 19.8% of the total 
respondents strongly agree that the UK needs to develop a body of regulation 
concerning heat provision and its infrastructure such as DH systems. However, the 
support is weak due to the non-significant result, therefore the data are inconclusive. 
Furthermore, drawing from the results of Table 54,  the value of Cramer’s V  is 0.13, 
which suggest that measure of association or effect size that shows the proportionality 
of variability of the groups within the study is less than .2 and therefore it has small 
effect (i.e < .2) according to  Fritz et al. (2012).  
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Q 26 - It is likely this would require a regulator. Which body should act as the 
regulator? Group Crosstabulation 
 
Group 
Total 
CHP 
Operators Consultants LAs 
It is likely this would 
require a regulator. 
Which body should 
act as the regulator? 
Ofgem Count 48 17 68 133 
% within 
Group 
55.8% 63.0% 49.3% 53.0% 
% of Total 19.1% 6.8% 27.1% 53.0% 
Government Count 8 3 29 40 
% within 
Group 
9.3% 11.1% 21.0% 15.9% 
% of Total 3.2% 1.2% 11.6% 15.9% 
Another body (say 
who if possible) 
Count 11 6 4 21 
% within 
Group 
12.8% 22.2% 2.9% 8.4% 
% of Total 4.4% 2.4% 1.6% 8.4% 
No regulation is 
required 
Count 3 0 7 10 
% within 
Group 
3.5% 0.0% 5.1% 4.0% 
% of Total 1.2% 0.0% 2.8% 4.0% 
No answer Count 16 1 30 47 
% within 
Group 
18.6% 3.7% 21.7% 18.7% 
% of Total 6.4% 0.4% 12.0% 18.7% 
Total Count 86 27 138 251 
% within 
Group 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 34.3% 10.8% 55.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 55: Which body should act as the regulator  
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.600a 8 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 26.911 8 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association .319 1 .572 
N of Valid Cases 251   
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a. 4 cells (26.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 1.08. 
Table 56: Chi Square - Which body act as the regulator 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .313 .002 
Cramer's V .221 .002 
N of Valid Cases 251  
Table 57: Measurement of association (effect size) 
Results from Table 56 above shows that the expected count of the cells is 26.7% (i.e  
> 5), therefore the assumptions are violated since its greater than 20% and we will use 
likelihood ratio values instead of the chi square figures. The likelihood ratio value was 
26.911 and its corresponding p value was 0.001< 0.05 (likelihood ratio = 26.911, df = 
8, p = .001). This suggest that there is a significant difference in the agreements of the 
respondents regarding who should act as the regulator. Hence, we will reject the null 
(Ho) since there is evidence that there is a significant difference. Consequently, from 
Table 55 above, we can observe that, about 55.5% of the CHP operators, 63.0% of 
the consultants and 49.3% of the LAs expressed that Ofgem will be their preferred 
regulator. Furthermore, drawing from the results of Table 57,  the value of Cramer’s V  
is 0.221, which suggest that measure of association or effect size that shows the 
proportionality of variability of the groups within the study is greater than .2 and 
therefore it has an effect tending towards medium (i.e > .2) according to  Fritz et al. 
(2012). 
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Q 27 - There is a skill gap in the CHP and DH industry in the UK.  
 Group Total 
CHP operator Consultants 
There is a skill gap in the 
CHP and DH industry in the 
UK. 
Strongly agree 
Count 14 7 21 
% within Group 16.1% 25.9% 18.4% 
Tend to agree 
Count 48 11 59 
% within Group 55.2% 40.7% 51.8% 
Neither 
Count 14 4 18 
% within Group 16.1% 14.8% 15.8% 
Tend to disagree 
Count 7 1 8 
% within Group 8.0% 3.7% 7.0% 
Strongly disagree 
Count 2 1 3 
% within Group 2.3% 3.7% 2.6% 
No answer 
Count 2 3 5 
% within Group 2.3% 11.1% 4.4% 
Total 
Count 87 27 114 
% within Group 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 58: Skill gap in the UK 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.289a 5 .279 
Likelihood Ratio 5.669 5 .340 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
.554 1 .457 
N of Valid Cases 114   
a. 7 cells (58.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .71. 
Table 59: Chi Square - Skill gap in the UK 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .235 .279 
Cramer's V .235 .279 
N of Valid Cases 114  
Table 60: Measurement of association (effect size) 
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Results from Table 59 above shows that the expected count of the cells is 58.3% (i.e  
> 5), therefore the assumptions are violated since its greater than 20% and we will use 
likelihood ratio values instead of the chi square figures. The likelihood ratio value was 
5.669 and its corresponding p value was 0.340 > 0.05 (likelihood ratio = 5.669, df = 5, 
p = .340). This suggest that there is no significant difference in the agreements of the 
respondents regarding skill gap in the UK CHP-DH industry. Hence, we will fail to 
reject the null (Ho), which says that there is a skill gap, since there is evidence that 
there is no significant difference. Consequently, from Table 58 above, we can observe 
that, about 55.2% of the CHP operators and 40.7% of the consultants tend to agree 
that, there is a skill gap in the CHP and DH industry in the UK. However, the support 
is weak due to the non-significant result, therefore the data are inconclusive. 
Furthermore, drawing from the results of Table 60,  the value of Cramer’s V  is 0.235, 
which suggest that measure of association or effect size that shows the proportionality 
of variability of the groups within the study is greater than .2 and therefore it has an 
effect tending towards medium (i.e > .2) according to  Fritz et al. (2012). 
 
Q 28 -  If you seem to agree to the above questions, please could you grade 
skills below according to your perceived deficiency levels in the UK 
Group Statistics 
 Group N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Zscore:  Design and 
Manufacture of DH pipes 
CHP operator 61 -.0619477 1.00058297 .12811152 
Consultants 22 .1717641 1.00111534 .21343851 
Zscore:  Manufacture of 
CHP systems 
CHP operator 63 -.0731393 1.00333175 .12640792 
Consultants 22 .2094445 .98280674 .20953510 
Zscore:  Business 
Development 
CHP operator 62 .0202962 .93624019 .11890262 
Consultants 22 -.0571984 1.18388378 .25240487 
Zscore:  Construction of DH 
systems 
CHP operator 62 -.0272443 .99936861 .12691994 
Consultants 22 .0767794 1.02123395 .21772781 
CHP operator 62 -.0156663 .99739873 .12666977 
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Zscore:  Installation of CHP 
Systems 
Consultants 22 .0441506 1.02953622 .21949786 
Zscore:  Operations and 
Maintenance 
CHP operator 64 .0810061 .94903730 .11862966 
Consultants 22 -.2356540 1.12580103 .24002159 
Table 61: Knowledge skill set - Groups statistics 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Zscore:  
Design and 
Manufacture 
of DH pipes 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.132 .718 -.939 81 .350 -
.23371186 
.24887187 -
.72888881 
.26146510 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-.939 37.169 .354 -
.23371186 
.24893485 -
.73802454 
.27060082 
Zscore:  
Manufacture 
of CHP 
systems 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.007 .933 -
1.143 
83 .256 -
.28258379 
.24719295 -
.77424063 
.20907306 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-
1.155 
37.390 .256 -
.28258379 
.24471191 -
.77824280 
.21307524 
Zscore:  
Business 
Development 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
3.677 .059 .311 82 .757 .07749458 .24952226 -
.41888469 
.57387385 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
.278 30.832 .783 .07749458 .27900905 -
.49167391 
.64666306 
Zscore:  
Construction 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.046 .831 -.417 82 .678 -
.10402372 
.24940456 -
.60016883 
.39212140 
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of DH 
systems 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-.413 36.256 .682 -
.10402372 
.25201998 -
.61501888 
.40697145 
Zscore:  
Installation of 
CHP 
Systems 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.023 .880 -.240 82 .811 -
.05981693 
.24958157 -
.55631419 
.43668032 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-.236 35.944 .815 -
.05981693 
.25342561 -
.57381569 
.45418182 
Zscore:  
Operations 
and 
Maintenance 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.139 .711 1.286 84 .202 .31666013 .24619697 -
.17292955 
.80624981 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
1.183 31.879 .246 .31666013 .26773748 -
.22878465 
.86210490 
Table 62: Knowledge skill set - Independent Sample test 
*zscore of the variables was used for the t-test to capture the standardized difference 
between means of the two independent groups, which indicates the estimates of the 
effect size (cohen’s d) to describe the level of variability accounted for by each 
independent variable (Gail M. Sullivan and Richard Feinn, 2012, Fritz et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, SPSS only captures the effect size in an independent sample test 
through using the zscore of the variables (see Table 61,Table 62).  
 
Considering results from Table 62, the p value for the levene’s test for all skill set are 
all greater than .05 (p>0.5), suggesting that we can consider that equal variances are 
assumed for the variable and we can proceed to observe the corresponding the t-test 
values. The p value corresponding to the t-test in all skill set – Design and manufacture 
of DH pipes, Manufacture of CHP systems, Business development, construction of DH 
systems, installation of CHP systems and operations and maintenance are more than 
0.05 (p>0.05). Hence, we can conclude that, there is no significant difference in the 
skill set between CHP operators and consultants. 
However, in a view to further distinguish the proportion of variability of the various skill 
set and considering the profound effect of sample size on statistical significance and 
the independence of effect size from sample size (Fritz et al., 2012, Gail M. Sullivan 
176 | P a g e  
 
and Richard Feinn, 2012). A further consideration of the effect size (Cohen’s d) was 
noted, as only Business development and Operations and Maintenance skill set had 
positive effect sizes of 0.077 and 0.32 respectively (see mean differences in Table 62). 
According to Cohen (1992), business development with a 0.1 effect size equivalent 
shows a small effect but not trivial, while operations and maintenance have 0.32 effect 
size,  which shows a near medium effect on the variability of the mean values. 
Therefore, this provides an opportunity for further research to increase the sample size 
with a view to achieve statistical significance and arrive at a more concrete theoretical 
and practical conclusion. 
 
Q 29 - Please rank the following in the order you consider most likely to be the 
growth pathways for district heating networks in the UK, 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Group N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Zscore:  New builds CHP operator 77 .0126616 .99231793 .11308512 
Consultants 24 -.0406225 1.04488903 .21328708 
Zscore:  Urban centres CHP operator 78 -.0030019 .98199544 .11118909 
Consultants 25 .0093660 1.07519080 .21503816 
Zscore:  Sub-urban areas CHP operator 79 -.0511626 1.03803921 .11678854 
Consultants 24 .1684101 .86138264 .17582900 
Zscore:  Industrial Areas CHP operator 82 .0295663 1.02604184 .11330737 
Consultants 26 -.0932476 .92581933 .18156811 
Zscore:  Remote areas CHP operator 79 -.0144046 .98886859 .11125641 
Consultants 26 .0437679 1.05186762 .20628821 
Table 63: Likely growth pathways for CHP-DH systems – Group statistics 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
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Zscore:  
New 
builds 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.491 .485 .227 99 .821 .05328411 .23489797 -
.41280444 
.51937265 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
.221 36.867 .827 .05328411 .24141173 -
.43592205 
.54249026 
Zscore:  
Urban 
centres 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.300 .585 -.054 101 .957 -
.01236790 
.23095881 -
.47052806 
.44579226 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-.051 37.709 .960 -
.01236790 
.24208351 -
.50256474 
.47782894 
Zscore:  
Sub-urban 
areas 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
4.752 .032 -.942 101 .349 -
.21957263 
.23320681 -
.68219222 
.24304695 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-
1.040 
45.178 .304 -
.21957263 
.21108150 -
.64466630 
.20552103 
Zscore:  
Industrial 
Areas 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.806 .371 .544 106 .588 .12281388 .22581466 -
.32488564 
.57051339 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
.574 46.105 .569 .12281388 .21402228 -
.30796410 
.55359185 
Zscore:  
Remote 
areas 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.109 .295 -.256 103 .798 -
.05817258 
.22711940 -
.50861033 
.39226517 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-.248 40.559 .805 -
.05817258 
.23437751 -
.53166394 
.41531878 
Table 64: Likely growth pathways for CHP-DH systems – independent sample test 
*zscore of the variables was used for the t-test to capture the standardized difference 
between means of the two independent groups, which indicates the estimates of the 
effect size (cohen’s d) to describe the level of variability accounted for by each 
independent variable (Gail M. Sullivan and Richard Feinn, 2012, Fritz et al., 2012). 
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Furthermore, SPSS only captures the effect size in an independent sample test 
through using the zscore of the variables (see Table 63,Table 64).  
Considering the results from Table 64, the p value for the levene’s test for all the 
growth pathways are all greater than .05 (p>0.5) except for sub-urban which had a p 
value of 0.032 (p<0.5). Therefore, we can proceed to consider the p values in the t-
test for the assumed equal variances for the variables with p values higher than 0.05 
(p>0.05), while we consider the p values for equal variances not assumed in the t-test 
for sub-urban. The p value corresponding to the t-test in new builds, urban centres, 
sub-urban, industrial areas and remote areas are all more than 0.05 (p>0.05). Hence, 
we can conclude that, there is no significant difference in the various growth pathways 
between CHP operators and consultants. 
However, in a view to further distinguish the proportion of variability of the various 
growth pathways and considering the profound effect of sample size on statistical 
significance and the independence of effect size from sample size (Fritz et al., 2012, 
Gail M. Sullivan and Richard Feinn, 2012). A further consideration of the effect size 
(Cohen’s d) was noted, as only new builds and industrial areas had positive effect 
sizes of 0.1 and 0.12 respectively. According to Cohen (1992), new builds with a 0.1 
and industrial areas with a 0.12 effect sizes, both shows a small effect but not trivial, 
on the variability of the mean values. Therefore, this provides an opportunity for further 
research to increase the sample size with a view to achieve statistical significance and 
arrive at a more concrete theoretical and practical conclusion. 
 
Q 30 - Is there an adopted energy efficiency strategy for your 
local authority 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 76 55.1 57.1 57.1 
In development 25 18.1 18.8 75.9 
Considering 19 13.8 14.3 90.2 
Not considering 6 4.3 4.5 94.7 
No Answer 7 5.1 5.3 100.0 
Total 133 96.4 100.0  
Missing System 5 3.6   
Total 138 100.0   
 
Table 65: Is there adopted energy efficiency strategy 
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Figure 23: Is there adopted energy efficiency strategy 
 
From the following the results from Table 65 and  Figure 23, we can observe that 
57.1% of the LAs expressed that there is an adopted energy efficiency strategy of 
their local authority. Following bar chart also shows the bars corresponding to the 
same. 
Q 31 - If there is one, is CHP-DH part of the strategy 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 27 19.6 21.1 21.1 
Somewhat 51 37.0 39.8 60.9 
No 31 22.5 24.2 85.2 
No Answer 19 13.8 14.8 100.0 
Total 128 92.8 100.0  
Missing System 10 7.2   
Total 138 100.0   
Table 66: Is CHP-DH part of strategy 
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Figure 24: Bar Chart - Is CHP-DH part of strategy 
 
From the following the results from Table 66 we can observe that 21.1% of the LAs 
expressed that CHP–DH is a part of their strategy. While 39.8% says its somewhat 
and another 24.2% said no. Following bar chart in Figure 24 also shows the bars 
corresponding to the same. 
 
Q 32 - Does the local authority provide any support/planning 
guidance for CHP-DH development? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Yes, Please comment 24 17.4 17.4 17.4 
Under development 32 23.2 23.2 40.6 
No 54 39.1 39.1 79.7 
No answer 28 20.3 20.3 100.0 
Total 138 100.0 100.0  
Table 67: LA planning guidance for CHP-DH 
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Figure 25: Bar Chart - LA planning guidance for CHP-DH 
From the results in Table 67 and Figure 25, we can observe that, 39.1% of the LAs 
expressed that, there is no local authority to provide any support/ planning guidance 
for CHP–DH development. Following bar chart also shows the bars corresponding to 
the same. 
 
Q 33 - Do you experience a slow or defaulting payment on your heat 
(counter party risk)? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes sometimes 3 3.2 3.8 3.8 
Yes but rarely 7 7.4 8.8 12.5 
Not at all 10 10.5 12.5 25.0 
No answer 60 63.2 75.0 100.0 
Total 80 84.2 100.0  
Missing System 15 15.8   
Total 95 100.0   
Table 68: Experience default in heat payment 
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Figure 26: Bar chart - Experience default in heat payment 
 
From the results in Table 68 and Figure 26 above, we can observe that 75% of 
respondents did not respond to the question on experience on slow or default of 
payment on heat. Therefore, the results cannot be taken further. Hence its 
inconclusive. Following bar chart also shows the bars corresponding to the same. 
 
Q 34 - Do you experience disputes with your heat customers? 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes sometimes 5 5.3 6.2 6.2 
Yes but rarely 11 11.6 13.6 19.8 
Not at all 18 18.9 22.2 42.0 
No answer 47 49.5 58.0 100.0 
Total 81 85.3 100.0  
Missing System 14 14.7   
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Total 95 100.0   
Table 69: Experience of dispute with heat customers 
 
Figure 27: Bar chart - Experience disputes with heat customers 
 
From the results in Table 69 and Figure 27, we can observe that 22.2% of respondents 
expressed that not at all, while 13.6% thinks that yes but rarely, with another 3.6% 
saying yes but sometimes that they do experience disputes with their heat customers. 
However, 58% did not respond to the question. Therefore, the results cannot be taken 
further. Hence its inconclusive. Following bar chart also shows the bars corresponding 
to the same. 
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Q 35 - Do you experience difficulty in finding a suitable counterparty 
with which to trade electricity (Market risk)? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes always 1 1.1 1.3 1.3 
Yes sometimes 3 3.2 3.8 5.0 
Yes but rarely 1 1.1 1.3 6.3 
Not at all 19 20.0 23.8 30.0 
No answer 56 58.9 70.0 100.0 
Total 80 84.2 100.0  
Missing System 15 15.8   
Total 95 100.0   
Table 70: Experience in trading electricity 
 
 
Figure 28: Bar chart - Experience in trading electricity 
 
From the results in Table 70 and Figure 28, we can observe that 23.8% of respondents 
expressed that not at all, while 3.8% thinks that yes but sometimes, with another 1.3% 
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saying yes but rarely that they do experience difficulties finding a suitable counterparty 
to trade electricity with. However, 70% did not respond to the question. Therefore, the 
results cannot be taken further. Hence its inconclusive. Following bar chart also shows 
the bars corresponding to the same. 
 
 
Q 36 - If some or all of your electricity is traded, do you experience a 
slow or defaulting payment on your electricity (counter party risk). 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes always 1 1.1 1.3 1.3 
Yes sometimes 4 4.2 5.0 6.3 
Yes but rarely 2 2.1 2.5 8.8 
Not at all 19 20.0 23.8 32.5 
No answer 54 56.8 67.5 100.0 
Total 80 84.2 100.0  
Missing System 15 15.8   
Total 95 100.0   
Table 71: Experience default in electricity payment 
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Figure 29: Bar chart - Experience in default of electricity payment 
 
From the results in Table 71 and Figure 29, we can observe that 23.8% of respondents 
expressed that not at all, while 5% thinks that yes but sometimes, with another 2.5% 
saying yes but rarely that they do experience difficulties in payment for electricity 
traded. However, 67.5% did not respond to the question. Therefore, the results cannot 
be taken further. Hence its inconclusive. Following bar chart also shows the bars 
corresponding to the same 
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7.3 Results – Governance mechanism 
 
Q 37 - Which Government scheme do you consider as the most 
effective in driving the penetration of CHP/DH 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Energy Company Obligation 3 11.1 11.1 11.1 
Enhanced Capital 
Allowance 
4 14.8 14.8 25.9 
Renewable Heat Incentive 5 18.5 18.5 44.4 
Renewable Obligation 1 3.7 3.7 48.1 
Community Energy Saving 
Programme 
5 18.5 18.5 66.7 
Climate Change Levy 
exemption 
4 14.8 14.8 81.5 
No answer 5 18.5 18.5 100.0 
Total 27 100.0 100.0  
Table 72: Government Scheme considered as most effective 
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Figure 30: Bar Chart - Government scheme considered as most effective 
Results from Table 72 and Figure 30,  we can observe that, 18.5% of the consultants 
considers community energy saving programme, another 18.5% considers renewable 
heat incentive, while another 18.5% chose not to answer. This suggest that the result 
is not clearly in favour of any mentioned scheme especially as 18.5% decided not to 
participate in this question. Following bar chart also shows the bars corresponding to 
the same. 
 
Q 38 - The EU ETS is a long-term incentive for CHP-DH systems 
 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
Strongly agree 3 3.2 3.4 3.4 
Tend to agree 26 27.4 29.5 33.0 
Neither 15 15.8 17.0 50.0 
Tend to disagree 18 18.9 20.5 70.5 
Strongly disagree 11 11.6 12.5 83.0 
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No answer 15 15.8 17.0 100.0 
Total 88 92.6 100.0  
Missing System 7 7.4   
Total 95 100.0   
Table 73: EU ETS as long-term incentive 
 
Figure 31: Bar Chart - EU ETS as long-term incentive 
From the following the results from Table 73 and Figure 31. we have observed that 
27.4% of the respondents tend to agree that the EU ETS is a long-term incentive for 
CHP – DH systems. 
 
 
Q 39 -  CHP’s in your system participate in ancillary service provision to the 
electricity grid (percentage) 
Ancillary 
service 
provision 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
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Yes 14 (15.4) 4 (13.8) 3 (27.3) 1 (16.7) 1 (25.0) 1 (33.3) 1 (33.3) 1 (33.3) 1 (50.0) 2 (66.6) 
No 66(72.5) 22 (75.9) 8 (72.7) 5 (83.3) 2 (50.0) 2 (66.6) 2 (66.6) 2 (66.6) 1 (50.0) 1 (33.3) 
No answer 11 (12.1) 3 (10.3) 1 (16.7) 1 (16.7) 1 (25.0) 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 74: CHPs participate in ancillary service provision 
Results from Table 74 suggest that most of the operators don’t participate in ancillary 
service provision to the electricity grid. 
Q 40 -  If you do above. What type of ancillary services? (percentage) 
Type of 
ancillary 
services 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
Short Term 
Operating 
reserve (STOR) 
6 (46.2) 1 (6.3) 2 (22.2) 1 (10.0) 1 (33.3) 1 (50.0) 2 (66.6) 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 1(33.3) 
Frequency 
response services 
0 0 0 5 (50.0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Reactive power 
services 
1 (7.7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (33.3) 
Other 0 3 (18.8) 1 (11.1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
No answer 6 (46.2) 12 (75.0) 6 (66.7) 4 (40.0) 2 (66.7) 1 (50.0) 1 (33.3) 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 1 (33.3) 
Table 75: What type of ancillary 
Results from Table 75 above suggest that majority of the CHP-DH operators 
different sites had no answer for the type of ancillary service. 
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Q 41 - The renewable heat incentive (RHI) should stimulate the required growth of 
CHP-DH in the UK  
 Group Total 
CHP operator Consultants 
The renewable heat 
incentive (RHI) should 
stimulate the required 
growth of CHP-DH in the UK 
Strongly agree 
Count 12 2 14 
% within Group 13.8% 7.4% 12.3% 
Tend to agree 
Count 37 10 47 
% within Group 42.5% 37.0% 41.2% 
Neither 
Count 16 2 18 
% within Group 18.4% 7.4% 15.8% 
Tend to disagree 
Count 12 6 18 
% within Group 13.8% 22.2% 15.8% 
Strongly disagree 
Count 6 6 12 
% within Group 6.9% 22.2% 10.5% 
No answer 
Count 4 1 5 
% within Group 4.6% 3.7% 4.4% 
Total 
Count 87 27 114 
% within Group 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 76: RHI as incentive to CHP-DH 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.972a 5 .158 
Likelihood Ratio 7.561 5 .182 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
3.295 1 .070 
N of Valid Cases 114   
a. 6 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 1.18. 
Table 77: Chi square - RHI as incentive to CHP-DH 
 
Symmetric Measures 
 Value 
Approximate 
Significance 
Nominal by Nominal Phi .264 .158 
Cramer's V .264 .158 
N of Valid Cases 114  
Table 78: Measure of association (effect size) 
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Results from Table 77 above shows that the expected count of the cells is 50% (i.e  > 
5), therefore the assumptions are violated since its greater than 20% and we will use 
likelihood ratio values instead of the chi square figures. The likelihood ratio value was 
7.561 and its corresponding p value was 0.182 > 0.05 (likelihood ratio = 7.561, df = 5, 
p = .182). Since the p value is more than 0.05, there is evidence that there is no 
significant difference in renewable heat incentive (RHI) stimulating the required growth 
of CHP – DH in the UK between the CHP operators and consultants. Hence, we will 
fail to reject the null (Ho), which is renewable heat incentive (RHI) should stimulate the 
required growth of CHP – DH in the UK 
Therefore, following Table 76, we can observe that about 42.5% of the CHP operators 
and 37.0% of the consultants tend to agree that the renewable heat incentive (RHI) 
should stimulate the required growth of CHP – DH in the UK. However, the support is 
weak due to the non-significant result, therefore the data are inconclusive. 
Furthermore, drawing from the results of Table 78,  the value of Cramer’s V  is 0.264, 
which suggest that measure of association or effect size that shows the proportionality 
of variability of the groups within the study is greater than .2 and therefore it has an 
effect tending towards medium (i.e > .2) according to  Fritz et al. (2012). 
 
7.4 UK Governance mapping 
The development and penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK energy landscape 
requires governance if it is to contribute to environmental, social and energy targets. 
The achievement of diffusion of CHP-DH systems is dependent on the governance 
mechanisms deployed that can influence its penetration (Hillman et al., 2011). Drawing 
upon several data on the governance structure and mechanisms that are prevailing in 
the electricity and heat sectors in the UK, a UK governance map was articulated. The 
governance map as shown in Figure 32 below will attempt to capture these 
mechanisms that impact on the development and diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the 
UK.
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Mapping of UK Governance Mechanism 
 
Figure 32: UK CHP-DH Governance map 
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In reference to the UK CHP-DH governance map in Figure 32, the green colour depicts 
the multi-level governance of CHP-DH systems in the UK between the EU and UK, 
which is usually carried out by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy DBEIS (formerly Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)). EU 
legislation mandates the UK to further develop regulations and policies with a view to 
meeting national obligations and targets. These regulations and policies are legalised 
through the UK’s own legislative arm. The blue linkages depict these legislative 
governance instruments that govern the interaction of actors and networks in the 
development and diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
The two major departments at the state level that impact on CHP-DH systems the 
most in the UK are DBEIS and Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG). DBEIS is responsible for legislation which establishes electricity, gas and 
heat regulation while DCLG has oversight of the national planning regime. Their 
responsibilities are carried through various governance instruments which are 
depicted in black. An additional network of actors, including industry networks in the 
UK CHP-DH industry have articulated governance instruments to self-regulate the 
industry in the absence of a state driven regulation. 
These governance instruments are administered, and an avenue is provided for 
feedback on disputes and non-compliance by actors. The schematic has provided 
compliance and dispute resolution boxes to reflect these concerns and the route or 
agencies that monitors compliances and access dispute resolutions are depicted in 
red and purple respectively.  
Finally, the governance mapping of CHP-DH industry also represents the institutional 
actors that have one role or the other to play in the CHP-DH arena and seeks to 
simplify an overview of the interactions between the institutions, actors and networks 
in the technological innovation system of CHP-DH in the UK. 
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8.0  Results and Discussion - CHP-DH Landscape and Risk Profile
  
8.1 Introduction 
 
CHP-DH technology has been mentioned as part of the solution portfolio to the UK’s 
energy trilemma of energy security, affordability and sustainability by both scholars 
and government ((BIS/DECC, 2009, DECC, 2013a, DECC, 2014, Kelly and Pollitt, 
2010, Ricardo-AEA, 2013, Ricardo-E&E, 2015, Ricardo-AEA, 2014, Toke and Fragaki, 
2008, Pöyry, 2009). The role of CHP-DH technology is further reinforced through 
various multi-level governance mechanisms from the European Union (EU). These 
include the EU Cogeneration Directive (EU, 2004a) to incentivise member states on 
generation of useful heat from CHPs and the EU Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) 
(EU, 2014), which mandates member states to set binding energy savings targets of 
20% by 2020. Many of these studies also discuss the opportunities that CHP-DH 
system portends in the UK, its potential and how regulatory frameworks can be 
harnessed to increase its use. However, little evidence has been presented which 
explores the operational and market landscapes that hold in the UK and the drivers 
underlying these landscapes. Some studies suggest ESCOs (Energy Service 
Companies) as a preferred governance structure to deliver the benefits of CHP-DH 
system for the UK in meeting its energy target (Hannon et al., 2013, Soroye and 
Nilsson, 2010, Bertoldi et al., 2006, Boait, 2009, Marino et al., 2011, Sorrell, 2007). 
Consequently, the knowledge of the landscapes of CHP-DH technology in the UK is 
sparse and the prevailing underlying drivers of the governance pattern seeks more 
understanding. 
This chapter will seek to investigate the landscapes through interviewing key 
stakeholders operating in CHP-DH systems in the UK. It shall attempt to identify the 
drivers that play critical roles in determining operational and market choices and the 
dominant governance structure. This is with a view to suggesting a more optimal 
governance structure that can be adopted to deliver more systems and increase their 
diffusion. This chapter will also seek to outline a better understanding of the types of 
risk that militate against the diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK by asking 
respondents to attach weights to 21 risk profile developed in chapter 7, Table 26  and 
also set the scene for further discussion in the next chapter on the barriers to the 
penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
8.2 Prevailing Landscape of the CHP-DH industry  
8.2.1 Operational Landscape 
Considering that CHP-DH produces two major energy vectors, electricity and heat, 
understanding the capacity landscape of the energy vectors in the UK would provide 
insight into the preference of developers, drivers and barriers such as those that 
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emanate from grid infrastructure. Furthermore, the knowledge of the operational 
landscape shall offer more incites on the impact of governance mechanisms that 
influences capacity uptake. Such as capacity market mechanism which allows only 
CHPs between 2-50MW to participate, though smaller plants can be aggregated to the 
minimum capacity of 2MW (DECC, 2014k). Therefore, the research sought the 
dominant electrical capacity portfolios across operators with as much as ten sites 
broken into five major groups: <5MWe, 6-10MWe, 11-50MWe, 51-100MWe, 
>100MWe.  
The results from a statistical – descriptive analysis of the responses as seen in chapter 
7, Table 11 from the questionnaire suggests that the dominant percentage of CHP 
electrical capacity sizes for all sites is less than 5MWe. For instance, 73.9% (136) of 
the 184 total sites being operated by respondents are on less than 5MWe indicating 
this is the dominant clustering in the electrical portfolio for CHP in the UK. Furthermore, 
Table 11 also shows that the next dominant size are plants of over 100MW with 12% 
(22) of the total site. Perhaps more importantly these represent more than 60% of 
capacity, which is consistent with a Government annual energy report which suggest 
that over 80% of CHP schemes are less than 5MW but over 60% of electrical 
contribution from CHP come from plant that are over 10MW (DECC, 2015c). Table 11 
also indicates that there are few organisations that operate multiple sites and large 
capacities, evidence of a landscape dominated by small individual systems. 
Additionally, it suggests that the CHP electrical market resides with few large 
organisations that would mostly likely contribute their capacity through the 
transmission grid rather than the distribution grid. 
Several studies had defined CHP plants of <5MWe as predominantly reciprocating 
engines, usually with low heat to power ratios and producing low grade heat (Pöyry, 
2009, Carbon Trust, 2010, Ricardo-AEA, 2013).Therefore, another deduction from 
Table 11 is that the prime movers in CHP schemes are predominantly reciprocal 
engines because of their small sizes, which indicates that there are more schemes 
(quantity) in the UK that provide low grade heat for space and water heating than 
process heat. However, the small proportion of large capacity CHP plants which are 
over 100MWe band, representing over 60% of electrical production from CHP, indicate 
that greater CHP electrical capacity is being produced from gas and steam turbines 
as prime movers, with less capacity from reciprocal engines. These gas and steam 
turbines are usually associated with higher heat grades and high heat to power ratio. 
The results in Table 12 will clarify the extent of coupling between the electrical and 
heat production landscapes. 
The profile for heat capacities of the network across the respondents, as seen in Table 
12 shows a similar trend to Table 11. Out of a total of 94 respondents representing 
178 sites, 106 sites (~60% of the sites, ~12% total heat production) have a heat 
operation <5MWth. However, almost 40% of heat comes from large producers 
(>100MWth heat capacity). Table 12 also shows that there are few multiple site 
operators of heat networks, indicating a landscape dominated by single heat network 
operators. The combination of both Table 11and Table 12 does indicate that the UK 
CHP-DH landscapes are dominated by silos or individual schemes. 
197 | P a g e  
 
The operational mode of CHP can either be electrically, least cost/standby or heat led. 
The dominant mode of operation of CHPs in the UK was sought so as to be able to 
understand the underlying factors that determine the dominant choice of operational 
mode. Generally, in determining the mode of operation of CHPs by the plant owners, 
two prevalent criteria come in to play namely: technical (infrastructure) and economic 
(market) (Kavvadias et al., 2010). Results from the questionnaire suggest that the 
dominant mode of operation of CHPs in the UK is heat led. This is shown in Table 13, 
where 104 (58%) are heat led, while 61 (34%) are electricity led from a total of 165 
sites operated by respondents. 
The deduction from Table 13 also shows that meeting heat demand is likely to be more 
of a concern than producing electricity. In part this seems likely to be because for 
CHPs to obtain good quality certification from CHP Quality Assurance (CHPQA), a 
government agency, demands that heat is not seen to be wasted (Ricardo-AEA, 
2013). Respondents have attributed to this trend to varying reasons. Such as net 
financial benefit of the overall system, electricity export not viable and some are led by 
heat contracts. Electricity export was often hinged on regulatory barriers. Such as 
electricity license regime which prohibits CHP-DH systems to supply themselves more 
than 2.5MWe through the public distribution network unless they sell their excess 
electricity to a supplier then buy it back to use or through a private network (DTI, 2005, 
Ofgem, 2008a). Therefore, the electricity license regime which acts as a disincentive 
for high electrical capacity from CHPs over 2.5MWe to the grid may have contributed 
to more systems opting for heat led than electricity led, so that they meet their heat 
demand as a priority and import more electricity. The other reason could be the 
absence of a city-wide heat network.  
Consequently, the extent of connectivity of the CHP-DH systems was sought, with a 
question concerning the average length of pipes in operational heat networks. 
Responses from CHP-DH operators in Table 14 suggests that out of the 187 sites 
registered in the survey, 94 sites (~50%) have network lengths of less than 1km. This 
indicates that the CHP-DH industry in the UK is predominantly made up of silo systems 
suggests that heat production and distribution is dominated by non-interconnected 
small-scale systems and minimal linking of heat network infrastructures. This absence 
of networked heating systems can be taken as indicating a system failure resulting 
from institutional failures that constitute barriers to innovation to develop heat 
governance infrastructures such as lack of heat regulation (Foxon, 2007 pg:134). This 
also supports an argument that the CHP-DH industry may exhibit “missing institutional 
link” (Edelenbos, 2005).  
A major insight arising from the data is that CHP-DH investors may not benefit from 
economies of scale in the UK as a result of the small-scale focus created by the 
institutional and regulatory failure (Pöyry, 2009, Ricardo-AEA, 2014). The implication 
of this is that the efficiency of these systems is not optimum since heat production and 
demand cannot easily be distributed across systems, resulting in higher average 
installation costs, which could be reduced by interconnectivity. This also suggests that 
the CHP-DH industry may show signs of inefficiency which can result in higher heat 
price (Le Grand, 1991) due to higher average installation cost resulting from low inter-
connectivity of heat networks. Another, interpretation is that average heat-to-power 
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ratio of the systems appears to be near one-to-one with marginal variation in ratio, 
suggesting that the CHPs used in the UK are predominantly low heat to power ratio 
plants with little contribution from coal. Suggesting also that most of the heat from 
CHP-DH systems are mainly used for low temperature heating in space and water 
heating rather than process heating. This is also collaborated with a Government 
observation that CHP-DH systems have little usage in the process heat industry and 
supported by Government’s data which also suggest that about ~69% of energy 
consumed for heating in the UK is for space and water heating with only about ~18% 
used for high and low temperature process heating (DECC, 2013a) 
8.2.2 Market Landscapes 
In understanding the economic landscape, this research sought to investigate the state 
of CHP-DH industry in the UK. In responding to the question of what the level of 
maturity of the CHP-DH system is in the UK. A total of 164 responses were received 
which was made up of 137 CHP-DH operators and 27 consultants. Statistical results 
from Table 16 shows that the chi square value was 23.37 and its corresponding p 
value was 0.000<0.05 (chi square =23.37, df = 4, p = .000). Since the p value was less 
than 0.05, we have evidence that, there is a significant difference in the level of 
maturity in the UK district heating supplier chain between the CHP operators and 
consultants. Therefore, we can draw upon the descriptive results from Table 15, which 
indicates that about 30.7% of the CHP operators and 77.8% of the consultants 
expressed that the level of maturity in the UK district heating is at infancy but growing. 
Hence, there is evidence to conclude that the level of maturity of the CHP-DH industry 
in the UK is at infancy stage but growing. 
The infancy market status reflects the low penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK, 
which the Government collaborates to, that the scale of DH in the UK is low and that’s 
why the industry is allowed to be self-regulated and not driven by regulation, but the 
Government do recognise that there is a system failure which needs to addressed to 
enhance its selection environment (DECC, 2013a). However, Government’s emphasis 
is on reducing the market barriers by deploying public finance to crowd in private 
finance, without wholly considering the non-market barriers, such as internalising low 
carbon gains, thereby only considering techno-economic conditions and not socio-
economic such as fuel poverty reduction, which contributes to the systemic failure as 
well (Webb, 2014). Therefore, the Government’s position is further reinforcing the path 
dependency of the large centralised energy market, which disincentives distributed 
energy systems like CHP-DH systems (Hawkey et al., 2013, Woodman and Baker, 
2008). A further consequence is that the heat market in the UK is neither a top-down 
steering model nor market-based competition, largely due to lack of regulatory 
infrastructures. Heat market in the UK differs considerably from the market for 
electricity largely due to the fact the large majority of heat produced is consumed 
locally (on site) or wasted, therefore there is a negligible quantity of heat that is from 
a third party which makes most UK heat producers the same consumers. Hence a 
limited market for heat as a product.  
Therefore, there is evidence that the UK CHP-DH market is a nursing market in the 
phases of market formation. The thematic view of respondents is that the investment 
in the CHP-DH industry to move it from the current nursing market to the desired mass 
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market so as to enable it compete with the incumbents (Andersson and Jacobsson, 
2000) would depend on regulatory infrastructures and availability of volume. A supplier 
iterated this also in respect to market volume and investment. 
“It's all about market volume. If manufacturers feel the market is big enough, they will 
invest” DHP3 
However, in spite of the infancy status or current nursing market and lack of a 
regulatory framework to signpost development and govern transaction, the CHP-DH 
industry is experiencing some growth in the sector as reflected in this research that it 
is in infancy but growing. For instance, the market growth has led to the opening of the 
first DH pipe manufacturer in the UK in 2012. 
“May 2012 is when we opened our UK factory…….. We're the only one, yeah. No, 
we're the only one. We use it as marketing. Obviously it's a key selling point for 
customers” DHP3 
Hitherto, all DH pipes were all imported from Europe into the UK, which respondents 
from this research claims cost an additional 1% to 3% for transportation. Suggesting 
that the cost of DH pipes may well reduce as more factories are opened in the UK. 
Furthermore, another respondent that is a DH pipe supplier to the UK market claims 
an annual growth of ~20% from 2013 - 2014 and the respondent suggest that the UK 
DH pipe supplier market increased from the previous dominant four (LOGSTOR, 
Isoplus, Power-Pipe, and Brugg) to around ten in 2015. 
 “You'd get everybody maybe anything between 1% and 3% of the overall cost would 
actually be transportation costs” DHP1  
Other pointers are that the CHP-DH market is growing and shows signs of enormous 
potential for further growth is the impressive balance sheets that CHP-DH 
development companies presents as their turnover surges, which is even attracting 
recognition from financial watch dogs (Vital energi, 2014). While several schemes are 
billed for expansion as mentioned by respondents and not to mention the over a 
hundred CHP-DH schemes awaiting development from the HNDU sponsored CHP-
DH projects through feasibility grants to LA schemes. 
In considering the extent of CHP-DH operator’s participation in the electricity market, 
the research sought to investigate how CHP-DH operators trade their electricity. The 
result is depicted in Table 18 which shows that of the 191 sites registered by 
respondents, 126 of the sites (~66%) consume their electricity on site. This also 
explains the trend in Table 19 and Figure 15 where almost 55% of respondents send 
their electricity from CHP-DH systems only via private wires, while another 19% of 
respondents mostly use private wires.  
Combining the trend in both Table 18 and Table 19 suggests that CHP-DH operators 
are not incentivised to export electricity, for instance at times when the local electricity 
demand is low, they are constrained to export but rather they mostly import electricity 
from the grid. Many CHPs may be locked out of electricity trading due to the high entry 
barrier such as high cost of IT requirement for standard electricity supply license 
owners and the challenges of self-supply restriction in the licensing condition. A CHP-
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DH operator with almost 2000 properties highlighted to the difficulty of supplying 
themselves because they didn’t have a private network and a standard electricity 
licence. 
“We're selling off our own electricity, yet we can't supply using our own electricity, 
because of the way the market is”.CDHOP3 
Under the UK Electricity Order 2001, electricity generators under 5MW are exempted 
from requiring generator, distribution and supply licences but however, electricity 
generators are limited to supplying not more than 2.5MW to domestic customers and 
5MW to business customers without having a supply licence. This is known as the 
class order exemption 2001 (DTI, 2005, Ofgem, 2008a). However, if the electricity 
supply is through a private network, such restriction doesn’t exist. Secondly, when 
CHP-DH operators procure the services of a supplier it generally cost them a discount 
of about 10-20% of the wholesale electricity market price, which typically constitutes 
the cost of trading, balancing cost, administrative cost, long term risk and profit margin 
(Handley, 2013). A common example was the collapse of a CHP-DH scheme 
connected to the Leicester citywide district-heating scheme when it failed to secure a 
supply contract for the sale of its electricity for its CHP plant (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010). 
This restriction of electricity supply volume on CHP-DH system of 5MW and below 
indicates the adverse consequence of electricity regulation on CHP-DH operators. 
A private network is therefore seen as an opportunity to optimise the operation of CHP-
DH systems as it allows developers/operators to remove barriers on supplier self-
restriction and minimise Distribution Network Operators (DNO) charges when they 
supply through public networks. However, when the CHP-DH system is improvised 
into a developed city with varying locations of load, it becomes uneconomical to build 
private wire except new builds or centralised load. An example of a private network 
being used to make savings on energy prices is Woking Council. Woking has about 
80 private networks and saves 5-10% on energy prices from electricity generated from 
their CHPs compared to market rates (DTI/Ofgem, 2007). Therefore, because of these 
restrictions as enumerated by various respondents, CHP-DH systems in the UK are 
not incentivised to size their CHPs to consider the wider electricity market but rather 
local heat requirement. Additionally, CHP-DH operators don’t want to put their CHPQA 
(CHP quality assurance) certification at risk by wasting heat and since there is usually 
no external heat market.  
In understanding the economics and management (integrated or separate) 
characteristics, the research sought the dominant economic and management models 
being adopted in the UK CHP-DH industry. This is with a view to align the result with 
other drivers of the system and understand the triggers for the reasons of the choices. 
This research sought from the CHP-DH operators what sort of economic model was 
adopted in their operations. Out of a total of 94 sites that provided answers to the 
questionnaire, 62 (~42%) sites are operated as fully commercial, while 6 (~4%) sites 
are partially commercial with profit caps and 26 (~18%) sites are non-profit as seen in 
Table 20. 
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To strengthen the above results, the research sought to understand the heat customer 
profile of the CHP-DH industry and the result depicted in Table 21 reinforces the earlier 
observation on the economic models adopted. Out of 161 sites that responded, 15 
sites are domestic, while 26 sites are industrial. Out of the remaining, 67 respondents 
are from commercial sites and 53 respondents are from mixed sites. Research results 
shows that most of the respondents with commercial sites are located at universities 
and hospitals. 
The deduction from these two sets of results (Table 20 and Table 21) are that firstly, 
CHP-DH developers are keen to hedge their heat risk with commercial portfolios which 
would support the right business model to attract developmental finance. Secondly, 
the blurred role of the state/LAs in the governance of CHP-DH has given the private 
sector the position of steering (setting the rules through networks) and rowing 
(delivering the systems) due to governance failure, leaving the private-led networks to 
initiate governance instruments like the heat network code and protection scheme. 
This is imperative because private actors are driven by profit and not social objectives 
such as fuel poverty, which makes the commercial model a more obvious economic 
model for them to deliver the services. Thirdly, the absence of state heat regulation 
leaves the industry to be regulated through laissez-faire (little or no interference from 
the state/LA), allowing the industry to respond to government failure by picking areas 
of development that match their economic preference. Fourthly, to reduce the risk of 
debt collection from the domestic sector especially social housing schemes as will be 
made apparent later in this research, commercial customers seem an obvious 
attraction as they exhibit greater certainty in heat bill payment. Fifthly a financial barrier 
such as high cost of capital and reduced funding from the state to the LAs contribute 
to hindering LAs to initiate CHP-DH systems, meaning most CHP-DH systems are 
supported by the private sector. Lastly, the development pattern of CHP-DH systems 
in the UK suggests that it is in misalignment with Government’s affordability goal for 
the reduction of fuel poverty with more commercial schemes based techno-economic 
goals rather than socio-economic (Webb, 2014).  
ESCO (Energy Service Company) models have been mentioned severally as suitable 
for delivering sustainable and environmental goals (Hannon et al., 2013, Marino et al., 
2011, Soroye and Nilsson, 2010). Others have credited ESCOs as possible solutions 
to increase the penetration of low carbon technologies such as CHP-DH and reduce 
barriers to energy efficiency (Bertoldi et al., 2006, Boait, 2009). However, in spite of 
its benefits the UK has no consensus form of ESCO and therefore no policy trust 
towards it either (Julian, 2014, APBenson, 2011). Consequently, the shape of ESCOs 
and governance structure on CHP-DH systems are site specific and largely depend 
on the actor’s perspective on risk. Elsewhere in chapter 5, the difference between 
Energy Service Providers (ESP) and ESCO were highlighted and the three major 
types of ESCO ownership structures, which are private led, joint venture or public led 
were also discussed. Also highlighted in chapter 5 are the two major forms of economic 
models of ESCOs, which are guaranteed savings or shared savings type.  
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Therefore, this research sought to ascertain management models of operations or 
dominant ownership structure from the CHP-DH operators. Results from  Table 22 did 
not offer clear indication of the type of management model adopted by the respondents 
due to the high value of no answer. However, from the respondents that responded, 
more respondents indicated a fully integrated energy services company (ESCO) 
model as the management model adopted depicted as in Table 22. Out of the 65 sites 
that responded, 44 sites (~70%), are fully integrated ESCOs, while 6 sites have 
separate production, distribution and supply entities and 11 sites are same production 
and distribution with different supply. Furthermore, only 1 site is same production and 
supply with different distribution, while 3 sites are same distribution and supply with 
different production. 
This results suggests that CHP-DH firms are vertically integrated monopolies through 
ESCO vehicles suggesting minimal competition throughout the value chain from 
production, transmission, distribution, and supply to metering of heat. Westin and 
Lagergren (2002) suggests that vertically integrated ESCOs that have monopolies of 
heat production, distribution and supply may have the strong temptation to always 
maximise profit and transfer higher cost to customers, since they are not faced with 
any price threat externally. Secondly, they have the potential to exhibit allocative 
inefficiency (suboptimal heat production and bad heat quality), especially in the 
absence of industry wide regulation (Westin and Lagergren, 2002, Le Grand, 1991). 
However, CHP-DH industry in both Norway and the Netherlands have ESCO models 
similar to the UK but with a vital deviation as to leadership or ownership. In both 
countries (Norway and the Netherlands) CHP-DH ESCOs are predominantly led or 
started by the municipalities, while UK LAs seems to have marginal presence in the 
CHP-DH industry with most ESCOs privately led. This suggestion was further 
reinforced as the participation of LAs in the CHP-DH industry was investigated and LA 
respondents were asked about their participation. 
Table 23 and Figure 16 shows that over ~46% of LAs respondents are sure they have 
a CHP-DH project in their locality, while about ~15% of LA respondents don’t know if 
they have one and another. While about 40% of LAs don’t have a CHP-DH project in 
their area at all. Consequently, the research sought if the LAs are directly involved in 
the CHP-DH project. Results from Table 24 and Figure 17, only 10% of the LAs are 
currently involved with CHP-DH projects in their locality with almost another ~33% are 
involved in an on-going project with almost another ~25% considering their 
involvement and ~22% not considering at all. The results from both Table 23 and Table 
24 suggest limited participation of LAs in CHP-DH systems. Consequence upon the 
narrative from the research results, CHP-DH systems are predominantly run by private 
led ESCOs for commercial goals by securing funds on their balance sheets with limited 
roles of the LAs. The narrative also suggests that a shared savings ESCO model 
seems more dominant as against guaranteed savings model in the CHP-DH industry. 
Further discussion on the UK’s LA existing role is in the next chapter.  
8.3 Risk profile of CHP-DH industry in the UK 
It is often said that no project is without a risk but requires potential investors to seek 
ways to reduce it, live with it or transfer it, but it is not ignorable (Lam et al., 2007). 
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Many commentators have projected risk in different light such as, sense of lack of 
certainty (Ward and Chapman, 2003), likelihood of an adverse event (Mills, 2001) and 
uncertainty of interactions amongst stakeholders (Green, 2001). In all these 
perspectives of risk the common theme is uncertainty but the one with the most 
relevance to this research is the definition advanced by Green. In this definition Green 
(2001), looks at risk from three perspectives. (a) Uncertainty of decision – the focus 
here is the interaction between the various actors, (b) Uncertainty of environment – 
the concern here is the financial and cost implication and lastly (c) Uncertainty of 
objectives - concern about the policy impact and clarity of objectives. The next step in 
looking at the potential future of CHP-DH in the UK was to consider the major factors 
that constitute uncertainty in the development of CHP-DH systems from an operator, 
local authority and consultant perspective. This is imperative because, how the risks 
are identified and allocated to all parties determines the success of the project. In 
enumerating the risk to be highlighted for allocation, only the humanly induced risk is 
considered here, rather than natural risk, according to the classification by Edwards 
and Bowen (1998). The choice of humanly induced risk is borne out of the fact that 
this research is investigating a technological system within a humanly organised 
governance system and not outside. 
A list of 21 risk factors were enumerated for respondents to rate according to what 
they considered as the most militating risk factor to investment in CHP-DH projects. A 
total of 260 correspondents participated in the survey, of which CHP-OPS were 95, 
LAs were 138 and Consultants were 27. The result from an inferential statistical 
analysis using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in SPSS as seen in Table 26 showed 
that out of the 21 risk factors, 7 factors were statistically significant with a p value that 
is less than 0.05. 
 
Risk Factors P value Measure of effect  
Heat off-take risk 0.041 Towards medium 
Land acquisition and compensation 0.005 Towards medium 
Availability of finance 0.012 Towards medium 
Cost of finance 0.02 Towards medium 
Planning permission risk 0.049 Towards medium 
Delay in planning permission 0.037 Towards medium 
LAs experience in PPP 0.013 Towards medium 
Table 79: Risk Factor Table 
Drawing from the results of the statistical analysis in Table 26, there is evidence that 
Heat off take risk, land acquisition and compensation, availability of finance, cost of 
finance, delay in planning permission, planning permission risk and Local authority 
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experience in Public Private Partnership/Public Finance are significant risk factors that 
militate against the investment in CHP-DH projects. Furthermore, results from Table 
28, which captured the measure of the contribution of each risk factor to the observed 
variables. The summarized results in Table 79 above shows the risk factors with a p 
values lower than 0.05 and their measure of contribution to the observation, with all 7 
risk factors showing a near medium strength of effect. However, land acquisition and 
compensation have the largest effect and closely followed by availability of finance. 
CHP-DH infrastructure is characterised by high initial capital and low marginal return 
that makes the investment fully recoverable after many years, which makes it less 
attractive to investors (Balcombe et al., 2013, Kelly and Pollitt, 2010, Aronsson and 
Hellmer, 2009). Therefore, availability of finance had featured in several studies as a 
critical barrier to the development of CHP-DH systems (Kelly and Pollitt, 2009, 
Williams, 2010, Kelly and Pollitt, 2010, UNEP, 2015, Pöyry, 2009). The qualitative data 
from interviewed CHP-DH actors also collaborated with a theme of lack of cheap 
finance. Which many expressed in various ways such as abandoned projects due to 
low rate of return to access private finance, difficulties of borrowing due to cuts from 
central government, high cost of borrowing to achieve social objectives, premium cost 
on heat off-take risk and absence of public support capital to provide total control by 
LAs as seen in Figure 33.  
 
 
 
Absence of 
possible support 
capital to provide 
total control by 
LAs 
High cost of 
borrowing to 
achieve social 
objectives 
Difficulties of 
borrowing due to 
cuts from central 
govt 
Low rate of 
return to access 
private finance 
Premium 
cost on heat 
off-take risk 
Lack of 
cheap 
finance 
Figure 33: Common theme on finance from qualitative data 
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The theme may have captured both availability of finance and cost of finance as 
significant risk to CHP-DH development in the UK deduced from the quantitative 
results and many also considers that this can only be provided by the government. 
Consequently, these risks (availability of finance and cost of finance) have been further 
discussed in section 9.3 as one of the roles the LAs can a play significant role to 
ameliorate it.  
I think probably, everything I've been told, it's about the financial. The cost of financing. 
For low-interest loans, you need low-interest loans for district heating to make a return 
on investments worthwhile. One of the issues are that there's not enough access to 
low-interest loans…….They need to have more low-interest loans available for these 
schemes to be able to show the return on investments. (DHP1) 
That was the single biggest driver…….As soon as the money became available then 
people were mobilized to help put a robust business case together.(CDHOP4) 
I think capital funding from central government kick starts schemes will probably be 
the key driver in the end (CDHO15) 
Furthermore, another risk factor that was highlighted that can militate against the 
investment of CHP-DH system in the UK is heat off-take. This was collaborated, when 
consultants were asked to rank the dominant challenge to the construction of CHP-
DH systems in the UK. The results from the Table 29 and Figure 18, shows that 44% 
of consultants considers heat load as their dominant challenge while 24% considers 
lack of capital as their dominant factor challenging the construction of CHP-DH 
systems in the UK. This suggest that consultants consider heat load as their major 
challenge. Similarly, some LA interviewees held similar views to also collaborate the 
importance of heat off-take to the development of CHP-DH systems. For instance, the 
citation from an LA respondent below, considers the availability of heat load as even 
more significant risk than lack of capital because they consider a down-up 
deterministic approach, where revenue stream will determine investment on the 
project and not capital. This may be part of why heat off-take has been thrown up as 
a potential risk to the development of CHP-DH systems in the UK. This is further 
reinforced by the lack of heat grid in cities to facilitate widespread heat transaction and 
lack of heat governance infrastructure. Nonetheless, qualitative suggest that revising 
local policies to capture CHP-DH systems and creating DH zones to mandate 
customers to connect to DH networks may ameliorate this risk.  
In a way, funding is the least of the problems, in a way. The real problem is actually 
getting the guaranteed revenue. It's getting the heat. The heat sale risk is the main 
problem for all the schemes (LA5) 
“It could pass planning laws, for example, that require connection to district heating 
units in new developments, that kind of thing” CDHOP15 
Planning was also thrown up as part of the risk profile that militates against investment 
in CHP-DH projects in the UK. The risk of planning permission denial and delay in 
planning permission were the varieties of planning captured in the risk profile which 
was earlier captured in chapter 2 as one of the barriers that militate against the 
206 | P a g e  
 
penetration of CHP-DH in the UK. In part because of the undue delays in getting 
agreed planning instruments (Bottini et al., 2013). Such as the difficulties experienced 
by Thameswey Energy (an ESCO wholly owned by Woking Borough Council) in  
gaining permission to lay pipes in Melton Keynes (Hawkey, 2009). Furthermore, 
development of DH networks compulsorily requires planning permission for new CHP-
DH projects, because they are not under the permitted development rights, unlike the 
electricity and gas networks that does not require one. Therefore, planning applicants 
run the risk of denial or delay.  
However, responses from the interviewees were split between planning being a 
facilitating instrument or a blocking instrument. As some in LAs opined that they are 
looking at the future and overall picture of the community, which would seek to capture 
several concerns. Such as emission, noise, social, master plan and land control and 
not a single spot or location. So, in as much they want to promote low carbon energy, 
the overall community concern and plans is paramount. While many of non-planners 
consider them as blockers to the penetration of CHP-DH because of their role in denial 
or delay in planning permission due to lack of knowledge and the requisite experience 
in CHP-DH deployment.  
“They see the need to do it as part of their planning policy, in other words, it's part of 
reducing carbon emissions locally and creating future proof to networks, and all that. 
Not all of them have that kind of vision. It's not built into their planning policy then it's 
not going to go forward” LA5 
“Yeah, I think the planning is certainly an issue that we have faced internally because 
we actually have to apply to our own planning department within the council for 
permission to build these systems. They have created a lot of problems for us. 
Probably it's because it's a very new industry. There's no kind of standards of what's 
expected of a district heating system. Within the planning laws, you get a lot of work 
called permitted development” CDHOP15. 
A further investigation was conducted quantitively on the role of planning officers and 
procedure to the penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK, where the views of LAs 
and consultants were sought on the statement that planning officers in the LAs are 
skilled enough to offer proactive guidance to CHP-DH planning permits. The results in 
Table 33 show indicate that 43.5% of the LAs and 48.5% of the consultants expressed 
that they tend to disagree, while 15.9% of LAs and 3.7% of consultant strongly 
disagree. Indicating the view that planning officers are not skilled enough to offer 
proactive guidance to CHP-DH applicants. However, due to the non-significant 
statistical result in Table 34 with a p of 0.308>0.05, the result has a weak support and 
therefore would require further analysis. Similarly, the same group of respondents 
were faced with the statement that the existing process to receive planning consent to 
be transparent enough to gain the confidence of the CHP-DH applicants. Results from 
Table 36 shows that 39.7% of LAs and 44.4% of the consultants expressed that they 
tend to agree, while 4.4% of the consultants strongly agree that the existing process 
to receive planning consent is transparent enough to gain the confidence of the 
applicants for CHP-DH projects. However, due to the non-significant statistical result 
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in Table 37 with a p of 0.616>0.05, the result has a weak support and therefore would 
be considered inconclusive. Nonetheless, planning was further discussed in chapter 
9 as a critical role that LAs may play to facilitate the penetration of CHP-DH system in 
the UK.  
Another risk revealed by the statistical analysis that may militate against investment in 
CHP-DH systems in the UK was land acquisition and compensation. A further 
quantitative investigation was conducted when LAs respondents were faced with a 
statement that private land owners are very receptive to CHP-DH projects. Results 
from the descriptive statistics in Table 31 are not conclusive as there was no dominant 
view in this respect. As 25.9% of respondents tend to disagree, while 22.2% tend to 
agree and another 25.9% hold neither view. However, the qualitative data suggest that 
there is little that can be done with regards to decisions on private landed property. 
Lastly, the lack of LAs experience in public private partnership was also considered as 
a risk that would militate against investment in CHP-DH systems in the UK. A further 
investigation was conducted when LA respondents were faced with a statement that 
LAs have the necessary capacity to engage energy services companies (ESCO). The 
statistical results as revealed in Table 32, shows that 35% of respondents tend to 
disagree, while 24% tend to agree. When 14% also strongly disagree and 4.4% 
strongly agree. This suggest that majority of LA respondents thinks that they don’t 
have the necessary capacity to engage energy services companies. This is also 
reinforced by the turnover of, and reduction in, skilled staff in the LAs since the 
beginning of the financial crisis with many LAs respondents indicating that they now 
have increased responsibilities, while some say of merging departments within 
councils and across councils. This is collaborated with a citation from an LA below. 
“I know lots of other local authorities who are losing skilled staff because of budgetary 
constraints” LAPLAN2 
However, some LAs had devised ways to reduce this barrier by collaborating with 
Universities or NGOs within their locality to further improve their knowledge base and 
help inform their decision. For instance, according to a respondent the collaboration 
between University of Exeter and Exeter City Council had greatly impacted on the 
development of planning routes and requisite capacity to increase the deployment of 
CHP-DH systems. While many LA interviewees had to engage the services of external 
consultants at a huge cost to improve their capacity in this respect. Therefore, the 
opportunities this research offered to LAs without academic institutions is to explore 
the opportunities to collaborate with NGOs or industry bodies. This is with a view to 
improve capacity in engaging ESCOs in their locality.  
Summarily, the seven (7) risks that have been thrown up by the quantitative analysis 
that militates against the investment of CHP-DH in the UK was further collaborated by 
the qualitative analysis. Suggesting further credibility to the prevalence of these risks. 
However, LAs may play greater roles as the prime movers of CHP-DH system in the 
UK to ameliorate some of these risks. The next chapter captures those potential roles. 
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8.4 Conclusion  
The CHP-DH landscape in the UK is dominated by heat led silo schemes with little 
interconnection with other schemes. Partly due to the requirement for CHPQA 
certification to encourage use of heat generated and the class order exemption 2001 
which prohibits CHPs to sell more than 2.5MWe (domestic)/5MWe (business) to 
themselves through a public distribution network without a standard electricity supply 
license (DTI, 2005, Ofgem, 2008a). 
Therefore, most schemes from respondents deliver their electricity through private 
wire to be consumed on site and are mostly governed by fully vertically integrated 
ESCOs. The research suggests that the dominant ownership structure of the ESCOs 
are mainly private led and economically, the UK CHP-DH industry is dominated by 
commercial schemes suggesting they are more structured as shared savings with the 
ESCOs bearing both technical and credit risk. This dominant governance arrangement 
of full vertical integration suggests that the CHP-DH industry in the UK may have the 
potential to exhibit allocative inefficiency (suboptimal heat production and bad heat 
quality), which can be aggravated by the absence of heat regulation. 
Furthermore, the seemly minimal participation of LAs in most ESCOs may be inimical 
to the diffusion of CHP-DH systems because without strong buy-in and a leadership 
role by the LAs, the ESCO may lack the potential to develop city-wide schemes to 
effectively couple supply and demand. In part because of the large anchor loads LAs 
possess across the area and with strong ability to locate and coordinate other potential 
customers. 
The next chapter shall to seek discuss other perceived barriers by the respondents 
with possible mitigations and the roles LAs can play to significantly influence the 
diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
  
209 | P a g e  
 
9.0  Discussion – Barriers and Alternative LA roles 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter 8 had discussed the UK landscape for CHP-DH in terms of capacity, 
operation, ownership structure and the dominant forms of risks that permeate the 
industry. Risk factors were identified during the descriptive phase of this research and 
were subsequently inserted into a risk matrix during the exploratory phase of the 
research with a view to seeking respondents’ assessment to identify those risk factors 
with the greatest impact on investment of CHP-DH systems in the UK. Other barriers 
have been identified that impacts the construction and operation of CHP-DH systems 
in the UK. 
This sets the scene for the discussion on these barriers and possible ways to mitigate 
them. Many studies have discussed the various barriers that militate against the 
diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK (Kelly and Pollitt, 2009, Russell, 2010, Kelly 
and Pollitt, 2010) but limited work has been done on how alternative governance 
routes will mitigate these barriers. The literature review highlighted a number of 
barriers, but this chapter will focus on the dominant barriers that has been identified 
during from both the quantitative and qualitative processes. 
Subsequently, a discussion on the various roles LAs can play in diffusing the 
penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK will be undertaken. Even though several 
publications have attempted to highlight the roles LAs can play in contributing to 
energy and environmental targets (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006, Bale et al., 2012, Hawkey 
et al., 2013, Lemon et al., 2013, Hall et al., 2014, Julian, 2014, Hawkey et al., 2014, 
Webb et al., 2016b) but few have had CHP-DH systems as the technology in focus 
and the role LAs can play to contribute to energy and environmental targets through 
facilitating the diffusion of CHP-DH systems. 
9.2 Dominant Barriers 
9.2.1 Information Asymmetries 
The absence of complete information concerning CHP-DH systems was identified 
during the literature review as a barrier to the diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK, 
suggesting that information is not available to all except at an extra cost. Jaffe and 
Stavins (1994) found that lack of information can affect the adoption of a technology, 
while Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2001) argue that high transaction costs arising from 
information asymmetries can lead to market failure. More specific to the energy field, 
Brown (2001) presents evidence that a lack of correct and complete information can 
also lead to suboptimal investment in energy efficiency technology. Similarly, in the 
UK information on CHP-DH systems is mainly provided by the Heat Network Delivery 
Unit (HNDU), ADE (formerly the CHPA), UKDEA, CIBSE and the Heat Network 
Partnership in Scotland (HNP). However, the information on CHP-DH in the UK is 
incomplete and not harmonised.  
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Furthermore, in response to the EU Energy Efficiency Directive, the UK introduced the 
Heat Network (Metering and Billing) Regulations (HNR) 2014 which mandates all DH 
systems to be registered by April 2015 with a view to improve information availability 
in the industry, but this only permits registration of systems from commencement of 
operation as indicated in Section 3 paragraph 2b of the HNR (UK Legislation, 2014). 
This means that collation of CHP-DH systems data under development will still be 
problematic because businesses wishing to plan new schemes will still face a 
transaction cost to get information. Larsson (2006) had previously highlighted the lack 
of CHP-DH data in the UK and it appears that this has not significantly improved. Also 
in a recent studies by various independent bodies on consumer protection from DH 
systems, a common theme in these reports is that of non-clarity and transparency of 
heat bills as a vital concern to heat customers (CA, 2016, Which?, 2015). 
This was further reinforced by the qualitative data that there is a theme identified as 
lack of information on CHP-DH systems in the UK. This was captured in various 
aspects by the interviewees such as, lack of where to go and ask questions about 
CHP-DH system, not enough knowledge available outside, lack of energy usage and 
CHP-DH systems data, lack of communication amongst CHP-DH practitioners, lack of 
CHP-DH systems knowledge amongst developers and consultants. A citation is 
captured below from one of the interviewees. 
“There's no requirement for people to register, so there's always going to be missing 
pieces of data on our database or anyone's database. There's no benefit for district 
heating schemes to register and no requirement for them to register, either with the 
government or with us, so any database built is always going to be incomplete” ASSO1 
This informed a quantitative question for the CHP-DH operators, Consultants and LAs, 
‘Is there a need to have a one-stop shop for information on CHP-DH systems and 
sources of heat to District Heating network’. Results from the statistical analysis in 
Table 45, we can observe that, 39.3% of the CHP operators, 44.4% of the consultants 
and 48.6% of the LAs tend to agree that there should be a one stop shop for the 
necessary information on different technologies to CHP and sources of heat to District 
Heating network. However, the support is weak due to the non-significant result p 
=.116 (.116>0.05) in Table 46, therefore the data are inconclusive.  
In response to lack of information in this arena, the UK government has recently 
established a community energy unit at DBEIS (Formerly DECC) to serve as a one-
stop shop for information on community energy, including CHP-DH technology. This 
will host information on the various energy sources that communities can harness, 
with a focus on heating opportunities including the RHI (DECC, 2014). However, it is 
not clear if it will host a CHP-DH system register and play the role of an official clearing 
house for information on CHP-DH systems in the UK. Furthermore, another attribute 
to information asymmetries from the qualitative data is the absence of information 
arising from lack of data on heat load in the UK. The Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) in DBEIS, through the Heat Network Delivery Unit – HNDU 
(England and Wales), has developed heat maps which can assist investors in 
discerning heat distribution and suppliers across England and Wales, while Heat 
Network Partnership (HNP) of Scotland has developed a similar heat map for Scotland 
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(Bale et al., 2014) These heat maps are intended to assist investors in producing initial 
reports and not detailed energy data for investment decision. However, respondents 
from various spheres believe that these heat maps can be improved upon to provide 
a more detailed and updated data to facilitate investment decisions. Specifically, how 
the industry will be able to get heat load data which is vital information for development 
of CHP-DH systems from the LAs in-spite of the national heat map. From amongst the 
respondents within this theme (lack of energy data), below is a citation from an 
operator.  
“The key point is, you know, the one bit of information that local authorities need to be 
able to plan these types of local energy systems is not available and that is building 
level energy consumption…….That's the one thing that nobody seems to be able to 
get from the energy suppliers” CDHOP14 
Thus, the industry thinks that the heat maps need a deeper level of, and more updated, 
information to be more relevant to potential CHP-DH investors with minimal 
transaction cost. This is hinged on the fact that up-to-date energy consumption pattern 
of the load is part of the information from the heat map which usefully informs design 
and investment decisions for any DH project. The national heat map doesn’t seem to 
currently provide this. This may be another instance where the intention of a 
mechanism is not reaching its full potential because of a weak interaction between the 
structural components of the CHP-DH system. In this case the role of the energy 
companies and the LA are blurred. So invariably the impact of a national heat map 
may not transcend a viewing tool to see geographical spread of heat load without a 
more in-depth role for both the energy companies and local authorities. 
The results from the descriptive statistics in the Table 48 shows that, 33.3% of the LAs 
expressed that, their local authority has developed heat maps for its area. While 22.5% 
says that their heat map is under development, and 17.4% are considering developing 
one with another 10.9% not considering. Following the bar chart in Figure 22, it also 
shows taller bar corresponding to the same. This suggest that many LAs may soon 
have a heat map for their area. However, how useful these maps may be to make 
decisions such as investments, depends on how much energy data that can be 
assessed. Nonetheless, the smart meter roll out programme by the Government, 
would seek to capture building level energy data through the installation of estimated 
53 million smart electricity and gas meters by 2020 (DECC, 2015t).  
However, the access to energy data from the smart meters will still be a significant 
challenge as LAs are not part of the governance structure that manages the data with 
Smart Data Communications Company Limited (DCC), the licensee from the 
Government. DCC are licensed to host smart meter inventory but can access energy 
data from the meters if given consent by the customer to pass on the data to other 
requested parties, but these parties must have signed up to the Smart Energy Code, 
which governs their interaction before it can use the DCC route to access energy data 
from these meters. This limits access, as it regards privacy and may require legislation. 
However, discussion is ongoing on how LAs can access the data if required. 
Alternatively, LAs can register with Smart Data Communications Company Limited 
(DCC) as a user. It is also imperative to recognise that there may be issues 
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surrounding confidentiality of energy data by dwellers and this may be where the LAs 
could come in to assure residents of the confidentiality of the data if permitted by the 
resident. This possible information hub to feed into a heat map may require 
stakeholder debate and eventual legislation to mandate Ofgem or the energy suppliers 
or DCC to keep and share such information for development of energy project. LAs 
may exhibit lack of skill and finance to actively partake in accessing and collating such 
data for energy planning/maps, but it may be useful to open the opportunity to address 
such challenges through interaction with other actors including the state. Nonetheless, 
the smart metering programme of the Government may provide a useful input to an 
energy database that may reduce information asymmetries for the CHP-DH industry. 
There is a growing importance for local heat planning by local authorities, for example, 
with the London model aiming to drive investment and offer clarity of demand to district 
heating investors. If LAs develop local heat planning/maps it shall provide sufficient 
information on planned heat demand/location, sources and distribution routes. 
Therefore, the imperative development of local heat maps with a frequent update is a 
vital information tool to promote the adoption of CHP-DH systems. 
9.2.2 Policy/Regulation 
The pillars of the UK’s energy policy framework are emission reduction, security of 
supply and affordability. The UK’s energy policy framework is traditionally centrally 
evolved, coupled with EU Directives to members states to provide national goals. 
Therefore, the state provides the strategic direction to reach the collective national 
targets which makes energy policies from the LAs as more complimentary to national 
policy framework (Bale et al., 2012, Keirstead and Schulz, 2010). The thrust of UK 
regulation on electricity market has been economic through competition with the 
regulatory and policy framework been criticised to perpetuate lock-in by the centralised 
plants which often discriminates against decentralised plants like CHPs, culminating 
in the market not leveraging on the ability of CHPs to reduce nodal peak loads and 
improve security (Neuhoff and Twomey, 2008 pg: 268). Also importantly is that the 
regulatory and policy framework of electricity market has been largely short term in 
part due to government and regulatory institution’s penchant for competition over 
social and environment causes (Woodman and Baker, 2008). These short term 
policies precipitates uncertainties (Wood and Dow, 2011) that stifle innovation in 
investment resulting in tightening capacity margin and increased margin for legacy 
plants like coal plants to further lock in the decentralised system (Helm, 2014b). 
However, heat is still awaiting a regulating framework to govern the market from the 
state, except for self-regulating mechanisms by industry networks and therefore it’s 
largely unregulated by the state.  
These policy and regulatory uncertainties have also resulted in many energy policy 
goals being missed or targets abandoned which often leads to several versions of 
consultations, regulations and policies (Pearson and Watson, 2012). For instance, the 
change of roll out dates and funding routes within the RHI scheme attracted criticism 
from industry actors for undermining the market. This can be seen as partially due to 
change of government resulting in change of renewable energy policy but at least in 
part due to political recalcitrance (Connor et al., 2015). The uncertainty that permeates 
the policy and regulation landscape often precipitates risk to investors which must be 
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managed to give rise to potential viable projects. Alternatively, investors will find 
alternative routes by investing in lobbying or be patient till the regulatory tide calms 
down (Grubb and Newbery, 2008 pg. 297). However, the results from the statistical 
analysis on risk factors that would militate against investment in CHP-DH in the UK 
did not throw up policy uncertainty as a risk factor, because it had a p value greater 
than 0.615 (0.615>0.05) (see Table 26). Therefore, results from the quantitative 
analysis does not support policy uncertainty as a dominant risk factor in the UK. 
However, when CHP-DH operators were asked what the biggest barrier to their 
operations was. Results from the quantitative analysis in Table 30 and Figure 19, 
suggest that, 28.4% of operators considers regulatory as their biggest barrier, while 
23% considers market, 18.9% considers taxation, 10.8% considers skill and another 
4.1% considers planning as their biggest barrier to the operations of their CHP-DH 
systems in the UK. This suggest that over ~47% of operators of CHP-DH systems 
consider regulatory/taxation as the biggest barrier to their operations. Furthermore, 
the qualitative data from CHP-DH operators also echo a similar concern.  
“…in terms of regulatory requirements, they are quite onerous in terms of us having to 
comply with the various CHPQAs and EU ETS and all that sought of thing…….They 
do tend to fiddle around with these things quite a lot and that's quite difficult ... I mean, 
once you're running with a CHP district heating system, you really haven't got an awful 
lot of choice. You have to live with whatever changes come about, but if you're trying 
to set one up at the start and trying to forward look 10 years, there's definitely a difficult 
decision to be made, shall we say, on the basis of trying to predict what the regulatory 
framework's going to be” CDHOP7  
An example of regulatory impact to CHP-DH operations was a recent announcement 
by the treasury of the removal of CCL benefits for generation of renewable electricity 
(HM Treasury, 2015) with a 24 days’ notice (Simkins, 2015). The impact on renewable 
generators was so substantial that two operators of large renewable heat and 
electricity plants, Drax group and Infinis Energy lost 28% and 37% respectively of their 
share values on the day of announcement, subsequently leading the companies to 
take the matter to court to seek redress (Simkins, 2015). The companies asked the 
court why such a vital aspect of the CCL regime was being withdrawn in just 24 days’ 
notice before the issue of LECS ended by 1 August 2015. Interestingly, they lost the 
case, because in the eye of the law the decision by the treasury was proportionate 
since it was seemly done in the interest of the public to reduce budget deficit (ELM, 
2015). Nonetheless, this is a classical instance of how sudden regulatory amendment 
can shock financial models and sow uncertainty for future investment. To add to this, 
CHP had hitherto received Enhanced Capital Allowance (ECA) (writing off 100% 
capital tax on first year), but will no longer enjoy it if they sign up for either FiT or RHI 
from April, 2014 (HMRC, 2011a) distorting their future business model. 
A vital antidote to uncertainty in governance is the development of a comprehensive 
policy framework with the capability to withstand unanticipated outcomes (Tietenberg, 
1976 pg 141). Many energy white papers and frameworks have given credence to the 
potential for CHP-DH to contribute to decarbonisation goals in the UK energy sector 
but none has advanced or contained a joined-up strategy to deploy them (DECC, 
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2011, DDD, 2012, DECC, 2011c, HM Government, 2010, DECC, 2013a). Secondly, 
state energy policies do not form a holistic fit with LAs and the latter are not 
incentivised to strategically evolve long-term energy frameworks (Bale et al., 2012). 
This research therefore sought the perspective of both the LA and Consultant groups 
on the impact of the absence of a national integrated CHP-DH strategy. Results from 
statistical analysis in Table 50 suggest that there is a statistical difference between the 
responses from respondents on the impact of the absence of a national integrated 
CHP-DP strategy with p = 0.000 (0.000 < 0. 05).  Consequently, from the results in 
Table 49, we can observe that, 43.8% of the total respondents tend to agree, while 
25% of the total respondents strongly agree that the absence of a national integrated 
CHP-DH strategy impacts on its growth in the UK. Furthermore, drawing from the 
results of Table 51 the value of Cramer’s V  is 0.608, which suggest that the measure 
of association or effect size that shows the proportionality of variability of the groups 
within the study is greater than .5, and therefore it has large effect (i.e >.5) according 
to Fritz et al. (2012). Hence, there is evidence that the absence of a national integrated 
CHP and DH strategy could hamper the growth of the technology in the UK. 
This suggest that there is a desire for a long-term and joined-up policy framework for 
the industry, else the CHP-DH sector is unlikely to fully neither contribute to the overall 
energy and environmental goals of the country nor reach its full potential. Furthermore, 
as noted earlier HNs in the UK are currently not regulated, rather they are driven in 
part by local planning policies and by individual actors’ contracts. Government 
acknowledges that they are not driven by regulation suggesting this is at least in part 
because of the relatively small-scale of the sector to the present; they do however 
recognise that there is a system failure (DECC, 2013a). The only indirect regulation 
on CHP-DH systems is the HN (metering and billing) regulation of 2014. This seeks to 
offer some direction on metering and registration of DH networks. However, some 
industry actors consider it too little and inadequate, especially as it relates more to of 
billing than debt recovery. A CHP-DH operator opined: 
“I find the regulations we've got isn't really worth the paper it's written on. It's not good 
enough. Yes, there is right of entry but there's only rights of entry to install meters. It 
doesn't state debt is included on that….Yeah, that's the biggest issue in my opinion is 
at the moment is rights. Obviously protection for us, also protection for the residents” 
CDHOP 3 
However, some other respondents think otherwise. The core of their argument is that 
the market is still small and growing and therefore there is little need for industry-wide 
regulation to steer its growth but rather what is needed is more guidance, as suggested 
by this interviewee. 
“I also think there needs to be room for the industry to innovate without regulation. At 
the moment, so that somebody doesn't come along with a load of regulation that 
prevents innovation that stifles growth….may be what we need are better guidelines 
….I think ultimately we will need regulation, but not so we've got critical mass. Not till 
you're up to a point where you're still talking, 5 to 10% of the country demand heat” 
LA4 
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The debate above clearly indicates that the industry may be divided, though more 
thinks the CHP-DH industry needs regulation from the state, however experience in 
the Netherlands and Norway CHP-DH models shows that regulatory instruments were 
used to stimulate incremental innovation in the CHP-DH industry to accelerate it to its 
present status (Blok, 1993, Kempegowda et al., 2012). The research further sought a 
quantitative response from the CHP-DH actors (all groups) if the industry requires a 
regulation. Results from the statistical analysis in Table 52, shows that 53.2% of the 
total respondents tend to agree, with only 2.8% tend to disagree. While 19.8% of the 
total respondents strongly agree and another 2% strongly disagree that the UK needs 
to develop a body of regulation concerning heat provision and its infrastructure such 
as DH systems. This suggest that the industry may require a body of regulation 
concerning heat provision in the UK. However, the support is weak due to the non-
significant result of p = 0.514 (0.514 > .05), therefore the data are inconclusive. 
Therefore, there is no evidence that the industry requires a regulation for heat 
provision and its infrastructure in the UK. However, when respondents were asked 
that if a regulation were to be introduced. Which body would be the preferred regulator 
for heat in the UK. Results from the statistical analysis in Table 56 suggest that there 
is a statistical difference between the responses from respondents on which body 
should act as the regulator with p = 0.002 (0.002 < .05).  Consequently, from the results 
in Table 55, we can observe that, about 55.5% of the CHP operators, 63.0% of the 
consultants and 49.3% of the LAs (53% of total) expressed that Ofgem will be their 
preferred regulator. Furthermore, drawing from the results of Table 57,  the value of 
Cramer’s V  is 0.221, which suggest that measure of association or effect size that 
shows the proportionality of variability of the groups within the study is greater than .2 
and therefore it has an effect tending towards medium (i.e > .2) according to  Fritz et 
al. (2012). Hence there is evidence that Ofgem is the preferred regulator for heat by 
UK CHP-DH industry.  
The results suggest a strong preponderance of stakeholders believe that the 
regulatory function for heat should reside with the current electricity and gas regulator, 
Ofgem, this may be due to the prior experience of Ofgem in regulating energy and 
networks such as administering RHI scheme. Secondly, it could be that the industry 
actors would prefer to communicate with an already known regulator that would host 
all regulatory requirements for gas, electricity and heat so as eliminate conflicting 
requirements (Jamasb et al., 2008 pg 94). Thirdly, this will also reduce start-up costs 
for the regulators and fourthly, residing inside Ofgem may create avenues for cross 
pollination of knowledge and experience. This one-stop regulatory house for gas, 
electricity and DH is consistent with the Netherland’s Authority for Consumer and 
Markets (ACM). 
9.2.3 Depletion of Social Housing by LAs  
Market barriers are factors that are not necessarily market failures but which constitute 
obstacles to the penetration of innovative technologies or slow their diffusion (Brown, 
2001). The literature review identified a number of factors which align with this thought 
path, but one for which evidence emerged in the exploratory phase of the research 
was the sale of social housing blocks/flat by local authorities in the UK. Government 
data suggests that LA owned housing stock available for renting has been depleting 
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over an extended period indicating that the number of houses that LAs own are on the 
downward side as shown in Figure 34. 
 
 
Figure 34: Houses Rented from LAs 
Source: (DCLG, 2015a) 
Housing stock has been a catalyst for the development of CHP-DH systems by local 
authorities in their locality, as these assets act as an anchor load, guaranteeing the 
scheme the inertia of available long-term heat load (Russell, 1993, Kelly and Pollitt, 
2009, Hawkey et al., 2013). However, evidence from this research tends to suggest 
that these loads, large storey domestic buildings or other social housing stocks are 
changings hands, either through transfer to housing associations or to fully or partially 
devolved arms' length companies as with Torfaen council in Wales and many more in 
England. Some LAs are demolishing their social housing stock, as in Glasgow, while 
others are selling them off. When the representative of one English council was asked 
as to the relationship with the administration of their housing stock, it was suggested 
that. 
“We haven’t got any relationship at all between us. It’s completely sold off to a private 
company” LA1 
However, councils in Scotland now desist from sale of council houses as the response 
from a council in Scotland indicates:  
“In Scotland they've changed the law back and you can't buy council houses anymore” 
LA2. 
In a similar vein, the Welsh government has also introduced a legislation to stop the 
sale of council houses by January, 2019 (WG, 2018). However, the feeling in England 
appears to be different as councils are more bothered about adjusting to financial cuts 
by selling off houses and the 2016 housing and planning bill’s silence on transfer of 
local housing stock may suggest this trend may continue in England. 
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An investigation by the Guardian newspaper on the sale of housing by councils 
revealed that 130,000 homes have been sold in the last decade despite the need for 
more social housing. It also revealed that between 2013 and 2014 councils sold off 
11,261 homes but only built 10,840 (Booth and Clark, 2015). 
However, the UK Government’s housing and planning bill seeks to legalise the gradual 
enforced sale of 1.3 million housing association owned homes to private owners 
through an extended right-to-buy scheme in order to encourage purchase of homes 
rather than renting (DCLG, 2015c). This implies more homes will be sold off to private 
tenants, further depleting social housing stock. The Labour Party feels that the bill will 
cause almost 200,000 homes to be sold by 2020 (Booth, 2016). 
The point of note is not if the new housing bill is bad or good, but what its impact on 
the growth of CHP-DH systems will be. The trend for selling social housing schemes 
to the private sector will eventually deny local authorities potential future anchor loads 
to help provide the desired long term heat off-take for CHP-DH investments and the 
much-desired inertia for LAs to lead the development of the systems. It will also 
weaken the LAs ability to reduce fuel poverty in their locality because of reduced stake 
in the CHP-DH development.  
Therefore, considering that the sale of housing stock by LAs is mainly driven by 
financial consideration with a view to respond to cuts from the state. This research 
suggests an alternative pathway that would capture this motivation and as well as 
mitigate the non-availability of housing stock barrier by making these housing stock 
available for future district heating connection. This may entail LAs to be mandated by 
the state to include in their sale/lease agreement with external parties a mandatory 
provision of connection to district heating, whenever DH is made available or provided 
but not obliged to consume the heat as its obtained in Norway. which will still make 
LAs make revenue from the sale of the houses but still make the houses available for 
DH connection. Secondly, these housing stock could be designated to be within DH 
network zones by the LAs and as such any sale/lease agreement would capture this 
provision that such housing schemes will always be considered for DH connection 
whenever DH is made available. The applicability of these pathways would entail the 
modification of these housing stock to be DH ready within an agreed time line by the 
buyers or the LAs before the sale and the state shall allow the LAs to decide the route 
to follow if it’s either to apply these houses stock in DH zoning areas or just leave it to 
the realm of conditions of house sale 
9.2.4 Heat Debt Recovery 
The key drivers for the growth of CHP-DH systems are primarily economic (lower 
energy bills), environmental (carbon reduction) and social (reducing fuel poverty). A 
recent Government report recognised the need to stimulate innovation in energy 
policies by considering the impacts of environmental, economic and social objectives 
on fuel poverty (DECC, 2015u). It defined fuel poverty as any dweller who would have 
to spend more than 10% of their annual income on energy, which includes heating to 
a reasonable standard (DECC, 2015k). The latest data from Ofgem suggest that fuel 
poverty has been on the increase from 4.4million (17%) households in the UK under 
the fuel poverty in 2013 being the peak after 2009 to 4.5million since 2003 data 
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collation (Ofgem, 2016a) and the UK has adopted centralised heating systems has 
one of the strategies to reduce fuel poverty by 2030 compared to present levels 
(DECC, 2015u). 
 A recent study by Hills (2012) also suggested a centralised heating system might be 
an option to address fuel poverty. Some CHP-DH systems have been built to address 
fuel poverty in their locality such as Aberdeen City Council and Woking Council (EST, 
2004, BRE, 2003, Hawkey et al., 2013). However, qualitative data from this research 
had highlighted that some CHP-DH schemes are struggling to survive financially as 
they focus on delivering the objective of fuel poverty, largely because some tenants 
struggle to pay their heating bill, leaving some DH operators running on tight financial 
ropes. Hence constituting a barrier to the successful operation of many CHP-DH 
systems in the UK. As captured by one of the interviewees below: 
 “There have been a lot of problems with getting the end users to pay up for their heat. 
It's made a loss, year on year. A substantial loss. The current conversion to biomass 
is an attempt to reduce that loss” LA 8. 
Similarly, another housing association with a DH network had similar concerns: 
“Collection, and obviously that's our biggest issue at the moment……. We have a few 
home owners. With the homeowners we've had to cut off one or two, but the rest of 
them, there's nothing we can do. We just go around and ask them to pay even though 
they're not” CDHOP 3 
However, this barrier could not be reinforced further from the quantitative results. As 
CHP-OP operators were asked if they experience a slow or defaulting payment on 
their heat. Results from Table 68 and Figure 26 show that 75% of respondents did not 
respond to the question on experience on slow or default of payment on heat. 
Therefore, the results cannot be taken further. Hence its inconclusive. Subsequently, 
CHP-DH operators were also asked if they experience disputes with their heat 
customers. Results from Table 69 and Figure 27, shows that 22.2% of respondents 
expressed that not at all, while 13.6% thinks that yes but rarely, with another 3.6% 
saying yes but sometimes that they do experience disputes with their heat customers. 
However, 58% did not respond to the question. Therefore, the results cannot be taken 
further. Hence its inconclusive. 
Nonetheless, some interviewees suggested that the application of smart metering was 
very useful in abating this challenge, but a further research on the impact of heat debt 
on CHP-DH operators may be necessary, considering the impact of heat revenue to 
the financial survival of the schemes. 
9.2.5 CHP-DH Skill Deficiency 
Lack of skill and knowledge in the CHP-DH industry was identified as another theme 
from the qualitative research as many schemes struggle to get the appropriate skill at 
various levels of development of CHP-DH systems. The acquisition of expertise by 
organizations in various areas of the technology is vital to diffuse incremental change 
in enhancing its objectives (North, 1990). Therefore, skills accumulated by 
219 | P a g e  
 
organisations can affect the growth trajectory of CHP-DH systems by enhancing the 
regulatory capacity and institutional structures. 
Inadequate knowledge and skill within the CHP-DH industry as highlighted by the 
research spans across the whole chain of the industry, as different actors echoed 
similar fears in relation to knowledge and skill within the industry. The research 
therefore investigated this barrier with a view to highlighting the skill gap intensity of 
the different areas within the value chain of the CHP-DH industry.  
Firstly, CHP-DH operators and consultants were asked if there is a skill gap in the 
UK’s CHP-DH industry. Statistical results from Table 58 shows that about 55.2% of 
the CHP operators and 40.7% of the consultants tend to agree (51.8% total group) 
that there is a skill gap in the CHP and DH industry in the UK. However, the support 
is weak due to the non-significant result as seen in Table 59, which shows a p value 
of 0.340 (0.340 > .05) therefore the data are inconclusive. 
Secondly, CHP-DH operators and consultants were asked that if they agree that there 
is a skill gap then they should grade the deficiency of skills according to the 
enumerated skill sets. Statistical results from Table 62, the p value for the levene’s 
test for all skill set are all greater than .05 (p>0.5), suggesting that we can consider 
that equal variances are assumed for the variables and we can proceed to observe 
the corresponding t-test values. The p value corresponding to the t-test in all skill set 
– Design and manufacture of DH pipes, Manufacture of CHP systems, Business 
development, construction of DH systems, installation of CHP systems and operations 
and maintenance are all more than 0.05 (p>0.05). Hence, we can conclude that, there 
is no significant difference in the skill set between CHP operators and consultants. 
Therefore, the data are inconclusive.  
However, in a view to further distinguish the proportion of variability of the various skill 
set and considering the profound effect of sample size on statistical significance and 
the independence of effect size from sample size (Fritz et al., 2012, Gail M. Sullivan 
and Richard Feinn, 2012). A further consideration of the effect size (Cohen’s d) was 
noted, as only Business development and Operations and Maintenance skill set had 
positive effect sizes of 0.077 and 0.32 respectively (see mean differences in Table 62). 
According to Cohen (1992), business development with a 0.1 effect size equivalent 
shows a small effect but not trivial, while operations and maintenance have 0.32 effect 
size, which shows a near medium effect on the variability of the mean values. 
Therefore, this provides an opportunity for further research to increase the sample size 
with a view to achieve statistical significance and arrive at a more concrete theoretical 
and practical conclusion even though there was strong qualitative evidence as seen 
below. 
Nonetheless, from the qualitative data, various actors expressed skill deficiencies to 
capture various aspects of skill set. Such as for example an equipment supplier in the 
CHP-DH industry expressed his in this form… 
 “There are unique challenges in the fact that you have to educate and inform 
consultants, specifiers, contractors sometimes to deal with district heating. I will say 
this, I think there's a lack of knowledge about it.” EQPSUP 
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Builders are also not left out in the knowledge and skill gap as expresses by a CHP-
HP operator… 
“it's not particular well known with the developers and builders. They don't really 
understand it. To get them to understand the mechanics of the system and understand 
that they have to make some design changes in order to deliver the return 
temperatures we require can be quite a challenge, and we very, very rarely achieve 
it”. CDHOP2 
Other actors expressed skill shortage in putting together the legal aspects of a 
transaction regarding CHP-DH operations such as the operators below:  
 “Yeah, then you get onto the tricky bit which is the legals. Believe it or not we still 
haven't signed the agreement… Yes. The legals just ran on and on” CDHOP10  
The challenge in getting through the legal bit of the transaction in a system like CHP-
DH is that it usually involves several iterative interactions with many actors and the 
absence of standard formats to engage both the operators and consumers even 
makes it more challenging. This can be collaborated by a not too recent report on the 
Coventry city CHP-DH scheme where complex and lengthy contractual issues posed 
as key difficulties to the success of the project (HCA, 2011).  
Another area highlighted during the qualitative research was the lack opportunities to 
get training for employees through training courses and apprenticeship schemes to 
expose actors to best practice techniques. Below is citation from an operator who 
bemoaned his frustration in finding a training programme for his personnel. 
“We're struggling to find some training to actually get someone trained up. Yeah, I 
think that's why skills had been mentioned as an extremely serious problem” 
CDHOP15 
“we're finding it quite difficult to find an appropriate course to send someone on. It'll be 
like an apprenticeship for example. We want to send someone on an engineering type 
of apprenticeship. It's proving quite difficult to find something appropriate” CDHOP15. 
Training needs for the CHP-DH industry are in two directions because CHP-DH is a 
coupled system of CHP and HN. The first is training in CHP systems and the second 
is training in heat networks. Skill development for CHP systems are delivered by the 
equipment suppliers as there are various manufacturers in the CHP landscape and 
most often they have maintenance contracts for their equipment. While the HN is 
slightly different because aside from the pipes (for which pipe manufacturers provide 
in-house training on an individual basis), developers need to understand the 
underlying design principles and overall system performance criteria in order to deliver 
an integrated efficient system.  
However in response to lack of unifying standard of practice and skill shortage in the 
industry, CIBSE and ADE as “complementary institutions” (Williamson, 2000) and 
supported by DECC with some other industry players have developed an ethical code 
known as the Heat Networks Code of Practice (HNCP) which is internalised to trigger 
an institutional change that will only be drawn from the activities of industry players 
that have signed up. Launched in July 2015 it is hoped that the HNCP will drive the 
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industry technical requirements and customers’ expectations in delivering a cost 
effective and efficient district heating system. The partnership between CIBSE and 
ADE also resulted in agreement that CIBSE would evolve accredited training schemes 
to propagate the knowledge behind the code. So, in 2015, CIBSE began the first 
industry led training modules, which includes a course known as ‘Introduction to 
HNCP’ and a more detailed course. CIBSE has also approved Bosch (an industry 
player in the CHP-DH landscape) to conduct training on heat networks. 
Nonetheless, in-spite of the introduction of these training courses by CIBSE would 
seem not to satisfy the appetite of the industry and there is still not standard 
apprenticeship scheme to accompany the HNCP. Even though in a service-based 
economy like the UK, skills acquisition through trainings most often overrides 
apprenticeship (Brannen, 2005). More importantly the CHP-DH industry entails 
demonstration of practical skills in design, construction, operation and maintenance of 
the system. This underpins the importance of an apprenticeship scheme for the 
industry as this would contribute to the CHP-DH industry’s learning-by-doing index as 
more people develop hands-on skills within the industries which is a vital component 
of system innovation (Elzen et al., 2004a pg 288). Nonetheless, the current CIBSE 
approach is a welcome development and more time may be needed to assess it’s 
impact on the development of skill for the CHP-DH industry, but it could be enhanced 
with a more frontline and collaborative role by the government, universities and 
industry networks in evolving an accredited apprenticeship scheme to enhance skill 
development for the CHP-DH industry.  
Summarily, in-spite of the qualitative evidence of various categories of skill shortage 
and the statistical results that shows that business development and operational and 
maintenance skill sets have positive effect sizes, there is no statistical evidence that 
there is skill shortage in the CHP-DH industry. In part due to the sample size 
investigated. Hence, a further research is recommended to achieve statistical 
significance.  
9.2.6 Scale of housing development 
CHP-DH systems are developed on the basis of financial scalability; therefore, the 
scale of housing development may impact on its diffusion. A building scheme that is 
intended to be served by CHP-DH has to allow a rate of return on investment of at 
least 10% to attract private finance, drawing upon Government estimates of 10-20% 
commercial discount rate for HN (Hawkey and Webb, 2016 pg:122). This research 
heard divergent views on what the scale should be before it becomes economical to 
proceed. One view from respondents was that the average number of houses should 
be from 500 and above while another view held that it should be about 1000. However, 
the common theme is that it should be a minimum of 500 houses before it becomes 
financially scalable to develop a housing scheme with a CHP-DH system, suggesting 
that the density of development by builders also plays a role in diffusion of CHP-DH 
systems. A citation from an interviewee below captures this thought path. 
“basically anything over a thousand houses might work with district heating” LAPLAN 
Drawing upon data from the Local Government Association (LGA), in 2012/13 a total 
of 3,057 housing development schemes obtained planning permission to provide 
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165,903 new homes (LGA, 2013). This provides an average of 54 new houses per 
scheme tending to suggest the average housing development would be uneconomical 
for DH. This signifies that the volume of houses per scheme built by developers also 
constitutes a barrier to signpost developers to CHP-DH systems. This is further 
reinforced by the death of the zero carbon homes policy of the government, which 
would have driven developers to adopt CHP-DH to meet the policy requirement. In a 
recent report by RTPI (2013), they argue that in the last decade, the housing 
development density in the UK has been at it lowest since the post war era, largely 
due to lesser participation in house development by the LAs resulting from state 
budget cuts. This barrier is more severe in councils that don’t already have a CHP-DH 
network, as the availability of the HN impacts on the economics positively.  
In understanding the role of housing density, the research also sought to find out what 
is the development growth path of CHP-DH systems in the UK with a view to ascertain 
if respondents consider new builds as one of the areas that could be critical to the 
diffusion of CHP-DH systems. 
Considering the statistical results from Table 64, the p value for the levene’s test for 
all the growth pathways are all greater than .05 (p>0.5) except for sub-urban which 
had a p value of 0.032 (p<0.5). Therefore, we can proceed to consider the p values in 
the t-test for the assumed equal variances for the variables with p values higher than 
0.05 (p>0.05), while we consider the p values for equal variances not assumed in the 
t-test for sub-urban. The p value corresponding to the t-test in new builds, urban 
centres, sub-urban, industrial areas and remote areas are all more than 0.05 (p>0.05). 
Hence, we can conclude that, there is no significant difference in the various growth 
pathways between CHP operators and consultants. 
However, in a view to further distinguish the proportion of variability of the various 
growth pathways and considering the profound effect of sample size on statistical 
significance and the independence of effect size from sample size (Fritz et al., 2012, 
Gail M. Sullivan and Richard Feinn, 2012). A further consideration of the effect size 
(Cohen’s d) was noted, as only new builds and industrial areas had positive effect 
sizes of 0.1 and 0.12 respectively. According to Cohen (1992), new builds with a 0.1 
and industrial areas with a 0.12 effect sizes, both shows a small effect but not trivial, 
on the variability of the mean values. Therefore, this provides an opportunity for further 
research to increase the sample size with a view to achieve statistical significance and 
arrive at a more concrete theoretical and practical conclusion.  
In summary, this barrier provides input for a further study which would possibly 
examine the impact of house market scale against CHP-DH technology on the national 
emission target and the environment at large. 
9.3 Possible roles of UK Local Authorities in the CHP-DH arena 
Cities which are jurisdictions of LAs account for approximately two-thirds of the world's 
primary energy consumption (Keirstead and Schulz, 2010) indicating that LAs can play 
significant roles in contributing to national goals of developing a low-carbon economy 
and meeting national energy obligations (Keirstead and Schulz, 2010, Kelly and Pollitt, 
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2011, Bulkeley et al., 2011, Carbon Trust, 2012b). In part, this is because of the 
strategic position the LAs hold in developmental projects by virtue of being the 
custodians of the planning powers and the right to promote the social, economic and 
environmental well-being of their community.  
CHP-DH schemes are more driven by the public than the private sector (Goth, 2010) 
with LAs championing the growth of CHP-DH systems globally through participation 
and policies (UNEP, 2015). For instance, municipalities owned and still owns many 
CHP-DH schemes in both the Netherlands and Norway suggesting that municipalities 
were at the centre of its growth (Deloitte, 2015, Juhler, 2013).  
In contrast, there are only a handful of examples of local authority led CHP-DH 
systems in the UK (Lerwick, Westminster, Sheffield, Nottingham, Kirklees, 
Peterborough, Woking, Leicester, Southampton, Birmingham, Newcastle, Fife, 
Coventry, London and Aberdeen councils) of the 418 councils in the UK. However, 
many private single CHP-DH systems in UK such as universities and hospitals are 
seeking to be interconnected or grow organically to city-wide scheme on the back of 
the LAs such as in Exeter or Edinburgh.  
In investigating the level of coverage and participation of LAs in CHP-DH systems. 
LAs were asked if there was any CHP-DH project in the area covered by their LAs. 
Results from Table 23 and Figure 16 shows that 45.8% of respondents are sure that 
CHP-DH system is installed in their area, while 39.7% of respondents say not all and 
another 14.5% don’t know if there is one. Indicating that less than half of the LAs have 
CHP-DH systems in their area. When asked if they are directly involved, only 10.1% 
of the respondents say they are involved, while 33.3% are currently in the process of 
getting involved and 25.4% are considering getting involved, with another 21.7% of 
the respondents not considering getting involved, as shown in Table 24 and Figure 17. 
Drawing on results from Table 24 and Figure 17, less than 50% of LAs respondents 
have been or are currently involved in any CHP-DH scheme (43.4%). Furthermore, 
during this research, a government agency reiterated that the over a hundred DH 
schemes that HNDU had facilitated to feasibility stage, none had come to development 
stage as at the time of this report, which may still leave us in the band of 10% of the 
LAs. In part because of how viable the schemes may be or finance related issues. An 
interviewee from government re-echoed a similar view.  
“Even though we’ve been in operation for eighteen months none of our projects have 
got us far as business case yet and so there will probably be another couple of years 
before we see the first network supported by HNDU come to market and get built” 
GOVT 1 
Therefore, the next step was to investigate which roles the LAs as a part of the 
governance hierarchy in the UK can play either by ways of evolving governance 
structures or mechanisms to reduce the impacts of various barriers. This is with a view 
to suggest roles LAs can play as a prime mover to influence the penetration of CHP-
DH TIS systems in the UK and what mechanisms could be adopted to stimulate 
innovation that would positively impact on the rate of diffusion of CHP-DH systems?  
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These roles may mean that the LAs could play significant roles in the energy market 
of electricity and heat with also strategic roles in coordinating the interaction of actors. 
These roles have been divided into five broad areas as highlighted below, which 
include:  
 Strategy and Planning 
 Local Umbrella institution 
 LAs as electricity supplier 
 LAs in the heat market 
 LAs in financing of CHP-DH systems 
9.3.1 Strategy and Planning  
The strategic position of LAs as developers of anchor loads and custodians of the 
socio-technical fabric, which includes the behavioural pattern, businesses and 
infrastructural growth path of their locality, places them as imminent partners to realise 
national climate change targets. In a bid to extract commitment and partnership from 
the LAs in achieving the national targets, the state and the LAs in 2011 agreed in the 
Nottingham declaration that they will work together to develop strategies to monitor 
energy and emissions reductions at the local level. This aims to create the opportunity 
for a bottom-up approach for the state to actualise its national targets rather than a 
top-down approach. The process of a deliberate and consistent interaction usually 
precipitates an outcome borne out of a strategy which is clear with buy-in from 
stakeholders (Worrall et al., 1998). 
There have been four major national strategy statement/documents with implications 
for CHP-DH systems. These are (1) The Climate Change – UK programme in 2000 
(DETR, 2000), (2) The Future of Heating: A Strategic Framework for low carbon heat 
in the UK (DECC, 2012), (3) The Community Energy Strategy (DECC, 2014) and (4) 
Next steps to heat policy (CCC, 2016). The first (Climate Change – UK programme), 
set a target of 10,000MWe of CHP by 2010 while the fourth one (Next steps for heat 
policy) sets a target of connecting 250,000 homes to DH by 2020. However, none had 
a joined-up target for CHP-DH system. One of the key ways to assess the performance 
of a TIS is to identify the factors that will influence the direction of growth through set 
targets (Bergek et al., 2008b pg. 94). The absence of CHP targets in three out of the 
four strategy statements and the absence of DH targets in three of the four documents 
suggests a disconnect between these strategy documents and expectations. 
Considering that there is statistical evidence as seen in Table 49 and Table 50 that 
the absence of a national integrated strategy for CHP-DH systems could hamper the 
growth of CHP-DH systems in the UK, reiterates the importance of a joined-up 
strategy. Furthermore, state evolved energy framework and strategy which leads to 
energy polices at the LA level are often optional and largely self-selecting rather than 
obligatory, meaning many LAs are non-participants in national energy frameworks 
(Bale et al., 2012). Since LAs in the UK consider energy strategies as the prerogative 
225 | P a g e  
 
of the state (Keirstead and Schulz, 2010), in part because the state energy policy 
regime does not incentivise local energy strategy (Bale et al., 2012). 
However, an increasing number of LAs are beginning to take frontline positions in the 
governance of energy in their locality as residents are increasingly exposed to fuel 
poverty (Peters et al., 2011, Kelly and Pollitt, 2011). They are also increasingly seeing 
the need for sustainable energy strategies to capture distributed energy technologies 
to lower energy bills, improve living standards, create jobs and reduce emissions. 
These strategies by the LAs are the instruments to encapsulate energy, environmental 
and social ambitions to meet national goals which also may include the adoption of 
CHP-DH systems. Therefore, respondents from LAs were asked if they have an 
energy efficiency strategy in their locality. Results from Table 65 and Figure 23 shows 
that 57.1% of respondents replied in the affirmative, while 18.8% say such a strategy 
was under development and almost 14.3% say they are considering developing one, 
with 4.5% saying that they are not considering such a strategy.  
It is evident that many LAs have or plan to have energy efficiency strategies. However, 
in developing these strategies, the tension between departments, such as what this 
research has observed between the energy/sustainable and planning departments on 
what should be the priority can result in unclear coordination (Peters et al., 2011). This 
blurs the strategic role of LAs in delivery, except where there is a focused political 
leadership and genuine buy-in from employees on the outcomes (Kelly and Pollitt, 
2011).  
The LAs were then asked if CHP-DH is part of the energy efficiency strategy. Only 
21.1% of respondents said its part of their strategy, almost twice as many saying its 
somewhat integrated (39.8%), and with about another quarter saying it’s not part of 
their strategy (24.2%) with as seen in Table 66 and Figure 24.  
The LA responses suggest that there is an alignment issue between the expectations 
of local strategies and CHP-DH systems as many LAs don’t see the need to capture 
it as part of their strategies. This result in many LAs not taking up the strategic role to 
offer the desired direction and coordination that CHP-DH systems require to link its 
benefits with energy targets, indicating that most LAs strategies are experiencing signs 
of governance failure due to non-alignment of strategies. Schrank and Whitford (2011) 
argue that governance failure is often precipitated by the weak interaction of 
“environmental factors” and “human factors” and partly because of bounded rationality 
of actors. This could partly be that most energy managers at the LAs are bounded by 
their historical knowledge of energy system and if they don’t know CHP-DH systems 
before they are employed, this may inform their stance on the exclusion of CHP-DH 
systems from strategies. This is also reinforced by the turnover of, and reduction in, 
skilled staff in the LAs since the beginning of the financial crisis. Where staffs have 
increased responsibilities energy/sustainable managers may now oversee two or 
three different council areas as evident during this research. An LA staff member 
hinted during an interview that they fell into the job by chance without any knowledge: 
 “I know lots of other local authorities who are losing skilled staff because of budgetary 
constraints…I would say I came to district heating without any knowledge of it 
whatsoever. I've kind of learned on the job” LAPLAN2 .  
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This supports Kelly and Pollitt (2011) position that many LAs involved in energy have 
focussed on delivery of energy-related services rather than strategic coordination and 
integrated approach, and that they therefore take little or no strategic role in energy 
provision.  
The framework to these strategies in relation to the diffusion of CHP-DH systems is 
usually through the context of the planning system. Planning permission and delay in 
planning had been highlighted as one of the risk factors that militate against 
investment in CHP-DH systems in the UK (See Table 28). Therefore, there is statistical 
evidence that the industry is concerned about delay in getting permissions and the risk 
of not getting planning approval at all. 
Furthermore, qualitative data had also highlighted planning as a key impediment to 
the penetration of CHP-DH systems largely because CHP-DH system is not part of 
permitted development order and more then often prevailing planning system is 
targeted at new builds, while there is little relevance to existing builds and as such its 
often a bespoke approach to each scheme. A few citations below to reflect on the 
planning risk theme as discussed. 
“There's no kind of standards of what's expected of a district heating system. Within 
the planning laws, you get a lot of work called permitted development. Certain things 
are just allowed to happen because you had no clear benefit. District heating is not 
amongst those things” (CDHOPS15) 
“And therefore, the current planning system which is mostly focused on new build 
rather than existing, means that it doesn't look at that and support it, in maybe the way 
that it could. So it's more of, that we probably need to rethink the way that we look at 
planning and how planning can support district heating” (LA2) 
Therefore, planning conditions could be revised to reflect the role of CHP-DH systems 
as done by some LAs already from the qualitative data. Such as in Croydon, Leicester. 
Planning conditions are not only used to compel builders to develop CHP-DH systems 
but also to signpost others to connect to available DH systems. LAs can also negotiate 
and appeal to new and existing builders to connect to DH systems in the context of 
corporate social responsibility like the Southampton DH system (Gearty, 2008). 
Alternatively, LAs could map out CHP-DH zones or concession areas with a mandate 
to connect all buildings to DH  networks but not obliged to use the heat from the DH 
networks as its obtained in Norway through the use of planning (Patronen et al., 2017, 
Aanensen and Fedoryshyn, 2014). The landscape in the UK is increasingly changing 
as many new large-scale builders are not given planning permission except they agree 
to the terms of development with conditions inserted into as a planning condition with 
LA, effectively using planning to “push” for the development of low carbon 
infrastructures like CHP-DH system.  
Some LAs have made reservation that they can’t really push new builders legally to 
use CHP-DH or connect to one since all they have is the planning permission to build. 
In some cases, developers’ sign up to the agreement then declare it to be economically 
or technically infeasible to use the CHP-DH system. An LA lamented the limitations:  
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“You can't develop a scheme on the back of just planning requirements, simply 
because they'd never give you the money to invest on the scheme on the back of that 
because they're not watertight. We recognise the fact that we've done is much as we 
can through planning, but there is a limit. You can't actually force people to have a 
scheme”.LA5 
Contrastingly, another council have succeeded in taking a developer to court who 
reneged on the agreement to connect to a DH scheme. They have inserted clauses 
into the S106 agreement document to seal up the contract. 
“Through the legal agreement, we say you must do district heating. Then, we go on to 
enforce it against developers who don't comply with that agreement. It's a contract, at 
the end of the day. We’re happy to share the clauses with other authorities……. We've 
been through enforcement on it” LAPLAN 1 
In addition to the planning documents, LAs have found useful the application of 
Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1990. This allows LAs to 
generate funds for communal compensation against perceived project externalities. 
The S106 is considered as an ordinance and it goes pari-passu with the planning 
permission document, so if a developer doesn’t sign the S106, the planning permission 
is refused. The combination of the planning and S106 documents is seen as an 
innovative tool for LAs to push for the penetration of CHP-DH schemes by mandating 
DH connection on CHP-DH zones. However, S106 has been criticised for delaying 
planning permission as it depends on the negotiation skills of the applicant (TCPA, 
2006).  
Summarily, LAs could take a strategic role to coordinate interactions of the CHP-DH 
actors within and outside its jurisdiction by evolving energy policies and adapt planning 
systems to reflect innovative ways of adopting CHP-DH systems in the UK and 
mandating DH connections in CHP-DH zones. Such as Birmingham’s sustainable 
energy action plan (BCC, 2011) and Lancashire County Council’s revised planning 
system to signpost developers to CHP-DH systems (CLASP, 2011). The output of 
such strategies could be energy policy strategies that incorporates CHP-DH as part of 
its strategy and outlines the roles of LAs in the electricity and heat market with delivery 
of CHP-DH systems as the outcomes.  
9.3.2 LAs as Institutional Bridge  
This research has thrown up issues around coordination of national with local energy 
goals. The CHP-DH industry is undoubtedly one with an array of actors, in part 
because the system can be deployed at different scales with varying motives, such as 
electricity generation/sales, heat generation/sales or both. Therefore, it would require 
an institution to play the role of coordination and bridging. An identified theme from the 
qualitative data was that the role of the LA is still not visible in the drive for CHP-DH 
system in their locality. A citation from respondent had this to say: 
“You would have to have a body that has the power to bring all of these public sector 
bodies together. Higher education, further education, the NHS, the local authorities, 
housing associations in particular…there's no incentive for all of those organizations 
to come together. I think the local authorities do not have that place.”CDHOP4.  
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Many have postulated different roles LAs can play in this respect so as not to distance 
themselves from their traditional roles of public administration as “enablers rather than 
providers” (Barlow and Röber, 1996), “doers rather than enablers” (Peters et al., 
2011), “business-like but not like a business” (Worrall et al., 1998). LAs, bearing in 
mind their steering power as a hierarchy of governance, can take a command and 
control position to facilitate the process of corporation amongst actors locally through 
coordination ensuring they are all captured for the collective goal. This coordination of 
individual institutions which are systems on their own with their governance structures 
would require a complex (interconnected systems) form of coordination to connect the 
various systems to forestall governance failure. The coordination of complex actors 
within the CHP-DH arena locally can be better achieved through systematic 
coordination. Geels et al. (2004 pg 8) suggest that in addition to systematic 
coordination the system needs to have directionality to exhibit good governance.  
In hierarchy of governance perspective, Worrall et al. (1998) calls it “strategic 
direction”. Simply put, all institutions or actors will have to participate in an interactive 
process that will be systematically coordinated if the desired local and national energy 
targets have to be met. This becomes imperative because institutions like universities 
and hospitals have unique energy and environmental targets and coordinating these 
targets to meet national/local objective may be well suited to the LAs (Kelly and Pollitt, 
2011). Suggesting that LAs could play the roles of both “enablers” by providing 
strategic direction through systematic coordination of CHP-DH related activities in their 
area and also “doers” by developing DH networks to connect individual networks 
together. 
The next two sections will discuss more in detail, LAs role as doers in the electricity 
and heat markets. 
9.3.3 LAs in the Electricity Market 
The UK Electricity Industry (EI) has been criticised as being a quasi-monopoly, 
dominated by a few dominant players which has precipitated resistance to innovation, 
institutional change and thereby reduced the emergence of new entrants (Mitchell et 
al., 2014, Woodman and Baker, 2008, Ofgem, 2014, Ofgem, 2008b). The EI is built 
on the mantra of competition driven by economic regulation. However, the UK energy 
regulator Ofgem acknowledges that the market still lacks competition, and that there 
is distrust of the dominant energy suppliers (Ofgem, 2014). The EI market has been 
captured by the six dominant energy suppliers (“big six”) that are seemly vertically 
integrated companies, with generating and retail axes and collectively creating a 
market lock-in. This is reinforced by the characteristics of the regulatory and incentive 
regimes to make them reduce risk and hold on to (or even increase) market share 
(Mitchell et al., 2014).  
This brings to the fore the route to electricity market participation and what role the 
LAs can play in instigating institutional changes and participating as formidable 
electricity providers. This is against the backdrop of LAs being in possession of large 
and long-term electrical loads and with the ability to intersect social and economic 
objectives with energy targets through the supply of electricity. In investigating the key 
routes to instituting a change to the regulatory environment for greater participation by 
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the LAs as electricity providers, two dominant regulatory issues arose; The challenge 
of registering as a supplier and admission into the Balancing and Settlement Code 
(BSC). An actor in the electricity market was asked what were the hurdles to overcome 
to become an electricity supplier in the UK? 
“any other country we were able to set up within two, three, six months, in the UK… 
we made the decision to go into the UK in 2011 and we traded the first MW two years 
later. It was two years of preparation. So they were four people including myself full 
time doing nothing else than preparing for the UK market, that is the first cost. The 
second cost is that you have to get the IT systems up and running, now to give you a 
range it is a seven digit figure only the IT systems to buy it……that's why I definitely 
can see why, I would say it is virtually impossible for a UK grown owner of a CHP plant 
to trade that power themselves,” ELECTSUP 
This is consistent with the literature review as to the high transaction cost as a barrier 
to new entrant to the UK EI, which can inhibit the participation of CHP-DH developers 
in the electricity market. This could precipitate resistance to institutional change where 
the incumbents will consider it disruptive because of path dependency and act to 
oppose this. 
Another issue that stifles innovation in the UK’s EI is the complexities that surround 
the modifications to the Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) in the electricity market 
with members of the code holding strong decisive powers on the operation of the 
market (Mitchell et al., 2014) . BSC is the governance arrangement that oversees 
electricity market transaction to ensure that the market operates within a threshold and 
it’s been administered by Elexon. The key point of interest in the activities of BSC is 
that the process of changes to the market codes known as modification to the code 
tends to draw concessions from the permanent BSC parties and essentially 
determining how the electricity market operates (Mitchell, 2014). This highlights the 
strategic position of the BSC parties in determining changes to the rules of trading of 
electricity in the UK and invariably making smaller generators and other generators 
that are not able to sign to the code on a disadvantaged position as suppose to the 
incumbents. A supplier’s response to being asked why they could not make the rules 
more open to change is shown below:  
“so that means only the guys who already made that very, very difficult progress can 
then change it to make it easier but once have set up all this huge IT systems why in 
the world would I want to change them because I just already set them up before. So 
you are stuck in the system because you can only create a change once you get into 
the system but once you are in the group of people you don't want to change it 
anymore because you've finally obliged to all the rules. It’s called inclusion” 
ELECTSUP 
This is tantamount to capturing a territory by network governance for the incumbents. 
Inferring from Voigt’s (2004 pg. 113) narrative on constitutional change, outsiders can 
only effect an implicit change to the interpretation of the rules without the formal 
altering or modification of the rule. However, when the aim of the network and their 
collective market share is threatened, they will exercise an explicit change that will 
result in rule modification through their collective bargaining power. Therefore, it can 
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be reasoned that if LAs with CHPs desire an explicit change to the BSC and by 
extension other codes, rules and incentives, they must transcend the complex and 
accentuated institutional boundaries within the EI. 
However, to be a signature to the BSC you must be a holder of a standard electricity 
license, which leads the research to possible routes for LAs to being party to the BSC 
through acquiring an electricity license. In response to the difficulty of entry into the 
electricity market, Ofgem introduced Licence Lite (LL) to allow potential energy actors 
without the capability for a standard licence, but LL has struggled to take off due to 
changes to the industry code as a result of delay in development of workable business 
models to capture the new process by the working group (Bainbridge and Abrahams, 
2011). Nonetheless, LL license does not open the doors to be part of the BSC, but 
LAs have begun to explore the LL route as a way to afford the opportunity to increase 
their gains from electricity sales from their generators especially CHPs such as the 
GLA (2014). Though as earlier noted the LL process is still struggling to take off as we 
are still waiting to hear from the experience of Greater London Authority (GLA) since 
no other LA has started off as a LL supplier. Also of importance is the ground breaking 
news of September 7th 2015 that Nottingham City Council has finally made it as the 
first council to challenge the status quo of the EI. They are now the first council since 
nationalization of energy assets in 1948 with a full supply licence to supply residents 
electricity on a non-profit basis with an estimate potential saving to households of over 
£200 annually (BBC, 2015, ADE, 2015). A consortium of Scottish housing associations 
has applied to Ofgem for a similar licence (Bramah, 2014). Other models have been 
adopted by local authorities to take advantage of their anchor loads to penetrate the 
electricity market and provide cheaper energy prices to their residents. This includes 
the formation of a partnership between Plymouth City Council and Ovo Energy to 
supply electricity on agreed tariff levels (Bramah, 2014). 
It’s not clear if the LL route or partnership routes of the various councils will be 
sustainable on price and volume due to the presence of the standard license suppliers. 
This is against the backdrop of the fact that incumbents drive the price from the 
wholesale side and not from the supply side, because price follows cost (Helm, 
2014a). Therefore, the incumbents who are asset owners of generators (both 
baseload and now renewables) will still be determining the wholesale cost and 
perhaps continue the display of institutional rigidity. Thus a possible way will be to 
challenge the status quo of the incumbent’s market share and hold on governance 
structure, largely because of path dependency arising from large amounts of 
investment already made, by developing new business models that will trigger a 
change (Pollitt, 2008). It is also common knowledge that institutional change will be 
disruptive and therefore resisted, in part because their organisational power, wealth 
and status will be threatened (Kingston and Caballero, 2009). Hence, the possibility of 
LAs aggregating their load and resources and participating in the electricity markets 
with a view to challenge the incumbents, may be an alternative governance route. 
9.3.4 LAs in the Heat Market 
Heat off-take has been highlighted as one of the risk that is militating against 
investment in CHP-DH systems in the UK (see Table 26) and the LAs are known to 
be in possession of anchor loads (domestic and commercial loads) that can provide 
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the necessary heat load to de-risk CHP-DH systems. Furthermore, the argument had 
been made in chapter 8 for an LA led ESCO to optimally provide and sustain the 
provision of cost effective heat for its residents and championing the delivery of a 
citywide network to couple domestic, commercial or industrial loads to converge both 
the economic and social goals of the LAs are vital to provide a faster penetration of 
CHP-DH systems. However, the research had taken note of the importance to protect 
those that provide the heat demand and provide legitimacy to the scheme. Therefore, 
if the scheme is not socially accepted to create legitimacy by the heat customers, the 
survival of CHP-DH scheme in a locality may be brought to question as echoed by a 
developer 
“Basically, I think the CHP District heating market will fail at the first hurdle if we don't 
get the end user on board” CDHDEV1 
However, some LAs had expressed their worries about how the heat customers will 
be treated as some think that these heat customers may not be having a good deal in 
terms of price and responding to their complaints. Echoes of some of them are seen 
below. 
“we've got powers and the rights to do so, but every offer we've seen has been a 
terrible deal for the residents”LA4 
“We need comfort for the investor. We need comfort for the customer…………and the 
serving of energy at the right price”LA2 
This is consistent with a recent study that highlights that heat customers were not 
particularly satisfied about the customer service and complaints handling procedure 
of the DH companies (Which?, 2015). As part of the response to this challenge, the 
Association for Decentralised Energy (ADE) in conjunction with industry actors have 
introduced the Heat Trust (HT) scheme which is supposed to provide some protection 
and an independent ombudsman for heat customers. This HT scheme is a voluntary 
scheme for CHP-DH operators to sign up to but, however in a recent study of heat 
suppliers in the UK, a quarter of the respondents from the study say they will not join 
the scheme because they are already involved with other protection schemes such as 
Local Government Ombudsman or Housing Ombudsman (CA, 2016). Suggesting that 
CHP-DH schemes choose which ombudsman to align with and there is little say from 
the customers, but importantly also is that there are several reasons why voluntary 
schemes for energy sector had not provided the expected results for energy 
consumers as anticipated. For instance the voluntary code of practice for gas and 
electricity billing administered by Energy UK which still did not effectively provide 
enough information on energy bills for customers until the regulation by Ofgem during 
retail market review in 2014 (Which?, 2015). Similarly under the same code of practice, 
Ofgem’s probe suggested that 50% of customers were mis-sold tariffs during the door-
step sales era of electricity and gas tariffs until a binding license was issued by Ofgem 
to treat customers fairly and also of note is the cost of administering these schemes 
are passed back to customers through bills (Which?, 2015). Suggesting that the heat 
market may require a regulation as indicated by 53.2% of respondents (all groups) in 
Table 52, to provide a universal protection scheme for heat customers as voluntary 
schemes may not provide optimal protection for customers as anticipated.  
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Contrastingly, several reports suggest that energy customers including vulnerable 
customers in the UK have enormous trust on the LAs as their trusted intermediary for 
energy services, which it referred to the LAs as the “Trusted Brand” by energy 
customers (IPPR, 2014). Additionally also in a recent report by the LGA, 77% of 
respondents trust the local authority to make decisions about how services are 
provided (LGA, 2014b). Suggesting that the LAs have more “social capital” (Pollitt, 
2002) from local residents to engage CHP-DH schemes on their behalf. Hence the 
LAs may play an intermediary role between the CHP-DH schemes and the residents. 
An LA had suggested a similar role for LAs to play in the heat market to provide 
legitimacy for CH-DH schemes.  
 “The third constraint is around the heat price to the occupants……I think our role in 
the schemes is often to act as a proxy regulator. There to make sure that any charges 
are reasonable”LA5 
Therefore, a possible route for heat customers to have the desired protection in the 
absence of a regulation through an effective complaints procedure and feedback 
mechanism to the heat providers is for LAs to leverage on the trust between them and 
local residents by playing the role of an ombudsman. In understanding the role of the 
ombudsman, the research reflects on the definition of an ombudsman as captured in 
Gadlin (2000) below. 
 “The Ombudsman system provides a forum which enables citizens to have access to 
an independent, impartial and inexpensive dispute resolution mechanism which can 
resolve their grievances, protect their human rights, and restore their dignity and 
confidence in the democratic process. In this context, it has three essential elements 
in its favour — independence in operation; flexibility in dispute resolution; and 
credibility with the public and the organization subject to jurisdiction”. 
LAs role as an ombudsman can be briefly described as the “advocate” (Rowe, 1995) 
for the residents and umpire for complaints or disputes. This is with a view to always 
be seen to protect the yearnings of the residents and escalate systemic concerns of 
the heat customers with the CHP-DH operators and address them. However, the 
optimal functionality of this role shall attract acquisition of the requisite skill and 
knowledge to effectively discharge this function. So, the LAs may have to develop a 
framework and a skill acquisition programme for those interested in the job or hire an 
already skilled personal for such one to lead capacity building in the LAs in this 
knowledge space. Additionally, the effectiveness of this role will also depend on how 
the ESCOs recognise the LA in this capacity as the ombudsman. It’s important that 
the role of the LAs as the ombudsman is not vague to the ESCOs. In order words the 
ESCO governance framework is expected to acknowledge that this function resides 
outside the powers of the ESCO but rather with the LAs. The details of the coordination 
and interface of the ESCO and the LA as an ombudsman would have been spelt out 
in possibly the planning permission or any other document from inception that parties 
have signed up to, such that there is no ambiguity as to the functions of the LA in this 
capacity. 
Secondly, A CHP-DH operator had echoed the need for potential heat customers to 
be identified and campaigned to, with a view to convince them to connect to the DH 
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network in their locality, which this research suggests LAs could rightly assume as the 
CHP-DH enablers. 
“there is a lot of work to identify the potential customers, to identify the owners to 
convince them to a change from a standalone heating to district heating” CDHOP12 
LAs can play the role of enablers of CHP-DH systems as they are the custodian of the 
socio-economic indicators that will enable them to identify fuel-poor areas (UNEP, 
2015) and the command and control of land development to signpost developers to 
CHP-DH mapped areas and therefore influence the diffusion of the systems. 
Furthermore, by reason of their statutory powers, LAs can significantly influence 
energy production from low carbon sources and energy use in buildings (Hawkey et 
al., 2014), by playing the role of the local CHP-DH champions. They could be 
champions by campaigning and educating residents of the socio-economic benefit of 
CHP-DH systems and how DH heating could be beneficial to their economic status 
and the environment. Additionally LAs could come up with policies, such as connection 
polices, or incentives such as tax reduction for companies on DH network with a view 
to stimulate the growth of CHP-DH systems in their locality (UNEP, 2015). 
LAs could also play the role of a quasi-regulator of some sort but it is crucial to highlight 
that the heat sector may require a national regulator albeit because of the many 
benefits of what national regulation brings to bear. Such as the need for a national 
heat customer protection scheme which may require a legislation to be able to 
investigate and enforce or a uniform pricing model and many more advantages. 
However, a possible route to create the right environment for the continued 
acceptance of CHP-DH by local residents in the absence of a national regulation is for 
LAs to institute governance mechanisms that would govern market transactions, 
operations and the sustainability of the CHP-DH systems. The advantage is to provide 
the required governance and accountability pathway of the CHP-DH ESCO to forestall 
the failure that occurred at Caithness Heat and Power in Scotland (Caithness, 2014), 
so that the “public pound” can be followed and protected (Audit Scotland, 2011). Other 
roles could include responsibility for liaising with utility companies and other 
governance structures with a view to hosting regularly updated planning and energy 
data. Furthermore, they could also liaise with other tiers of governance to guarantee 
access to right of way and permits such as environmental, street license and highway. 
It is expected that the LAs could suffer challenges as a result of lack of human and 
financial capital to fully execute the aforementioned roles giving the incessant budget 
cuts but the innovation to drive through these roles may most likely come from how 
finance is sought for realisation of the schemes and acquire the requisite knowledge 
and skills to effectively play these roles. The nest section shall discuss the possible 
financial options that may suffice. 
9.3.5 LAs in financing of CHP-DH systems 
Finance has been an obvious barrier to CHP-DH penetration in the UK, as highlighted 
in the literature review and further vindicated by the research findings in the previous 
chapter. Two types of risks associated with finance emerged in the risk profile in Table 
26; these are availability of finance and cost of finance. Chapter 8 had discussed 
financing of CHP-DH systems as a high-risk potential in the deployment of CHP-DH 
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systems. However, this section shall seek to discuss the window to mitigate these risks 
using the LAs as the prime mover in the CHP-DH TIS in the UK. 
As discussed in chapter 2, the methodology of finance of CHP-DH systems is usually 
derived from a discounted cash flow which determines the rate of return. The rate of 
return is a common theme for investors to access the viability of a CHP-DH scheme. 
The UK recommends a discount rate of 3.5% for social analysis, with estimates for 
heat network to be between commercial rates of 10% to 20% (Hawkey and Webb, 
2016 pg:122). This is also consistent with a recent meeting of CHP-DH actors with the 
Government, where it was raised that the low rate of return of many HNDU schemes 
between 6% -10% as oppose to about 15% which is what is desired by the market 
could be one of the reasons why many of the HNDU projects have not commenced 
(King, 2016). This was also further collaborated by many respondents to this research 
why many CHP-DH projects cannot take off due to low rate of return.  
Therefore, many of these schemes cannot access finance on commercial rates except 
they have access to cheaper finance. Furthermore, in mitigating the initial high capital 
cost, a report to DECC by Pöyry (2009), suggested two policy levers that government 
can use to trigger investment in this terrain. Firstly, the provision of initial capital grants 
to develop the supply chain and catalyse cost reduction. Secondly the provision of 
cheap finance, which may be more appropriate than the first on the medium and long 
terms, given the technological and market status of the industry. CHP-DH technology 
is not a niche or emerging technology but a matured one with some financial barriers 
to push it through in the UK. So, what may be more appropriate may be policy lever 
from the treasury on the use of government’s funds like the pension which would have 
a more sustainable effect on the discount rate or liaise with the Green Investment Bank 
(GIB) to refocus on CHP-DH. Also Johnstone et al. (2010) had suggested that 
investment incentives such as financial and investment guarantee is more effective to 
stimulate the diffusion of high initial cost RE technologies. However, the GIB funding 
principle is tied to commercial terms and not low cost loans that is aimed to stimulate 
private investment, partly because Governments sees its role as to reduce market 
barriers by attracting private finance in spite of the socio-economical gains of the 
project (Webb, 2014). Additionally, government’s announcement that it intends to sell 
some its share in GIB to private bidders dimmed the hope for GIB’s intervention in low 
cost financing in spite of protest from NGOs and low carbon businesses (Hatchwell, 
2015). The likely result will be higher cost of capital in investment in low carbon 
infrastructures. In contrast, the Netherlands introduced a National Investment Bank to 
militate against high interest rate and limited capital by offering finance at favourable 
rates without security or any risk assessment to projects like CHP (Blok, 1993, Hekkert 
et al., 2007a). A citation from a respondent on the limits of GIB below: 
“Green Investment Bank are taking a keen interest in these projects, but the Green 
Investment Bank are required to ... They can't undercut a market offering. They can't 
offer finance at the same levels that say the PWLB can” CTNT1 
Therefore, the GIB is not positioned to provide low interest finance as much as the 
PWLB can provide.   
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The discussion will now seek to analyse the role LAs as CHP-DH prime movers can 
play to alleviate the finance associated risk. The combination of the LAs drawing on 
their anchor loads and the availability of cheap finance will be key to LAs playing a 
role to reduce risk profile associated with finance. Pöyry (2009) had previously 
suggested that the volume of heat uptake has a direct correlation with the cost of the 
scheme. Volume uptake reflects on the effective heat tariff for the financial model since 
the fixed cost of the scheme will be spread over the heat load. The study demonstrated 
that the higher the volume from the heat uptake the lower the cost of the schemes, at 
least to about 80% of heat uptake before it begins to flatten out. Therefore, the 
possession of heat anchor loads is critical to de-risking of investment in CHP-DH 
systems, which places the LAs with heterogeneous types of heat loads from council 
houses, offices, leisure centres, heritage buildings and schools in a strategic position 
to seek finance for CHP-DH systems, but the cost of finance may not be right for many. 
“The cost of financing…..,you need low-interest loans for district heating to make a 
return on investments worthwhile. One of the issues are that there's not enough 
access to low-interest loans” DHP1 
Secondly the source of finance is critical to the discount rate as highlighted earlier but 
currently LAs have few sources of finance, with over 70% of loans coming from the 
Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) (LGA, 2014a). Other sources include the open 
markets, pension funds, tax increment financing and municipal bonds even if they’re 
not allowed borrowing over the set threshold by the Prudential Code Regime which is 
the code that supports LA to borrow for capital investment. (HoC, 2014b). The PWLB 
is an opportunity for LAs to access loans at a low interest rate from a pool of £95bn, 
but borrowing from the PWLB has been greeted with mix feelings due to the increased 
cost of borrowing by the Treasury by 1% in 2010 (HoC, 2014b, LGA, 2013e, UKDMO, 
2015). A respondent informed the research that PWLB lends to the LAs for as long as 
50 years and the interest rate are set on daily basis. However, the introduction of the 
infrastructure bill in 2015 includes a provision for abolishing the PWLB and no 
replacement organ with similar functions has not been announced (UKDMO, 2015). 
Another innovative form of borrowing by LAs that is of interest to this research is the 
municipal bond route. This is sequel to the un-satisfaction of the various governance 
structures the government had put in place to access finance presumably at a cheap 
rate such as PWLB and TIF. The LA stakeholders have been keen to institute a 
governance network that would challenge the governance structure of borrowing for 
investment by forming a municipal bond body of its own. The result is the inauguration 
of a municipal bond agency called the Local Capital Finance Company (LCFC) 
Limited, modelled after similar institutions in other European countries like Sweden ’s 
Kommuninvest. It is a financial body to fund, amongst others, infrastructure projects 
which include CHP-DH technology. It is under the auspices of the LGA with the LAs 
as investors (LGA, 2014a). The state had in 2010 increased the cost of borrowing by 
LAs from PWLB by 1%, which had propelled them to come together and share the 
liabilities (HoC, 2014b, LGA, 2013e). Currently, about 75% of loans by the LAs come 
from state run PWLB and their model estimates that the municipal bond agency could 
save the LAs over a £1bn over thirty years. As councils have ownership of the agency 
they will have the opportunity to refinance debts without penalties, guaranteed lending 
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terms and ultimately ensure competitive pressure on PWLB (LGA, 2014a). An 
example of bond funded project is the £600m funding for Crossrail by GLA (HoC, 
2014b). 
In reaction to the emergence of LA led finance model, in 2012 the government 
introduced a discount of 0.8-1% for LAs borrowing through the PWLB and a further 
0.6% if it’s an infrastructure nominated by Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP) since 
November, 2013 (HoC, 2014b). The innovation for access to finance by the LAs had 
barely started, but it had triggered an incremental change in the governance structure 
of lending by the state to LAs, and therefore the introduction of LCFC by the LAs is a 
welcome innovation. However, the size of the portfolio that can be supported by the 
LCFC remains questionable and it is uncertain as to whether it can be relied upon to 
stimulate huge capital requirement projects like CHP-DH systems. This is of a concern 
because as of September, 2014, only 38 LAs had come together to raise just over 
£4.5m for the municipal bond agency (LGA, 2014a). The foregoing suggests that 
because of its current low capital base, it may well be more appropriate for other low-
cost infrastructure financing other than CHP-DH systems because of the cost and 
volume of CHP-DH projects that may require funding for example the over a hundred 
projects that the HNDU had facilitated that has not been executed. Therefore, PWLB 
may still be the better route to fund CHP-DH systems due to its £95bn funding base 
but also because LAs borrow against their income stream and they still may not be 
able to borrow much due to complaints from many LAs on cuts of funding from the 
state.  
The implication of both scenarios from LCFC and PWLB are that it may have an 
insignificant effect in the penetration of CHP-DH systems due to either low funding 
available to LCFC bonds or reduced income stream to borrow from PWLB. This will 
leave the LAs with no option than to seek private finance through ESCOs to fund these 
projects with the consequence of higher discount rates and energy prices. It is also 
worth mentioning that the intended reform on the PWLB by the government is still not 
out, without being too pre-emptive one would expect a reduced bureaucratic process 
but not the loan criteria after the reform.  
However, the seemly unanimous voice on the funding of CHP-DH systems from 
interviewed actors is that the state has to provide the finance to stimulate the diffusion 
of CHP-DH systems in the UK, with some calling for DH networks to be treated like 
public goods. 
“I think capital funding from central government kick starts schemes will probably be 
the key driver in the end” CDHOP15 
“If you step back, see district heating as something as providing a heat network for 
heat for a whole settlement. In the same way that we do utilities”LA2 
“What can be done to enhance? The government make money available”LA1 
“They have access to finance, certainly competitive interests rates and they're 
generally seen as a good credit risk, I think, so they can play a role in bringing the 
financing to the table and reducing the amount of risk in the scheme” LA7 
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Therefore, the common theme from the research as can be seen from the word tree 
below in Figure 35 is that CHP-DH systems should be financed from either 
government guarantees loans to the public authority, pensions funds or loans from 
public works loan board (PWLB) as the best sources of funds for LAs to finance CHP-
DH systems. However, the finance from PWLB is the dominant choice. A citation of 
one of the interviews is captured below 
 
Figure 35: Best sources of funding for CHP-DH systems int eh UK 
“The public works loan board for local authorities is very attractive. Because it offers a 
very low-interest rates and obviously that gives the local authority the opportunity to 
have ownership and control over the schemes……..they can't offer finance at the 
same levels that say the PWLB can. So that they can offer flexible financing which is 
interesting as a blended finance sort of, because that allows you to pay back in a 
interesting ways that maybe aren't available through other financing sources” CTN1 
In order words, it is pertinent that the LAs desires a more innovative route of funding 
from the state that may offer an alternative and sustainable cheap funding for CHP-
DH systems by possibly incorporating assets into the lending principle by PWLB. This 
is also consistent with the suggestion of Webb (2014), that in the prevailing political 
economic conditions, for any meaningful penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK, 
the dominant form of financing such projects may have to be slightly adjusted. 
Suggesting that the dominant form of borrowing by the LAs for-capital projects which 
is from the PWLB could possibly be adjusted. Currently, LAs are not allowed by law to 
borrow against their asset or breach the overall limits on their borrowing by the 
prudential code (HoC, 2014b) which limits the volume of loan they can take from 
PWLB.  
Therefore, it may not be out of place to suggest that a possible route for LAs to access 
cheap finance for the development of CHP-DH systems may be revision of funding 
principle for LAs to include either LAs asset or the CHP-DH asset in the evaluation 
criteria of loans from PWLB. A shade of this may make the central government appear 
to recognise the considerable environmental, societal and economic benefits CHP-DH 
systems can bring to the LAs and the overall energy goals of the state. The 
modification of borrowing principles would entail a legislative instrument but as LAs 
are members of the governance hierarchies that will interact with the state to re-align 
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priorities and agree on accounting principles that will focus on both assets and income 
generation from the CHP-DH. The negotiated outcome would likely exhibit the 
potential of reducing the two risks associated to finance mentioned above, which were 
availability of finance and cost of finance. 
The application of these suggestions may evoke other forms of risk for consideration 
by both the LAs and the state, such as increased national deficit, especially if 
anticipated revenue is unable to cover the debt (Webber, 2010), but recent ownership 
restructuring of the Wick DH scheme has shown that CHP-DH schemes can be sold 
through the secondary market to recover bad debts. This is evident in the acquisition 
of 100% shares of Wick DH scheme by GIB and Equitex from Ignis Energy, the 
previous owners (King, 2016). Others have even opined that refinancing of DH 
networks could be an alternative approach to springboard the development of CHP-
DH after the high initial cost outlay using a model known as Pipeco (Manders and 
Groth, 2016). This was further collaborated by a government respondent to this 
research that once some of the key initial risk have been taken away. Such as heat 
off-take risk, development risk, planning risk, the project can access cheaper finance 
and therefore can be re-financed (GOVT1). Therefore, non-performing schemes can 
be off-loaded in the secondary market or refinanced, when the state considers the 
level of performance as unacceptable or considers that the DH market is ripe for exit, 
thereby offering an escape route for under performing loans or government 
investment.  
However, this may feed into a further research investigation to determine the profile of 
the risk exposure of hierarchies of governance if asset-based lending is incorporated 
into the borrowing principles of LAs considering that the state can also attract political 
capital from financing of CHP-DH systems. 
Summarily, if the government reconsiders its current lending criteria of revenue-based 
lending to lend more funds to the LAs against CHP-DH assets and income generated 
and considering the anchor loads that the LAs possess, availability of finance and 
cheap finance may be on the horizon for CHP-DH developers to provide secure low 
carbon energy with a social outlook. This would also incentivise the LAs to form public 
led ESCOs and cause the growth of private led ESCO to begin a southward 
movement. 
9.4 Conclusion 
This research highlights various significant barriers identified during the descriptive 
phase of the research and a list of seven risks factors were deduced statistically from 
the quantitative data in the previous chapter, but the exploratory phase of the research 
revealed further risks which were discussed with a view to highlight their impact and 
possible mitigation. For instance, a more integrated information hub and high-level 
energy data system may be necessary to reduce information asymmetries in the 
industry and enhance the usefulness of heat map to CHP-DH developers. Others are 
evolution of innovative ways to address heat debt collection, training schemes to 
involve more apprenticeships to reduce skill shortages, concern over the impact of the 
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sale of social housing by LAs, and low housing density by new build developers are 
impacting on the development CHP-DH schemes.  
There statistical evidence that industry actors consider a joined-up policy framework 
to capture and set targets for the development of CHP-DH systems will be helpful in 
attracting and sustaining investment. Additionally, the actors consider that the heat 
industry may require a regulation and there is statistical evidence that Ofgem is the 
favourite organ to take on that function. 
Other studies focussing on LAs show that it is not just developing strategies that is the 
desired outcome but their abilities to innovate ways to navigate through existing 
systemic challenges to deliver on the expected long term outcomes (Bale et al., 2012). 
Some of these factors can be overcome by the LAs being innovative in taking a 
prominent role in providing heat and electricity as well as being an enabler for the 
CHP-DH technology locally. LAs are the foremost actors with potential to facilitate the 
growth of CHP-DH systems (UNEP, 2015) , because of the LA’s statutory powers to 
provide social housing, health services, planning and influence energy production and 
use of energy by buildings, but their role in the CHP-DH arena is being hampered by 
both endogenous and exogenous factors. Therefore, this research proposes five 
broad roles that LAs can play to militate against or reduce the impact of these 
barrier/risk factors with a view to stimulate an incremental diffusion of CHP-DH 
systems in the UK. These are:  
1. LAs could be more strategic by evolving policy frameworks that would 
encapsulate CHP-DH systems through joined-up policy visions and planning. 
2. LAs could act as the bridge between institutions with CHP-DHs systems with a 
view to coordinate interconnections of DH networks to organically grow the 
network to a citywide infrastructure. 
3. LAs could leverage on their collective electrical generation capacity and load to 
disrupt the electricity industry status quo by participating in the electricity 
market. 
4. LAs could also leverage on their collective heat load to de-risk CHP-DH 
investment and the trust they enjoy from residents to play the role of an 
ombudsman for the local heat sector. As well being a quasi-regulator to institute 
governance mechanisms that would govern market transactions and provide 
accountability pathway for the ESCOs operations. 
5. Finance supports to CHP-DH systems has been intermittent and unpredictable 
(Hawkey et al., 2013) suggesting that financing still seems to be a significant 
risk to the development of CHP-DH systems. This was collaborated by the 
statistical results that shows that availability of finance and cheap finance are 
inimical to CHP-DH investment in the UK. In spite of the various routes of 
finance such as the huge financial chest of the PWLB, GIB, municipal bond 
agency by LAs and the financial market. These reasons could have been 
influenced by lack of regulation of the heat sector; low discount rates of many 
CHP-DH projects, revenue-based borrowing principle of PWLB to LAs. This 
research suggests LA led CHP-DH systems which are financed on the back of 
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LAs to develop socially focused CHP-DH systems could contribute to national 
environmental and energy targets. However, none of the financial routes 
available to LAs has the combined strength of low or social lending rates and 
right volume of finance to develop socially focused CHP-DH systems like PWLB 
with a financial chest of about £95billion (UKDMO, 2015). Nonetheless, PWLB 
lending principle is revenue based, which effectively limits how much finance 
many LAs can borrow and LAs are also barred by law to borrow against their 
asset, as grants may not sustainably develop these systems, neither are other 
sources but debt finance route. Hence the suggestion from this research of a 
possible re-thinking of the borrowing principle to include either assets of the 
LAs or CHP-DH to the lending principle of PWLB to LAs for low carbon energy 
projects like CHP-DH systems. 
The next chapter will discuss the impact of the various governance mechanisms on 
the diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK and possible ways of how they can further 
instigate an incremental change.  
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10.0  Discussion – Governance Mechanisms 
10.1 Introduction 
Several types of governance mechanisms were adopted by the government in the UK 
with the aim of stimulating investment in the generation of electricity and heat from low 
carbon sources and securing the integrity of the grid. These instruments could be 
regulatory, market or public/private partnership driven (Hillman et al., 2011, Nilsson et 
al., 2012) that has taken heterogeneous designs and scopes. Such as the old 
traditional forms of grants, loans and taxes or the new forms which are broadly Feed-
in-Tariff (FiT), quota (tradable certificates), tendering/auction and capacity 
mechanisms or a combination of both forms, known as “hybrid regulation” (Hey et al., 
2007).  
Several authors have discussed the various mechanisms in achieving the UK’s energy 
goal (Connor et al., 2015, Connor et al., 2013, Helm, 2014c, Wood and Dow, 2011, 
Newbery and Grubb, 2014, Newbery, 2015, Woodman and Mitchell, 2011) but there 
is limited work on how these mechanisms impact on the penetration of CHP-DH 
systems. Therefore, this section shall seek to discuss the various governance 
mechanisms with specific interest on how it impacts on the penetration of CHP-DH 
systems in the UK.  
10.2 Current governance mechanisms and their impact on CHP-DH 
systems in the UK 
The consultant group were questioned as to what government mechanisms impacted 
CHP-DH development the most, since they are more involved with developing 
business case for the systems than the CHP-DH operator and LA groups. The results 
from Table 72 and Figure 30 shows that 18.5% of respondents consider community 
energy saving programme, 18.5% considered RHI and 14.8% considered Climate 
change levy. While another 14.8% considered enhanced capital allowance, with 
11.1% of the respondents considering energy company obligation as the most 
effective government scheme. 
The respondents in Table 72 favoured the CESP and RHI as the governance 
mechanism with the most impact on CHP-DH systems, but the CESP scheme was 
closed in December 2012 as discussed in chapter 5. It was estimated to have saved 
about 16.31Mt/CO2 against a target of 19.25 MTCO2, through 293,922 measures with 
48.8% of the scheme on wall insulation, while DH (connection to DH, upgrade of DH 
and DH meters to house dwellings) was around 8% (Ofgem, 2013h). This suggests 
that the scheme contributed to the improvement of energy efficiency in social houses, 
DH billing and the customer base of existing CHP-DH systems but little impact on the 
development and diffusion of CHP-DH technology. Additionally, the scheme was 
operational for a short time (3 years) which makes assessment of its long-term impact 
on CHP-DH difficult. Secondly, because it was targeted downstream with a focus on 
households within an area, rather than upstream with actual generation of either 
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electricity or heat CHP-DH systems and distribution of heat. Nonetheless, heat 
customers on social housing from DH networks benefited from the scheme. An early 
survey of beneficiaries of the scheme suggested respondents were feeling warmer in 
their homes and about 77% of respondents felt that it had enabled them to pay less 
for their heating (CAG et al., 2011).  
ECO was highlighted in chapter 5 as a governance mechanism that may impact on 
the penetration of CHP-DH systems. However, a small percentage (11.1%) of 
respondents consider ECO as effective in driving the penetration the CHP-DH 
systems. Other measures not strongly considered is the RO with a 3.7% of 
respondents thinking RO impacts on the penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
This also suggests that the respondents do not generally consider RO mechanisms 
as having significant impact on CHP-DH systems. The discussion of RO operations in 
chapter five highlighted the associated risk in its early version and the risk after the 
reform in 2009.  
Additionally, the EU-Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) as a multi-level governance EU-
led mechanism was also investigated in terms of impact on CHP-DH system 
penetration in the UK. CHP-DH operators were asked if the EU-ETS was a long-term 
incentive for CHP-DH systems. The results from Table 73 and Figure 31 shows that 
29.5% of the respondents tend to agree and 3.2% strongly agree. While 18.9% tend 
to disagree, with another 11.6% strongly disagree. This shows that respondents were 
split on the effect of the EU - ETS scheme, some seeing the scheme as better than 
paying other carbon taxes like Carbon Price Support (CPS), which is the carbon tax 
for using fossil fuel for power generation as part of the CCL and it’s also considered 
as a top up on the EU ETS, they both form the Carbon Price Floor (CPF). This is 
because as the interviewees claim, when you participate in the EU-ETS you pay for 
the allowances for gas, you are automatically exempted from paying the tax in the 
CRC. When a CHP operator was asked if the EU-ETS constituted a tax burden to their 
operations, he came across as if the ETS is a win-win on their overall tax profile.  
“Emission trading scheme again it’s a cost, but it is not a problem because if the 
university would have buildings without CHP we would be in EU ETS anyway and our 
EU ETS, CRC total bill will be higher because would buy more gas and electricity. The 
saving on EU ETS is part of the business case to reduce the overall tax of the 
university” CHDOP12 
However, the pattern of responses from the respondents suggests that the industrial 
operators of CHP-DH systems may be more affected by EU ETS on the long term than 
commercial and domestic (such as housing associations) which thinks EU-ETS is less 
impactful on their operations. This is consistent with Orchards (2013) that claims the 
EU ETS is better suited for industrial CHP-DH schemes because of the target of overall 
emission levels. This is imperative as the scheme targets about 1,000 facilities with 
more than 20MW thermal output in the UK (DECC, 2015i) and this research suggests 
that the dominant scale of CHP-DH schemes are around 5MW th (see chapter 8), 
indicating a minimal effect on smaller CHP-DH capacities, but more significant impact 
on >20MWth capacity sites which contributes about 40% of the total thermal capacity 
of CHP-DH systems in the UK (see Table 12). Furthermore, the price instability of 
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carbon within the EU-ETS since its introduction may have also influenced operators 
varying perspective, on the impact of the scheme on CHP-DH systems in the UK 
especially from industrial schemes, which may likely remain the case until the carbon 
price stabilises. Therefore, the impact of EU ETS on the growth of CHP-DH systems 
in the UK may be restricted to the high energy intensive or industrial sectors.  
10.2.1 Electricity Market Reform (EMR) 
The EMR as a governance mechanism seeks to capture the three prong strategies of 
attracting investment into low carbon technologies to meet climate change targets, 
while securing the supply of electricity at a minimal cost to tax payers to meet the 
overall energy target moving forward to 2050. EMR is mixed bag of both regulatory 
and economic incentives. 
Detailed discussions on the mode of operations of these various mechanisms was 
undertaken in chapter 5 but the impact of the schemes on the diffusion of CHP-DH 
systems is being discussed below. 
10.2.1.1 Capacity Mechanism (CM) 
The CM seeks to provide security of supply of electricity and ensure system stability 
in view of many plants shutting down. A detailed discussion on CM was undertaken in 
chapter 5.  
Two auction periods had been conducted under the CM scheme, one in each of in 
2014 and 2015. In 2014 T-4 auction, out of the total of 49.3 GW procured in the 
auction, CHP and auto-generators accounted for 8.6% of the capacity (NG, 2015d) . 
While in 2015 T-4 auction, out of the 46.35GW procured, CHP and auto-generators 
accounted for 4.21GW (9%) of the contracted volume (NG, 2015a). Since CHPs were 
eligible to participate in the CM processes, the research sought the view of actors of 
the mechanism with a view to investigate the impact on the diffusion of CHP-DH 
systems in the UK. An actor’s response on the CM mechanism summarises a general 
notion of the scheme by CH-DH actors.  
“Yeah, capacity markets I think ... it's nice for CHP because it's an extra income, but 
the biggest winners in the whole capacity market where the very big, very old power 
stations” ELECTSUP 1 
The response is consistent with Newbery and Grubb’s (2014) prediction that the 
design of the UK’s CM is questionable due to its poor attention to political economy, 
because the design may favour coal plants which may be unprofitable without CM due 
to taxes from carbon price floor and have less risk as against the gas plants that are 
struggling with rising and volatile gas prices. Therefore, the research sought to 
investigate the features of the UK CM mechanism that may have locked out the 
participation of CHPs in the auction process. 
Firstly, CHPs are commonly installed based on heat to power ratio. The quantitative 
data presented in chapter 8 indicates that they are often heat-led (see Table 13). This 
is as a result of meeting local heat load and consuming generated electricity on site 
while any additional electrical needs are met from the grid. Since heat consumption 
will be the primary concern and CM requires electrical availability, implying the need 
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for possible heat dumping. The second possible reason is that the CM scheme does 
not admit CHPs with STOR contracts and many are already involved in providing 
ancillary services as indicated by the research data presented in Table 74. Thirdly, 
CHPs that benefit from any low carbon subsidy such as RHI, RO, CfD or FiT are not 
entitled to participate in the CM unless they can show that such funding routes have 
been revoked or dissociated from. This is largely to discourage developers from 
engaging in double incentive schemes. However CHPs with balancing service 
contracts can participate in the CM as an alternative revenue stream, but when both 
services are in demand the balancing services supersedes the CM demand (DECC, 
2014k) . 
Lastly, new plants (capacity and unproven DSR) will have to post collateral equivalent 
to a 100% termination fee of £500/MW to be held by the settlement company before 
qualification. This poses an additional transaction cost to small and new entrants. 
Compounding this is the failure for any new plant or unproven DSR to show evidence 
of a connection agreement offer to NG for at least 18 months before the start of the 
delivery year, else the site will pay a termination fee drawn from the collateral (DECC, 
2014k). The interesting part about this clause is electricity projects still suffer 
connection bottlenecks with the severity depending on the regions. For example 
delays may be as much as seven years on Teesside (PX, 2010) with a respondent in 
Scotland to this research suggesting they have suffered a ten year delay to CHP grid 
connection and seeing NG electrical infrastructure as part of a jigsaw to get connected. 
A CHP-DH operator had this to say: 
“Over the last 10 years we have tried to connect a CHP up and routinely we've been 
told no…..it’s effectively been a game changer for us. It's effectively stopped us.” 
CDHOP7 
The grid regulator acknowledges that the grid requires as much as £32bn of 
investment to ensure grid security by 2020 (Ofgem, 2010a). The congested grid results 
in a restricted power flow of about 2.2GWe from Scotland to England (Hammond and 
Pearson, 2013), and other areas of the UK as well as indicated by an interviewee and 
all these contribute to a grid infrastructure barrier to CHP developers. The severity of 
this barrier can also be appreciated with smaller generators now have to obtain 
statement of works (SoW) from NG before the DNO or NG can grant the connection 
agreement offer. SoW is usually obtained from NG if the generation will impact on the 
transmission grid and usually above 50MW but a DNO informed this research that a 
SoW can now be requested for as low as 250kW of generation in some locations, such 
as Lincolnshire. 
“if you've got an area which is particularly constrained sometimes national grid 
requests you do statements of work for smaller generators as well. In Lincolnshire 
they've asked for generators over two hundred and fifty kilowatts to go through 
statements of work because they are really constrained” DNO2 
The implicit message from government to the new build here is that for you to 
participate in the CM auction you should have started the process to get a connection 
offer many years before the auction year. The experience of some respondents 
suggests that even with significant forward planning it may not be possible to get an 
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agreement with any reliability in more congested network areas. This evokes concerns 
that there is a governance issue with NG playing the role as the delivery body of the 
CM yet also a participant in the process (HoC, 2015). Simply put, NG stands as the 
“defendant” of not letting generators connects to the grid due to congestion and low 
investment by determining when to grant connection agreement through statement of 
works. Yet NG is also the “judge” receiving a request for a connection agreement offer 
from new generators at least 18 months before delivery. Additionally, in the recent 
review of the rules of the CM mechanism, any generator that seeks to connect through 
the transmission grid will have to demonstrate they have secured a Transmission Exit 
Capacity (TEC) before qualification for the auction (DECC, 2016c). The combination 
of postage of collateral to the same organ that will determine if the collateral will be 
called for or not, and the grid infrastructure barrier to new plant, appears to indicate a 
system failure of the CM design. This is a system failure borne out of infrastructural 
failure resulting from limited investment in grid infrastructural provision and therefore 
may seek policy intervention (Foxon, 2007 pg 133-134). This may have also resulted 
in the non-procurement of any new CHP plants in favour of existing plants. 
A possible solution may be since NG is responsible for grid availability, they may apply 
locational marginal pricing factors for new generations in different regions of the 
country (Cramton and Ockenfels, 2011) as was done in the Italian CM scheme to 
encourage CHP generators at less congested part of the grid to be part of the CM 
process (Eurelectric, 2015).  
10.2.1.2 Contract for Difference (CfD) 
CfD is one of the pillars of the government’s EMR programme with emphasis on 
incentivising cost effective development of renewable electricity projects with a view 
to ensure confidence of revenue to investors through a tariff mechanism with more 
focus on >5MW plants (Grant Thornton and Pöyry, 2015b). A more detailed discussion 
was done in chapter five. 
In respect to CHPs, only energy from waste (EfW) was listed in the established 
category, while in the less established technologies, there are four routes for CHPs 
such as advanced conversion technologies, anaerobic digestion, geothermal and 
dedicated biomass but only two EfW CHP projects, totalling 95MW of new capacity, 
were successful in being allocated contracts (Grant Thornton and Pöyry, 2015b). The 
technology winner of the day were the wind energy developers with over 90% of the 
capacity procured, as shown in Figure 36. 
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Figure 36: Capacity Distribution in the first CfD round allocation 
Source: (Grant Thornton and Pöyry, 2015b) 
The beneficiaries received varying years of contract with the first delivery date by 
2016/17 (LCP/FRONTIER, 2015) with utilities winning the greatest share of the 
contracts at 41%, while large independent developers received 31% (Grant Thornton 
and Pöyry, 2015b). In reviewing the CfD auction process, this research sought to 
investigate the poor performance of CHP developers with a view to highlighting the 
factors that impacted on their performance and the CHP-DH systems on the whole. 
In an attempt not to be drawn to the performance and profile of fuel sources for CHP-
DH systems as its dimmed not part of the research but to take a more critical look at 
the impact of the CfD round on CHPs, the research looked at the contribution of 
various renewables sources to CHPs to better understand their performance. The 
digest of UK energy statistics suggests that RES-E increased by 19% from 2013 to 
2014, mostly solar PV which increased by 104% and biomass by 45%, with plant 
biomass also being second largest contributor to renewable heat after industrial wood 
in 2014 (DECC, 2015c).  
In 2014, bioenergy contributed 72.2% to renewable electricity generation with biomass 
contributing 58% and landfill gas accounting for 22% of the bioenergy contribution. 
The dominant fuels for renewable CHP in the UK are biomass and sewage gas 
(DECC, 2015c). Drawing upon the contribution and growth of biomass to both 
renewable electricity and heat generation in the UK and its poor performance at the 
CfD first round auction throws up a complex (interconnected) system concern. In the 
course of the research, CHP developers were engaged, and a renewable CHP 
developer in particular came across this way 
“if your heat user goes bust during the plant life time, you will lose your CHP status, 
your CHPQA accreditation and therefore you will lose all of your support. Again, if 
you're doing this on a project finance basis, banks simply will not take that risk. If there 
is a significant cut off that suddenly your heat user goes bust which is a risk in itself 
because you're reliant for a lot of your revenues on heat sales. Suddenly, you lose 
your heat sales, you lose any incentive you might get through any renewable heat 
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incentive and you lose your contract for difference to the government, so you're left 
only with your electricity revenue” CDHDEV 3 
The performance of CHPs at the CfD was as a result of a network of system failures 
that had culminated in many developers to shy away from the bidding arena. Key 
amongst them as narrated by the developer above and consistent with the finding of 
an independent government report to review the process (Grant Thornton and Pöyry, 
2015b) was the effect of heat off-taker risk to secure investor buy-in. The report also 
confirms that biomass CHPs had a grace period of five years if they lose their heat 
customers or else they face termination of their CfD contract, losing all support from 
government.  
The starting point of this governance failure is not with the CfD. It starts at the good 
quality CHP status accreditation by the CHPQA, an agent of government. All CHP 
must be certified with good quality status from CHPQA before it can get any 
government support. When CHPQA are satisfied that a CHP installation meets the 
quality index and power efficiency criteria, they are issued a certificate which is then 
submitted to DECC. DECC will then issue a Secretary of State (SoS) certificate to the 
CHP developer before they can now enjoy any government support. This certification 
becomes invalid the moment you lose your heat customer because it is deemed that 
you are now dumping your heat and therefore the generating plant becomes inefficient 
and environmentally unfriendly. The process is reviewed annually so the process of 
certification is a regular annual ritual for CHP operators. 
Chapter 8’s analysis of the risk profile experienced by the CHP-DH sector highlighted 
that heat off-take and cost of finance were major risk consideration and one of the 
reasons why cost of finance was highlighted because of the consideration of the high-
risk attribute of the heat off-taker. Hence lenders would often consider long term heat 
contracts as the security for the loan rather than the asset (Chao et al., 2008 pg:45). 
These risks were echoed by a supplier  
“that to an investor is of course not that easy and because they don't see two income 
streams they see two risks of income” ELECTSUP 
Other times even with a heat purchase agreement, investors still place a premium on 
the heat off-take risk because they assume that companies can go bust or relocate 
and shareholders are not liable for payment as long as they don’t consume the heat. 
A developer below affirms the difficulty that even with a heat purchase agreement, 
investors can remain sceptical in cases where the heat consumer is not an institution, 
and that relocation is not in the foreseeable future as with LAs, universities, hospitals 
or housing associations. The developer states that even with well-known manufacturer 
with 170 years of experience, investors were still seeing the heat as a risk in 
developing a biomass CHP and not revenue: 
“which is an enormous brand, has billions of pounds worth of whisky in storage and is 
an enormous business that's been there for 170 years, it's still seen as a credit 
risk…The banks assume that your heat user is not going to be there…They can't take 
the risk that the third party is going to be there for the term of the debt” CDHDEV 3 
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Considering that CHP developers have to show evidence of project financial viability, 
some CHP developers may have struggled to cross the financial bridge without a 
concrete heat agreement. Thus, CHP developers may have been locked out of the 
CfD auction due to a cascade of barriers from impact of heat off-take risk to the 
necessity to stay within the regulatory ambit of CHPQA. 
In addition to the issues raised above, there are a few legacy concerns which had 
been highlighted but still impact on CHP developers attempting to participate in the 
CfD auction. One is the entry route into the electricity market for independent 
generators such as guaranteed power purchase agreements. This is key because CfD 
contract beneficiaries have to earn revenue from the market, topped up via the LCCC. 
The implication of this is that renewable generators would have to enter into PPAs to 
earn guaranteed price indexed to the reference price of the CfD minus a discount from 
suppliers. Furthermore, suppliers have a better negotiating position and skills as they 
have the capacity to hire the best expertise. This discount, which is made up of the 
cost of trading, balancing cost, administrative cost, long-term risk and profit margin for 
the PPA provider, usually means a 10-20% reduction on the wholesale electricity 
market price to the generators (Handley, 2013). Therefore this risk is significant for the 
development of the market in the long term which was even acknowledged by 
government (DECC, 2013i).  
However, to mitigate the challenge of entry to the market by CfD beneficiaries, BEIS 
(formerly DECC) had developed an alternative route to the market known as off-taker 
of last resort (OLR). Where necessary the OLR mandates suppliers to enter into short-
term (one year back stop) PPAs with generators that hold a CfD contract on a fixed 
and pre-set discount to the market reference price until they can find a commercial 
PPA. However OLR will only be available for RE generators from April 2016 through 
applications started in October, 2015 (DECC, 2014b), so the weight of the merits and 
demerits of the OLR are unknown at the time of writing. 
The second legacy issue is grid connection for independent generators. This barrier 
was discussed in section 2.3, concerning CM, but also has a bearing on the 
performance of CfD auctions as its part of the qualification risk. This resulted in the 
disqualification of three applicants in the CfD allocation round for not submitting a 
validly signed connection agreement (Grant Thornton and Pöyry, 2015b) though it’s 
not clear if any of the three disqualified CfD beneficiaries intend to use CHP but 
nonetheless grid connection has been identified as barrier to CHPs.  
10.2.1.3 Carbon price floor/CCL/CRC 
The UK has an array of energy taxes on electricity, gas, LPG and other solid fuel used 
by businesses and the public sector with the motive of incentivising reduction of 
decarbonisation of energy consumption. Furthermore, 14.8% of respondents in Table 
72 considers CCL as an effective government scheme to drive the penetration for 
CHP-DH system. The Climate Change Levy (CCL) was introduced in 2001 on fuel and 
electricity supplied to non-domestic energy consumers (HMRC, 2016a) excluding 
renewables. The CCL is typically made up of two tax routes, namely, the main rates 
and the Carbon Price Support (CPS) rates. The main rates mandates businesses and 
public sector to pay taxes on consumption of electricity and other fuel used for lighting, 
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heat and power to their suppliers, who then pay it to the revenue and customs. The 
CPS rate is a tax on energy products such as oil, coal and gas used for electricity 
generation by the non-domestic sector. In effect the main rate is a downstream tax on 
energy products and the CPS an upstream energy tax. Additionally, the CPS is the 
also considered as the top-up tax on the EU ETS to form part of the Carbon Price 
Floor, which seeks to attach a floor price to carbon from both the EU ETS and CPS 
with a view to incentivise the non-domestic sector to monitor and reduce their emission 
through renewable energy sources such as biomass. 
Other related governance mechanisms are the Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) 
and the Climate Change Agreement (CCA). The CRC is both a regulatory and market 
mechanism which targets companies and institutions with over 6000MWh annual 
electricity consumption and who are not part of the EU ETS and the CCA. These have 
to report and publish their annual energy (electricity and gas) consumption and buy 
allowances from the Government or secondary market for every tonne of carbon 
emitted or face a penalty (Carbon Trust, 2016) with heat having a zero allowance 
(CCC/DECC/DEFRA, 2015b). While the CCA is a voluntary agreement between 
networks or actors in the energy intensive sector like paper or chemical sectors and 
the Government to monitor and reduce their carbon emission to an agreed target and 
which is being administered by the Environment Agency. CCAs are captured through 
two major sets of agreement, namely the umbrella agreement between networks or 
association and the Government, while the second is the underlying agreement 
between Government and the actors. The significance of the CCA is that organisations 
that sign up to the CCA attract a 90% discount on their CCL main rates on electricity 
and a 65% discount on CCL main rates on other fuels (EA, 2014). 
However, the complexities and reporting burden of these interrelated mechanisms on 
the non-domestic energy actors have spurred the Government to announce the 
abolishment of the CRC scheme after the 2018-2019 compliance year and integrate it 
with the main rates of the CCL (HMRC, 2016a). This is with a view to smoothing the 
energy consumption reporting landscape and to incentivise energy efficiency and 
renewable energy sources. The implication of the abolishment of the CRC scheme is 
that the band of organisations under the CRC scheme will focus on the paying the 
main rates of the CCL only but with the CCL main rates now increasing with inflation.  
Nonetheless, the CRC scheme has been seen by CHP operators as another example 
of policy change as a result of political change. This scheme was intended to be 
revenue neutral when it was announced in 2007, with operators getting their money 
back if emissions were reduced to agreed limits at the end of the compliance year 
(DTI, 2007 pg 54. para 2.23). However, on the arrival of the Coalition government in 
2010, the return side of the policy was abolished, and it literally became a carbon tax. 
This constituted a distortion in their financial flow with a knock-on effect on payback 
time. 
Additionally in 2010 through its consultative proposal, the treasury initiated a reform of 
the CCL regime to remove the previously enjoyed levy exemption certificate (LECs) 
on electricity exported from CHPs with effectiveness from the 1st of April, 2013, but 
still retained the LECs for site-only electricity consumption (HMRC, 2010). Therefore, 
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since April 2013 if the CHP is certified by the CHPQA, it will attract an exemption from 
CPS on fuel used for heat generation and from April 2015 CHPs are also exempted 
from fuel used for electricity generation that was consumed not exported (DECC, 
2015c). Indicating that from April 2015 CHPQA certified CHPs are now exempted from 
both main rates of CCL and CPS on fuel used for electricity generated that is 
consumed but not exported including CPS on fuel used for heat generated. The 
findings from this research suggest that the industry’s impression about CPS is mixed 
on the impact on CHP. Some think it makes gas fired CHPs more expensive to develop 
since some of electricity generated will have to be exported to gain revenue from the 
electricity market, while others think its impact is negligible considering the low and 
unstable price of carbon and for any serious impact on CHP economics the price of 
carbon will have to be many folds more as suggested by a CHP-DH developer below. 
“I think the carbon price floor the CPS, that is a tax, so it makes CHP more expensive, 
so it’s not good. If you have a gas CHP, it’s obviously making business more difficult” 
CDHOP 12 
“I think carbon price floor ... this is where it becomes quite interesting because I've 
looked into this a little bit. Actually, for CHP not to be economic, I'm purely speaking 
from a financial perspective, I've done some exercises looking at it. In reality carbon 
would have to increase by about ten-fold, the cost of carbon… The quick sums that I 
did, I reckoned it had to be over 100 before it would have any impact” CDHDEV 5 
However the Government has reviewed the CPS policy by pegging the CPS to £18 
from 2016 to 2020 due to uncertainty of carbon price at the EU ETS partly due to the 
excessive supply of permits at the continental level (HMRC, 2014), but as highlighted 
in chapter 5 the increased and continuous levy on the UK industries through the CPS 
without a corresponding levy on their counterparts in Europe may precipitate the risk 
of carbon leakage (the relocation of production to less taxed areas). The negative 
effect of the CPS will continue to impact on the finances of CHP operators who 
participate in the EU ETS. For instance the British companies under the EU ETS pay 
an additional £18t/CO2 compared to their European counterparts, which has led to 
some politicians calling for the scrapping of the CPS scheme (Carbonnel, 2016). 
Therefore, until the EU evolves a policy lever to have stable price for carbon through 
the management of the supply of emission allowance, the CPS cost to business will 
continue to destabilise the policy framework in the long term. Secondly, the UK CPF 
policy may be integrated into an EU-wide policy so as to create a level playing field for 
the CHP operators in the UK else it may begin to show signs of unpopularity. 
Nonetheless, CHPQA certified CHP-DH systems in the UK appears not to be 
significantly worried with the various reviews of CPS and CRC schemes but more 
concerned with the exclusion of CHP from export of electricity from CCL main rates. 
This suggests that the overall objective of the schemes which is to incentivise investors 
in low carbon technology by exploring gains from both electricity and heat production 
may not reach its full potential through these governance instruments.  
10.2.1.4 Emissions Performance Standard (EPS) 
EPS is a regulatory mechanism under the EMR framework which seeks to limit 
emission from new fossil fuel plants but is elaborated further in Section 5.1.3.4. 
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However, CHPs (including gas fired) plants that have been certified by CHPQA as 
good quality are usually EPS compliant so are not affected by this policy. Therefore, 
the EPS shall not receive further consideration in this analysis because of its 
insignificance to the CHP-DH sector. 
10.2.2 Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) 
The RHI is a tariff-based governance mechanism introduced in law in 2008 and 
intended to support the diffusion of renewable heat sources in the UK. Its adoption 
was partitioned into two phases, the first phase covering non-domestic use of RES-H 
in 2011 and the second, a domestic phase, introduced in 2014 (Connor et al, 2015).  
The concern of this research lies with the non-domestic RHI, in part because the focus 
is on CHP-DH technology which entails heating more than one building which the 
domestic RHI does not support while the non-domestic RHI supports both CHPs and 
district heating. 
There are four renewable heat sources that are relevant to CHP which are eligible for 
non-domestic RHI. These are biogas, solid biomass, waste and geothermal. There is 
also a separate tariff level for solid biomass CHP. Despite solid biomass CHP being 
eligible to RHI, there are caveats for CHPs to be eligible for RHIs, for example, solid 
biomass CHPs must show evidence of CHPQA certification. Effectively saying any 
solid biomass CHP that loses or is unable to renew their CHPQA certificates will only 
receive the solid biomass tariff for that period, which is smaller than the solid biomass 
CHP tariff (Ofgem, 2015b). This is because of the combustion component involved in 
solid biomass CHPs in the process of heat generation. Secondly, biogas CHP below 
200kwth that has converted from electricity to heat must have been installed on or 
after July 2009 (on or after December 2013 if it’s over 200kW th). In accessing the 
payments for RHI under the non-domestic regime, CHPs installed before July 2009 
have been exempted from the mandatory class 2 meters, if they have a pre-installed 
class 3 meter (Ofgem, 2015b) 
In addition to CHPQA certification, solid biomass CHPs with capacities of 45kW th or 
below are required to obtain a Microgeneration Certification Scheme (MCS) 
accreditation. However, there are technologies that are 45kW th and below that don’t 
require MCS certification such as biogas, geothermal and solid biomass in waste heat 
sources. What this essentially means is that under the non-domestic RHI scheme 
there was no obligation for compliance regarding design standards and sizing of 
equipment that was required for capacities over 45kW. Connor et al. (2013) had 
argued that lack of standard may undermine public confidence and the value for 
money of tax payer’s money spent on such schemes. Therefore, absence of a 
standard for over 45kW may erode legitimacy of the scheme. However, in 2014, three 
years after the non-domestic scheme had started; CIBSE unveiled a guidance manual 
on applying for biomass systems known as AM15 Biomass heating. It sought to inject 
some form of standardisation on biomass heating systems by outlining design, 
installation and commissioning standards. This application manual only covers 
biomass systems between 50kW and 5MW (CIBSE, 2014) leaving an overall 
standardization of the schemes still in doubt, especially for schemes between 45 -
50kW. Also, of note is the insufficient monitoring and feedback mechanism embedded 
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in the scheme. A CHP developer had this to say on the lack of standardization of the 
scheme. 
“The kind of thing that we could have probably in a few years ago, be like the biomass 
technically guide of CIBSE that came out a few months ago, it would have been handy 
if we would have had that before the RHI started so that a lot of the biomass projects 
that went in would have been designed more efficient” CTNT3 
Ofgem, as administrators of the scheme, released a guidance document on non-
domestic RHI but didn’t make mention of CIBSE AM15 standardization document but 
rather only referred to CIBSE’s heat loss calculation document for heat metering 
purposes (Ofgem, 2015b). Indicating that the adoption of the CIBSE AM15 
standardisation manual is not obligatory to applicants by Ofgem. However, applicants 
who are members of CIBSE which is a governance network of heating professionals 
are bound to adhere to the instructions from the CIBSE AM15 document. The concern 
remains that the efficiency of larger systems outside the regulatory reach of MCS may 
not be guaranteed to actually reduce the emissions as expected or justify the value for 
money as there will be no uniform standard of installation. Another implication could 
be the heating landscape becomes proliferated with different installation standards 
which may constitute a barrier to learning lessons from large-scale systems.  
To investigate the role and impact of RHI on the diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the 
UK amongst the respondents of the research, CHP operators and consultants were 
asked whether the RHI scheme should stimulate the required growth of CHP-DH in 
the UK. The results from Table 76 shows that about 42.5% of the CHP operators and 
37.0% of the consultants tend to agree that the renewable heat incentive (RHI) should 
stimulate the required growth of CHP – DH in the UK. However, the support is weak 
due to the non-significant result as the p value was 0.182 (0.182>0.05), therefore the 
data are inconclusive. Hence there is no statistical evidence that the respondents think 
that RHI should stimulate the diffusion of CHP-DH in the UK. 
Summarily, since there was no significant in the statistical results, a further research 
with a view to achieve significance may necessary to reinforce the qualitative data 
which some consider RHI as an instrument that should stimulate CHP-DH penetration 
but it’s not. 
10.3 Conclusion 
The UK has deployed several governance mechanisms for RE systems, including 
tendering/auction, tariff, quota mechanisms and tax instruments, which might have 
had the potential to facilitate the penetration of CHP-DH systems if applied to them. A 
number of these mechanisms have been home or domestic focused to improve energy 
efficiency of homes such as CESP, ECO, and GD with little impact on the development 
of CHP-DH systems.  
Secondly the taxation regime to drive the penetration of low carbon generation of 
electricity such as EU-ETS, CPS, CCL, CRC and ECA have not driven penetration 
due to the prolonged uncertainty of the price of carbon, removal of tax rebate on 
electricity exported from CHP-DH systems on CCL and the removal of ECA rebate for 
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CHPs if they are enjoying other mechanisms like RHI. Other mechanisms that seek to 
incentivise the generation of electricity include the RO, CM, and CfD. The RO was 
reformed but still presents risk; the CfD sought to reduce unit energy costs by 
addressing these with a view to guaranteeing investor revenue and market access 
through OLR. However, in respect to development of CHP-DH systems, problems with 
grid access was still prevalent in both CfD and CM schemes which was further 
encapsulated in qualification risk and reinforced by the non-convergence of cost and 
revenue risk of CHP-DH systems which may have systematically locked out the 
penetration of CHP-DH system in the UK. The literature suggests a possible 
alternative for the adoption of locational pricing in the procurement of fixed payment 
capacities to achieve a middle ground response to the connection risk as employed in 
the CM scheme of Italy (Eurelectric, 2015).  
As other mechanisms were focused on electricity generation, RHI is focused on RES-
H, but there was no significance on the results to reinforce the claim that RHI should 
stimulate the penetration of CH-DH or not.   
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11.0 Conclusion Chapter  
11.1 Introduction  
The outline of this conclusion chapter starts with a definitive introduction that captures 
the broad status of CHP-DH systems in UK and the research objectives underpinning 
this research. This is followed with a synthesis of the empirical findings presented in 
the statistical results in chapter 7 and the discussion in chapters 8, 9 & 10. The next 
section seeks to discuss the theoretical and policy implications of the findings in the 
context of adopted concepts, which may offer insights to alternative governance 
pathways to address the findings. Thereafter, the strength, weakness and contribution 
to TIS was discussed. This chapter also highlighted the original contribution of this 
research to knowledge, how recommendations would be quantified and accessed and 
the recommendations for further research.  
Despite the benefits and the technological maturity of CHP-DH, it is still commercially 
immature in the UK as evident from its low penetration (about 6% of UK electrical 
production, while ~2% of total heat consumption is supplied via DH networks). This 
may be largely due to an array of failures that extend beyond the traditional market 
failure, such as high entry cost. However, Government’s usual focus of reducing 
market barriers by providing seed money to crowd in private investment may not be 
optimal. Since in a market economy like the UK, the market failure approach does not 
capture externalities. Such as free riders or knowledge generation which are not 
reflected in market transactions that is driven by competitive prices. Furthermore the 
persistent focus of regulatory paradigms driven by techno-economic factors but with 
little recognition of socio-economic factors (Webb, 2014) does not internalise the 
externalities associated with the growth of CHP-DH systems and this choice of 
regulatory route may also have resulted in resistance to new entrants, lock-in by 
incumbent actors and selection environment of heating technology.  
The investigation of the failures that may have contributed to the low penetration of 
CHP-DH systems in the UK is broadly captured in three research objectives. Firstly, 
to investigate the dominant operational and marketing landscapes and governance 
structures that permeate the UK CHP-DH industry. This includes consideration of the 
underlying characteristics such as economic and management models, with a view to 
improving the impacts of these models on technology diffusion and also providing 
illumination on the dominant risks that militates against the development of the system 
from the CHP-DH actor’s perspective. Secondly, building on the barriers thrown up by 
this research and the dominant risk profile, the research seeks to pose alternative 
governance pathways to reduce or eliminate these barriers. Alternative roles of local 
authorities (LAs) as governance hierarchies and TIS prime movers are also explored 
to address these barriers given the potential roles they can play to promote social, 
economic and environmental wellbeing of their community and being CHP-DH 
champions globally (UNEP, 2015). Thirdly, the research explores the impact of current 
governance instruments in the UK electricity and heat sectors on the diffusion of CHP-
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DH systems, with a view to propose pathways to influence the penetration of CHP-DH 
system. 
In achieving these objectives, this research has adopted a TIS functional analytical 
approach system to diagnose and explain how the socio-technical system work and 
performs in relation to the structure rather than how the system is composed (Markard 
and Truffer, 2008b). This is as suppose to a system failure framework which only 
captures the structural element of the system (actors, networks and institutions) and 
not paying enough attention to the system dynamics that determine the performance 
of the system (Bergek et al., 2008b, Bergek et al., 2010, Hekkert et al., 2007b).  
Since infrastructures are socio-technical systems with complexities arising from the 
interaction of technical, economic, political and social actors to ensure their diffusion 
and utilization. The modes of governance of the interactions of these actors are vital 
for the technology to meet set targets and goals (Carlsson et al., 2002, Hillman et al., 
2011). Therefore, governance mechanisms were adopted in mapping of a TIS 
functional pattern to advance alternative governance routes.   
This research does not suggest any form or type of governance mechanism that is the 
silver bullet to influence the greater penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK because 
of the complex array of actors in the CHP-DH industry but suggest a targeted 
combination of governance mechanisms or “hybrid regulation” (Hey et al., 2007) that 
may influence and coordinate the nested nature of decision-making. Nonetheless, key 
to note is the role of the hierarchies of governance (state and LA) in enabling or 
blocking the diffusion of the technology. Primarily, with the state evolving a joined-up 
policy portfolio to stimulate investment in CHP-DH systems and the LAs taking up 
“doers and enablers” roles as prime movers in the penetration of the technology.  
11.2 Empirical Findings 
The empirical findings of this research were discussed in chapters 8, 9 and 10. These 
chapters sought to investigate the research objectives using results from both the 
quantitative (statistical) and qualitative (thematic and citation) data analysis. Below is 
the synopsis of these findings. 
Chapter eight sought to offer an insight into the prevailing technological, economical 
and management landscape of the UK CHP-DH industry. Technologically, the industry 
is dominated by small sized CHP-DH systems that are predominantly heat-led silo 
systems with little interconnectivity with other systems. While the electricity from CHPs 
is mainly consumed locally through private wire arrangements with little patronage of 
the electricity grid. Economically, the industry is commonly driven by techno-economic 
and commercial objectives suggesting that socio-economically motivated systems are 
not prevalent, with the dominant management approach favouring more emphasis on 
vertically integrated ESCOs that are predominantly privately led as supposed to public 
led. Suggesting that ESCOs are more structured as shared savings with the ESCOs 
bearing both technical and credit risk due to the inability of LAs to bear the credit risk 
of the development of CHP-DH systems. Results also suggest that 35.3% of LAs think 
they disagree and another 14% strongly disagree (see Table 32) that they possess 
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the capacity to engage ESCOs for their services. Suggesting that LAs lack the capacity 
to engage with ESCOs. 
Furthermore, the results suggest minimal participation of LAs in the CHP-DH industry, 
which may be inimical to its diffusion considering that LAs are custodians of large 
anchor loads and can locate and coordinate other potential customers. Results in this 
chapter also shows that there is statistical evidence that the CHP-DH industry in the 
UK is at an infancy but growing stage with p = 0.000 (0.000< 0.05) (see Table 16). 
Also, the descriptive results show that 63% of respondents thinks the industry is at 
infancy but growing (see Table 15). Suggesting that UK CHP-DH industry is in a 
nursing market phase of development due to its limited penetration. 
Chapter eight also investigated the prevalent risk factors that militate against 
investment in CHP-DH system in the UK and the results show that there is statistical 
evidence of seven risk factors which militates against the development of CHP-DH 
systems in the UK with p value less than 0.05. They are heat off-take, availability of 
finance, cost of finance, delay in planning permission, planning permission risk, land 
acquisition and compensation and LAs experience in PPP (see Table 26). 
Furthermore, when CHP operators were asked the dominant challenge to their 
operations, 28.44% of respondents consider regulatory, while 23% considers the 
market and another 18.9% thinks its taxation (see Table 30). Similarly, consultants 
were asked the dominant challenge before construction. Results show that 44% of 
respondents also consider heat load as the most, with 24% considering lack of capital 
(see Table 29).  
Chapter nine discussed the significant barriers identified during the research that are 
militating against the growth of the industry and possible pathways from actors on 
ways to ameliorate these risks. Key areas of discussion as highlighted by respondents 
included: 
 The impact of information asymmetries in the industry as a barrier where all 
actors don’t access information equally due to high transaction cost in getting 
information for CHP-DH development resulting from lack of registered database 
on CHP-DH systems and accessible energy data. Results show that many LAs 
have developed and are developing heat maps for their area, but how the 
content can be populated with updated building level energy data to enhance 
planning and development as the current national heat map is insufficient and 
yet to be clear. Also, importantly the privacy rights of dwellers will be key to the 
success including the coordination of the roles of both the regulators and 
energy suppliers as critical factors. 
 There was qualitative and statistical evidence that the absence of nationally 
integrated CHP-DH strategy is hampering the growth of the industry and 
therefore a joined-up national framework for CHP-DH systems be put in place 
to curtail incessant policy changes and provide certainty to investors with 
respondents suggesting more roles for the LAs. Furthermore, there was also 
statistical evidence that Ofgem is the preferred body to host any regulation for 
heat infrastructure.  
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 The sale of social housing by LAs is a concern to the industry as these anchor 
loads impact on the ability of LAs to lead the development of CHP-DH projects. 
While Scotland and Wales seem to have back pedalled on this, LAs in England 
are more concerned with adjusting to financial cuts by selling off these social 
housing schemes than keeping them. Suggesting that the state may be driving 
the selloff due to cuts to LAs. Thus, this research suggests the state to mandate 
the LAs to insert in sale/lease agreement of such housing stock that it should 
be connected to DH networks when it’s made available or such housing areas 
should be designated as DH zones, whenever DH is made available. This 
would provide the avenue for the LAs to still make money from the sales but 
still ensure that such housing stock will still be considered for DH in future 
energy plans.  
 This research also investigated skill deficiency in UK CHP-DH industry by firstly, 
determining if there is a skill gap in the UK’s CHP-DH industry. Quantitative 
results show that about 55.2% of the CHP operators and 40.7% of the 
consultants tend to agree (51.8% total group) that there is a skill gap in the CHP 
and DH industry in the UK (see Table 58). However, the support is weak due 
to the non-significant result as seen in Table 59, which shows a p value of 0.340 
(0.340 > .05) therefore the data are inconclusive. Furthermore, CHP-DH 
operators and consultants were asked that if they agree that there is a skill gap 
then they should grade the deficiency of skills according to the enumerated skill 
sets. Statistical results show that the p value corresponding to the t-test in all 
skill set – Design and manufacture of DH pipes, Manufacture of CHP systems, 
Business development, construction of DH systems, installation of CHP 
systems and operations and maintenance are all more than 0.05 (p>0.05). 
Hence, we can conclude that, there is no significant difference in the skill set 
between CHP operators and consultants. Therefore, the data are inconclusive.  
However, in a view to further distinguish the proportion of variability of the 
various skill set and considering the profound effect of sample size on statistical 
significance and the independence of effect size from sample size (Fritz et al., 
2012, Gail M. Sullivan and Richard Feinn, 2012). A further consideration of the 
effect size (Cohen’s d) was noted, as only Business development and 
Operations and Maintenance skill set had positive effect sizes of 0.077 and 0.32 
respectively (see mean differences in Table 62). According to Cohen (1992), 
business development with a 0.1 effect size equivalent shows a small effect but 
not trivial, while operations and maintenance have 0.32 effect size, which 
shows a near medium effect on the variability of the mean values. Therefore, 
this provides an opportunity for further research to increase the sample size 
with a view to achieve statistical significance and arrive at a more concrete 
theoretical and practical conclusion even though there was strong qualitative 
evidence. 
 Finally, the qualitative data suggest that scale of housing could also influence 
the influence the selection environment of CHP-DH systems as it becomes 
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appropriate to use CHP-DH between 500 – 1000 housing units/site. However, 
the current new build scale of about 54 houses per site is too low to attract 
CHP-DH systems. In understanding the role of housing density. This research 
also sought to find out what is the development growth path of CHP-DH 
systems in the UK with a view to ascertain if respondents consider new builds 
as one of the areas that could be critical to the diffusion of CHP-DH systems. 
Statistical results from Table 64 show that the p value corresponding to the t-
test in new builds, urban centres, sub-urban, industrial areas and remote areas 
are all more than 0.05 (p>0.05). Hence, we can conclude that, there is no 
significant difference in the various growth pathways between CHP operators 
and consultants. However, in a view to further distinguish the proportion of 
variability of the various growth pathways and considering the profound effect 
of sample size on statistical significance and the independence of effect size 
from sample size (Fritz et al., 2012, Gail M. Sullivan and Richard Feinn, 2012). 
A further consideration of the effect size (Cohen’s d) was noted, as only new 
builds and industrial areas had positive effect sizes of 0.1 and 0.12 respectively. 
According to Cohen (1992), new builds with a 0.1 and industrial areas with a 
0.12 effect sizes, both shows a small effect but not trivial, on the variability of 
the mean values. Therefore, this provides an opportunity for further research to 
increase the sample size with a view to achieve statistical significance and 
arrive at a more concrete conclusion.  
Chapter 9 also captured the roles LAs can play as prime movers in the CHP-DH TIS 
in mitigating the identified risks and barriers. Considering that LAs as part of the 
hierarchies of governance, they are the foremost actors with the potential to facilitate 
the growth of CHP-DH systems (UNEP, 2015). This is in part because of their statutory 
powers to provide social housing, health services, planning and influence energy 
production and use of energy by buildings. Five major roles were outlined which were 
drawn from results of this research, these include: 
 Strategic role of LAs to evolve local policy frameworks that would encapsulate 
CHP-DH systems through joined-up policy visions and planning. 
 LAs playing the role as the institutional bridge between institutions with CHP-
DHs systems with a view to coordinate interconnections of DH networks to 
organically grow the network to a citywide infrastructure. This is in view of 
respondents suggesting LAs as the link between various heat off-takers. 
 LAs could leverage their collective electrical generation capacity and load by 
obtaining a full electricity standard license so as to disrupt the electricity industry 
status quo by participating in electricity market governance. 
 LAs can leverage on anchor loads to de-risk CHP-DH investment to ameliorate 
the heat off-take risk. LAs can also leverage on the trust they enjoy from 
residents to play the role of an ombudsman for the local heat sector and a quasi-
regulator to institute governance mechanisms that would govern market 
transactions and provide accountability for the ESCOs operations. However, 
there may arise skill challenges that may reflect financial constraints. 
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 There was statistical evidence that availability of finance and cost of finance are 
risk factors that militate against the penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
Furthermore, there was also strong qualitative data to support this as many 
interviewees suggest that the finance must be provided by the state to capture 
these two risk factors. Therefore, data from the qualitative research suggests a 
government guarantee to loans, loans from pensions fund or loans from PWLB, 
as more innovative and sustainable route to financing CHP-DH systems, that 
captures LAs as prime mover. However, the dominant choice was getting loans 
from PWLB to deliver LA led systems as the alternative pathway. However, 
PWLB lends to LAs based-on revenue, so many LAs are locked out due to low 
earnings and severe cuts on statutory grants from the state over time. Hence, 
the alternative governance for LAs to have access to sustained high volume of 
low cost finance. Therefore, the lending criteria of the PWLB to the LAs may be 
reconsidered by the state to reflect the CHP-DH asset or revenue. This would 
effectively consider the potential for LA led CHP-DH systems to contribute to 
national environmental and energy targets.  
Chapter 10 discussed the prevailing governance mechanisms that permeate the CHP-
DH landscape in the UK. Quantitative results from respondents favoured Community 
Energy Savings Programme (CESP) which is an obligatory scheme and Renewable 
Heat Incentive (RHI – a form of FiT) schemes as the governance mechanisms that 
influenced the diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK the most. However, the CESP 
scheme was before the commencement of this research, which leaves the RHI for 
further investigation and only the non-domestic RHI supports biomass CHPs but not 
DH, which suggest that RHI supports decentralised heat system rather than 
centralised heating system like DH network.  
To investigate the role and impact of RHI on the diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the 
UK. CHP operators and consultants were asked whether the RHI scheme should 
stimulate the required growth of CHP-DH in the UK. Quantitative results from Table 
76 shows that 41.2% of respondents tend to agree and another 15.8% strongly agree 
that the renewable heat incentive (RHI) should stimulate the required growth of CHP 
– DH in the UK. However, the support is weak due to the non-significant result as the 
p value was 0.182 (0.182>0.05) (see Table 77), therefore the data are inconclusive. 
Hence there is no statistical evidence that the respondents think that RHI should 
stimulate the diffusion of CHP-DH in the UK. 
Chapter 10 also investigated the impact of the EU-ETS on CHP-DH diffusion but 
results from this research shows that respondents were almost evenly split as to the 
extent of the influence on the diffusion of CHP-DH in the UK. This is largely depending 
on the scale of the CHP-DH system, if it’s larger than 20MW or less. Domestic and 
commercial CHP-DH operators do not see the EU-ETS as impacting on their 
operations as they are often below 20MW thermal output. A further investigation of the 
impact of government’s electricity market reform schemes on the CHP-DH industry 
was also examined. These mechanisms are seen to have minimal impact on CHP-DH 
system, largely because they were not targeted by the EMR mechanisms, and thus 
they have weak interaction with CHP-DH systems. According to respondents of this 
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research, infrastructural failure resulting from CHPs being unable to access 
connection offers due to grid bottlenecks, may also contribute to why CHP investors 
may consider the qualification risk as a significant hurdle. These may all have 
combined to result in CHP-DH system being systematically locked out from EMR 
governance mechanisms (CM and CfD). 
11.3 Applying Technological Innovation Systems Framework to 
CHP-DH 
11.3.1 Functional Analytical Pattern – CHPDH development phase 
Results from quantitative analysis shows that there is statistical evidence that the 
CHP-DH industry in UK is in an infancy but growing stage. Therefore, this section shall 
seek to diagnose and explain the development stages in the diffusion of CH-DH 
systems in the UK using the TIS functional pattern with the aim of analysing the 
performance of the CH-DH innovation system which would give special attention to 
the governance measures that influenced the functioning of the innovation system. 
Such as regulations, tax exemptions and so on. Also, in the focus shall be the actors 
and institutional structures that permeates the CHP-DH innovation system considering 
their various roles in influencing the rate of diffusion of CH-DH system in the UK. 
In diagnosing and explaining the development of CHP-DH innovation system using 
the functional approach, there are two distinct phases that defines the technological 
transformation of the system. They are the formative and growth/market expansion 
phases (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). The description of the formative phase was 
undertaken in chapter 3.7.2. While this section shall describe the growth phase. The 
growth phase is determined by when the market is formed and up to when its self-
sustaining. This phase is also known as the market formation phase, which is further 
divided into three categories, namely: (a) nursing market – when market begins to 
evolve and with limited size, (b) bridging market – enlargement of actors and increased 
market size, (c) mass market – when market is fully evolved and self-sustaining. 
Therefore, drawing from the quantitative results that shows that the CHP-DH industry 
is in infancy, but growing stage suggests that the growth/market formation phase of 
the UK CHP-DH industry is a nursing market. 
The seven amalgamated categories of functions of a TIS as discussed by various 
authors (Hekkert et al., 2007b, Hekkert and Negro, 2009, Bergek et al., 2008b, Bergek 
et al., 2008a) are F1 – Entrepreneurial Activities, F2 – Knowledge Development and 
Diffusion, F3 – Influence on the Direction of Search, F4 – Market Formation, F5 – 
Resource Mobilization, F6 – Creation of Legitimacy, F7 – Development of Positive 
Externalities.  
The description of each function of the structure is discussed below, highlighting the 
significant contributors to its performance as well as capturing the complex interaction 
of the element within the structure. Suggesting that one contributor may have the 
potential to impact on several functions.  
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Influence of the direction of search 
These are factors that can stimulate network and institutional interaction with a view 
to signposting new firms to enter the CHP-DH arena. These include regulatory 
mechanisms, Government targets and policies, incentives, visions, actors assessment 
and elimination of technical bottlenecks (Bergek et al., 2008b). Scarcity or non-
alignment of these factors may be detrimental to the performance of CHP-DH systems. 
The UK has evolved several sorts of mechanisms that may stimulate the penetration 
of CHP-DH systems through electricity and heat policies, such as tax rebates & 
exemptions, price and quantity determinant schemes. The first UK national 
assessment of the CHP-DH potential was in 1977 by the Marshall report, which gave 
rise to the Atkins report that led to the Lead city scheme, which provided a grant of 
£750,000 from DOE to three LAs (Belfast, Edinburgh, Leicester) in 1985 (Babus'Haq 
and Probert, 1996). Subsequently, there has been several stop-and-go grants 
schemes to facilitate the penetration of CHP-DH systems and the recent being the 
£320m under the HNIP.  
There have also been four major national strategy statement/documents with 
implications for CHP-DH systems. These are (1) The Climate Change – UK 
programme in 2000 (DETR, 2000), (2) The Future of Heating: A Strategic Framework 
for low carbon heat in the UK (DECC, 2012), (3) The Community Energy Strategy 
(DECC, 2014) and (4) Next steps to heat policy (CCC, 2016). The first (Climate 
Change – UK programme), set a target of 10,000MWe of CHP by 2010 while the fourth 
one (Next steps for heat policy) sets a target of connecting 250,000 homes to DH by 
2020. However, none had a joined-up target for CHP-DH system. One of the key ways 
to assess the performance of a TIS is to identify the factors that will influence the 
direction of growth through set targets (Bergek et al., 2008b pg. 94). The absence of 
CHP targets in three out of the four strategy statements and the absence of DH targets 
in three of the four documents suggests a disconnect between these strategy 
documents and expectations. Furthermore, the results from the quantitative analysis 
also reinforces that there is evidence that the absence of a joined-up strategy may 
have militated against the penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK.  
Also importantly, since the first target of 10GW of electricity generation from CHP by 
2010 (DETR, 2000), the UK has not set any further target from CHPs or heat 
generation from DH. An exception is the recent adoption of a Scotland specific target 
of 1.5TWh of heat demand through DH by 2020 by the Scottish Government (GIB, 
2015).These policy expectations not only influence direction of growth of CHP-DH but 
also impact on other functions of TIS in the CHP-DH arena such as actor behaviour.  
Furthermore, there is no regulation for heat supply in the UK and there is statistical 
evidence from this research that the CHP-DH actors would refer Ofgem to be the 
regulator. The results of this research also note the difficulty of CHP connection to the 
grid, with a respondent suggesting up to 10 years delay in obtaining connection 
approval, which was collaborated by a distribution network operator, that conditions 
meant for 100MW CHPs are now being implemented for small CHP plants as small as 
250KW in some areas in the UK due to grid bottlenecks. 
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Since elimination of technical bottlenecks is one of the factors that can influence 
direction of search, CHP grid connection barriers further reinforces a system failure, 
since CHPs cannot effectively connect to the electricity grid due to grid infrastructural 
failures (Foxon, 2007 pg:131-133 ). 
Entrepreneurial Experimentation 
Entrepreneurial experimentation within the functional pattern of system innovation 
framework attempts to capture the entrance of new actors in the CHP-DH arena as 
they seek to take a position in the market or the entrance of incumbents that change 
their business strategies with a view to capturing business opportunities that the CHP-
DH may offer. LAs have been central to the development of CHP-DH systems in the 
UK. However, this research has shown that many CHP-DH schemes are private led 
due to their dept of resources (human and capital) and ability to carry on both technical 
and credit risk. Such as Veolia, Thameswey, Cofely, Vital Energi and so on.  
Furthermore, the recent trend in the entrance of energy utilities known as super-
ESCOs into the CHP-DH industry to explore the business opportunities that CHP-DH 
industry offers may potentially alter the landscape of CHP-DH market. One example 
is the entrance of E-ON with the delivery of a CHP-DH scheme at Cranbrook in Devon 
in 2009 (Hawkey and Webb, 2016 pg:131). The concern around the entrance of 
incumbent large-scale vertically integrated energy companies is that it will further 
perpetuate their lock-in of the energy sector. Some 72% of UK total electricity 
generation in 2014 was from the six biggest electricity generators - EDF, Uniper 
(formerly E-On), RWE npower, British Gas (owned by Centrica), Drax, SSE, and 
Scottish Power- (Ofgem, 2016b).  
The expansion in gas infrastructure alongside rising demand for gas and other 
governance activities such as the privatization of the gas industry in 1986, which 
triggered the “dash for gas” in 1990s that resulted in about 20GW capacity of gas 
plants at an average growth of 2.1GW/year between 1991 and 2001 (McGlade et al., 
2016). These growths of gas capacity has also contributed to the significant 
displacement of coal by natural gas as the major primary energy source in the UK. 
This positions the gas actors to take opportunity of the North Sea gas and demand for 
gas to further exhibit stability and lock-in attributes of the gas grid as an infrastructure, 
contributing to gas being the dominant fuel for CHP-DH systems. 
According to the results reported in section 8.2.1, the UK CHP-DH industry has also 
recently seen the entrance of several new DH pipe suppliers. Hitherto there had been 
four major suppliers servicing the UK market, with the UK seeing its first local DH pipe 
manufacturer in 2012. However, lack of information on CHP-DH systems in the UK, 
lack of a joined-up strategy for CHP-DH system and the frequency at which policies 
are changed over short periods may have deterred more new entrants to the CHP-DH 
arena. Additionally, this research has shown evidence that seven risk factors, namely: 
heat off-take, availability of finance, cost of finance, delay in planning, planning 
permission, land acquisition and compensation, and lack of LAs experience in PPP 
militates against investment in CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
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Knowledge Development and Diffusion 
This function is determined by the learning activities which are considered to be at the 
heart of the innovation process. The common forms of learning processes, as 
highlighted in chapter 3, are “learning-by-doing” which arises from market growth that 
leads to reduction in the cost of production (Smith, 2000) , learning-by-using” which is 
as a result of increased use of CHP-DH systems by demand actors to influence 
increase in development and diffusion (McWilliams and Zilbermanfr, 1996), “learning-
by-research” which is typically as a result of knowledge resulting from research and 
development and  while “learning-by-interaction” is the knowledge acquired through 
interaction of demand and supply actors to influence the diffusion of CHP-DH systems 
(Edquist, 2005 pg:16). However due to the limited time of this research and the 
maturity of CHP-DH technology learning-by-research has been under-emphasised in 
this research work. The opportunity for learning-by-using activities are likely to be 
weak due to increased sale of LA housing stock, especially in England, which limits 
the economic viability and opportunity to lead the development and learning from CHP-
DH projects. Other factors that may have affected CHP-DH systems from being 
accepted and deployed that will see the increase in learning activities are for instance, 
the common perception that DH is not considered an integral part of the energy system 
in UK but rather an appendage (Russell, 1993, Hawkey, 2014) and widespread gas 
network may also have affected the low selection rate of CHP-DH systems for heating. 
Nonetheless, the Heat Networks Code of Practice (HNCP), jointly developed by ADE 
and CIBSE, and which seeks to regulate the development of CHP-DH system may 
trigger some form of regulation of best practice amongst signed-up members in the 
interim, though yet to be seen, but a sustainable pathway may be national regulatory 
code of practice and not voluntary for the CHP-DH industry. 
This research also suggests that the weak learning-by-interaction activities, due to 
lack of interaction of demand and supply actors may have been influenced by the 
absence of a national/local ombudsman and institutional infrastructures for heat. 
However, the learning-by-interaction activities has been strengthened by the Heat 
Customer Protection Scheme (HCPS) by ADE resulting in the Heat Trust, which has 
provided the channel for registered heat suppliers to further interact with their 
customers by providing a channel of feedback on complains and grievances. This is 
further strengthened by learning networks, which facilitates learning through 
interaction of CHP-DH actors such as ADE (formerly CHPA), CIBSE, Heat and the 
City, and UKDEA. 
The process of learning-by-doing which influences the cost reduction of development 
activities within CHP-DH systems is also weak due to high transaction cost resulting 
from information asymmetries such as lack of harmonised information concerning 
CHP-DH systems, lack of skills and unavailability of building level heat maps. 
However, DBEIS and its Scottish equivalent, Business, Industry and Energy of 
Scottish Government (BIE) through governance structures like HNDU and HNP 
respectively are acting to improve learning-by-doing activities through several 
measures. These include assisting in the development of knowledge and diffusion of 
CHP-DH systems by supporting feasibility studies, development of heat maps and 
through skill acquisition in many LAs. HNDU has supported over a hundred LAs in 
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developing CHP-DH systems, energy maps and council staff skills across England 
and Wales (DECC, 2016b). However, results from this research suggests that many 
LAs remain concerned about whether they have sufficiently skilled personnel to 
manage these schemes to delivery, with many suggesting they are not sufficiently 
equipped to deliver them without external help. Suggesting that the low learning 
activities is also because of the current low penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK 
with other contributing factors. Such as, low scale of new builds, lack of standards of 
energy contracts or ESCO, lack of recognised apprenticeship schemes and lack of 
institutional infrastructures for heat. 
In response to skill acquisition, many LAs with universities within their jurisdiction have 
developed working teams to enable knowledge transfer from universities to the LAs 
while other LAs are seeking help from external consultants. Additionally, there has 
been several steps by governance hierarchies to increase learning activities by 
improving penetration of CHP-DH systems. Such as the Scottish Government which 
sought to provide a total of £8million from 2014-2016 to registered social landlords, 
LAs, small and medium sized enterprises and energy services companies (ESCOs) 
with fewer than 250 employees to develop DH systems (Ricardo-E&E, 2015) through 
the District Heating Loan Fund. Another £320m has been provided by DBEIS to 
develop DH systems under the HNIP funding. These governance hierarchies have 
also stimulated the markets with several other mechanisms with a view to increasing 
the diffusion of CHP-DH systems including tax rebates such as Enhanced Capital 
Allowance or exemptions like CHP-DH exemption from CPS. However various 
scholars have regarded these mechanisms as ineffective due to their unpredictable 
and intermittent approach, and therefore cannot sustain the desired growth of CHP-
DH systems in the UK (Hawkey, 2016 pg:101, Winskel, 2016 pg:70, Tingey et al., 2016 
pg:174).  
Therefore, the stop-and-go policy approach by governance hierarchies, may have 
contributed to the low learning processes for the CHP-DH industry in the UK and thus 
may require alternative pathways to increase knowledge diffusion through seeking 
ways to improve learning curves by reducing barriers that may impact on the 
sustainable penetration of the systems. Such as the introduction of a national system 
of joined-up regulation for CHP-DH systems by the state that will be overseen by a 
national regulator for heat.  Furthermore, for the LAs to take up more strategic and 
leadership roles in the development of CHP-DH systems locally, by being enablers 
and doers in the CHP-DH industry through participation in the electricity and heat 
sectors. Such as leading the development of DH networks through LA-Led ESCOs 
and being a local ombudsman for heat. 
Market formation 
CHP contributed about 5.9% to UK electricity generation in 2015 (DBEIS, 2016a) with 
DH providing about 2% of heat demand (DECC, 2013a). Suggesting the limited 
contribution of CHP-DH to UK’s energy market and this collaborates with the findings 
of this research that the CHP-DH industry is at infancy meaning it’s a nursing market. 
Markets are created by policies and regulatory mechanisms and the stability of these 
mechanisms in the long-term determines how investors react to the market (Foxon et 
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al., 2005). This research suggests that there are seven risk factors that militate against 
the investment in CH-DH systems in chapter 8. Namely: heat off-take, availability of 
finance, cost of finance, delay in planning, planning permission risk, LAs experience 
in PPP, and land acquisition and compensation. Furthermore, the CHP-DH industry is 
at an infancy stage according to the findings of this research. This is consistent with 
various Government data that suggests the relatively small contribution of CHP-DH to 
UK’s electricity and heat sectors. Since the first national assessment potential of CHP-
DH systems by the Marshall report which advocated Government support for the 
diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK (Marshall, 1977). There has been several 
supports schemes such as the DOE £750,000 grant under the Lead City Scheme for 
Belfast, Edinburgh and Leicester (Babus'Haq and Probert, 1996). However these 
mechanisms have been considered unpredictable and intermittent and therefore 
likened to a “stop and go” policy (Praetorius et al., 2008 pg:157) with little impact to 
migrate the CHP-DH industry from a nursing market to a bridging market to enable it 
compete with the incumbents (Andersson and Jacobsson, 2000). Furthermore, the 
increased sale of LA housing stock, especially in England, reduces the de-risking 
capacity of LAs to economically justify the deployment of schemes and the low scale 
of housing development per site of new builds have also been highlighted in this 
research as contributing to blocking the formation of market for CHP-DH systems. Also 
the lack of information on CHP-DH systems in the UK may contribute to the low 
adoption of the technology (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). Also, importantly is the matured 
gas grid network which has dominated the provision of heat in the UK. 
However, despite the slower than expected growth, the increased awareness and 
acceptability of CHP-DH technology, arising from amongst other reasons. The 
interaction of increased energy demand, bills and the environment have precipitated 
gains in the supply chain. For instance, in 2012 the first UK based DH pipe 
manufacturing plant was built in 2012. While some other DH pipe manufacturers still 
think the volume of UK CHP-DH industry is not yet big enough to attract the 
development of a manufacturing plan to the UK. 
However, the respondents to this research agree that there is a growth in the industry, 
with a Denmark-based DH pipe supplier to the UK market claiming an annual growth 
of ~20% from 2013 - 2014 and the DH pipe supplier market broadening from the 
previously dominant four companies (LOGSTOR, Isoplus, Power-Pipe, and Brugg) to 
around ten in 2015. Respondents also reported gains in the CHP supplier market such 
as increased in sale of CHPs to the UK market.  
Additionally, this research suggests that there is growing optimism in the CHP-DH 
industry that the successful take-off of over 200 HNDU supported projects (DECC, 
2016b) and the recent £320m HNIP funding announcement (DECC, 2016a) could lead 
to further growth. Furthermore the potential increase of the CHP-DH market by the 
delivery of over 100 potential heat network projects to be supported by the Scottish 
Government’s Heat Network Partnership (HNP) (GIB, 2015) offers the opportunity for 
potentially significant market growth in the CHP-DH industry leading to bridge the 
CHP-DH market in the UK. 
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It is important to note that the delivery of many potential LA CHP-DH projects that are 
currently on the shelf and in feasibility stages would require the removal of several 
barriers that are militating against the penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK. Such 
as finance, grid connection for CHPs, joined-up policy/regulation and many more as 
highlighted in chapter eight would be critical to the market growth of the industry.  
Legitimation 
In innovation system, legitimisation is the process of overcoming the “liability of 
newness” (Bergek et al., 2008b) for the technology to be socially acceptable as 
incumbents seek to de-legitimise the technology by unit performance, growth potential 
or cost (Negro et al., 2012). The seemly poor historical performance of CHP-DH 
systems in the UK resulting from the failure of a few earlier CHP-DH systems. Such 
as the failure of the Gorton scheme in Manchester in 1919 due to pipe corrosion and 
the failure of Duddeston scheme in Birmingham in the fifties due to poor costing of the 
pipelines (Diamant and McGarry, 1968 pg 171-172). These and in addition with unsure 
position of government on the technical and economic viability of the technology 
(Russell, 1993) may all have contributed to weak selection environment and 
acceptability of CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
Therefore, the growth of CHP-DH systems in the UK would require for it to overcome 
its baggage of social acceptance and this process has been driven by several actors 
advocating the benefits of deploying CHP-DH systems. These advocacy 
groups/actors engage the Government, parliament, media, the energy industry, 
consumers, LAs and other actors with a view to creating social acceptance of the 
technology. Actors such as ADE, CIBSE, Heat and the City (A joint university 
collaboration energy research programme between universities of Edinburgh and 
Strathclyde), universities, UKDEA and many more are playing different roles in 
advocating for the deployment of CHP-DH systems in the UK. These lobby groups, 
which also draw from the research community and non-governmental organisations, 
have continued to exert pressure on the hierarchies of governance, to promote the 
benefit of CHP-DH systems on the environment and energy targets. They advocate 
for appropriate accommodation of CHP-DH systems in energy policies and for 
Government and regulators to evolve favourable governance mechanisms to eliminate 
barriers militating against the CHP-DH industry through various stakeholders’ 
workshops and meetings.  
This increased national awareness and acceptance of CHP-DH systems has led many 
LAs to evolve energy policies and adapt planning systems to reflect innovative ways 
of adopting CHP-DH systems in the UK. Such as Birmingham’s sustainable energy 
action plan (BCC, 2011) and Lancashire County Council’s revised planning system to 
signpost developers to CHP-DH systems (CLASP, 2011). Furthermore, the increased 
acceptance and legitimisation of CHP-DH systems has also attracted media coverage 
to advocate for the benefits of the technology (Johnson, 2014) and provide input to 
the energy sustainability debate in the UK. 
However, several other factors may also have negatively impacted on the 
legitimisation of CHP-DH systems in the UK. These include the increased sale of LA 
housing stock (especially in England), the centralised energy policy, the lack of 
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governance structures for heat suppliers and customers to build consumer confidence 
and strengthen social acceptance may all have impacted in reduced legitimacy for 
CHP-DH systems. Despite the seemingly increasing buy-in by national and local 
Government. The results of this research suggest the need for a national integrated 
strategy. The state has remained slow in presenting a joined-up policy and regulations 
for CHP-DH systems to influence its acceptance. In part because the Government 
considers district heating as still not widespread and therefore considers that 
regulatory mechanisms will impede its growth (DECC, 2013a). Furthermore, other 
factors against the legitimisation of CHP-DH systems could be attributed to the strong 
and organised incumbent advocates of centralised energy system which influence 
policy making and often oppose moves to strengthen support to a more distributed 
energy system (Bergek et al., 2008b). Nevertheless, several CHP-DH actors under 
the auspices of ADE and CIBSE have come together to evolve self-regulating 
mechanisms such as the Heat Customer Protection Scheme (HCPS) and Heat 
Networks Code of Practice (HNCP) with a view to instilling increased confidence and 
enhanced legitimacy, at least in the interim while the industry awaits a national 
regulatory system.  
Resource Mobilisation 
The results from this research suggest that availability of finance and cost of finance 
are some of the risk factors that are militating against investment in CHP-DH systems 
in the UK. Since after the lead city scheme of £750,000 in 1983 that offered grants to 
LAs for the development of CH-DH schemes. There have been several other grants 
and loan schemes with irregular timelines to facilitate the penetration of CHP-DH 
systems in the UK. Such as the Community Energy Programme (CEP) established in 
2001 was a £50m scheme by government that offered grants to develop CHP-DH 
projects. Such as in Aberdeen and Birmingham but closed in 2007 (Webb, 2016a 
pg:139). £26m Low Carbon Infrastructure Fund (LCIF) established in 2009 as a one-
off grant to LAs to develop CHP-DH schemes (Hawkey, 2016b pg:94).  
Furthermore, Private Finance Initiative Scheme was another government scheme that 
was introduced in 1992 to encourage the private sector to invest in infrastructural 
projects in partnership with the public sector, which includes CHP-DH systems. Such 
as the 1.4MW combined cooling/heating and power (CCHP) project with 250W 
absorption chillers at St. Bartholomew’s Hospital (GIB, 2014a). The UK Green 
Investment Bank (GIB) was also launched in November, 2012 to provide finance with 
a view to stimulate the development of green infrastructure and creation of the 
expertise to impact on the economy with a £3.8Billion take off fund that has focus on 
a number of green technologies which includes CHP-DH systems (GIB, 2014a). A 
case in hand of a GIB sponsored scheme was the Edinburgh and Glasgow city council 
CHP-DH project and Cambridge University Hospitals CHP based energy centre 
project, where GIB is committing £18m (GIB, 2013). However, it does not provide 
capital on public borrowing term but rather on commercial terms with the aim to crowd 
in private sector capital. Renewable Energy Investment Fund (REIF) is also a similar 
scheme like the GIB by the Scottish government through Scottish Investment Bank 
with renewable generation of electricity and heat including DH networks as priority 
(Hawkey, 2016b pg:95).  
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Recently also CHP-DH schemes have been drawing upon various funding routes to 
facilitate its penetration in the UK. Such as the UK Government £11m grants since 
2013, under the HNDU to support DH networks across 118 LAs (DECC, 2016b). The 
HNDU has also provided guidance support through the feasibility exercise by attaching 
a “critical friend” during the process with a view to enhancing human capital (DECC, 
2015b). Others are the Scottish Government’s £20m funding under the Local Energy 
Challenge Fund (LECF) since 2014 -2016 to support the feasibility and development 
of low carbon technology including CHP-DH systems like the DH scheme at Highland 
Council. Others are the Scottish District Heating Loan Fund that provides currently 
about £8m loan supports to DH schemes in Scotland, such as the Aberdeen Heat and 
Power (DECC, 2015p). Similarly is the Rural Community Energy Fund (RCEF) since 
2012 of about £15m that is jointly funded by DBEIS and Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) for rural communities to access loan for the feasibility 
to develop low carbon technologies such as CHP-DH systems in England (WRAP, 
2016). The European Union is one source of funding of CHP-DH systems in the UK 
through provision of grants and part funding such as the Islington CHP-DH system in 
London. It could get sponsorship from European Social Funds and European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) as 20% of ERDF are targeted towards low carbon 
infrastructures (DECC, 2014).  
In addition, another £320m under the Heat Network Investment Project (HNIP) is 
expected to be spent to aid the delivery of the supported HNDU projects from 2016 to 
2021 with a view to attract additional £2b capital investment (DECC, 2016a). While the 
Green Investment Bank (GIB) is projected to make available another £3.6b to DH 
networks in the UK by 2016 (GIB, 2013) but it’s not clear if this finance was made 
available. This all suggest to the litany of finance routes outside the commercial market 
that is expected to be explored to support the CHP-DH industry. 
The GIB has estimated that the UK district heating market may offer an investment 
opportunity of over £500m by 2020 (GIB, 2015), suggesting that the CHP-DH industry 
may require huge financial mobilisation and this is most likely to be sourced from 
outside the loans and grants routes from both the UK Government and Scottish 
devolved Government. However, this research has suggested that availability of 
finance and cost of finance are significant barriers to the penetration of CHP-DH 
systems in the UK. This suggests that the industry may require a more reliable and 
sustained source of finance outside the Government’s intermittent loans and grants 
routes such as the open market. However, the contrasting tension of the evaluation 
criteria’s and strategies of many CHP-DH schemes between if the scheme is driven 
by socio-economic (fuel poverty) or techno-economic (capital accumulation) 
objectives determines the financial routes to pursue (Webb, 2014). Put simply the 
implication is that most LA led schemes tend to be on the back of socio-economic 
models are stifled out of the open market finance routes due to the low rate of returns 
of their schemes. This illustrates the reason why many HNDU schemes that have the 
potential to provide the bridging market for the CHP-DH industry according to this 
research are not in the construction phase. This indicates a system failure, as many 
LAs are not able to transit their CHP-DH schemes from feasibility stage to delivery 
stage due to low rate of return of their projects. 
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This tension of low rate of returns of many HNDU projects is what the HNIP funding of 
£320m tends to address but this route may still be an unsustainable route considering 
the volume of projects to be considered and future schemes. However, this research 
has pointed to PWLB that has a financial chest of over £90b as a more sustainable 
source of cheap funding. Drawing on the fact that the almost 70% of LA borrowing 
comes from PWLB (LGA, 2014a), but the LAs are constrained by the prudential code, 
which determines the volume to be borrowed depending on revenue. This research 
suggests a possible consideration of a change of borrowing principles to the LAs to 
capture CHP-DH projects as they provide public goods like heat and electricity, so that 
they can have a sustained access to cheap finance, that would capture their socio-
economic objectives. 
Development of positive externalities 
The emergence of a DH pipe manufacturer in the UK in 2012 and many more CHP-
DH developers outside the hitherto four big ESCOs, suggests successful entry of new 
actors and increase of the supply chain in the CHP-DH arena, which may impact on 
the penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
CHP-DH actors may have increased in political power as the Government has 
supported several industry-led mechanisms such as the HNCP and Heat Customer 
Protection scheme being introduced by both the ADE and CIBSE bodies with a view 
to providing ad-hoc regulation for the industry. These bodies, as well as other bodies 
such as UKDEA, have grown in recognition in the CHP-DH arena stimulating 
interaction of actors and knowledge diffusion through seminars, workshops and 
training programmes, such as the training on the Heat Network Code of Practice 
conducted by CIBSE.  
However the absence of an institutional infrastructure for heat, and lack of a joined-up 
policy framework for CHP-DH system may hinder the development of positive 
externalities to firms due to the non-existence of a heat market (Bergek et al., 2008d). 
Additionally, these barriers may also have impacted on knowledge spill over due to 
low penetration of CHP-DH systems.  
11.3.2 Mapping of TIS 
The process of innovation of the CHP-DH system inherently involves the complex 
interaction of variety of activities, such that outlining the elements of change alone will 
not be enough to capture an appropriate interpretation of the dynamics within the 
innovation system (Hekkert et al., 2007b). Therefore, to enable a clearer 
understanding of the system dynamics after the analysis of the various functions 
mentioned above, a mapping approach was adopted to show the interaction of the 
factors that strengthen or limit the performance of the functions within the innovation 
process. The mapping of these functionalities of the CHP-DH system in the UK was 
carried out with a view to present a pictorial view to access the performance of the 
systems by linking the blocking and inducing mechanisms that impact on innovative 
activities within the system (Johnson, 2001). Secondly, it makes more visible the 
differences in institutional infrastructures when comparing different innovation systems 
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and thirdly it offers the potential to provide clarity of governance mechanisms to 
achieve set targets (Hekkert et al., 2007b). 
However, the complexity of activities in the innovation process makes it impossible to 
effectively map all the factors that influence CHP-DH system, but this research 
endeavoured to map the most relevant factors that has been evident from both 
quantitative and qualitative results which significantly impacts on the penetration of 
CHP-DH systems in the UK. Nonetheless, the functional mapping will seek to provide 
insights in to possible key governance pathways which may seek to reduce the 
strength of the blocking mechanisms. Figure 37 below shows the mapping of the 
functional pattern aligned with possible alternative governance pathways to influence 
the diffusion of CHP-DH system in the UK. 
 
Figure 37: TIS mapping of CHP-DH system 
This research captured three key drivers for the growth of CHP-DH systems in the UK 
as primarily economic (lower energy bills), environmental (carbon reduction) or social 
(reducing fuel poverty) which is depicted as the inducement mechanisms, though not 
necessarily all at once for a scheme. For instance, many universities deploy CHP-DH 
systems to reduce energy bills, while some LAs like Aberdeen have the social 
motivation of reducing fuel poverty and others like hospitals use CHP-DH systems to 
meet their carbon reduction targets at the least cost as required by the NHS England 
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which has a target of 34% emission reduction by 2020 (NHS, 2010). These 
inducement mechanisms interrelate with many functions in the CHP-DH technological 
system in the UK, which seeks to strengthen the diffusion of the system. However, 
nine significant blocking mechanisms have been identified as significant factors that 
limit the diffusion of CHP-DH system in the UK. The interactions of these mechanisms 
are also interconnected with many other functions as they impact on the performance 
of CHP-DH systems negatively in the UK. For instance, the absence of a joined-up 
policy towards CHP-DH affects the legitimatisation function of the CHP-DH in 
becoming socially accepted and also impacts on other functions like entrepreneur 
experimentation that would allow firms to seek business opportunities that the CHP-
DH industry may present.  
The TIS mapping diagram also captured several key governance mechanisms that 
may be introduced with a view to reducing the scope of the blocking mechanisms 
within the CHP-DH TIS and increasing the strength of the inducing mechanism so as 
to increase the diffusion of CHP-DH to a self-reinforcing stage (Bergek et al., 2008b). 
These mechanisms could take various shapes to target the identified blocking 
mechanism, with some governance mechanisms possessing the potential to target 
several blocking mechanisms. For instance, developing a national joined-up policy 
with medium and long-term vision for CHP-DH systems in the UK may have the 
potential to reduce the effect of both policy uncertainty and lack of direction of growth 
of the CHP-DH industry. 
11.4 Strength and Weakness of TIS from research findings 
11.4.1  Strength of TIS 
TIS has been deployed severally as a diagnostic tool to investigate the performance 
of a socio-technical system and derive policy recommendations that would target 
specific technological penetration for economic growth (Hawkey, 2012, Hendry et al., 
2008 , Praetorius et al., 2008 ). This investigative characteristic of TIS through the 
functional pattern has been beneficial to achieving the overall objective of this 
research, which seeks to investigate the performance of CHP-DH system in the UK 
with a view to have insights into the barriers and drivers to its diffusion and utilization 
and contribute to economic growth. Therefore, I shall enumerate some strong insights 
to the understanding of the UK CHP-DH system that TIS concept had facilitated.  
Firstly, the diagnostic feature of the TIS (Kern, 2015) using its functional pattern 
offered the opportunity to determine and capture the blocking or inducing innovative 
activities within the system and map these functions with a view to provide a picture 
of the system performance as seen in Figure 37. 
Secondly, the incremental innovation and competency enhancement characteristics 
of TIS  (Alkemade et al., 2011) was a critical consideration of this analysis. Considering 
that CHP-DH as a matured network-based infrastructure only has negligible 
contribution to UK’s electricity and heat generation profile and since, infrastructures 
slowly transit, but rather they have tendencies for incremental change (Frantzeskaki 
and Loorbach, 2008). Furthermore, Ofgem as part of the matured governance 
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infrastructures for electricity and gas in the UK, regulates the electricity and gas 
sectors. Therefore, the opportunity of strengthening of an existing regime like Ofgem 
in the governance structure of heat was helpful rather than a regime shift. For instance, 
the research results showed that there is statistical evidence that CHP-DH actors 
would prefer heat regulation to reside with Ofgem.    
Thirdly, TIS captures the role of actors in networks knowledge generation by 
collectively supporting the actors, learning activities, building support structures and 
building the CHP-DH system that would legitimize and stabilize CHP-DH systems in 
the UK (Markard et al., 2011, Musiolik et al., 2012). This is evident in the role of ADE 
and CIBSE in building support structures. Such as the development of the Heat 
Networks Code of Practice (HNCP) which seeks to regulate the development of CHP-
DH system amongst actors and the role of ADE in the development of the Heat 
Customer Protection Scheme (HCPS) resulting in the Heat Trust, which has provided 
the channel for registered heat suppliers to further interaction with their customers by 
providing a channel of feedback on complains and grievances. This also captured 
learning networks such as Heat and the City, UKDEA, e.t.c, which facilitates learning 
through interaction of CHP-DH actors.  
Fourthly, TIS acknowledges the role of social acceptance in the transformation change 
of a network infrastructure, given the interplay of the heterogeneous actors in the 
diffusion of a CHP-DH system. This feature of TIS offered the opportunity to capture 
the impact of failed CHP-DH systems on its diffusion and importance of buy-in by heat 
customers and other social actors.  
Fifthly, the role of an actor with unique features that can facilitate the diffusion of CHP-
DH has been acknowledged by TIS as the prime mover. This feature offered me the 
opportunity to designate LAs in the CHP-DH TIS as a prime mover. Considering their 
position of champions of local energy targets and custodians of the social and 
economic fabric locally. Furthermore, TIS also presents the opportunity to capture the 
heterogenous actors (vertical and horizontal) that permeates the CHP-DH industry 
which has the capacity to influence the building of the system. Such a hospitals, 
universities and auto-producers. 
Lastly, the emphasis of TIS on the importance of directionality through targets, 
strategies and resource mobilization is critical for actors to experiment on 
entrepreneurial activities. Like the building of the first DH pipe manufacturing factory 
on the back on the potential of so many HNDU supported projects amongst others to 
come to fusion. 
11.4.2  Weaknesses of TIS 
TIS is generally formed through three key structural processes. Namely: formation of 
networks, entry of firms and institutional alignments (Bergek et al., 2008b). The 
formation of networks of actors can been captured in the light of learning networks and 
“political networks” advocacy coalitions (Bergek et al., 2008b). However, TIS is less 
clear on the political processes that ensue between hierarchical political actors and 
the role they play in shaping the technological growth, but rather it captures more 
emphasis on political processes like lobbying or advocacy, which was captured under 
the legitimization function  (Bergek et al., 2015, Markard et al., 2015) . This is given 
273 | P a g e  
 
against the back drop of LAs as the prime mover of the TIS and part of the hierarchies 
of governance depend on the state for financial survival to sufficiently play their role. 
TIS appears to capture horizontal political processes and interactions but less on 
vertical political processes across hierarchies of governance. For instance, as evident 
in this research financial resource mobilization from the state is critical to the 
legitimization and stabilization of CH-DH in the UK. In part because financial resources 
are considered a vital input to the development of a TIS but the processes to acquire 
various sources of finance is not given much attention outside public grants or 
collective network resources, as the LAs in the UK depends on the state for its financial 
survival. Therefore, the impact of hierarchical political processes on resource (such as 
financial) mobilization is under theorized.  
This weakness is particularly important to CHP-DH systems because of its features as 
a network infrastructure. Such as asset specificity, exhibition of stability and lock-in 
due to huge sunk cost, increasing returns, network externalities, and the economic, 
social and political impact as a large-scale capital goods producer/service delivery with 
multiusers that often requires public intervention. Furthermore, this research suggest 
that the public intervention is expected from the state due to a centrally resource 
allocation in the UK. However, LAs are the prime movers of the CHP-DH TIS 
considering that they are in the best position to champion the diffusion of DH systems  
(UNEP, 2015) due to their social capital -trust, norms and networks (Pollitt, 2002), 
geographical proximity to CHP-DH actors (Boschma and Frenken, 2010 pp:123) and 
frontline role to promote social, economic and environmental wellbeing of their 
community. Therefore, the political interaction between the hierarchies of governance 
in resource mobilization is hugely critical to attract more emphasis in the TIS concept  
Another weakness of the TIS with respect to CHP-DH in the UK is the role of the 
incumbent centralized energy paradigm that has a seemly vertical integration of actors 
and the role of a matured gas grid which is the main source of energy for individual 
heating and electricity generation as well as being the main source of fuel for CHP-DH 
system in the UK. This can be seen as the “paradox of embedded agency” captured 
by Battilana et al. (2009) and Farla et al. (2012). This captures the inadvertent role of 
institutional actors in the CHP-DH TIS to reinforce the incumbents. Such as the role of 
super- ESCOs in the vertical chain of the energy sector and the lock-in of the gas grid 
system that challenges the adoption of CHP-DH system which they seek to promote 
that may precipitate internal conflict and competition. This is against the backdrop of 
the UK energy system where in 2016, 81% of gas and 82% of electricity retail market 
share belong to the big six energy providers and they have strong presence in both 
energy whole sale (Ofgem, 2017b) and in deployment of CHP-DH systems. Such as 
E-ON in the Cranbrook CHP-DH system in Exeter and as well as being part of the big 
six. Indicating that these actors (big six) have presence in the governance structures, 
such as in Elexon in the electricity market and have the potential to influence the 
directionality of the CHP-DH TIS. However, TIS considers that in directing the 
influence of search, actors of competing technologies are not controlled by one 
organisation apart from regulation (Bergek et al., 2008d). Rather TIS recognises the 
role of advocacy coalitions to build-up momentum which would lead to a process of 
creative destruction within the incumbent system (Hekkert et al., 2007a). Though TIS 
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scholars have also admitted that the framework pays little attention to the interaction 
of multiple technologies and the decline of incumbents (Markard et al., 2015). 
Therefore this suggest that TIS has paid more emphasis on the creative destruction – 
destabilization of incumbent in a specific technological space by political networks to 
achieve legitimacy without similar consideration to “destructive creation” (Calvano, 
2006) - which is the monopolistic role of an actor to introduce a new improved product 
simultaneously with an old product at a price gain with a view to destabilize the 
incumbent. This also suggest that TIS is silent on the role of actors in institutional 
determinism to reduce conflict and competition within the TIS and therefore insufficient 
for a broader energy sector transformation.  
Also, TIS concept mainly focuses on the meso-level of the system with little attention 
on the micro-level and therefore it’s not intended to capture all the activities at the 
micro level (Markard et al., 2015, Bergek et al., 2008b, Kukk et al., 2015). Suggesting 
that its primary unit of analysis is the system level even though it recognises actors as 
its strong focus, cumulative effects and couple dynamics within the system. This 
emphasis of the TIS system on the system level may not fully capture the dynamics 
that permeates a CHP-DH TIS. In part because CHP-DH systems are not nationally 
interconnected but delineated by regions or localities and as such actors may possess 
distinct social and environmental characteristics that would inform their role at the 
micro level in the TIS. For instance, results from this research suggest that Scotland 
and Wales have proscribed the sale of social houses, while England still engages in 
the sale of social houses. Considering that social houses are critical for de-risking 
CHP-DH systems as it guarantees heat off-take, thereby militating against a significant 
risk to the development of CHP-DH systems according to the results from this research 
that showed heat off-take is a significant risk to the formation of CHP-DH market. This 
suggest that actors or LAs in Scotland and Wales may exhibit varying characteristics 
from other actors in England that would inform their interaction, action and entrance 
of new actors to the UK CHP-DH TIS. Nonetheless, TIS scholars are open to support 
more micro-level analysis in a view to enrich their understanding at the meso-level 
(Markard et al., 2015). 
Lastly, TIS captures the importance of directionality as earlier discussed, but without 
emphasis on coordination at both the system level and micro levels. Rather, 
coordination in TIS is concentrated on R&D activities, which makes it insufficient for a 
mature technology like CHP-DH system with several local actors that have 
independent governance systems. Such as hospital, universities, auto-producers and 
so on that would require strategic coordination by the prime mover (LAs) to achieve a 
mutual goal. This is critical because the DH network can be a service provider to many 
actors who want to use the DH infrastructure to sell their heat to their independent 
customers. Therefore, this can be considered another weakness of the TIS concept 
11.5 Contributions to TIS Concept 
I would hereby make a few contributions to the conceptual framework of TIS which 
would offer more understanding and application to low carbon energy resources and 
network infrastructures. This is in the light of the role of incumbent actors and the 
hierarchies of governance in contributing to environmental innovation through 
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generation of positive externalities. Such as knowledge spill overs, waste and 
emission reduction from established technologies. 
Firstly, resource mobilization as a function in TIS has been categorized into four 
distinct areas: tangible resources – finance, human resource – expert, skill; structural 
resources – governance structures like rules and culture; and lastly relational 
resources – power and reputation (Musiolik et al., 2012). These resources emerge 
and can be accessed at the firm, network and system levels to influence the building 
of the TIS (Markard et al., 2011). However, mobilization of certain resources (such as 
finance) are beyond the capability of some actors and networks and more so in the 
UK context of the position of LAs as prime movers of the CHP-DH TIS with severe 
dependency on the state. Therefore, considering the argument that the transformation 
of network based infrastructures like CHP-DH systems with huge investment and sunk 
cost would require strategic intervention of a particular actor (Farla et al., 2012) like 
the state. Suggesting that the capturing of the processes and interaction of the current 
steering and rowing (top-down) power of an actor like the state and LAs as the prime 
mover in building of a TIS. Given that the prime mover like the LAs possess unique 
and relevant characteristics but would still require accessing finance from the state to 
enable them to effectively build the system. This consideration would be useful in 
further enhancing the application of TIS in a network-based infrastructure. 
Secondly, the role of actors in the creative destruction of the incumbent was captured 
in TIS under the legitimization function but further analysis on the roles of actors with 
multiple and competing technologies may offer greater understanding to how actor 
strategies could perpetuate destructive creation and institutional embeddedness. 
11.6 Recommendations arising from this research 
This section shall synthesize the various results from both the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis as discussed in the empirical findings section in this chapter in a 
view to highlight the recommendations that arose from the findings. These 
recommendations depict several governance options that seeks to contribute to the 
policy debate to influence the diffusion of CHP-DH systems in the UK and this section 
shall also seek to discuss how these recommendations shall be tested to quantify their 
impact on the penetration of CHP-DH system in the UK. Furthermore, this research 
generated other serendipitous findings which were not statistically significant but offers 
useful contribution to understanding the barriers that may be militating against CHP-
DH in the UK. Therefore, these findings will also be highlighted for further research. 
There are four commonly known research methods to measure the impact of a policy 
and gather evidence on the efficacy of a policy in overcoming the identified 
barriers/risk. They are namely: Randomised Controlled Trials (RCT)- locate 
respondents at random to assess policy, Difference-in Difference (DID) – Compares 
change in outcome over time amongst respondents using pre-policy and post-policy 
data, Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) – Measures effect of policy on 
respondents close to eligible thresholds and not the entire population and finally, 
Statistical Matching (SM) – matching data from different sources (EC, 2014b). 
However, desired outcomes such as the penetration of a networked infrastructure like 
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CHP-DH system that draws on the interaction of several actors from the technical, 
economic, social and political sphere of the society would require both research and 
participatory processes to effectively measure the impact of the identified governance 
mechanisms that are suggested to reduce the blocking effect of the barriers/risk to the 
penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK. The participatory processes shall be a 
parallel and simultaneous process along with the research process in a view to provide 
feedback and implications of the policies and secure buy-in from the diverse range of 
actors (EC, 2014b). The participatory process entails the development of learning 
processes and network management through series of seminars, conferences, 
consultations, works shops and public debates (Geels et al., 2004 pg:9). 
Hence, I shall discuss further the recommendations advanced from the empirical 
findings and shall also attempt to assign ways to quantify the impact of the advanced 
the governance mechanisms on the penetration of CHP-DH systems in the UK. 
 According to the empirical findings there was statistical evidence that the UK 
CHP-DH industry requires a national joined-up strategy to facilitate the 
penetration of CHP-DH systems (See Table 50). Suggesting a joined-up 
governance mechanism that would couple both CHP and DH systems is 
desired. Therefore, the assessment of the impact of this mechanism may 
require a participatory process since evidence had been gathered from a 
randomised control trial process and significance had been achieved. In a view 
to secure buy-in by the multiple social bodies that permeate the CHP-DH 
industry, conferences and works shops driven by the state should be held to 
capture the myriad of views to access its impact. 
 There was statistical evidence that the lack of LAs experience on PPP is a 
significant risk to the development of CHP-DH systems in the UK (See Table 
26). Furthermore, many respondents from the qualitative data suggests that 
collaboration with universities within their localities was used to improve skills 
in setting up ESCOs and negotiating PPPs, while others without such 
institutions used consultants and paid huge cost for the services. Additionally, 
49% of LAs don’t think they have the skills to engage ESCOs, while 28.4% 
thinks they do (see Table 32). Suggesting that LAs may require an innovative 
way to acquire skill, especially LAs without academic institutions. Results from 
qualitative research had proposed collaborations with NGOs and industry 
networks as possible ways for LAs to improve such skills. Therefore, a 
participatory process of using conferences involving actors from institutions, 
NGOs, industry networks and LAs may be required to access the impact of this 
governance mechanism.  
 The results from this research shows that there is statistical evidence that the 
CHP-DH industry in the UK is at an infancy but growing state with a strong 
thematic pattern from the qualitative data suggesting that the industry requires 
a regulation to facilitate its growth. Furthermore, the quantitative results suggest 
that about 73% of respondents (See Table 52), thinks that the industry requires 
heat governance infrastructures and CHP-DH operators considers regulation 
as their biggest barrier (See Table 30 and Figure 19). However, the support is 
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weak as there was no statistical significance between respondents that the 
industry requires a regulation. Therefore, this may be further subjected to a 
larger sample size with a view to achieve significance. Hence, I recommend 
that a further research using the RCT method be conducted to validate the 
descriptive results before proceeding to a participatory process.   
 There was statistical evidence that if a regulation is required for the industry 
that the body to administer the heat regulation be Ofgem, since it’s already 
administering the gas and electricity sectors, which is similar to the model 
adopted by the Netherlands and Norway. Nonetheless, a further participatory 
process may be conducted through conferences to covey the merits of this 
development to other actors and secure buy-in. 
 The qualitative data from the interviewees captured a theme of lack of cheap 
finance. Which many expressed in various ways such as abandoned projects 
due to low rate of return to access private finance, difficulties of borrowing due 
to cuts from central government, high cost of borrowing to achieve social 
objectives, premium cost on heat off-take risk and absence of public support 
capital to provide total control by LAs. The theme was captured by the 
quantitative results in both availability of finance and cost of finance risk factors, 
as both risk factors were statistically significant risk to CHP-DH development in 
the UK (See Table 26) and the dominant choice from interviewees was that this 
can only be provided by the government with PWLB as the most likely source 
of cheap finance. However, LAs borrow from PWLB based on their revenue, 
which limits how much that can be borrowed and not on their assets, therefore 
a policy shift is proposed from revenue financing to asset financing which would 
capture the value of the CHP-DH assets in borrowing. This would however 
require a further participatory process amongst the policy echelon of 
government agencies and political actors using conferences to capture the 
views of actors that are close to decision making.  
 Qualitative data suggest that there is a theme amongst interviewees identified 
as lack of information on CHP-DH systems in the UK. This was captured in 
various aspects by the interviewees such as, lack of where to go and ask 
questions about CHP-DH system, not enough knowledge available outside, 
lack of energy usage and CHP-DH systems data, lack of communication 
amongst CHP-DH practitioners, lack of CHP-DH systems knowledge amongst 
developers and consultants. Furthermore, the quantitative results in Table 45, 
shows that 44.4% of respondents (39.3% of the CHP operators, 44.4% of the 
consultants and 48.6% of the LAs) tend to agree and another 28.7% strongly 
agree that there should be a one stop shop for the necessary information on 
different technologies to CHP and sources of heat to District Heating network. 
However, the support is weak due to the non-significance of the result. 
Therefore, a further research would be required to be conducted with a larger 
sample size in a view to achieve significance before embarking on a 
participatory process. Nonetheless, the consensus amongst interviewees was 
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that the national heat map is insufficient in terms of building level energy data 
and since LAs have developed and are developing heats maps, more building 
level energy data is required to better inform investment decisions. However, 
currently, building level energy data is being harvested through the smart 
meters programme and administered by Smart Data Communications 
Company Limited (DCC), the licensee from the Government, but LAs are not 
part of governance structure. Therefore, LAs have limited access to the data, 
which may also have data privacy implication and may require legislation. 
Hence, a further quantitative research is required to conduct its usefulness to 
investors/developers and ways for LAs to access the data in a bid to influence 
the penetration of CHP-DH in the UK. This would be followed by a participatory 
process, such as consultations, public debate, that shall capture the impact of 
dwellers and views from CHP-DH actors.  
 Skills have been shown to be essential to the expansion of numerous energy 
technologies and precipitate incremental change (North, 1990). Shortage of 
skills in the CHP-DH industry was captured by the qualitative data with legal 
and CHP-DH O&M skills as more pronounced. This was further validated by 
the quantitative results as seen in Table 58. This shows that about 55.2% of the 
CHP operators and 40.7% of the consultants tend to agree (51.8% total group) 
and another 18.4% of the total respondents strongly agree that there is a skill 
gap in the CHP and DH industry in the UK. However, the support is weak due 
to the non-significant result as seen in Table 59. This suggest a 
recommendation for further research with a larger sample size be conducted to 
investigate skill shortage in the industry, what type of skill is more deficient in 
the industry and the best way to bridge the skill gap if any. Then a participatory 
process may follow afterwards. 
 Responses from interviewees suggests that for the development of CHP-DH 
systems to be economically viable, it may require between 500 – 1000 houses 
per site. However, available UK house development data suggest that the 
average range of new house development per site in the UK is about 54, which 
indicates that the UK has a low scale of viable new build development. To 
further understand the growth pathway of CHP-DH systems in the UK. CHP 
operators and Consultants were asked the growth pathway for CHP-DH 
systems in the UK. The quantitative results did show any significance for the 
pathways (see Table 64). However, only new builds and industrial area had a 
positive effect size. Suggesting that a further research with a larger sample size 
would be required to achieve statistical significance and validate the strength 
of effect of industrial areas and new builds on CHP-DH development in the UK.  
 The results of this research also suggest that CHP-DH systems in the UK 
requires an injection of innovation to the energy policy arena to create the 
desired diffusion of the technology. For instance, the various governance 
mechanisms introduced by the UK has not targeted CHP-DH systems as a 
technology that can contribute to its energy targets and considering that it 
contributes to two energy vectors (electricity and heat) of the UK energy 
spectrum. This is evident from the systemic lock out of many CHP-DH systems 
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from the key mechanisms, such as the EMR (CfD and CM) due to qualification 
risk resulting from grid access barrier and non-convergence of cost and 
revenue risk since electricity and heat are two separate risk factors. Results 
from interviewees suggest a more targeted response towards CHP-DH system 
with a view to capture both electricity and heat risk factors and a grid connection 
policy to assure developers of secured CHP connections as obtained in the 
Netherlands. Therefore, a further participatory process of conferences and 
consultations may be required to seek buy-in from actors including policy 
makers and grid operators to access this policy. 
 There was statistical evidence in this research that delay in planning and 
planning permission are risk factors that are militating against the development 
of CHP-DH systems in the UK (see Table 26). However, results from the 
qualitative data suggest that some LAs have revised their planning conditions 
to influence the development of CHP-DH systems by capturing CHP-DH 
systems for new builds and designate such areas as CHP-DH zones using 
planning conditions. This is with a view to mandate DH networks to capture 
heat customers and facilitate planning permissions for CHP-DH systems. Such 
as in Leicester, Croydon. Furthermore, other LAs such as in Exeter, where 
planning conditions were used to mandate developers to adopt CHP-DH 
system and were successful with the litigation in court are all ways of how 
planning conditions have been adopted by LAs to influence the penetration of 
CHP-DH systems. Therefore, this research presents a useful mechanism to 
reduce planning related risk from LAs by revising planning conditions to capture 
CHP-DH systems and create CHP-DH zones to mandate heat connection to 
DH systems.  For other LAs to gain from the lessons of LAs which have 
successfully used planning conditions to reduce planning risk. A participatory 
process such as, through workshops and conferences would be required for 
LAs and developers to share their experiences on how planning was used as 
an inducement tool rather than a blocking tool.  
 The sale of LA housing stock was a prominent feature in the qualitative data, 
which many LAs consider as not beneficial to the development of CHP-DH 
systems. In part because these housing stock helps de-risk CHP-DH system 
by guaranteeing some level of heat load. However, Scotland and Wales have 
stopped the sale of these buildings, while it’s still prevalent in England. 
Therefore, an alternative pathway may entail LAs inserting mandatory 
connection to DH system but not obliged to consume the heat in housing 
sale/lease agreements as obtained in Norway or designated CHP-DH zones as 
already done in some LAs. Such as Leicester. However, this policy would 
require a buy-in from the hierarchies of governance in UK and other actors. 
Therefore, a participatory process through conferences would be required to 
access its impact.  
Furthermore, this research suggests that CHP-DH systems mostly supply their 
electricity through private networks by consuming their electricity on site rather than 
exporting it to the grid (see Table 18 and Table 19). In part because of the conditions 
in the electricity license regime, which limits the capacity to export electricity to the grid 
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without a standard license. This suggest that innovation in electricity market 
participation is required to trigger the penetration of CHP-DH systems, since the 
hierarchies of governance (state and local authorities) have the capacity to play new 
roles and address or mitigate the barriers that have impacted on the penetration of 
CHP-DH systems (Foxon et al., 2005, Edquist, 1999). In part because LAs as part of 
hierarchies of governance are custodians of social fabrics and the political institutions 
to coordinate the production of public goods. Consequently, a possible model for the 
LAs is proposed here. Its adoption may offer a route to instigating an institutional 
change and thus the development of an alternative governance structure to challenge 
the status quo and make explicit changes to the governance arrangements that govern 
daily transactions in the electricity industry. The proposed model is shown in Figure 
38 below, and comprises an interactive governance model (Teisman and Edelenbos, 
2004) that puts the LAs at its core. The model aims to leverage on the collective load 
of the LAs as regards their CHP assets and resources with a view to obtaining a 
standard electricity supply licence. It would allow them to jointly buy and sell electricity 
to themselves. The governance structure of the model would look like the newly 
created Local Capital Finance Company (LCFC) to finance infrastructural projects 
which was discussed in chapter eight. It was suggested that the Local Government 
Association (LGA) could be the centre championing this role of electricity trading for 
the LAs. However, respondents agreed to the necessity of having a common front to 
enter the electricity market, but a point of variation amongst respondents was the level 
of scale this would take, whether national or regional level. Some favoured such a role 
residing within the LGA as echoed below from an LA respondent. 
“So I think it certainly makes sense for us as a local government sort of family, to have 
something within the LGA and look at how we, it gives us more interest in terms of 
how it makes it simpler for us as local authorities to access the market and enter it, 
and get to be able to get to the point when we can offer really good quality power 
products to our residents, to our businesses” LA9 
The LGA was suggested because it is a cross-party umbrella organisation with 
presently 414 registered LA members out of 418 UK LAs. The LGA also has other 
registered members, including 21 Parish/Town councils, 31 fire authorities and 10 
national parks (LGA, 2015). The LGA exhibit the potential to deploy this model faster 
than regional networks at reduced administrative cost due to economy of scale so as 
to free up more fund to source for required experts to commence the operation. 
However, the dominant choice amongst respondents was for the model to be 
operational at the regional level so as not to lose the benefits from LAs negotiating 
local rates due to proximity to generation with a view to reduce transmission and 
distribution charges. Therefore, some respondents argued that a regional approach 
may be more beneficial and attractive as echoed below. 
“Many councils now enter into Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) locally but some 
of the benefits of this approach could be lost if the model were to be extended to 
provide national coverage. For example, would there still be the ability to negotiate 
local rates or would a national or regional rate have to be accepted? Thinking about 
distribution and transmission costs, would a national arrangement be as attractive to 
a council in an urban area close to a power generator compared to a council for 
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example at the tip of Cornwall many miles from a generation source? Councils may 
feel they are able to negotiate more advantageous rates with local generators where 
distribution and transmission costs are lower” CDHOP 18 
“good idea but why be attached to London? I am sure a number of authorities would 
like it starting by the Northern Powerhouse LA's around Manchester” CDHOP12 
Thus, the electricity trading role could reasonably reside within a regional body, most 
likely shaped after the structure of the defunct regional development agencies that will 
be formed by LAs with geographical proximity. These regional networks will be 
responsible for marketing and development of the business model. The role of the 
regional electricity trading body will include operating an electricity clearing house for 
its members. It will advise LAs on-electricity market dynamics, analysis and 
forecasting of demands, scheduling and to let them know when it’s best to bring up 
their CHPs. It will also act as an off-taker of all CHP generation and trade power on 
their behalf either on the market or to other LAs that require it. It can also position itself 
to buy cheaper and greener electricity from other international exchanges, LAs and 
countries in Europe. It can act as the intermediary between the LAs, other local 
institutional actors and the electricity market. It would also represent the actors to the 
balancing and settlement company Elexon, and to the regulator. A graphical 
description of the model is seen in Figure 38. 
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Figure 38: Electricity Governance Structure for LAs 
The illustrated electricity trading model above depicts an integrated business case 
where the LAs will form a regional body, which can target local institutional bodies like, 
universities, hospitals and other potential clients with a view to incorporating actors 
with CHP-DH systems to sell or buy excess electrical capacity. Though hospitals 
usually source procured electricity via the Crown Commercial Service (CCS), which 
procures electricity for public institutions, such as courts, police offices and other state 
buildings. However, hospitals are not under obligation to buy from CCS, so they could 
be offered the option to partner with the LAs if it makes business sense. The link to 
the CCS has been incorporated to open the opportunity for electricity trading since 
CCS presents a potentially useful partner to invite into the model because of their 
buying (not selling) capacity. Engaging with these third parties is really a pivotal part 
of the whole model as these parties (hospitals and universities as institutional 
customers) are very concerned with the economics of the deployment of CHP-DH 
systems such as energy bill reduction as a vital part of their energy strategy. If a good 
business case is presented with a good off-take tariff, many may well buy into it. 
However, the LAs also possess large electrical load such as housing stock or leisure 
centres that can provide the initial take off to de-risk the model without other 
institutional participation. 
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The model portends many advantages which can be harnessed by all parties given 
the share size of the potential aggregated CHP assets from these actors. The key 
benefits that may convince actors of the business case include: 
 All regional electricity trading bodies of the LAs that obtains an electricity supply 
licence and can now sign up to be part of the BSC and therefore have a right 
to vote and trigger an explicit change on the electricity market governance from 
inside and not outside. 
 An important component in complementing market activities is the development 
of trust, norms and networks (Pollitt, 2002). A recent report by the LGA showed 
77% of respondents trusted the LA to make decisions about service provision 
(LGA, 2014b). LAs may thus be able to leverage on their social capital to 
generate and supply electricity to citizens through coordinated actions to solve 
market failures (Pollitt, 2002). For instance, LAs can use CHP-DH systems to 
internalise the benefits of low carbon and efficient generation of electricity and 
reduce fuel poverty and can also self-supply local domestic load above 2.5MW 
with their self-generation, which currently, generators are inhibited without a 
standard licence.  
 The retail margin amongst the incumbent electricity retailers is about 5% and 
one of the reasons why it could be this high is the ability of customer switching 
and increased volume risk (Helm, 2014b); but the LAs can leverage on the 
aggregated customer base from the local generation to gain economy of scale 
and customer stability to reduce volume risk which will translate into reduced 
margin. This may also translate in to cheaper energy. 
 The combined collective gains of contracting bulk power from institutions with 
private wire such as universities and hospitals for a long-term can impact on 
energy prices by internalizing the discounts earlier paid out to suppliers. Further 
gains can also be derived from reduced network charges as more local 
generation will be supplying local demand at minimal Transmission Use of 
System charges (TUoS). 
 As a result of the stable revenue for the CHP operators from electricity, heat 
prices can be reduced, which would reinforce the reduction of fuel poverty in 
the locality and increase energy access for the poor and vulnerable. 
 The LAs would be able to implement and monitor key performance indicators 
of their local energy strategies as they would be better placed to contribute to 
their social, energy and environmental targets from the supply side through 
investment in CHPs. 
 LAs would have the opportunity to evolve tariff and payment schemes for low-
income/vulnerable residents in a bid to target fuel poverty in their locality. 
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 The cost for the procurement of a standard electricity license and cost of 
electricity trading infrastructure shall be jointly borne by LAs in the same body. 
However, the richer and bigger LAs will be more likely to carrier greater 
implementation cost and smaller LAs to contribute smaller amounts, while 
allowing all members to jointly benefit from the gains of the scheme, irrespective 
of the size of the contribution. This band wagon effect would afford smaller LAs 
who ordinarily wouldn’t have been able to obtain such license to enjoy the 
benefits of a full electricity license.    
However, this model, which seeks to effect radical change to the current electricity 
governance structure by challenging the status quo will no doubt be open to resistance 
by the system in which change is sought, due to the path dependency by the 
incumbents (Mitchell, 2008 pg. 85). Secondly, lessons from institutional theory suggest 
that there are substantial challenges in building partnerships (Teisman and Klijn, 
2002). Possible institutional barriers which may emerge from this model include: 
 Long negotiation and conceptual period to actualise the project due to various 
councils requiring approval from their individual local governance institutions. 
In part because this is due to the varying degree of political affiliations and 
different hierarchal system of governance since it is the politicians that will 
determine the success and not the residents.  
 As an owner of a full electricity licence, the associated operational risk and 
market risk will be internalised by the LAs (IPPR, 2014). Indicating that the 
responsibility of bearing the complexities and scheduling of electrical 
transactions amongst councils shall be borne locally by the regional licence 
body which may exhibit the potential of going burst. 
 The process leading to acquisition and operation of a full licence is expensive 
and knowledge based, therefore the start-up cost may constitute a challenge 
 Coordinating and linking of actors/institutions with a single governance 
structure may be difficult in terms of achieving a common solution. This is in 
part because of their dedication to their own internal hierarchical method of 
governance (Teisman and Edelenbos, 2004 pg. 183). For instance, universities 
and hospitals have their governance structures and energy strategies, which 
may not intersect. Furthermore, it may be a challenge to elicit cooperation from 
LAs in the same region that have already entered the electricity market. 
Examples include Nottingham City Council which already has a full supply 
licence or the GLA which is about to commence the operation of their Licence 
Lite (LL) provision. This parallel process brings a new mode of discussion as to 
how what they’ve already obtained can be integrated in to the new objective if 
desired. 
 Decision making lies with the administrative (technocrats) and political 
(politicians) actors; they may not always buy in to the outcome of interactive 
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processes, partly due to path dependency. Also, because the process of 
interaction and feedback may not be properly coordinated that may lead to 
disassociation from either the administrative or political processes (Teisman 
and Edelenbos, 2004 pg. 179). Hence precipitating likely tension between the 
administrative and the political process of each LA. 
 There may be reluctance from LAs, universities, hospitals and private actors to 
share their CHP-DH assets and resources with other private or societal actors, 
though this might be mitigated by the economic opportunities.  
This model could trigger an explicit institutional change by the LAs instigating a change 
from inside as a member of the BSC thereby exhibiting the potential to cause a radical 
disruption to the electricity market system. Since LAs participation in the electricity 
market may alter market share of the incumbents and expose energy customers to 
new economic, social and environmental benefits, especially when compared with 
other type of energy market participants in the UK.  
The possible antidote to the several misgivings highlighted above is to engineer a 
careful and robust coordination mechanism, through efficient marketing and 
negotiation. The success of this model seems likely to be dependent on the quality of 
interaction amongst the actors within the LA subsystem (Markard and Truffer, 2008b). 
The marketing strategy of the trading model should also emphasise the social benefits 
to the local area such as job creation and fuel poverty reduction. In a recent survey 
from a YouGov poll in 2014 concerning the support LAs can get as energy suppliers, 
it showed that 32% of respondents believed that the LAs are more likely to provide a 
better energy tariff than incumbent energy providers, with only 11% favouring the 
incumbents, while 25% indicates that they don’t know with another 25% favouring 
smaller energy suppliers (IPPR, 2014) . In the same survey 37% of respondents would 
prefer to buy their energy from a community energy company than the large retailers, 
if both present the same price and service (IPPR, 2014). The future of the electricity 
industry is going to be greatly determined by the continued growth of distributed 
energy, including CHP-DH systems. This will create more space and emphasis for the 
role of the LAs to participate in the electricity market.  
However, the impact of this role of LAs would require series of conferences by LAs 
and the LGA to access the overall implications on their traditional roles and with a view 
to secure buy-in from other stakeholders. 
Concluding, the UK has shown the will to meet its environmental target of emission 
reduction compared to 1990 base levels and 2020 energy targets from renewable 
energy by introducing several governance mechanisms. Such as EMR and many 
others, but it’s evident by the low penetration of CHP-DH systems that these 
mechanisms have not fully capture the full potential of these systems in the range of 
technological options available in the energy spectrum to achieve these targets. 
Secondly, it is also not clear if the UK have adequately considered heat energy as a 
critical aspect of the energy vector to meet its energy target, based upon the limited 
governance infrastructures to facilitate the efficient generation and distribution of heat. 
Therefore, this research seeks to highlight the roles the hierarchies of governance 
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(state and LA) can play in influencing the diffusion of the technology, with the state 
evolving a joined-up policy portfolio to stimulate investment in CHP-DH systems and 
the LAs taking up “doers and enablers” roles in the penetration of the technology. 
Thereby contributing to the energy policy debate by persuading the hierarchies of 
governance to consider the vital potentials CHP-DH systems may bring to the energy 
mix and meeting energy, social and environmental targets. These potentials can be 
better harnessed by considering alternative governance mechanisms that may 
enhance the selection environment of CHP-DH systems and ultimately progress the 
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11.6 Recommendation for further work 
One recommendation of this research is for LAs to play a more significant role in the 
UK electricity market. Action in this direction might result in the disruption of the market 
share of the incumbents; this suggests a further investigation as to the potential impact 
of LA participation in the electricity market and on wholesale electricity prices. 
Energy utilities in the UK have made inroads in to the CHP-DH industry; they are 
commonly known as super-ESCOs (Vine et al., 1999) and have unique advantages in 
deploying CHP-DH system. This includes their ability to provide integrated energy 
services, their ability to bear risk due to deep capital and human resources and greater 
likelihood of having access to consumer energy data than other ESCOs. The 
emergence of these super-ESCOs with strong presence in large scale electricity 
generation and supplier chain of the electricity market, may usher in a potential 
question regarding their role in the CHP-DH landscape. The question will be, what the 
electricity regulatory landscape will portend, regarding the low liquidity ratio of the UK 
electricity market (Ofgem, 2014f)  as these super-ESCOs will further reinforce their 
hold on the energy market and suffocate new entrants. This might draw on the lessons 
of the electricity and gas sectors where network ownership is outside the portfolio of 
the energy companies. 
This research proposes that Government should re-evaluate the criteria for LAs to 
access PWLB loans from the current revenue-based approach to one based on the 
assets of the CHP-DH developer. A further research might consider the possible risk 
profile exposure of hierarchies of governance if assets of the CHP-DH systems can 
be incorporated into the borrowing principles to LAs for CHP-DH projects, considering 
that the Government shall also gain political capital from financing CHP-DH systems. 
This research results also suggest that the current UK energy paradigm exhibits a 
missing link in nesting the ambitions of its energy security, environmental and social 
targets together, considering that the dominant electricity and heat governance 
mechanisms that ought to impact on CHP-DH systems do not. In part, because CHP-
DH systems are not targeted and are therefore not internalising the low carbon and 
social benefits. Therefore, this research proposes further work as to the appropriate 
governance model to adopt biomass and energy from waste CHP-DH systems for 
capacity adequacy provision in the UK, considering its potential to provide base load 
capacity and renewable energy generation and its long-term role in the Government’s 
decarbonisation programme. 
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Regarding financial support for decarbonising heat in the RHI scheme, this research 
also suggests a possible consideration of RHI to support distribution of heat through 
CHP-DH systems. Further work might usefully consider the impact of possible roles of 
the RHI scheme in the penetration of RES-H using CHP-DH systems in an off-gas 
system.  
11.7 Conclusion 
The work in this thesis seeks to contribute to the debate on the role of governance on 
CHP-DH system in the UK and opportunities to improve its penetration, considering 
its potential contribution to the economic, environmental and social fabric of the 
society. 
The underlying driver of this thesis is the current approach of the government and 
policy makers to CHP-DH as another energy technology, which they seek to trigger 
technological diffusion by eliminating market barriers. Such as the HNIP £320m 
funding to attract about £2b private investment to ameliorate the tension of low rate of 
returns of many HNDU projects (DECC, 2016a). This can be considered as another 
government stop-and-go approach to CHP-DH system, even though government 
thinks that after this programme the industry would have been self-sustaining not to 
require such interventions. This still suggests that government is still losing sight of the 
fact that CHP-DH system is a network-based heat distribution infrastructure that 
market failure approach may be not a sustainable path to address its failures.  
Market failure is considered blind to several externalities. Such as knowledge 
generation, which is often not reflected in market transaction that is underpinned by 
competition or free riders that may benefit from the infrastructure without payment as 
well as the constant demand for expansion due to increase in demand (Finger et al., 
2005). This suggest that market actors will not allocate the right resources to steer 
technological change. This is not going to be different to CHP-DH systems, 
considering that it is network-based infrastructure with huge investment cost, high 
sunk cost, long duration, with path dependency and network externalities features. 
Therefore, a system failure that would warrant government’s intervention that is 
different from grants or stop-and-go intervention, considering the political, economic, 
social and environmental impacts of CHP-DH systems may be more sustainable. 
This brings the issue of the current political economy of technological neutral policy 
position to the fore. Most often energy policy makers use one brush to paint all energy 
technologies without considering the differences between network-based and non-
network-based infrastructure, especially as it relates to CHP-DH systems. The point 
of departure to my mind is the distinction between product and service. A product is 
an output of a service. For instance, wind and solar farms produce electricity and use 
the services of the electricity grid to deliver or sell their produce, but these technologies 
(wind and solar) are not used to produce electricity by non-owners except you would 
have to install your wind turbines or solar panels yourself. This is the key reason why 
government embarked on high pressure natural gas transmission network known as 
NTS in 1977 and the low pressure gas network replacement programme known as the 
Iron Main Replacement Programme to be completed by 2032 in a view to provide 
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wholesalers and retailers safe and secured access to gas (HoP, 2017). In a similar 
vein, the 2016 national grid’s Network Options Assessment  (NOA) recommends an 
expenditure of £83m on network reinforcements in 2017 to provide secured 
transmission services to electricity customers such as offshore wind farms (NG, 
2017b). The implications of the services provided by these network-based 
infrastructures is key to why investments made by these sectors are guaranteed under 
the RIIO regulatory framework, which is indexed to RPI that is tied to government and 
corporate bonds. This regulatory framework incentivises electricity and gas network 
companies to seek finance for investment for the development of networks at a 
reasonable cost (Ofgem, 2010c). These investment assurances are captured through 
governance infrastructures such as regulation. 
However, CHP-DH infrastructure which not only provides electricity and heat as 
product but services to other heat production customers (though not nationally but 
geographically limited to local or regional areas) are not regulated in the UK and as 
such investments are not guaranteed by any regulation. This may be because of CHP-
DH systems are being considered as delivering a product and not services. This 
research exposed me to auto-producers whose business strategy was to sell heat and 
not to transport heat. For instance, an interviewee lamented that he had excess heat 
to sell to a hospital that requires his heat but neither of them had the capacity to build 
the heat distribution infrastructure. This is a classic case of one seeking to use the 
services of a DH infrastructure, but it was not available. Therefore, the argument of 
technological neutrality or picking winners as often advanced may not apply to CHP-
DH systems as a network-based infrastructure with its peculiarities. 
Rather. government should provide the steering “coordination and control” (Barlow 
and Röber, 1996) role of policy strategies to influence direction, create regulation, and 
make available cheap sustainable finance considering the infancy phase of the CHP-
DH industry as shown statistically in this research. This is not an uncommon approach 
to other network-based infrastructures. As the electricity and gas infrastructures 
benefited from states governance interventions after nationalisation in the late 1940s 
through the Gas Act and Electricity Acts of 1948 (Arapostathis et al., 2014, Winskel, 
2002), before privatisation in the late eighties, guiding these infrastructures through 
the bridging phase before the current mass market phase of guaranteeing investment 
through regulation as we see today. While the LAs and other actors in the CHP-DH 
arena would engage in rowing “delivering and implementation “role. This is contrary to 
the traditional top-down “state-led” approach where the state does the steering and 
rowing, but rather a governance approach which captures the role of the state 
concentrating on steering powers (e.g. making ground rules) while leaving rowing (e.g. 
services provision) to other segments of the system or actor such as LAs (Jessop, 
2001). 
This form of governance is not new to other countries like the Netherlands with higher 
penetration of CHP-DH system than the UK and with similar energy market conditions 
with huge gas reserves. For instance, in 1982 Netherlands established National 
Investment Bank to militate against high interest rate and limited capital by offering 
finance at favourable rates without security or any risk assessment to projects like 
CHP (Blok, 1993, Hekkert et al., 2007). Furthermore, they’ve established a Heat Act 
to mandate a negotiated access to DH grids as oppose to regulated third party access 
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and provide clarity and protection with regards tenancy roles in a heat supply contract 
(CMS, 2017). 
Therefore, in the light of the discussion above, energy policy makers should not bunch 
CHP-DH systems with other energy technologies in the application/discussion of the 
current political economy of technological neutral policies, if CHP-DH systems are 
seen through the lenses of a network-based infrastructure that provides heat 
distribution services. Hence, I support the role of the state to advance targeted CHP-
DH policies and national heat governance infrastructures if the government is seriously 
considering meeting its to 80% emission reduction by 2050 compared to 1990 levels.  
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                                        Appendix 1 
    
# ACTORS/INSTITUTIONS CODE FORMAT POST ON INTERVIEWEE 
1 
CHPDH OPERATOR 
CDHOP1 Manager 
2 CDHOP2 Engineering Manager 
3 CDHOP3 Energy and Compliance assistant 
4 CDHOP4 Energy and Environment Manager 
5 CDHOP5 Head of Engineering Services 
6 CDHOP6 Head of Operations 
7 CDHOP7 Technical Engineering manager 
8 CDHOP8 Business Development Engineering Manager 
9 CDHOP9 Energy Manger 
10 CDHOP10 Director of Estates & Facilities 
11 CDHOP11 Estates Officer (Contract Support) 
12 CDHOP12 Head of Energy & Sustainability 
13 CDHOP13 Head of Energy Services 
14 CDHOP14 Energy Master planner 
15 CDHOP15 Energy Projects & Programmes Team Leader 
16 CDHOP16 Energy Projects & Programmes Team Leader 
17 CDHOP17 Head of Energy & Sustainability 
18 CDHOP18 Sustainability and Low Carbon Manager 
19 
CHP DEVELOPER 
CDHDEV1 Accounts manager 
20 CDHDEV2 Sector Manager 
21 CDHDEV3 Supply Chain Development and Policy Analysis 
22 CDHDEV4 Building Services & Design Director 
23 CDHDEV5 Regional Director, Building Engineering 
24 CDHDEV6 Director 
25 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
LA1 Principal Mechanical, Electrical & Energy Engineer 
26 LA2 Lead Officer (Climate Change & Zero Waste) 
27 LA3 Project Manager  
28 LA4 Sustainable Energy Officer 
29 LA5 Team Leader - Sustainable Development & Energy 
30 LA6 Energy Manager 
31 LA7 Energy Manager 
32 LA8 Environmental Policy Manager 
33 LA9 Environment and Climate Change Strategic Advisor 
34 LAPLAN1 Major projects officer 
35 LAPLAN2 Senior Sustainability Officer/Planning officer 
36 
CONSULTANTS 
CTNT1 Manager 
37 CTNT2 Energy Manager 
38 CTNT3 Manager - Bioenergy & Thermal 
39 EQUIPMENT SUPPLIER EQPSUP Regional Manager UK 
40 ELECTRICITY TRADER ELECTSUP Sales Manager Renewables 
41 
ASSOCIATIONS 
ASSO1 Policy Manager (Consultant) 
42 ASSO2 Advisor - Climate Local 
43 
GOVERNMENT 
GOVT1 Policy Officer 
44 GOVT2 Business Operations Manager 
45 REGULATOR REG1 Head of distribution Policy 
46 
DH PIPE SUPPLIER 
DHP1 UK Sales manager 
47 DHP2 Account Manager UK & Ireland 
48 DHP3 Business Team Manager - Renewable Energy 
49 DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 
OPERATOR 
DNO1 Contract Administrator, Power System Commercial 
50 DNO2 Innovation and Low Carbon Networks Engineer 
      
   Direct Interviews 
   Responded via emails 
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                                     Appendix 2  - CHPDH Operators 
 
Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
Combined Heat and Power and District Heating Systems: Barriers and stimulants to growth in 
the UK 
 
Thank you very much for taking out time to participate in this survey 
BACKGROUND TO SURVEY 
In response to new challenges facing the energy sector globally, such as increase in global energy 
demand, energy resource depletion and the impact of energy on the environment, the UK 
Government has set targets and timelines to overcome some of these challenges by reflecting on 
new pathways in redrawing its energy policies. The dominant pathway has been decarbonisation 
while ensuring energy security and affordability to achieve 80% greenhouse gas emission by 2050. 
In recognising that about a third of its greenhouse gas emissions come from heating, the 
consideration of how heat is produced, distributed and consumed is now a major discuss. 
The unique advantage of the simultaneous generation of electricity and heat from array of sources 
by Combined Heat and Power (CHP) and District Heat networks (DH) ability to distribute heat also 
from array of sources has awakened the debate of the potential contribution of Combined Heat and 
Power on District heating systems in achieving the long term goal of the energy policy. 
 
WHY THE SURVEY 
The underlining concern of CHPs contributing about 21% of its potential to electricity consumption, 
while only 2% of the total heat consumption of heat in the UK is from Heat networks is the focus of 
this research. This survey seeks to investigate the factors that have shaped the low penetration of 
CHP-DH systems in the UK drawing on existing governance arrangements with a view to advance 
options that would increase its penetration, create competition and ultimately affect energy price as 
it’s obtained in other network industries like gas or electricity. The results are in pursuant of an 
academic target and to inform the research community. 
 
WHY YOU 
In recognition of your contribution as a key participant in the chain of actors in the CHP-DH 
industry that will impact on the development of CHP-DH systems in the UK, you have been invited 
to kindly participate in this survey. 
 
MY CONTACT INFORMATION 
I can be reached through my contact details below: 
2  
Tony Granville 
PhD Researcher, 
Renewable Energy Department, 
College of Engineering, Mathematics and Physical Sciences, 
University of Exeter,Tremough Campus, 
Penryn, Cornwall, 
TR10 9FE 
http://emps.exeter.ac.uk/renewable-energy/ 
Email:ag424@exeter.ac.uk 
Tel: 07831893361 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
Consent Page 
 
 
Confidentiality 
 
Your response to this survey will be held in confidence. They will not be used other than for the 
purpose described below and third parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may be 
required by law). Your data will be held in accordance with Data Protection Act. 
The Purpose of this consent page is obtain your consent to precipitate in the survey to be taken 
and subsequently to be used by the University of Exeter (“University”) in a number of media, 
including printed publication, exhibition boards, the intranet/web (e.g. University web pages, 
YouTube) and/or via social media (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, Instagram), to further and promote the 
work of the University in, for example the following ways: 
• through the sharing of results and recommendations arising from the Project; 
• as research and teaching material by the University and its students during and after the Project; 
and/or 
• as public engagement material, i.e. to showcase the types of research and engagement activities 
the University carries out 
And in turn, the University offers a commitment to review unedited material to allow it to be used 
appropriately and sensitively, as well as ensuring that any confidential material or opinion, which 
you indicate as being confidential at the time of the survey, is only shared for the purpose with 
your permission. 
 
Anonymity 
 
The questionnaire data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your 
name, but we will refer to the group of which you are member. 
 
Consent 
 
I voluntary agree to participate in this survey and the use of my data or opinion for the purpose 
specified above. I can withdraw consent at any time by contacting the researcher 
 
Please click next to agree and proceed to the survey 
4  
 
 
Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
Perceived Risk Factors 
 
 
1. The implementation of CHP-DH in the UK is characterised by a variety of risk factors. In your 
consideration please scale the under listed perceived risk factors according to their level of seriousness 
that would hamper investment decisions 
Extremely Slightly 
Serious Very Serious Serious Less Serious   Not Serious No Opinion N/A 
Policy uncertainty 
                                                                                                  
 
Absence of State capital 
incentive 
 
Lack of local authority 
incentive 
Absence of regulatory 
regime for heat 
Absence of a heat market 
in the UK 
Electricity off-take risk 
                                                                                                                    
 
Heat off-take risk 
                                                                                                   
Developmental/Connection 
to electricity grid risk 
 
Potential for change in the 
taxation regime 
Tradition of private 
provision of public goods 
Level of public opposition 
to project                                                                                                    
 
Land acquisition and 
compensation 
 
Availability of finance 
 
Financial attraction of 
project to investors 
 
5  
Extremely 
Serious Very Serious 
Slightly 
Serious Less Serious   Not Serious No Opinion N/A 
 
 
Delay in planning 
permission 
Unavailability of CHP-DH 
construction Skills 
 
Operation cost overrun and 
revenue expectation 
Any comment if you wish 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
CHP-DH Operations 
 
 
2. How many sites of operation does your company have 
 
 
 
3. What is the capacity of your CHP in operation….. 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 
 
<5MW e 
 
6-10MW e 
 
11-50MWe 
 
51-100MW e 
 
>100MWe 
 
 
4. What is the capacity of your heat network operation 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 
 
<5MWth 
 
6-10MWth 
 
11-50MWth 
 
51-100MWth 
 
>100MWth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 10 
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5. What is the mode of operation of your CHP plant. 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
Electricity Led 
 
No answer 
 
Other (please comment) 
 
6. How do you trade the electricity from CHPs? 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
Bilateral 
 
Onsite 
Other (please comment) 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
CHP-DH Operations 
 
 
7. What is the length of your heat network 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 
 
<1KM 
 
2-5KM                                                     
6-10KM 
 
11-20KM 
                                                   
 
>20KM 
 
No answer                                                     
 
8. What are your class of heat consumers 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 
 
Domestic 
 
Industry                                                    
 Commercial 
Mixed                                                    
 No answer 
Other (please comment) 
 
 
 
9. Do you have thermal storage in your CHP-DH system? 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 
 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 5 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 6 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 7 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 8 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 9 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site 10 
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10. If yes what size is the thermal storage? 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
10-50m3 
 
101-200m3 
No answer 
 
 
11. What type of thermal storage technology is deployed? 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
Sensible (Underground) 
 
Thermochemical 
Other (please commment) 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
 
 
 
12. Do you have an absorption chiller for cooling effect in your operations? 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
 
Yes 
No 
 
13. If yes above what type of absorption chiller is deployed 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
 
Direct fired 
 
In-Direct fired 
Bespoke 
No answer 
 
 
14. CHP's in your system participate in ancillary service provision to the electricity grid 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
 
Yes 
No 
No answer 
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15. If you do above. What type of ancillary services? 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
Frequency response 
Services 
 
Reactive power services 
No answer 
 
Other (please comment) 
 
16. What nature of electricity distribution is adopted in distributing electricity from CHP 
 
   Only on Private network 
   Only on Public network 
   Mostly on Private Network 
   Mostly on Public Network 
   Mostly Hybrid of both 
   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
 
 
 
17. If some or all of your electricity is traded, do you experience a slow or defaulting payment on your 
electricity (counter party risk). 
   Yes always    Yes sometimes    Yes but rarely    Not at all   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
18. Do you experience a slow or defaulting payment on your heat (counter party risk)? 
 
   Yes always    Yes sometimes    Yes but rarely    Not at all   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
19. Do you experience difficulty in finding a suitable counterparty with which to trade electricity (Market 
risk)? 
   Yes always    Yes sometimes    Yes but rarely    Not at all   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
20. Do you experience disputes with your heat customers? 
 
   Yes always  
   Yes sometimes 
   Yes but rarely 
   Not at all 
   No answer 
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21. If you do experience disputes with your customers, how often is it resolved? 
 
   Always resolved 
   Often resolved (two out of three) 
   Rarely resolved 
   Not resolved 
   No answer 
 
22. Which third party institution/body do you approach to resolve supplier/customer disputes for heat 
supply? 
Energy Ombudsman 
Local Authourity 
Ofgem 
No body/Self resolve 
Housing Association 
DECC 
Please comment if you wish 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
 
 
 
23. What option of management of the metering and billing section of the CHP-DH system do you use? 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
 
Fully outsourced from 
our operations 
Only metering 
outsourced 
 
Only billing outsourced 
Part of our operations 
No answer 
Please comment if you wish 
 
 
 
24. What form of management model is used for the CHP-DH project 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
 
Fully integrated Energy 
Services Company 
(ESCO) 
Separate production, 
distribution and supply 
entities 
Same production and 
distribution with different 
supply entity 
Same production and 
supply with different 
distribution entity 
Same distribution and 
supply with different 
production entity 
 
No Answer 
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25. What economic model is adopted for the CHP-DH project 
 
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4 Site 5 Site 6 Site 7 Site 8 Site 9 Site 10 
Partially commercial 
with profit caps 
 
No Answer 
 
Please comment if you wish 
 
26. There should be a one-stop shop for the necessary information on different technologies to CHP and 
sources of heat to District Heating network 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
27. The EU ETS is a long term incentive for CHP-DH systems 
 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
28. The renewable heat incentive (RHI) should stimulate the required growth of CHP-DH in the UK 
  Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree    No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
29. The Government's energy company obligation has proved an incentive to DH development in the UK 
 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
 
 
 
30. What do you think is biggest government induced barrier to your operations? 
 
   Planning permits 
   Taxation 
   market 
   Requisite skill 
   Regulatory  
Suggest any 
Please suggest 
 
 
 
31. The UK needs to develop a body of regulation concerning heat provision and its infrastructure such as 
DH systems. 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree   Neither agree not disagree        Tend to disagree       Strongly disagree 
   No answer 
 
32. it is likely this would require a regulator. Which body should act as the regulator? 
 
   Ofgem 
   Government 
   Another body (Say who if possible) 
   No regulator is required (Please add comment to expand on this) 
   No answer 
Please comment if you wish 
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33. On what basis do you calculate your charges to customers? 
 
   Fixed charge 
   Floor space 
   Consumption rate 
   Other (Please comment in box below) 
   No answer 
Please comment if you wish 
 
34. There is a skill gap in the CHP and DH industry in the UK. 
 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree   Neither     Tend to disagree       Strongly disagree   No answer 
 
35. If you seem to agree to the above question, please could you grade skills below according to your 
perceived deficiency levels in the UK. 
Extremely 
deficient Very deficient 
Moderately 
deficient Slightly deficient 
Not deficient at 
all No answer 
 
 
Manufacture of CHP 
systems 
Construction of DH 
systems 
 
Operations and 
Maintenance 
 
 
36. What is your assessment of the level of maturity in the UK district heating supplier chain? 
 
   Mature 
   Infancy but growing 
   Infancy and Stagnant 
   Non-existence 
No answer 
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37. Please rank the following in the order you consider most likely to be the growth pathway for district 
heating network in the UK with 5 as the most prevalent 
 
New builds 
 
 
Urban centres 
 
 
Sub-urban areas 
 
 
Industrial Areas 
 
 
Remote areas 
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Combined Heat and Power - District Heating System in the UK 
Combined Heat and Power and District Heating Systems: Barriers and stimulants to growth in 
the UK 
Thank you very much for taking out time to participate in this survey 
BACKGROUND TO SURVEY 
In response to new challenges facing the energy sector globally, such as increase in global energy 
demand, energy resource depletion and the impact of energy on the environment, the UK 
Government has set targets and timelines to overcome some of these challenges by reflecting on 
new pathways in redrawing its energy policies. The dominant pathway has been decarbonisation 
while ensuring energy security and affordability to achieve 80% greenhouse gas emission by 2050. 
In recognising that about a third of its greenhouse gas emissions come from heating, the 
consideration of how heat is produced, distributed and consumed is now a major discuss. 
The unique advantage of the simultaneous generation of electricity and heat from array of sources 
by Combined Heat and Power (CHP) and Heat Networks (HN) ability to distribute heat also from 
array of sources has awakened the debate of the potential contribution of Combined Heat and 
Power on District heating systems in achieving the long term goal of the energy policy. 
 
WHY THE SURVEY 
The underlining concern of CHPs contributing about 21% of its potential to electricity consumption, 
while only 2% of the total heat consumption of heat in the UK is from Heat networks is the focus of 
this research. This survey seeks to investigate the factors that have shaped the low penetration of 
CHP-DH systems in the UK drawing on existing governance arrangements with a view to advance 
options that would increase its penetration, create competition and ultimately affect energy price as 
it’s obtained in other network industries like gas or electricity. The results are in pursuant of an 
academic target and to inform the research community. 
 
WHY YOU 
In recognition of your contribution as a key participant in the chain of actors in the CHP-DH 
industry that will impact on the development of CHP-DH systems in the UK, you have been invited 
to kindly participate in this survey. 
 
MY CONTACT INFORMATION 
I can be reached through my contact details below 
Tony Granville 
PhD Researcher, 
2  
Renewable Energy Department, 
College of Engineering, Mathematics and Physical Sciences, 
University of Exeter, Tremough Campus, 
Penryn, Cornwall, 
TR10 9FE 
http://emps.exeter.ac.uk/renewable-energy/ 
Email:ag424@exeter.ac.uk 
Tel: 07831893361 
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Combined Heat and Power - District Heating System in the UK 
Consent Page 
 
 
Confidentiality 
 
Your response to this survey will be held in confidence. They will not be used other than for the 
purpose described below and third parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may be 
required by law). Your data will be held in accordance with Data Protection Act. 
The Purpose of this consent page is obtain your consent to precipitate in the survey to be taken 
and subsequently to be used by the University of Exeter (“University”) in a number of media, 
including printed publication, exhibition boards, the intranet/web (e.g. University web pages, 
YouTube) and/or via social media (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, Instagram), to further and promote the 
work of the University in, for example the following ways: 
• through the sharing of results and recommendations arising from the Project; 
• as research and teaching material by the University and its students during and after the Project; 
and/or 
• as public engagement material, i.e. to showcase the types of research and engagement activities 
the University carries out 
And in turn, the University offers a commitment to review unedited material to allow it to be used 
appropriately and sensitively, as well as ensuring that any confidential material or opinion, which 
you indicate as being confidential at the time of the survey, is only shared for the purpose with 
your permission. 
 
Anonymity 
 
The questionnaire data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your 
name, but we will refer to the group of which you are member. 
 
Consent 
 
I voluntary agree to participate in this survey and the use of my data or opinion for the purpose 
specified above. I can withdraw consent at any time by contacting the researcher 
 
Please click next to agree and proceed to the survey 
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Combined Heat and Power - District Heating System in the UK 
Perceived Risk Factors 
 
 
1. The implementation of CHP-DH in the UK is characterised by a variety of risk factors. In your 
consideration please scale the under listed perceived risk factors according to their level of seriousness 
that would hamper investment decisions 
Extremely Slightly 
Serious Very Serious Serious Less Serious   Not Serious No Opinion N/A 
Policy uncertainty 
                                                                                                  
 
Absence of State capital 
incentive 
 
Lack of local authority 
incentive 
Absence of regulatory 
regime for heat 
Absence of a heat market 
in the UK 
Electricity off-take risk 
                                                                                                                    
 
Heat off-take risk 
                                                                                                   
Developmental/Connection 
to electricity grid risk 
 
Potential for change in the 
taxation regime 
Tradition of private 
provision of public goods 
Level of public opposition 
to project 
Land acquisition and 
compensation                                                                                                                      
Availability of finance 
                                                                                                   
Financial attraction of 
project to investors 
Cost of Finance 
 
5  
 
 
 
Delay in planning 
permission 
Extremely 
Serious Very Serious 
 
  
Slightly 
Serious Less Serious   Not Serious No Opinion N/A 
 
 
 
Unavailability of CHP-DH 
construction Skills 
Operation cost overrun and 
revenue expectation 
 
Any comment if you wish 
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Combined Heat and Power - District Heating System in the UK 
 
 
 
2. Are you representing a local authority 
 
   Yes 
   No 
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Combined Heat and Power - District Heating System in the UK 
Energy Strategy 
 
 
3. Is there an adopted energy efficiency strategy for your local authority 
 
   Yes 
   In development 
   Considering  
Not considering    
No Answer 
 
4. If there is one, is CHP-DH part of the strategy 
 
   Yes 
   Somewhat 
   No 
   No Answer 
 
5. Is there any CHP-DH project in the area covered by your Local authority 
 
   Yes 
   Don’t Know 
   Not at all 
 
6. Is your local authority directly involved in any CHP-DH project? 
 
   Been Involved 
   Ongoing 
   Considering  
Not considering 
No Answer 
8  
7. If involved or considering a CHP-DH project in your area, which project procurement model approach is 
planned 
   Turnkey 
   Design and Build 
   Build Own Operate and Transfer 
   Other (Please comment in box below) 
Other (please specify) 
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Combined Heat and Power - District Heating System in the UK 
Development Model 
 
 
8. What form of management model would be/has been adopted for the CHP-DH project 
 
   Fully integrated Energy Services Company (ESCO) 
   Separate production, distribution and supply entities 
   Same production and distribution with different supply entity 
   Same production and supply with different distribution entity 
   Same distribution and supply with different production entity 
   No Answer 
Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
9. What economic model would be/has been adopted for the CHP-DH project 
 
   Fully commercial 
   Partially commercial with profit caps 
   Cooperative/Non Profit 
   Other (Please comment in the box) 
   No Answer 
Other (please specify) 
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10. Has the local authority developed heat maps for its area? 
 
   Yes 
   In development 
   Considering  
Not considering    
No Answer 
 
11. Does the local authority provide any support/planning guidance for CHP-DH development? 
 
   Yes, Please comment 
   Under development 
   No 
   No Answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
12. Who do you consider as the main conceivers/drivers of the CHP-DH project/s within the local 
authority/ies 
   Local Authority 
   Local Cooperatives 
   Private/Commercial Developers 
   DECC 
Hybrid/Other (Please comment below) 
 
11  
13. What nature of electricity distribution is adopted by your LA in distributing electricity from CHP 
 
   Only on Private network 
   Only on Public network 
   Mostly on Private Network 
   Mostly on Public Network 
   Mostly Hybrid of both 
   No answer 
 
Other comments if you wish 
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Combined Heat and Power - District Heating System in the UK 
Barriers to Development 
 
 
14. Information on heat demands on local areas is available from local authorities for the development of 
CHP-DH 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
15. Local authorities have the necessary capacity to engage energy services companies (ESCO) for their 
areas 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
16. There should be a one-stop shop for the necessary information on different technologies to CHP and 
sources of heat to District Heating network 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
17. The absence of a national integrated CHP and District Heating strategy could hamper the growth of 
CHP/DH technology in the UK 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
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18. The UK needs to develop a body of regulation concerning heat provision and its infrastructure such as 
DH systems. 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
19. As a follow up to the question above, it It is likely this would require a regulator. Which body should act 
as the regulator? 
   Ofgem 
   Government 
   Another body (Say who if possible) 
   No regulator is required (Please add comment to expand on this) 
   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
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Combined Heat and Power - District Heating System in the UK 
Barriers to Development 
 
 
20. Did the localism bill, 2011 succeed in making planning more democratic and effective to impact 
positively on CHP-DH developments 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
21. I consider the existing process to receive planning consent to be transparent enough to gain the 
confidence of the applicants for CHP-DH projects and locals 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
22. Planning officers in the Local authorities are skilled enough to offer proactive guidance to district 
heating and CHP planning applicants 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
23. In addition to planning permission there are many other consent that are required to commence 
development of a CHP-DH project, such as environmental permits or street works licence. There is room 
for a single consent regime or to at least reduce the consent chain in obtaining planning permission for 
district heating and CHP developers? 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
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24. A conveyor belt (one-stop shop) approach with a definite time for the planning system should be 
introduced 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
25. The prevailing policy frameworks provide enough protection for CHP-DH customers 
 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
26. The housing stock in the UK, which are generally houses/bungalows impact negatively on the growth of 
DH 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
1  
                                                                          Appendix 4   -   Consultants 
 
Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
Combined Heat and Power and District Heating Systems: Barriers and stimulants to growth in 
the UK 
Thank you very much for taking out time to participate in this survey 
BACKGROUND TO SURVEY 
In response to new challenges facing the energy sector globally, such as increase in global energy 
demand, energy resource depletion and the impact of energy on the environment, the UK 
Government has set targets and timelines to overcome some of these challenges by reflecting on 
new pathways in redrawing its energy policies. The dominant pathway has been decarbonisation 
while ensuring energy security and affordability to achieve 80% greenhouse gas emission by 2050. 
In recognising that about a third of its greenhouse gas emissions come from heating, the 
consideration of how heat is produced, distributed and consumed is now a major discuss. 
The unique advantage of the simultaneous generation of electricity and heat from array of sources 
by Combined Heat and Power (CHP) and Heat Networks (HN) ability to distribute heat also from 
array of sources has awakened the debate of the potential contribution of Combined Heat and 
Power on District heating systems in achieving the long term goal of the energy policy. 
 
WHY THE SURVEY 
The underlining concern of CHPs contributing about 21% of its potential to electricity consumption, 
while only 2% of the total heat consumption of heat in the UK is from Heat networks is the focus of 
this research. This survey seeks to investigate the factors that have shaped the low penetration of 
CHP-DH systems in the UK drawing on existing governance arrangements with a view to advance 
options that would increase its penetration, create competition and ultimately affect energy price as 
it’s obtained in other network industries like gas or electricity. The results are in pursuant of an 
academic target and to inform the research community. 
 
WHY YOU 
In recognition of your contribution as a key participant in the chain of actors in the CHP-DH 
industry that will impact on the development of CHP-DH systems in the UK, you have been invited 
to kindly participate in this survey. 
 
MY CONTACT INFORMATION 
I can be reached through my contact details below 
Tony Granville 
2  
PhD Researcher, 
Renewable Energy Department, 
College of Engineering, Mathematics and Physical Sciences, 
University of Exeter, Tremough Campus, 
Penryn, Cornwall, 
TR10 9FE 
http://emps.exeter.ac.uk/renewable-energy/ 
Email:ag424@exeter.ac.uk 
Tel: 07831893361 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
Consent Page 
 
 
Confidentiality 
 
Your response to this survey will be held in confidence. They will not be used other than for the 
purpose described below and third parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may be 
required by law). Your data will be held in accordance with Data Protection Act. 
The Purpose of this consent page is obtain your consent to precipitate in the survey to be taken 
and subsequently to be used by the University of Exeter (“University”) in a number of media, 
including printed publication, exhibition boards, the intranet/web (e.g. University web pages, 
YouTube) and/or via social media (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, Instagram), to further and promote the 
work of the University in, for example the following ways: 
• through the sharing of results and recommendations arising from the Project; 
• as research and teaching material by the University and its students during and after the Project; 
and/or 
• as public engagement material, i.e. to showcase the types of research and engagement activities 
the University carries out 
And in turn, the University offers a commitment to review unedited material to allow it to be used 
appropriately and sensitively, as well as ensuring that any confidential material or opinion, which 
you indicate as being confidential at the time of the survey, is only shared for the purpose with 
your permission. 
 
Anonymity 
 
The questionnaire data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no mention of your 
name, but we will refer to the group of which you are member. 
 
Consent 
 
I voluntary agree to participate in this survey and the use of my data or opinion for the purpose 
specified above. I can withdraw consent at any time by contacting the researcher 
 
Please click next to agree and proceed to the survey 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
Perceived Risk Factors 
 
 
1. The implementation of CHP-DH in the UK is characterised by a variety of risk factors. In your 
consideration please scale the under listed perceived risk factors according to their level of seriousness 
that would hamper investment decisions 
Extremely Slightly 
Serious Very Serious Serious Less Serious   Not Serious No Opinion N/A 
Policy uncertainty 
                                                                                                  
 
Absence of State capital 
incentive 
 
Lack of local authority 
incentive 
Absence of regulatory 
regime for heat 
Absence of a heat market 
in the UK 
Electricity off-take risk 
                                                                                                                    
 
Heat off-take risk 
                                                                                                   
Developmental/Connection 
to electricity grid risk 
 
Potential for change in the 
taxation regime 
Tradition of private 
provision of public goods 
Level of public opposition 
to project                                                                                                    
 
Land acquisition and 
compensation 
 
Availability of finance 
 
Financial attraction of 
project to investors 
 
5  
Extremely 
Serious Very Serious 
Slightly 
Serious Less Serious   Not Serious No Opinion N/A 
 
 
Delay in planning 
permission 
Unavailability of CHP-DH 
construction Skills 
 
Operation cost overrun and 
revenue expectation 
Any comment if you wish 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
Barriers to Development 
 
 
2. The absence of a national integrated CHP and District Heating strategy could hamper the growth of 
CHP/DH technology in the UK 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
3. Information on heat demand in local areas is available from local authorities for the development of 
CHP-DH 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
4. There should be a one-stop shop for the necessary information on different technologies to CHP and 
sources of heat to District Heating network 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
5. Local authorities have the necessary capacity to engage energy services companies (ESCO) for their 
areas 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
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6. The renewable heat incentive (RHI) should stimulate the required growth of CHP-DH in the UK 
  Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree    No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
7. The Government's energy company obligation has proved an incentive to DH development in the UK. 
 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
8. There is little or no role for local authorities in the implementation of central Government's Electricity 
Market Reform (EMR) programme 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Other (please specify) 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
Governance Mechanisms 
 
 
9. Which Government scheme do you consider as the most effective in driving the penetration of CHP/DH 
 
   Energy Company Obligation 
   Enhanced Capital Allowance 
   Renewable Heat Incentive 
   Renewable Obligation 
   Green Deal 
   Community Energy Saving Programme 
   Climate Change Levy exemption 
   No answer 
Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
10. The Government should introduce a unified incentive for CHP-DH systems 
 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
11. Local authorities have the necessary competencies to govern the network of actors in relation to CHP- 
DH development 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
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12. CHP doesn’t have a dedicated funding limit in the Government's levy control framework (LCF). Is this a 
risk to investors? 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
13. The UK needs to develop a body of regulation concerning heat provision and its infrastructure such as 
DH systems. 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
14. It is likely this would require a regulator. Which body should act as the regulator? 
 
   Ofgem 
   Government 
   Another body (Say who if possible in comment box) 
   No regulator is required (Please add comment to expand on this) 
   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
Planning and Skills 
 
 
15. I consider the existing process to receive planning consent to be transparent enough to gain the 
confidence of the applicants for CHP-DH projects 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
16. Planning officers in the Local authorities are skilled enough to offer proactive guidance to district 
heating and CHP planning applicants. 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
17. In addition to planning permission there are other consent that are required to commence development 
of a CHP-DH project, such as environmental permits or street works licence. There is room for a single 
consent regime or to at least reduce the consent chain in obtaining planning permission for district heating 
and CHP developers? 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
18. A conveyor belt (one-stop shop) approach with a definite time for the planning system should be 
introduced. 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
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19. The HM Treasury guidance for project appraisals for public sector developments of 25 years is 
attractive to investors in district heating projects 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
20. There is a skill gap in the CHP and DH industry in the UK. 
 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree   Neither     Tend to disagree       Strongly disagree   No answer 
 
21. If you seem to agree to the above question, please could you grade skills below according to your 
perceived deficiency levels in the UK. 
Extremely 
deficient Very deficient 
Moderately 
deficient Slightly deficient 
Not deficient at 
all No answer 
 
 
Manufacture of CHP 
systems 
Construction of DH 
systems 
 
Operations and 
Maintenance 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
Development Issues 
 
 
22. Private land owners are very receptive to CHP-DH projects 
 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
23. Ofgem’s regulation demands DNOs should respond to connection request within 3 months of 
application and its usually valid for 30 – 90 days. Often times, two out of three grid connection offers expire 
before the planning permission is granted? 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
24. The quotations for electrical grid connection advanced by the DNOs and/or National Grid are 
transparent. 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
25. The methodology in arriving at grid connection quotations are standardised across the UK and 
DNOs/National Grid 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
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26. The housing stock in the UK, which are predominantly houses/bungalows impact negatively on the 
growth of DH 
   Strongly agree   Tend to agree    Neither     Tend to disagree        Strongly disagree   No answer 
Comment if you wish 
 
 
 
27. What is the dominant perceived challenge in the UK before the construction of a CHP-District heating 
system? 
   Planning Consent 
   Electricity market 
   Land acquisition 
   heat load 
   Lack of capital 
   Others (Please comment) 
Comment if you wish 
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Combined Heat and Power/District 
Heating Systems in the UK 
 
 
 
28. What is your assessment of the level of maturity in the UK district heating supply chain? 
 
   Mature 
   Infancy but growing 
   Infancy but stagnant 
   Non-existence 
   No answer 
 
29. Please rank the following in the order you consider most likely to be the growth pathways for district 
heating networks in the UK, with 5 as the most prevalent 
 
New builds 
 
 
Urban centres 
 
 
Sub-urban areas 
 
 
Industrial Areas 
 
 
Remote areas 
 
Appendix 5 
    Questions for Ofgem 
Is the connection cost of distributed energy e.g CHP distributed over the technical 
life or the economics of the asset? 
If Ofgem (Under DECC) approves transmission and distribution network investment, 
while the planning inspectorate (PI) (Under DCLG) approves planning application for 
transmission connection as national infrastructure project. Is there any interface 
between them Ofgem and PI?  
Are the revenues of DNOs are determined by regulatory process OR whole sale 
market. 
Is there any resource centre to take distributed energy developers like CHP-DH 
through the process of licencing and connection conditions? 
As different supplier offer different tariffs for export electricity is there any one-stop 
portal to see tariff offered 
Is the response time and cost for network connection standardized across the 
network? 
Is there any tariff methodology for export electricity? 
Are distributed generators on private networks eligible to policies such as RO or CCL 
Do you consider the quotation for the grid connection advanced by the DNOs or 
National grid as transparent? 
Any known incentive to buy electricity from distributed generators 
Is it mandatory for distributed generators to install and register their meters? 
CHP over 3 MW receive extra revenue through participation in system balancing 
through short-term operational reserves (STOR) (Kelly and Pollitt, 2010) 
In Scotland, small generators such as 5MW provide ancillary services such as 
reactive power, fast or short term operating reserve. In England and Wales do CHPs 
have the same opportunities?  
Comparatively on in retrospect, do you think liquidity in the wholesale market is 
improving in the UK 
What is the average electricity trading volume compared to the national electricity 
consumption or the market liquidity ratio? 
How is the strike price reached? 
Appendix 6 
DECC - HNDU 
1. Please take me through how the DECC heat map was developed?  
2. How often is the DECC heat map updated? 
3. What is the future of the heat map? 
4. What known financial options is the government offering developers to 
fund CHP-DH projects? 
5. Government underwrites investment for gas and electricity 
infrastructure for over 25yrs. Why can’t this happen to DH networks. 
6. DECC provides finance through the Salix finance programme where loans 
are given to public organisations to finance energy efficiency projects 
with a payback period of less than five years. Why that low? 
7. What do you think the return on investment on CHP-DH projects should 
be to attract an investment for public finance and private finance? 
8. Is the government tinkering with an industry wide regulation for heat, or 
what is the position and way forward? 
Appendix 7 
                          Questions for CHP-DH Operators 
1. Please can I hear briefly, the description of the expertise of your company 
2. What are the dominant perceived challenges of operation of a CHP-District heating 
system? 
3. What institution or actor that can affect the execution of the development of district 
heating scheme the most 
4. What known policy incentive is available to CHP-DH developers? 
5. What are the dominant PPA terms for CHPs. 
6. What is the biggest policy burden on CHP electricity suppliers? 
7. Which government institution do district heating schemes relate with 
8. What is a dominant funding route for district heating in the UK?  European 
Development or Private firms or Energy Company Obligation or Combination of any. 
9. Any known incentive to buy electricity from distributed generators. 
10. Are distributed generators on private networks eligible to policies such as RO or CCL 
11. Are developers of district heating networks eligible to pay community infrastructure 
levies under the planning Act 2008 to local authorities? 
12. On the average what is the number of permits you would require before the 
construction of DH system 
13. What taxes are paid as a CHP-DH developer or operator 
14. Do you participate in the EU ETS. What do you consider the impact of carbon price 
floor and Emission trading scheme on your operations 
15. What is your perspective of the contract for difference (CfD) in the new EMR 
mechanism by the government 
16. More clarification on your responses to the questionnaire 
 
 
     Appendix 8 
                        Questions for consultants 
1. What are the dominant perceived challenges pre and post construction of a 
CHP-District heating system in the UK?   
2. What institution or actor that can affect the execution of the development of 
district heating scheme the most 
3. What known policy incentive is available to CHP-DH developers? 
4. What do you consider the biggest policy burden on CHP electricity suppliers? 
5. Which government institution do district heating schemes/developers relate 
with 
6. What is a dominant funding route for district heating in the UK? European 
Development or Private firms or Energy Company Obligation or Combination 
of any. 
7. What do you think is the dominant market model for a CHP-DH in the UK. For 
instance is it a fully integrated model (bundled structure) of heat production, 
distribution and supply or separate value chain 
8. What is the dominant governance structure of CHP-DH in the UK. For 
instance are heat consumers part owners of the heat production and 
distribution company (cooperative model) or wholly owned by the energy 
company 
9. Any known incentive to buy electricity from CHPs generators. 
10. Are developers of district heating networks eligible to pay community 
infrastructure levies under the planning Act 2008 to local authorities? 
11. What are the current taxes levied on the CHP-DH operation 
12. Are developers of district heating networks eligible to pay community 
infrastructure levies under the planning Act 2008 to local authorities? 
13. Is there a known knowledge centre or skill transfer/acquisition schemes for 
CHP-DH development in the UK 
In embarking on a DH construction how many permit typically do you require (not 
highlighting them if it’s not handy, just the likely number at least) permanently or 
temporary. Such as building permits, environmental, cross water, highway, street, 
rails, safety approval and much more 
Appendix 9 
                       QUESTIONS FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
1. Please can I know briefly your job description 
2. Can you take me through any CHP-DH project in your locality and role of the 
local authority in the project. 
3. What is the relationship between the local authority and the housing authority 
or association especially in relation to the housing stock (For instance is there 
an arm’s length organisation to manage it) 
4. What is the relationship between the local authority and the CHP-DH 
administration (For instance is there an arm’s length organisation to manage 
it) 
5. How much of your housing stock do you still have within your ownership fold 
or is everything sold out like some other council 
6. What is the heat price indexed to?  
7. What do you think are the challenges to the uptake of CHP-DH from the local 
authority perspective? 
8. What roles do think the local authorities can play in driving up the usage of 
CHP-DH in the UK 
9. What is your LA/council doing in terms of CHP-DH?  
10. If you have a CHP-DH project in your area that the council is involved, do you 
know how much it cost the council in terms of capital funding to make the 
project a success. (Manpower, development of information/maps, feasibility 
and others) 
11. Does LA have the ability to directly borrow for investment into energy 
efficiency projects 
12. Does council have the necessary powers to enter into a joint venture with 
private company to provide energy infrastructure like a CHP-DH system (e.g 
Tower hamlets couldn’t so they decided to concession) 
13. Is there a research department within the council  
14. Is there also a collaboration with research organisations like University and 
how do you build capacity 
15. Is your LA benefiting from Energy Companies Obligation from big energy 
companies and how? 
16. Is the council benefiting from RHI 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 10 
QUESTIONS FOR LGA 
1. What is the relationship between the local authorities and LGA 
2. Does your organisation have some kind of targets for its members in terms of 
energy efficiency 
3. What is the opinion of LGA regarding councils selling off their housing stock 
4. What do you think are the challenges to the uptake of CHP-DH from the local 
authority perspective? 
5. What roles do think the local authorities can play in driving up the usage of 
CHP-DH in the UK 
6. What is the LGA doing in terms of CHP-DH through energy efficiency targets?  
7. Do LAs have the ability to directly borrow for investment into energy efficiency 
projects 
8. Do councils have the necessary powers to enter into a joint venture with 
private company to provide energy infrastructure like a CHP-DH system (e.g 
Tower hamlets couldn’t so they decided to concession) 
9. Some respondents have identified delay in planning as a major in embarking 
CHP-DH projects 
10. What is LGA doing in trying to improve the human capacity of councils with 
interest in these systems 
                 Appendix 11 
          Questions for LA - Planners 
1. Please can you me take me through your job description 
2. Can you also take me through any story of CHP-DH system in your locality? 
3. From a planner’s perspective what do you consider as the challenges of the 
growth of CHP-DH systems in the UK 
4. What role can planner’s play in improving the penetration of CHP-DH systems 
in the UK 
5. Can you please, take me through the meeting point between planner’s and 
the energy or sustainability team in the council before energy projects are 
approved for implementation in the council? 
6. Is there any forum planner’s meet to share knowledge and information on 
their various experiences in the UK, if not, what is your thought 
7. How do planners build capacity with respect energy efficiency outlook in the 
council? 
8. Please can you take me through how S106 is being implemented by the 
council with respect to energy projects and in particular CHP-DH projects 
9. Similarly, how is community infrastructure levies obtained from CHP-DH 
developers and how do you arrive at the cost 
10. Please can you take me through S50 and the process in applying and 
obtaining its approvals? 
11.  When a council owns a land and gives it to a private sector developer, what 
is the name of the land transfer agreement? 
 
 
 
 
                          Appendix 12 
                           Questions for Distribution Network Operators 
1. Please briefly take me through the process of connection request from a 
customer to actual connection to a customer 
2. Is it all connection request that leads to an actual connection and what do you 
think is the ratio 
3. Network stability charge. When last was the network charge revised and how 
often. 
4. Do you consider the quotation for the grid connection advanced by the DNOs 
or National grid as transparent?  
5. Is the connection cost of distributed energy e.g CHP distributed over the 
technical life or the economic life of the asset 
6. Is the connection cost consistent?  
7. Is the network connection standardized (network bus arrangement) across the 
network? 
8. Many CHP and other independent developers have complained of holding off 
or cancelling their projects due to no connection points from the DNOs. What 
is the situation to your knowledge in the South west and the UK at large? 
9. Is there any fixed time scale for connection of CHP to the network after 
acceptance and payment of fee? 
10. Is your distribution network ready for the perceived growth of DG on the 
medium and long term 
11. Since reduction of distribution losses in the DN is a KPI to the DNOs. Is the 
reduction of network losses in DNs internalized to the DGs 
12. Do you think the Governments EMR mechanism can facilitate deployment of 
CHPs 
13. Are the distributed expansion plans on schedule as forecasted in the business 
plans predicted in the RIIO for distribution? 
14. Are the revenues of DNOs determined by regulatory process OR market. 
15. Are the DNOs deploying more intelligent and controllable devices in the 
distribution networks known as active management as planned? 
16. Is there any incentive to LAs that want to generate power from CHP and 
supply their housing networks 
 
Appendix 13 
                   Questions to DH Pipe Suppliers 
1. Please can you take me through your core area of business 
2. How is the District Heating piping business regulated in the UK 
3. Is there any code of practice? 
4. Is there any internship scheme in place to train coming-up installers and how 
is the government supporting this scheme? 
5. What do you think is the average cost of laying the pre-insulated DH pipes per 
KM in the UK and do you think it’s more expensive in the UK than other 
European countries?  
6. To your mind, are there growing numbers of DH pipe manufacturing and 
installation in the UK or mostly being imported (You can separate 
manufacturing and installation if you wish)? 
7. What is your size perception of how many of these companies are owned by 
UK business owners? 
8. What do you consider as challenges to the growth of DH piping business in 
the UK (such as taxation, policy, cost of finance, planning permission  or 
others) and what ways could be deployed  to improve the industry? 
9. In embarking on a DH piping installation, typically how many permits do you 
require to commence installation? 
 
 
    Appendix 14 
Questions for CHP-DH Developers 
1. As developers what are the dominant perceived challenges pre and post 
construction of a CHP-District heating system in the UK?   
2. What institution or actor that can affect the execution of the development of district 
heating scheme the most 
3. What known policy incentive is available to CHP-DH developers? 
4. What policy option can be adopted to impact on CHP-DH development positively 
5. What do you consider the biggest policy burden on CHP electricity suppliers? 
6. Which government institution do district heating schemes/developers relate with 
7. What is a dominant funding route for district heating in the UK? European 
Development or Private firms or Energy Company Obligation or Combination of any. 
8. What do you think is the dominant market model for a CHP-DH in the UK. For 
instance is it a fully integrated model (bundled structure) of heat production, 
distribution and supply or separate value chain 
9. What is the dominant governance structure of CHP-DH in the UK. For instance are 
heat consumers part owners of the heat production and distribution company 
(cooperative model) or wholly owned by the energy company 
10. Any known incentive to buy electricity from CHPs generators. 
11. Are developers of district heating networks eligible to pay community infrastructure 
levies under the planning Act 2008 to local authorities? 
12. What are the current taxes levied on the CHP-DH operation 
13. Are developers of district heating networks eligible to pay community infrastructure 
levies under the planning Act 2008 to local authorities? 
14. Is there a known knowledge centre or skill transfer/acquisition schemes for CHP-DH 
development in the UK 
In embarking on a DH construction how many permit typically do you require (not 
highlighting them if it’s not handy, just the likely number at least) permanently or 
temporary. Such as building permits, environmental, cross water, highway, street, rails, 
safety approval and much more 
    Appendix 15 
Questions for Association for Decentralised Energy 
(ADE) 
1. What are the dominant perceived challenges pre and post construction of a 
CHP-District heating system in the UK?   
2. What institution or actor that can affect the execution of the development of 
district heating scheme the most 
3. What known policy incentive is available to CHP-DH developers? 
4. What is the dominant PPA term for CHPs. 
5. What do you consider the biggest policy burden on CHP electricity suppliers? 
6. Which government institution do district heating schemes/developers relate 
with 
7. What is a dominant funding route for district heating in the UK? European 
Development or Private firms or Energy Company Obligation or Combination 
of any. 
8. What do you think is the dominant market model for a CHP-DH in the UK. For 
instance is it a fully integrated model (bundled structure) of heat production, 
distribution and supply or separate value chain 
9. What is the dominant governance structure of CHP-DH in the UK. For 
instance are heat consumers part owners of the heat production and 
distribution company (cooperative model) or wholly owned by the energy 
company 
10. Any known incentive to buy electricity from CHPs generators. 
11. Are developers of district heating networks eligible to pay community 
infrastructure levies under the planning Act 2008 to local authorities? 
12. Which is more dominant among heat Suppliers from DH. Is it fixed rate or time 
of use rates 
13. What are the current taxes levied on the CHP-DH operation 
14. Planning obligation under S106 of the town and country planning Act 1990, 
mandates all developers to contribute towards the cost of development of 
local infrastructure. Is there a standardized methodology for contribution or it 
varies from local authority to another. 
15. Are developers of district heating networks eligible to pay community 
infrastructure levies under the planning Act 2008 to local authorities? 
16. Is there any interactive forum between planning workers and the developers 
with a view to share and develop skills? 
17. Is there an accredited system for district heating installers? 
18. Is there a known knowledge centre or skill transfer/acquisition schemes for 
CHP-DH development in the UK 
19. In embarking on a DH construction how many permit typically do you require 
(not highlighting them if it’s not handy, just the likely number at least) 
permanently or temporary. Such as building permits, environmental, cross 
water, highway, street, rails, safety approval and much more 
20. Any known governmental or institutional database of District Heating schemes 
in the UK 
   Appendix 16 
Questions for Electricity suppliers 
1. Please can you talk me through the functions of your business 
2. Are you a member of the balancing and Settlement Code and if yes, what is 
your position on the admittance of members and the impact on CHP asset 
owners 
3. What do you consider the impact of the UK electricity market on CHP assets 
4. Do you see the requirement to cover credit risk by Elexon a challenge to CHP 
developers 
5. What is the dominant PPA terms for CHPs 
6. Does the size of your plant influence the type of power contract you enter.  
7. Any known incentive to buy electricity from distributed generators 
8. Are distributed generators on private networks eligible to policies such as RO 
or CCL 
9. As different suppliers offer different tariffs for export electricity is there any one-
stop portal to see tariff offered.  
10. If No above do you think we need one.  
11. Do you think the prevailing government policies such as EMR, RHI are enough 
to stimulate the growth of CHP-DH in the UK 
12. Can CHP-DH raise the energy awareness of consumers through more direct 
socio-economic relationship between consumers and energy generation? 
13. Do you consider the government’s role as important in the diffusion of CHP-DH 
in the UK 
14. Do you consider the success stories of CHP-DH systems are considerably 
shared amongst local authority or housing developers 
Appendix 17 
Questions to Public Works Loan Board 
Background 
The research is on renewable energy policy with focus on the penetration of 
Combined Heat and Power and District Heating (CHP-DH) systems as low carbon 
energy generation in the UK using governance instruments such loans, taxes or 
mechanisms. However, after series of interviews with local authorities and other 
stakeholders it began to emerge that availability and cost of finance was a major risk 
to CHP-DH investors in the UK. Sequel to that I have sought to have your view on a 
number of issues surrounding the lending to local authorities in the UK and what 
possible route it may take to make cheaper funds available to local authorities in the 
UK. 
Questions 
1. Do you lend to LA to finance energy projects like CHP-DH systems with many 
years of payback time 
2.  If yes is there any internal policy preference for low carbon energy projects 
3. Please talk me through the underlying principles to lend to LAs and do they 
borrow against revenue or subvention from the state 
4. Please talk me through your discount rate approach and preference rates for 
energy projects if any 
5.  Does PWLB apply social discount rates to any of their project and what are the 
considerations, if you indeed apply it. 
6. Are there other sources from the state that LAs can borrow finance from to 
execute huge energy projects like CHP-DH systems 
7. Please criticise my proposal of PWLB lending to LAs against the assets of the 
CHP-DH system (Generation plants and District Heating Network) so as to make 
cheaper funds available for them to play their role more efficiently in providing low 
carbon energy to its residents. 
8. Your thoughts on how LAs can get cheap finance in sufficient volume as in PWLB 
to execute low carbon energy projects in the UK and possible signpost to other 
literatures and sites will also be helpful.  
 
Thank You 
Appendix 18 
          Questions to CHP-DH Equipment Suppliers 
1. Please can you take me through your core area of business 
2. How long have been in this area and what are your core motivations 
3. What are thoughts about the UK CHP-DH market? 
4. What do you consider as the barriers to your business in the UK and the growth 
of the CHP-DH industry at large? 
5. What polices or government intervention can make the CHP-DH more attractive 
or stimulate growth to investors or actors like you?  
 
 
